Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
 "Several fixes to recent release (4.19, fixes tagged for stable) and
  other fixes"

* tag 'for-4.20-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  Btrfs: fix missing delayed iputs on unmount
  Btrfs: fix data corruption due to cloning of eof block
  Btrfs: fix infinite loop on inode eviction after deduplication of eof block
  Btrfs: fix deadlock on tree root leaf when finding free extent
  btrfs: avoid link error with CONFIG_NO_AUTO_INLINE
  btrfs: tree-checker: Fix misleading group system information
  Btrfs: fix missing data checksums after a ranged fsync (msync)
  btrfs: fix pinned underflow after transaction aborted
  Btrfs: fix cur_offset in the error case for nocow

Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
 "A large number of ext4 bug fixes, mostly buffer and memory leaks on
  error return cleanup paths"

* tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
  ext4: missing !bh check in ext4_xattr_inode_write()
  ext4: fix buffer leak in __ext4_read_dirblock() on error path
  ext4: fix buffer leak in ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea() on error path
  ext4: fix buffer leak in ext4_xattr_move_to_block() on error path
  ext4: release bs.bh before re-using in ext4_xattr_block_find()
  ext4: fix buffer leak in ext4_xattr_get_block() on error path
  ext4: fix possible leak of s_journal_flag_rwsem in error path
  ext4: fix possible leak of sbi->s_group_desc_leak in error path
  ext4: remove unneeded brelse call in ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref()
  ext4: avoid possible double brelse() in add_new_gdb() on error path
  ext4: avoid buffer leak in ext4_orphan_add() after prior errors
  ext4: avoid buffer leak on shutdown in ext4_mark_iloc_dirty()
  ext4: fix possible inode leak in the retry loop of ext4_resize_fs()
  ext4: fix missing cleanup if ext4_alloc_flex_bg_array() fails while resizing
  ext4: add missing brelse() update_backups()'s error path
  ext4: add missing brelse() add_new_gdb_meta_bg()'s error path
  ext4: add missing brelse() in set_flexbg_block_bitmap()'s error path
  ext4: avoid potential extra brelse in setup_new_flex_group_blocks()

Pull namespace fixes from Eric Biederman:
 "I believe all of these are simple obviously correct bug fixes. These
  fall into two groups:

   - Fixing the implementation of MNT_LOCKED which prevents lesser
     privileged users from seeing unders mounts created by more
     privileged users.

   - Fixing the extended uid and group mapping in user namespaces.

  As well as ensuring the code looks correct I have spot tested these
  changes as well and in my testing the fixes are working"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  mount: Prevent MNT_DETACH from disconnecting locked mounts
  mount: Don't allow copying MNT_UNBINDABLE|MNT_LOCKED mounts
  mount: Retest MNT_LOCKED in do_umount
  userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs

Pull Ceph fixes from Ilya Dryomov:
 "Two CephFS fixes (copy_file_range and quota) and a small feature bit
  cleanup"

* tag 'ceph-for-4.20-rc2' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
  libceph: assume argonaut on the server side
  ceph: quota: fix null pointer dereference in quota check
  ceph: add destination file data sync before doing any remote copy

According to Ted Ts'o ext4_getblk() called in ext4_xattr_inode_write()
should not return bh = NULL

The only time that bh could be NULL, then, would be in the case of
something really going wrong; a programming error elsewhere (perhaps a
wild pointer dereference) or I/O error causing on-disk file system
corruption (although that would be highly unlikely given that we had
*just* allocated the blocks and so the metadata blocks in question
probably would still be in the cache).

Fixes: e50e5129f384 ("ext4: xattr-in-inode support")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.13

No one is running pre-argonaut.  In addition one of the argonaut
features (NOSRCADDR) has been required since day one (and a half,
2.6.34 vs 2.6.35) of the kernel client.

Allow for the possibility of reusing these feature bits later.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

This patch fixes a possible null pointer dereference in
check_quota_exceeded, detected by the static checker smatch, with the
following warning:

   fs/ceph/quota.c:240 check_quota_exceeded()
    error: we previously assumed 'realm' could be null (see line 188)

Fixes: b7a2921765cf ("ceph: quota: support for ceph.quota.max_files")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

If we try to copy into a file that was just written, any data that is
remote copied will be overwritten by our buffered writes once they are
flushed.  When this happens, the call to invalidate_inode_pages2_range
will also return a -EBUSY error.

This patch fixes this by also sync'ing the destination file before
starting any copy.

Fixes: 503f82a9932d ("ceph: support copy_file_range file operation")
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Timothy Baldwin <timbaldwin@fastmail.co.uk> wrote:
> As per mount_namespaces(7) unprivileged users should not be able to look under mount points:
>
>   Mounts that come as a single unit from more privileged mount are locked
>   together and may not be separated in a less privileged mount namespace.
>
> However they can:
>
> 1. Create a mount namespace.
> 2. In the mount namespace open a file descriptor to the parent of a mount point.
> 3. Destroy the mount namespace.
> 4. Use the file descriptor to look under the mount point.
>
> I have reproduced this with Linux 4.16.18 and Linux 4.18-rc8.
>
> The setup:
>
> $ sudo sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1
> kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone = 1
> $ mkdir -p A/B/Secret
> $ sudo mount -t tmpfs hide A/B
>
>
> "Secret" is indeed hidden as expected:
>
> $ ls -lR A
> A:
> total 0
> drwxrwxrwt 2 root root 40 Feb 12 21:08 B
>
> A/B:
> total 0
>
>
> The attack revealing "Secret":
>
> $ unshare -Umr sh -c "exec unshare -m ls -lR /proc/self/fd/4/ 4<A"
> /proc/self/fd/4/:
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 60 Feb 12 21:08 B
>
> /proc/self/fd/4/B:
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 40 Feb 12 21:08 Secret
>
> /proc/self/fd/4/B/Secret:
> total 0

I tracked this down to put_mnt_ns running passing UMOUNT_SYNC and
disconnecting all of the mounts in a mount namespace.  Fix this by
factoring drop_mounts out of drop_collected_mounts and passing
0 instead of UMOUNT_SYNC.

There are two possible behavior differences that result from this.
- No longer setting UMOUNT_SYNC will no longer set MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT on
  the vfsmounts being unmounted.  This effects the lazy rcu walk by
  kicking the walk out of rcu mode and forcing it to be a non-lazy
  walk.
- No longer disconnecting locked mounts will keep some mounts around
  longer as they stay because the are locked to other mounts.

There are only two users of drop_collected mounts: audit_tree.c and
put_mnt_ns.

In audit_tree.c the mounts are private and there are no rcu lazy walks
only calls to iterate_mounts. So the changes should have no effect
except for a small timing effect as the connected mounts are disconnected.

In put_mnt_ns there may be references from process outside the mount
namespace to the mounts.  So the mounts remaining connected will
be the bug fix that is needed.  That rcu walks are allowed to continue
appears not to be a problem especially as the rcu walk change was about
an implementation detail not about semantics.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5ff9d8a65ce8 ("vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users")
Reported-by: Timothy Baldwin <timbaldwin@fastmail.co.uk>
Tested-by: Timothy Baldwin <timbaldwin@fastmail.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Jonathan Calmels from NVIDIA reported that he's able to bypass the
mount visibility security check in place in the Linux kernel by using
a combination of the unbindable property along with the private mount
propagation option to allow a unprivileged user to see a path which
was purposefully hidden by the root user.

Reproducer:
  # Hide a path to all users using a tmpfs
  root@castiana:~# mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /sys/devices/
  root@castiana:~#

  # As an unprivileged user, unshare user namespace and mount namespace
  stgraber@castiana:~$ unshare -U -m -r

  # Confirm the path is still not accessible
  root@castiana:~# ls /sys/devices/

  # Make /sys recursively unbindable and private
  root@castiana:~# mount --make-runbindable /sys
  root@castiana:~# mount --make-private /sys

  # Recursively bind-mount the rest of /sys over to /mnnt
  root@castiana:~# mount --rbind /sys/ /mnt

  # Access our hidden /sys/device as an unprivileged user
  root@castiana:~# ls /mnt/devices/
  breakpoint cpu cstate_core cstate_pkg i915 intel_pt isa kprobe
  LNXSYSTM:00 msr pci0000:00 platform pnp0 power software system
  tracepoint uncore_arb uncore_cbox_0 uncore_cbox_1 uprobe virtual

Solve this by teaching copy_tree to fail if a mount turns out to be
both unbindable and locked.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5ff9d8a65ce8 ("vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users")
Reported-by: Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>