<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/proc/base.c, branch v4.6</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Revert "proc/base: make prompt shell start from new line after executing "cat /proc/$pid/wchan""</title>
<updated>2016-05-10T00:40:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Robin Humble</name>
<email>plaguedbypenguins@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-09T23:28:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1e92a61c4c7ed85c1bec037c046e92d6dc762f32'/>
<id>1e92a61c4c7ed85c1bec037c046e92d6dc762f32</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts the 4.6-rc1 commit 7e2bc81da333 ("proc/base: make prompt
shell start from new line after executing "cat /proc/$pid/wchan")
because it breaks /proc/$PID/whcan formatting in ps and top.

Revert also because the patch is inconsistent - it adds a newline at the
end of only the '0' wchan, and does not add a newline when
/proc/$PID/wchan contains a symbol name.

eg.
$ ps -eo pid,stat,wchan,comm
PID STAT WCHAN  COMMAND
...
1189 S    -      dbus-launch
1190 Ssl  0
dbus-daemon
1198 Sl   0
lightdm
1299 Ss   ep_pol systemd
1301 S    -      (sd-pam)
1304 Ss   wait   sh

Signed-off-by: Robin Humble &lt;plaguedbypenguins@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Minfei Huang &lt;mnfhuang@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts the 4.6-rc1 commit 7e2bc81da333 ("proc/base: make prompt
shell start from new line after executing "cat /proc/$pid/wchan")
because it breaks /proc/$PID/whcan formatting in ps and top.

Revert also because the patch is inconsistent - it adds a newline at the
end of only the '0' wchan, and does not add a newline when
/proc/$PID/wchan contains a symbol name.

eg.
$ ps -eo pid,stat,wchan,comm
PID STAT WCHAN  COMMAND
...
1189 S    -      dbus-launch
1190 Ssl  0
dbus-daemon
1198 Sl   0
lightdm
1299 Ss   ep_pol systemd
1301 S    -      (sd-pam)
1304 Ss   wait   sh

Signed-off-by: Robin Humble &lt;plaguedbypenguins@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Minfei Huang &lt;mnfhuang@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: prevent accessing /proc/&lt;PID&gt;/environ until it's ready</title>
<updated>2016-05-06T00:38:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-05T23:22:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3'/>
<id>8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3</id>
<content type='text'>
If /proc/&lt;PID&gt;/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.

Fix this as it is done for /proc/&lt;PID&gt;/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero.  It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().

This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.

The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/&lt;PID&gt;/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.

Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&amp;t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Cc: Emese Revfy &lt;re.emese@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Pax Team &lt;pageexec@freemail.hu&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mguzik@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Jarod Wilson &lt;jarod@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If /proc/&lt;PID&gt;/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.

Fix this as it is done for /proc/&lt;PID&gt;/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero.  It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().

This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.

The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/&lt;PID&gt;/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.

Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&amp;t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Cc: Emese Revfy &lt;re.emese@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Pax Team &lt;pageexec@freemail.hu&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mguzik@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Jarod Wilson &lt;jarod@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc/base: make prompt shell start from new line after executing "cat /proc/$pid/wchan"</title>
<updated>2016-03-17T22:09:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Minfei Huang</name>
<email>mnfhuang@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-17T21:21:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7e2bc81da333f0d4ca68882fdaef41e1b0d5690d'/>
<id>7e2bc81da333f0d4ca68882fdaef41e1b0d5690d</id>
<content type='text'>
It is not elegant that prompt shell does not start from new line after
executing "cat /proc/$pid/wchan".  Make prompt shell start from new
line.

Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang &lt;mnfhuang@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It is not elegant that prompt shell does not start from new line after
executing "cat /proc/$pid/wchan".  Make prompt shell start from new
line.

Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang &lt;mnfhuang@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>procfs: add conditional compilation check</title>
<updated>2016-03-17T22:09:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Engestrom</name>
<email>eric.engestrom@imgtec.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-17T21:20:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b5946beaa9ee6a3c0bb35db49adecf795fb159d2'/>
<id>b5946beaa9ee6a3c0bb35db49adecf795fb159d2</id>
<content type='text'>
`proc_timers_operations` is only used when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is
enabled.

Signed-off-by: Eric Engestrom &lt;eric.engestrom@imgtec.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
`proc_timers_operations` is only used when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is
enabled.

Signed-off-by: Eric Engestrom &lt;eric.engestrom@imgtec.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: add /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/timerslack_ns interface</title>
<updated>2016-03-17T22:09:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Stultz</name>
<email>john.stultz@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-17T21:20:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5de23d435e88996b1efe0e2cebe242074ce67c9e'/>
<id>5de23d435e88996b1efe0e2cebe242074ce67c9e</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch provides a proc/PID/timerslack_ns interface which exposes a
task's timerslack value in nanoseconds and allows it to be changed.

This allows power/performance management software to set timer slack for
other threads according to its policy for the thread (such as when the
thread is designated foreground vs.  background activity)

If the value written is non-zero, slack is set to that value.  Otherwise
sets it to the default for the thread.

This interface checks that the calling task has permissions to to use
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS on the target task, so that we can ensure
arbitrary apps do not change the timer slack for other apps.

Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Oren Laadan &lt;orenl@cellrox.com&gt;
Cc: Ruchi Kandoi &lt;kandoiruchi@google.com&gt;
Cc: Rom Lemarchand &lt;romlem@android.com&gt;
Cc: Android Kernel Team &lt;kernel-team@android.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch provides a proc/PID/timerslack_ns interface which exposes a
task's timerslack value in nanoseconds and allows it to be changed.

This allows power/performance management software to set timer slack for
other threads according to its policy for the thread (such as when the
thread is designated foreground vs.  background activity)

If the value written is non-zero, slack is set to that value.  Otherwise
sets it to the default for the thread.

This interface checks that the calling task has permissions to to use
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS on the target task, so that we can ensure
arbitrary apps do not change the timer slack for other apps.

Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Oren Laadan &lt;orenl@cellrox.com&gt;
Cc: Ruchi Kandoi &lt;kandoiruchi@google.com&gt;
Cc: Rom Lemarchand &lt;romlem@android.com&gt;
Cc: Android Kernel Team &lt;kernel-team@android.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc read mm's {arg,env}_{start,end} with mmap semaphore taken.</title>
<updated>2016-01-21T01:09:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mateusz Guzik</name>
<email>mguzik@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-20T23:01:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a3b609ef9f8b1dbfe97034ccad6cd3fe71fbe7ab'/>
<id>a3b609ef9f8b1dbfe97034ccad6cd3fe71fbe7ab</id>
<content type='text'>
Only functions doing more than one read are modified.  Consumeres
happened to deal with possibly changing data, but it does not seem like
a good thing to rely on.

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mguzik@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jarod Wilson &lt;jarod@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.linux@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Only functions doing more than one read are modified.  Consumeres
happened to deal with possibly changing data, but it does not seem like
a good thing to rely on.

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mguzik@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jarod Wilson &lt;jarod@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.linux@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks</title>
<updated>2016-01-21T01:09:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jann@thejh.net</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-20T23:00:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657'/>
<id>caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657</id>
<content type='text'>
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -&gt; /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -&gt; /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2016-01-13T01:11:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-13T01:11:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=33caf82acf4dc420bf0f0136b886f7b27ecf90c5'/>
<id>33caf82acf4dc420bf0f0136b886f7b27ecf90c5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "All kinds of stuff.  That probably should've been 5 or 6 separate
  branches, but by the time I'd realized how large and mixed that bag
  had become it had been too close to -final to play with rebasing.

  Some fs/namei.c cleanups there, memdup_user_nul() introduction and
  switching open-coded instances, burying long-dead code, whack-a-mole
  of various kinds, several new helpers for -&gt;llseek(), assorted
  cleanups and fixes from various people, etc.

  One piece probably deserves special mention - Neil's
  lookup_one_len_unlocked().  Similar to lookup_one_len(), but gets
  called without -&gt;i_mutex and tries to avoid ever taking it.  That, of
  course, means that it's not useful for any directory modifications,
  but things like getting inode attributes in nfds readdirplus are fine
  with that.  I really should've asked for moratorium on lookup-related
  changes this cycle, but since I hadn't done that early enough...  I
  *am* asking for that for the coming cycle, though - I'm going to try
  and get conversion of i_mutex to rwsem with -&gt;lookup() done under lock
  taken shared.

  There will be a patch closer to the end of the window, along the lines
  of the one Linus had posted last May - mechanical conversion of
  -&gt;i_mutex accesses to inode_lock()/inode_unlock()/inode_trylock()/
  inode_is_locked()/inode_lock_nested().  To quote Linus back then:

    -----
    |    This is an automated patch using
    |
    |        sed 's/mutex_lock(&amp;\(.*\)-&gt;i_mutex)/inode_lock(\1)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_unlock(&amp;\(.*\)-&gt;i_mutex)/inode_unlock(\1)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_lock_nested(&amp;\(.*\)-&gt;i_mutex,[     ]*I_MUTEX_\([A-Z0-9_]*\))/inode_lock_nested(\1, I_MUTEX_\2)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_is_locked(&amp;\(.*\)-&gt;i_mutex)/inode_is_locked(\1)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_trylock(&amp;\(.*\)-&gt;i_mutex)/inode_trylock(\1)/'
    |
    |    with a very few manual fixups
    -----

  I'm going to send that once the -&gt;i_mutex-affecting stuff in -next
  gets mostly merged (or when Linus says he's about to stop taking
  merges)"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  nfsd: don't hold i_mutex over userspace upcalls
  fs:affs:Replace time_t with time64_t
  fs/9p: use fscache mutex rather than spinlock
  proc: add a reschedule point in proc_readfd_common()
  logfs: constify logfs_block_ops structures
  fcntl: allow to set O_DIRECT flag on pipe
  fs: __generic_file_splice_read retry lookup on AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE
  fs: xattr: Use kvfree()
  [s390] page_to_phys() always returns a multiple of PAGE_SIZE
  nbd: use -&gt;compat_ioctl()
  fs: use block_device name vsprintf helper
  lib/vsprintf: add %*pg format specifier
  fs: use gendisk-&gt;disk_name where possible
  poll: plug an unused argument to do_poll
  amdkfd: don't open-code memdup_user()
  cdrom: don't open-code memdup_user()
  rsxx: don't open-code memdup_user()
  mtip32xx: don't open-code memdup_user()
  [um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul()
  [um] hostaudio: don't open-code memdup_user()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "All kinds of stuff.  That probably should've been 5 or 6 separate
  branches, but by the time I'd realized how large and mixed that bag
  had become it had been too close to -final to play with rebasing.

  Some fs/namei.c cleanups there, memdup_user_nul() introduction and
  switching open-coded instances, burying long-dead code, whack-a-mole
  of various kinds, several new helpers for -&gt;llseek(), assorted
  cleanups and fixes from various people, etc.

  One piece probably deserves special mention - Neil's
  lookup_one_len_unlocked().  Similar to lookup_one_len(), but gets
  called without -&gt;i_mutex and tries to avoid ever taking it.  That, of
  course, means that it's not useful for any directory modifications,
  but things like getting inode attributes in nfds readdirplus are fine
  with that.  I really should've asked for moratorium on lookup-related
  changes this cycle, but since I hadn't done that early enough...  I
  *am* asking for that for the coming cycle, though - I'm going to try
  and get conversion of i_mutex to rwsem with -&gt;lookup() done under lock
  taken shared.

  There will be a patch closer to the end of the window, along the lines
  of the one Linus had posted last May - mechanical conversion of
  -&gt;i_mutex accesses to inode_lock()/inode_unlock()/inode_trylock()/
  inode_is_locked()/inode_lock_nested().  To quote Linus back then:

    -----
    |    This is an automated patch using
    |
    |        sed 's/mutex_lock(&amp;\(.*\)-&gt;i_mutex)/inode_lock(\1)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_unlock(&amp;\(.*\)-&gt;i_mutex)/inode_unlock(\1)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_lock_nested(&amp;\(.*\)-&gt;i_mutex,[     ]*I_MUTEX_\([A-Z0-9_]*\))/inode_lock_nested(\1, I_MUTEX_\2)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_is_locked(&amp;\(.*\)-&gt;i_mutex)/inode_is_locked(\1)/'
    |        sed 's/mutex_trylock(&amp;\(.*\)-&gt;i_mutex)/inode_trylock(\1)/'
    |
    |    with a very few manual fixups
    -----

  I'm going to send that once the -&gt;i_mutex-affecting stuff in -next
  gets mostly merged (or when Linus says he's about to stop taking
  merges)"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  nfsd: don't hold i_mutex over userspace upcalls
  fs:affs:Replace time_t with time64_t
  fs/9p: use fscache mutex rather than spinlock
  proc: add a reschedule point in proc_readfd_common()
  logfs: constify logfs_block_ops structures
  fcntl: allow to set O_DIRECT flag on pipe
  fs: __generic_file_splice_read retry lookup on AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE
  fs: xattr: Use kvfree()
  [s390] page_to_phys() always returns a multiple of PAGE_SIZE
  nbd: use -&gt;compat_ioctl()
  fs: use block_device name vsprintf helper
  lib/vsprintf: add %*pg format specifier
  fs: use gendisk-&gt;disk_name where possible
  poll: plug an unused argument to do_poll
  amdkfd: don't open-code memdup_user()
  cdrom: don't open-code memdup_user()
  rsxx: don't open-code memdup_user()
  mtip32xx: don't open-code memdup_user()
  [um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul()
  [um] hostaudio: don't open-code memdup_user()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.symlinks' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2016-01-11T21:13:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-11T21:13:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=32fb378437a1d716e72a442237d7ead1f435ecf0'/>
<id>32fb378437a1d716e72a442237d7ead1f435ecf0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs RCU symlink updates from Al Viro:
 "Replacement of -&gt;follow_link/-&gt;put_link, allowing to stay in RCU mode
  even if the symlink is not an embedded one.

  No changes since the mailbomb on Jan 1"

* 'work.symlinks' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  switch -&gt;get_link() to delayed_call, kill -&gt;put_link()
  kill free_page_put_link()
  teach nfs_get_link() to work in RCU mode
  teach proc_self_get_link()/proc_thread_self_get_link() to work in RCU mode
  teach shmem_get_link() to work in RCU mode
  teach page_get_link() to work in RCU mode
  replace -&gt;follow_link() with new method that could stay in RCU mode
  don't put symlink bodies in pagecache into highmem
  namei: page_getlink() and page_follow_link_light() are the same thing
  ufs: get rid of -&gt;setattr() for symlinks
  udf: don't duplicate page_symlink_inode_operations
  logfs: don't duplicate page_symlink_inode_operations
  switch befs long symlinks to page_symlink_operations
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull vfs RCU symlink updates from Al Viro:
 "Replacement of -&gt;follow_link/-&gt;put_link, allowing to stay in RCU mode
  even if the symlink is not an embedded one.

  No changes since the mailbomb on Jan 1"

* 'work.symlinks' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  switch -&gt;get_link() to delayed_call, kill -&gt;put_link()
  kill free_page_put_link()
  teach nfs_get_link() to work in RCU mode
  teach proc_self_get_link()/proc_thread_self_get_link() to work in RCU mode
  teach shmem_get_link() to work in RCU mode
  teach page_get_link() to work in RCU mode
  replace -&gt;follow_link() with new method that could stay in RCU mode
  don't put symlink bodies in pagecache into highmem
  namei: page_getlink() and page_follow_link_light() are the same thing
  ufs: get rid of -&gt;setattr() for symlinks
  udf: don't duplicate page_symlink_inode_operations
  logfs: don't duplicate page_symlink_inode_operations
  switch befs long symlinks to page_symlink_operations
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc_pid_attr_write(): switch to memdup_user()</title>
<updated>2016-01-04T15:28:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-24T05:16:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a'/>
<id>bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
