linux.git/fs/proc, branch v3.3-rc1

Merge branches 'sched-urgent-for-linus', 'perf-urgent-for-linus' and 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2012-01-19T22:53:06+00:00

* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  sched/accounting, proc: Fix /proc/stat interrupts sum

* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  tracepoints/module: Fix disabling tracepoints with taint CRAP or OOT
  x86/kprobes: Add arch/x86/tools/insn_sanity to .gitignore
  x86/kprobes: Fix typo transferred from Intel manual

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86, syscall: Need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_IPC for 32 bits
  x86, tsc: Fix SMI induced variation in quick_pit_calibrate()
  x86, opcode: ANDN and Group 17 in x86-opcode-map.txt
  x86/kconfig: Move the ZONE_DMA entry under a menu
  x86/UV2: Add accounting for BAU strong nacks
  x86/UV2: Ack BAU interrupt earlier
  x86/UV2: Remove stale no-resources test for UV2 BAU
  x86/UV2: Work around BAU bug
  x86/UV2: Fix BAU destination timeout initialization
  x86/UV2: Fix new UV2 hardware by using native UV2 broadcast mode
  x86: Get rid of dubious one-bit signed bitfield

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit

2012-01-18T00:41:31+00:00

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit: (29 commits)
  audit: no leading space in audit_log_d_path prefix
  audit: treat s_id as an untrusted string
  audit: fix signedness bug in audit_log_execve_info()
  audit: comparison on interprocess fields
  audit: implement all object interfield comparisons
  audit: allow interfield comparison between gid and ogid
  audit: complex interfield comparison helper
  audit: allow interfield comparison in audit rules
  Kernel: Audit Support For The ARM Platform
  audit: do not call audit_getname on error
  audit: only allow tasks to set their loginuid if it is -1
  audit: remove task argument to audit_set_loginuid
  audit: allow audit matching on inode gid
  audit: allow matching on obj_uid
  audit: remove audit_finish_fork as it can't be called
  audit: reject entry,always rules
  audit: inline audit_free to simplify the look of generic code
  audit: drop audit_set_macxattr as it doesn't do anything
  audit: inline checks for not needing to collect aux records
  audit: drop some potentially inadvisable likely notations
  ...

Use evil merge to fix up grammar mistakes in Kconfig file.

Bad speling and horrible grammar (and copious swearing) is to be
expected, but let's keep it to commit messages and comments, rather than
expose it to users in config help texts or printouts.

proc: clean up and fix /proc//mem handling

2012-01-17T23:21:19+00:00

Jüri Aedla reported that the /proc//mem handling really isn't very
robust, and it also doesn't match the permission checking of any of the
other related files.

This changes it to do the permission checks at open time, and instead of
tracking the process, it tracks the VM at the time of the open.  That
simplifies the code a lot, but does mean that if you hold the file
descriptor open over an execve(), you'll continue to read from the _old_
VM.

That is different from our previous behavior, but much simpler.  If
somebody actually finds a load where this matters, we'll need to revert
this commit.

I suspect that nobody will ever notice - because the process mapping
addresses will also have changed as part of the execve.  So you cannot
actually usefully access the fd across a VM change simply because all
the offsets for IO would have changed too.

Reported-by: Jüri Aedla 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

audit: only allow tasks to set their loginuid if it is -1

2012-01-17T21:17:00+00:00

At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.  In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they
log in and it be impossible to ever reset.  We had to make it mutable even
after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have
to restart sshd.  Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which
logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid.

Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel
work the way it should.  With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed
to restart services directly.  The system will restart the service for
them.  Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and
sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions.

If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting
himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his
loginuid that should be used!  Since we have old systems I make this a
Kconfig option.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

audit: remove task argument to audit_set_loginuid

2012-01-17T21:17:00+00:00

The function always deals with current.  Don't expose an option
pretending one can use it for something.  You can't.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

sched/accounting, proc: Fix /proc/stat interrupts sum

2012-01-16T07:13:27+00:00

Commit 3292beb340c7688 ("sched/accounting: Change cpustat fields to an array")
deleted the code which provides us with the sum of all interrupts in the
system, causing vmstat to report zero interrupts occuring in the system.

Fix this by restoring the code.

Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Tested-by: Russell King  # [on ARM]
Tested-by: Tony Luck 
Tested-by: Steven Rostedt 
Cc: Glauber Costa 
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Paul Tuner 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security

2012-01-15T02:36:33+00:00

* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
  capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
  security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
  ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
  capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
  capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
  capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
  capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
  capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
  capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
  capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
  capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
  capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
  selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
  selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
  selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
  selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
  selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
  selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
  SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()

Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():

 - the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove
   the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")

 - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add
   userspace configuration API")

causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.

c/r: procfs: add start_data, end_data, start_brk members to /proc/$pid/stat v4

2012-01-13T04:13:13+00:00

The mm->start_code/end_code, mm->start_data/end_data, mm->start_brk are
involved into calculation of program text/data segment sizes (which might
be seen in /proc//statm) and into brk() call final address.

For restore we need to know all these values.  While
mm->start_code/end_code already present in /proc/$pid/stat, the rest
members are not, so this patch brings them in.

The restore procedure of these members is addressed in another patch using
prctl().

Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Tejun Heo 
Cc: Andrew Vagin 
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: fix null pointer deref in proc_pid_permission()

2012-01-13T04:13:02+00:00

get_proc_task() can fail to search the task and return NULL,
put_task_struct() will then bomb the kernel with following oops:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
  IP: [] proc_pid_permission+0x64/0xe0
  PGD 112075067 PUD 112814067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP

This is a regression introduced by commit 0499680a ("procfs: add hidepid=
and gid= mount options").  The kernel should return -ESRCH if
get_proc_task() failed.

Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov 
Cc: Stephen Wilson 
Acked-by: David Rientjes 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount options

2012-01-11T00:30:54+00:00

Add support for mount options to restrict access to /proc/PID/
directories.  The default backward-compatible "relaxed" behaviour is left
untouched.

The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much
info about processes we want to be available for non-owners:

hidepid=0 (default) means the old behavior - anybody may read all
world-readable /proc/PID/* files.

hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc// directories, but
their own.  Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected
against other users.  As permission checking done in proc_pid_permission()
and files' permissions are left untouched, programs expecting specific
files' modes are not confused.

hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/PID/ will be invisible to other
users.  It doesn't mean that it hides whether a process exists (it can be
learned by other means, e.g.  by kill -0 $PID), but it hides process' euid
and egid.  It compicates intruder's task of gathering info about running
processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether
another user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any
program at all, etc.

gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info
(as in hidepid=0 mode).  This group should be used instead of putting
nonroot user in sudoers file or something.  However, untrusted users (like
daemons, etc.) which are not supposed to monitor the tasks in the whole
system should not be added to the group.

hidepid=1 or higher is designed to restrict access to procfs files, which
might reveal some sensitive private information like precise keystrokes
timings:

http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3

hidepid=1/2 doesn't break monitoring userspace tools.  ps, top, pgrep, and
conky gracefully handle EPERM/ENOENT and behave as if the current user is
the only user running processes.  pstree shows the process subtree which
contains "pstree" process.

Note: the patch doesn't deal with setuid/setgid issues of keeping
preopened descriptors of procfs files (like
https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/7/368).  We rely on that the leaked
information like the scheduling counters of setuid apps doesn't threaten
anybody's privacy - only the user started the setuid program may read the
counters.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Randy Dunlap 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: Theodore Tso 
Cc: Alan Cox 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds