<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/proc/fd.c, branch v4.0</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>fs: Convert show_fdinfo functions to void</title>
<updated>2014-11-05T19:13:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Perches</name>
<email>joe@perches.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-29T23:08:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a3816ab0e8fe542a89a53b82506a8ddac063fbe3'/>
<id>a3816ab0e8fe542a89a53b82506a8ddac063fbe3</id>
<content type='text'>
seq_printf functions shouldn't really check the return value.
Checking seq_has_overflowed() occasionally is used instead.

Update vfs documentation.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/e37e6e7b76acbdcc3bb4ab2a57c8f8ca1ae11b9a.1412031505.git.joe@perches.com

Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
[ did a few clean ups ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
seq_printf functions shouldn't really check the return value.
Checking seq_has_overflowed() occasionally is used instead.

Update vfs documentation.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/e37e6e7b76acbdcc3bb4ab2a57c8f8ca1ae11b9a.1412031505.git.joe@perches.com

Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
[ did a few clean ups ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Remove d_drop calls from d_revalidate implementations</title>
<updated>2014-10-09T06:38:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-13T18:19:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c143c2333c48f1430231b31a8c17e074b9b504eb'/>
<id>c143c2333c48f1430231b31a8c17e074b9b504eb</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that d_invalidate always succeeds it is not longer necessary or
desirable to hard code d_drop calls into filesystem specific
d_revalidate implementations.

Remove the unnecessary d_drop calls and rely on d_invalidate
to drop the dentries.  Using d_invalidate ensures that paths
to mount points will not be dropped.

Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that d_invalidate always succeeds it is not longer necessary or
desirable to hard code d_drop calls into filesystem specific
d_revalidate implementations.

Remove the unnecessary d_drop calls and rely on d_invalidate
to drop the dentries.  Using d_invalidate ensures that paths
to mount points will not be dropped.

Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: add and remove /proc entry create checks</title>
<updated>2014-08-08T22:57:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-08T21:21:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=dbcdb504417ae108a20454ef89776a614b948571'/>
<id>dbcdb504417ae108a20454ef89776a614b948571</id>
<content type='text'>
* remove proc_create(NULL, ...) check, let it oops

* warn about proc_create("", ...) and proc_create("very very long name", ...)
  proc code keeps length as u8, no 256+ name length possible

* warn about proc_create("123", ...)
  /proc/$PID and /proc/misc namespaces are separate things,
  but dumb module might create funky a-la $PID entry.

* remove post mortem strchr('/') check
  Triggering it implies either strchr() is buggy or memory corruption.
  It should be VFS check anyway.

In reality, none of these checks will ever trigger,
it is preparation for the next patch.

Based on patch from Al Viro.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
* remove proc_create(NULL, ...) check, let it oops

* warn about proc_create("", ...) and proc_create("very very long name", ...)
  proc code keeps length as u8, no 256+ name length possible

* warn about proc_create("123", ...)
  /proc/$PID and /proc/misc namespaces are separate things,
  but dumb module might create funky a-la $PID entry.

* remove post mortem strchr('/') check
  Triggering it implies either strchr() is buggy or memory corruption.
  It should be VFS check anyway.

In reality, none of these checks will ever trigger,
it is preparation for the next patch.

Based on patch from Al Viro.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: show mnt_id in /proc/pid/fdinfo</title>
<updated>2014-04-07T23:36:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Vagin</name>
<email>avagin@openvz.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-07T22:38:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=49d063cb353265c3af701bab215ac438ca7df36d'/>
<id>49d063cb353265c3af701bab215ac438ca7df36d</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently we don't have a way how to determing from which mount point
file has been opened.  This information is required for proper dumping
and restoring file descriptos due to presence of mount namespaces.  It's
possible, that two file descriptors are opened using the same paths, but
one fd references mount point from one namespace while the other fd --
from other namespace.

$ ls -l /proc/1/fd/1
lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Mar 19 23:54 /proc/1/fd/1 -&gt; /dev/null

$ cat /proc/1/fdinfo/1
pos:	0
flags:	0100002
mnt_id:	16

$ cat /proc/1/mountinfo | grep ^16
16 32 0:4 / /dev rw,nosuid shared:2 - devtmpfs devtmpfs rw,size=1013356k,nr_inodes=253339,mode=755

Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Rob Landley &lt;rob@landley.net&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently we don't have a way how to determing from which mount point
file has been opened.  This information is required for proper dumping
and restoring file descriptos due to presence of mount namespaces.  It's
possible, that two file descriptors are opened using the same paths, but
one fd references mount point from one namespace while the other fd --
from other namespace.

$ ls -l /proc/1/fd/1
lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Mar 19 23:54 /proc/1/fd/1 -&gt; /dev/null

$ cat /proc/1/fdinfo/1
pos:	0
flags:	0100002
mnt_id:	16

$ cat /proc/1/mountinfo | grep ^16
16 32 0:4 / /dev rw,nosuid shared:2 - devtmpfs devtmpfs rw,size=1013356k,nr_inodes=253339,mode=755

Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Rob Landley &lt;rob@landley.net&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly</title>
<updated>2013-09-11T22:59:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-11T21:24:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=96d0df79f2644fc823f26c06491e182d87a90c2a'/>
<id>96d0df79f2644fc823f26c06491e182d87a90c2a</id>
<content type='text'>
proc_fd_permission() says "process can still access /proc/self/fd after it
has executed a setuid()", but the "task_pid() = proc_pid() check only
helps if the task is group leader, /proc/self points to
/proc/&lt;leader-pid&gt;.

Change this check to use task_tgid() so that the whole thread group can
access its /proc/self/fd or /proc/&lt;tid-of-sub-thread&gt;/fd.

Notes:
	- CLONE_THREAD does not require CLONE_FILES so task-&gt;files
	  can differ, but I don't think this can lead to any security
	  problem. And this matches same_thread_group() in
	  __ptrace_may_access().

	- /proc/self should probably point to /proc/&lt;thread-tid&gt;, but
	  it is too late to change the rules. Perhaps it makes sense
	  to add /proc/thread though.

Test-case:

	void *tfunc(void *arg)
	{
		assert(opendir("/proc/self/fd"));
		return NULL;
	}

	int main(void)
	{
		pthread_t t;
		pthread_create(&amp;t, NULL, tfunc, NULL);
		pthread_join(t, NULL);
		return 0;
	}

fails if, say, this executable is not readable and suid_dumpable = 0.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
proc_fd_permission() says "process can still access /proc/self/fd after it
has executed a setuid()", but the "task_pid() = proc_pid() check only
helps if the task is group leader, /proc/self points to
/proc/&lt;leader-pid&gt;.

Change this check to use task_tgid() so that the whole thread group can
access its /proc/self/fd or /proc/&lt;tid-of-sub-thread&gt;/fd.

Notes:
	- CLONE_THREAD does not require CLONE_FILES so task-&gt;files
	  can differ, but I don't think this can lead to any security
	  problem. And this matches same_thread_group() in
	  __ptrace_may_access().

	- /proc/self should probably point to /proc/&lt;thread-tid&gt;, but
	  it is too late to change the rules. Perhaps it makes sense
	  to add /proc/thread though.

Test-case:

	void *tfunc(void *arg)
	{
		assert(opendir("/proc/self/fd"));
		return NULL;
	}

	int main(void)
	{
		pthread_t t;
		pthread_create(&amp;t, NULL, tfunc, NULL);
		pthread_join(t, NULL);
		return 0;
	}

fails if, say, this executable is not readable and suid_dumpable = 0.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: kill the extra proc_readfd_common()-&gt;dir_emit_dots()</title>
<updated>2013-08-24T16:10:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-08-24T15:14:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a5a1955e0c2d4d325fabdf6b09aa3f9d33e78a10'/>
<id>a5a1955e0c2d4d325fabdf6b09aa3f9d33e78a10</id>
<content type='text'>
proc_readfd_common() does dir_emit_dots() twice in a row,
we need to do this only once.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
proc_readfd_common() does dir_emit_dots() twice in a row,
we need to do this only once.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc_fill_cache(): just make instantiate_t return int</title>
<updated>2013-06-29T08:57:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-15T07:15:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c52a47ace7ef58cbe06e6b48190fee7073dceccc'/>
<id>c52a47ace7ef58cbe06e6b48190fee7073dceccc</id>
<content type='text'>
all instances always return ERR_PTR(-E...) or NULL, anyway

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
all instances always return ERR_PTR(-E...) or NULL, anyway

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[readdir] convert procfs</title>
<updated>2013-06-29T08:56:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-16T16:07:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f0c3b5093addc8bfe9fe3a5b01acb7ec7969eafa'/>
<id>f0c3b5093addc8bfe9fe3a5b01acb7ec7969eafa</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>procfs: add ability to plug in auxiliary fdinfo providers</title>
<updated>2012-12-18T01:15:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyrill Gorcunov</name>
<email>gorcunov@openvz.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-18T00:04:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=55985dd72ab27b47530dcc8bdddd28b69f4abe8b'/>
<id>55985dd72ab27b47530dcc8bdddd28b69f4abe8b</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch brings ability to print out auxiliary data associated with
file in procfs interface /proc/pid/fdinfo/fd.

In particular further patches make eventfd, evenpoll, signalfd and
fsnotify to print additional information complete enough to restore
these objects after checkpoint.

To simplify the code we add show_fdinfo callback inside struct
file_operations (as Al and Pavel are proposing).

Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;jbottomley@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Helsley &lt;matt.helsley@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin &lt;tvrtko.ursulin@onelan.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch brings ability to print out auxiliary data associated with
file in procfs interface /proc/pid/fdinfo/fd.

In particular further patches make eventfd, evenpoll, signalfd and
fsnotify to print additional information complete enough to restore
these objects after checkpoint.

To simplify the code we add show_fdinfo callback inside struct
file_operations (as Al and Pavel are proposing).

Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;jbottomley@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Helsley &lt;matt.helsley@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin &lt;tvrtko.ursulin@onelan.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>don't leak O_CLOEXEC into -&gt;f_flags</title>
<updated>2012-09-27T01:10:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-26T15:01:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c6f3d81115989e274c42a852222b80d2e14ced6f'/>
<id>c6f3d81115989e274c42a852222b80d2e14ced6f</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
