The process_sysctl_arg() does not check whether val is empty before
invoking strlen(val).  If the command line parameter () is incorrectly
configured and val is empty, oops is triggered.

For example:
  "hung_task_panic=1" is incorrectly written as "hung_task_panic", oops is
  triggered. The call stack is as follows:
    Kernel command line: .... hung_task_panic
    ......
    Call trace:
    __pi_strlen+0x10/0x98
    parse_args+0x278/0x344
    do_sysctl_args+0x8c/0xfc
    kernel_init+0x5c/0xf4
    ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30

To fix it, check whether "val" is empty when "phram" is a sysctl field.
Error codes are returned in the failure branch, and error logs are
generated by parse_args().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210118133029.28580-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Fixes: 3db978d480e2843 ("kernel/sysctl: support setting sysctl parameters from kernel command line")
Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[5.8+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Turning a pinned page read-only breaks the pinning after COW.  Don't do it.

The whole "track page soft dirty" state doesn't work with pinned pages
anyway, since the page might be dirtied by the pinning entity without
ever being noticed in the page tables.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Turning page table entries read-only requires the mmap_sem held for
writing.

So stop doing the odd games with turning things from read locks to write
locks and back.  Just get the write lock.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull seccomp updates from Kees Cook:
 "The major change here is finally gaining seccomp constant-action
  bitmaps, which internally reduces the seccomp overhead for many
  real-world syscall filters to O(1), as discussed at Plumbers this
  year.

   - Improve seccomp performance via constant-action bitmaps (YiFei Zhu
     & Kees Cook)

   - Fix bogus __user annotations (Jann Horn)

   - Add missed CONFIG for improved selftest coverage (Mickaël Salaün)"

* tag 'seccomp-v5.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  selftests/seccomp: Update kernel config
  seccomp: Remove bogus __user annotations
  seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache
  xtensa: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
  sh: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
  s390: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
  riscv: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
  powerpc: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
  parisc: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
  csky: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
  arm: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
  arm64: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
  selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead
  x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
  seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow
  seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist bitmap for fast path

Merge yet more updates from Andrew Morton:

 - lots of little subsystems

 - a few post-linux-next MM material. Most of the rest awaits more
   merging of other trees.

Subsystems affected by this series: alpha, procfs, misc, core-kernel,
bitmap, lib, lz4, checkpatch, nilfs, kdump, rapidio, gcov, bfs, relay,
resource, ubsan, reboot, fault-injection, lzo, apparmor, and mm (swap,
memory-hotplug, pagemap, cleanups, and gup).

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (86 commits)
  mm: fix some spelling mistakes in comments
  mm: simplify follow_pte{,pmd}
  mm: unexport follow_pte_pmd
  apparmor: remove duplicate macro list_entry_is_head()
  lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c: make lzogeneric1x_1_compress() static
  fault-injection: handle EI_ETYPE_TRUE
  reboot: hide from sysfs not applicable settings
  reboot: allow to override reboot type if quirks are found
  reboot: remove cf9_safe from allowed types and rename cf9_force
  reboot: allow to specify reboot mode via sysfs
  reboot: refactor and comment the cpu selection code
  lib/ubsan.c: mark type_check_kinds with static keyword
  kcov: don't instrument with UBSAN
  ubsan: expand tests and reporting
  ubsan: remove UBSAN_MISC in favor of individual options
  ubsan: enable for all*config builds
  ubsan: disable UBSAN_TRAP for all*config
  ubsan: disable object-size sanitizer under GCC
  ubsan: move cc-option tests into Kconfig
  ubsan: remove redundant -Wno-maybe-uninitialized
  ...

We don't need pde_get()'s return value, so make pde_get() return nothing

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201211061944.GA2387571@rlk
Signed-off-by: Hui Su <sh_def@163.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit 1fde6f21d90f ("proc: fix /proc/net/* after setns(2)") only forced
revalidation of regular files under /proc/net/

However, /proc/net/ is unusual in the sense of /proc/net/foo handlers
take netns pointer from parent directory which is old netns.

Steps to reproduce:

	(void)open("/proc/net/sctp/snmp", O_RDONLY);
	unshare(CLONE_NEWNET);

	int fd = open("/proc/net/sctp/snmp", O_RDONLY);
	read(fd, &c, 1);

Read will read wrong data from original netns.

Patch forces lookup on every directory under /proc/net .

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201205160916.GA109739@localhost.localdomain
Fixes: 1da4d377f943 ("proc: revalidate misc dentries")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Reported-by: "Rantala, Tommi T. (Nokia - FI/Espoo)" <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Similar to speculation store bypass, show information about the indirect
branch speculation mode of a task in /proc/$pid/status.

For testing/benchmarking, I needed to see whether IB (Indirect Branch)
speculation (see Spectre-v2) is enabled on a task, to see whether an
IBPB instruction should be executed on an address space switch.
Unfortunately, this information isn't available anywhere else and
currently the only way to get it is to hack the kernel to expose it
(like this change).  It also helped expose a bug with conditional IB
speculation on certain CPUs.

Another place this could be useful is to audit the system when using
sanboxing.  With this change, I can confirm that seccomp-enabled
process have IB speculation force disabled as expected when the kernel
command line parameter `spectre_v2_user=seccomp`.

Since there's already a 'Speculation_Store_Bypass' field, I used that
as precedent for adding this one.

[amistry@google.com: remove underscores from field name to workaround documentation issue]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201106131015.v2.1.I7782b0cedb705384a634cfd8898eb7523562da99@changeid

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201030172731.1.I7782b0cedb705384a634cfd8898eb7523562da99@changeid
Signed-off-by: Anand K Mistry <amistry@google.com>
Cc: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Anand K Mistry <amistry@google.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Delete repeated words in fs/proc/.
{the, which}
where "which which" was changed to "with which".

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201028191525.13413-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull exec-update-lock update from Eric Biederman:
 "The key point of this is to transform exec_update_mutex into a
  rw_semaphore so readers can be separated from writers.

  This makes it easier to understand what the holders of the lock are
  doing, and makes it harder to contend or deadlock on the lock.

  The real deadlock fix wound up in perf_event_open"

* 'exec-update-lock-for-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  exec: Transform exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore