Pull btrfs fixes from Chris Mason:
 "Has some fixes and some new self tests for btrfs.  The self tests are
  usually disabled in the .config file (unless you're doing btrfs dev
  work), and this bunch is meant to find problems with the 64K page size
  patches.

  Jeff has a patch to help people see if they are using the hardware
  assist crc32c module, which really helps us nail down problems when
  people ask why crcs are using so much CPU.

  Otherwise, it's small fixes"

* 'for-linus-4.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/linux-btrfs:
  Btrfs: self-tests: Fix extent buffer bitmap test fail on BE system
  Btrfs: self-tests: Fix test_bitmaps fail on 64k sectorsize
  Btrfs: self-tests: Use macros instead of constants and add missing newline
  Btrfs: self-tests: Support testing all possible sectorsizes and nodesizes
  Btrfs: self-tests: Execute page straddling test only when nodesize < PAGE_SIZE
  btrfs: advertise which crc32c implementation is being used at module load
  Btrfs: add validadtion checks for chunk loading
  Btrfs: add more validation checks for superblock
  Btrfs: clear uptodate flags of pages in sys_array eb
  Btrfs: self-tests: Support non-4k page size
  Btrfs: Fix integer overflow when calculating bytes_per_bitmap
  Btrfs: test_check_exists: Fix infinite loop when searching for free space entries
  Btrfs: end transaction if we abort when creating uuid root
  btrfs: Use __u64 in exported linux/btrfs.h.

Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.

* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
  sched: panic on corrupted stack end
  ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
  proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top

This prevents users from triggering a stack overflow through a recursive
invocation of pagefault handling that involves mapping procfs files into
virtual memory.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This prevents stacking filesystems (ecryptfs and overlayfs) from using
procfs as lower filesystem.  There is too much magic going on inside
procfs, and there is no good reason to stack stuff on top of procfs.

(For example, procfs does access checks in VFS open handlers, and
ecryptfs by design calls open handlers from a kernel thread that doesn't
drop privileges or so.)

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
 "Fixes for crap of assorted ages: EOPENSTALE one is 4.2+, autofs one is
  4.6, d_walk - 3.2+.

  The atomic_open() and coredump ones are regressions from this window"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  coredump: fix dumping through pipes
  fix a regression in atomic_open()
  fix d_walk()/non-delayed __d_free() race
  autofs braino fix for do_last()
  fix EOPENSTALE bug in do_last()

The offset in the core file used to be tracked with ->written field of
the coredump_params structure. The field was retired in favour of
file->f_pos.

However, ->f_pos is not maintained for pipes which leads to breakage.

Restore explicit tracking of the offset in coredump_params. Introduce
->pos field for this purpose since ->written was already reused.

Fixes: a00839395103 ("get rid of coredump_params->written").

Reported-by: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

open("/foo/no_such_file", O_RDONLY | O_CREAT) on should fail with
EACCES when /foo is not writable; failing with ENOENT is obviously
wrong.  That got broken by a braino introduced when moving the
creat_error logics from atomic_open() to lookup_open().  Easy to
fix, fortunately.

Spotted-by: "Yan, Zheng" <ukernel@gmail.com>
Tested-by: "Yan, Zheng" <ukernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Ascend-to-parent logics in d_walk() depends on all encountered child
dentries not getting freed without an RCU delay.  Unfortunately, in
quite a few cases it is not true, with hard-to-hit oopsable race as
the result.

Fortunately, the fix is simiple; right now the rule is "if it ever
been hashed, freeing must be delayed" and changing it to "if it
ever had a parent, freeing must be delayed" closes that hole and
covers all cases the old rule used to cover.  Moreover, pipes and
sockets remain _not_ covered, so we do not introduce RCU delay in
the cases which are the reason for having that delay conditional
in the first place.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.2+ (and watch out for __d_materialise_dentry())
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>