linux.git/fs/overlayfs, branch v5.11

ovl: implement volatile-specific fsync error behaviour

2021-01-28T09:22:48+00:00

Overlayfs's volatile option allows the user to bypass all forced sync calls
to the upperdir filesystem. This comes at the cost of safety. We can never
ensure that the user's data is intact, but we can make a best effort to
expose whether or not the data is likely to be in a bad state.

The best way to handle this in the time being is that if an overlayfs's
upperdir experiences an error after a volatile mount occurs, that error
will be returned on fsync, fdatasync, sync, and syncfs. This is
contradictory to the traditional behaviour of VFS which fails the call
once, and only raises an error if a subsequent fsync error has occurred,
and been raised by the filesystem.

One awkward aspect of the patch is that we have to manually set the
superblock's errseq_t after the sync_fs callback as opposed to just
returning an error from syncfs. This is because the call chain looks
something like this:

sys_syncfs ->
	sync_filesystem ->
		__sync_filesystem ->
			/* The return value is ignored here
			sb->s_op->sync_fs(sb)
			_sync_blockdev
		/* Where the VFS fetches the error to raise to userspace */
		errseq_check_and_advance

Because of this we call errseq_set every time the sync_fs callback occurs.
Due to the nature of this seen / unseen dichotomy, if the upperdir is an
inconsistent state at the initial mount time, overlayfs will refuse to
mount, as overlayfs cannot get a snapshot of the upperdir's errseq that
will increment on error until the user calls syncfs.

Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon 
Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein 
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein 
Fixes: c86243b090bc ("ovl: provide a mount option "volatile"")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal 
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi

ovl: skip getxattr of security labels

2021-01-28T09:22:48+00:00

When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr
calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will
intercept in inode_getxattr hooks.

When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the
security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it
in inode_getxattr.  This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an
xattr returned by listxattr.

This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower
files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized,
because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by
vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr().

ovl_copy_xattr() skips copy up of security labels that are indentified by
inode_copy_up_xattr LSM hooks, but it does that after vfs_getxattr().
Since we are not going to copy them, skip vfs_getxattr() of the security
labels.

Reported-by: Michael Labriola 
Tested-by: Michael Labriola 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/2nv9d47zt7.fsf@aldarion.sourceruckus.org/
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi

ovl: fix dentry leak in ovl_get_redirect

2021-01-28T09:22:48+00:00

We need to lock d_parent->d_lock before dget_dlock, or this may
have d_lockref updated parallelly like calltrace below which will
cause dentry->d_lockref leak and risk a crash.

     CPU 0                                CPU 1
ovl_set_redirect                       lookup_fast
  ovl_get_redirect                       __d_lookup
    dget_dlock
      //no lock protection here            spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock)
      dentry->d_lockref.count++            dentry->d_lockref.count++

[   49.799059] PGD 800000061fed7067 P4D 800000061fed7067 PUD 61fec5067 PMD 0
[   49.799689] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
[   49.800019] CPU: 2 PID: 2332 Comm: node Not tainted 4.19.24-7.20.al7.x86_64 #1
[   49.800678] Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 8a46cfe 04/01/2014
[   49.801380] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x20
[   49.803470] RSP: 0018:ffffac6fc5417e98 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   49.803949] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93b8da3446c0 RCX: 0000000a00000000
[   49.804600] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: 0000000000000088
[   49.805252] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff993cf040
[   49.805898] R10: ffff93b92292e580 R11: ffffd27f188a4b80 R12: 0000000000000000
[   49.806548] R13: 00000000ffffff9c R14: 00000000fffffffe R15: ffff93b8da3446c0
[   49.807200] FS:  00007ffbedffb700(0000) GS:ffff93b927880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   49.807935] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   49.808461] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 00000005e3f74006 CR4: 00000000003606a0
[   49.809113] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   49.809758] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   49.810410] Call Trace:
[   49.810653]  d_delete+0x2c/0xb0
[   49.810951]  vfs_rmdir+0xfd/0x120
[   49.811264]  do_rmdir+0x14f/0x1a0
[   49.811573]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x190
[   49.811917]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   49.812385] RIP: 0033:0x7ffbf505ffd7
[   49.814404] RSP: 002b:00007ffbedffada8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
[   49.815098] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffbedffb640 RCX: 00007ffbf505ffd7
[   49.815744] RDX: 0000000004449700 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000006c8cd50
[   49.816394] RBP: 00007ffbedffaea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000017d0b
[   49.817038] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000012
[   49.817687] R13: 00000000072823d8 R14: 00007ffbedffb700 R15: 00000000072823d8
[   49.818338] Modules linked in: pvpanic cirrusfb button qemu_fw_cfg atkbd libps2 i8042
[   49.819052] CR2: 0000000000000088
[   49.819368] ---[ end trace 4e652b8aa299aa2d ]---
[   49.819796] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x20
[   49.821880] RSP: 0018:ffffac6fc5417e98 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   49.822363] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93b8da3446c0 RCX: 0000000a00000000
[   49.823008] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: 0000000000000088
[   49.823658] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff993cf040
[   49.825404] R10: ffff93b92292e580 R11: ffffd27f188a4b80 R12: 0000000000000000
[   49.827147] R13: 00000000ffffff9c R14: 00000000fffffffe R15: ffff93b8da3446c0
[   49.828890] FS:  00007ffbedffb700(0000) GS:ffff93b927880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   49.830725] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   49.832359] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 00000005e3f74006 CR4: 00000000003606a0
[   49.834085] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   49.835792] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Cc: 
Fixes: a6c606551141 ("ovl: redirect on rename-dir")
Signed-off-by: Liangyan 
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi 
Suggested-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi

ovl: avoid deadlock on directory ioctl

2021-01-28T09:22:48+00:00

The function ovl_dir_real_file() currently uses the inode lock to serialize
writes to the od->upperfile field.

However, this function will get called by ovl_ioctl_set_flags(), which
utilizes the inode lock too.  In this case ovl_dir_real_file() will try to
claim a lock that is owned by a function in its call stack, which won't get
released before ovl_dir_real_file() returns.

Fix by replacing the open coded compare and exchange by an explicit atomic
op.

Fixes: 61536bed2149 ("ovl: support [S|G]ETFLAGS and FS[S|G]ETXATTR ioctls for directories")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10
Reported-by: Icenowy Zheng 
Tested-by: Icenowy Zheng 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi

ovl: perform vfs_getxattr() with mounter creds

2021-01-28T09:22:48+00:00

The vfs_getxattr() in ovl_xattr_set() is used to check whether an xattr
exist on a lower layer file that is to be removed.  If the xattr does not
exist, then no need to copy up the file.

This call of vfs_getxattr() wasn't wrapped in credential override, and this
is probably okay.  But for consitency wrap this instance as well.

Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi

ovl: add warning on user_ns mismatch

2021-01-28T09:22:48+00:00

Currently there's no way to create an overlay filesystem outside of the
current user namespace.  Make sure that if this assumption changes it
doesn't go unnoticed.

Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi

ovl: unprivieged mounts

2020-12-14T14:26:14+00:00

Enable unprivileged user namespace mounts of overlayfs.  Overlayfs's
permission model (*) ensures that the mounter itself cannot gain additional
privileges by the act of creating an overlayfs mount.

This feature request is coming from the "rootless" container crowd.

(*) Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt#Permission model

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi

ovl: do not get metacopy for userxattr

2020-12-14T14:26:14+00:00

When looking up an inode on the lower layer for which the mounter lacks
read permisison the metacopy check will fail.  This causes the lookup to
fail as well, even though the directory is readable.

So ignore EACCES for the "userxattr" case and assume no metacopy for the
unreadable file.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi

ovl: do not fail because of O_NOATIME

2020-12-14T14:26:14+00:00

In case the file cannot be opened with O_NOATIME because of lack of
capabilities, then clear O_NOATIME instead of failing.

Remove WARN_ON(), since it would now trigger if O_NOATIME was cleared.
Noticed by Amir Goldstein.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi

ovl: do not fail when setting origin xattr

2020-12-14T14:26:14+00:00

Comment above call already says this, but only EOPNOTSUPP is ignored, other
failures are not.

For example setting "user.*" will fail with EPERM on symlink/special.

Ignore this error as well.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi