<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/open.c, branch v5.1</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock</title>
<updated>2019-04-06T17:01:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill Smelkov</name>
<email>kirr@nexedi.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-26T22:20:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=10dce8af34226d90fa56746a934f8da5dcdba3df'/>
<id>10dce8af34226d90fa56746a934f8da5dcdba3df</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 9c225f2655e3 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") added
locking for file.f_pos access and in particular made concurrent read and
write not possible - now both those functions take f_pos lock for the
whole run, and so if e.g. a read is blocked waiting for data, write will
deadlock waiting for that read to complete.

This caused regression for stream-like files where previously read and
write could run simultaneously, but after that patch could not do so
anymore. See e.g. commit 581d21a2d02a ("xenbus: fix deadlock on writes
to /proc/xen/xenbus") which fixes such regression for particular case of
/proc/xen/xenbus.

The patch that added f_pos lock in 2014 did so to guarantee POSIX thread
safety for read/write/lseek and added the locking to file descriptors of
all regular files. In 2014 that thread-safety problem was not new as it
was already discussed earlier in 2006.

However even though 2006'th version of Linus's patch was adding f_pos
locking "only for files that are marked seekable with FMODE_LSEEK (thus
avoiding the stream-like objects like pipes and sockets)", the 2014
version - the one that actually made it into the tree as 9c225f2655e3 -
is doing so irregardless of whether a file is seekable or not.

See

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/53022DB1.4070805@gmail.com/
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180387
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180396

for historic context.

The reason that it did so is, probably, that there are many files that
are marked non-seekable, but e.g. their read implementation actually
depends on knowing current position to correctly handle the read. Some
examples:

	kernel/power/user.c		snapshot_read
	fs/debugfs/file.c		u32_array_read
	fs/fuse/control.c		fuse_conn_waiting_read + ...
	drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c	atk_debugfs_ggrp_read
	arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c		hypfs_read_iter
	...

Despite that, many nonseekable_open users implement read and write with
pure stream semantics - they don't depend on passed ppos at all. And for
those cases where read could wait for something inside, it creates a
situation similar to xenbus - the write could be never made to go until
read is done, and read is waiting for some, potentially external, event,
for potentially unbounded time -&gt; deadlock.

Besides xenbus, there are 14 such places in the kernel that I've found
with semantic patch (see below):

	drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:400:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:985:7-23: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()

In addition to the cases above another regression caused by f_pos
locking is that now FUSE filesystems that implement open with
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, can no longer implement bidirectional
stream-like files - for the same reason as above e.g. read can deadlock
write locking on file.f_pos in the kernel.

FUSE's FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE was added in 2008 in a7c1b990f715 ("fuse:
implement nonseekable open") to support OSSPD. OSSPD implements /dev/dsp
in userspace with FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, with corresponding read and
write routines not depending on current position at all, and with both
read and write being potentially blocking operations:

See

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd
    https://lwn.net/Articles/308445

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1406
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1438-L1477
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1479-L1510

Corresponding libfuse example/test also describes FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE as
"somewhat pipe-like files ..." with read handler not using offset.
However that test implements only read without write and cannot exercise
the deadlock scenario:

    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L124-L131
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L146-L163
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L209-L216

I've actually hit the read vs write deadlock for real while implementing
my FUSE filesystem where there is /head/watch file, for which open
creates separate bidirectional socket-like stream in between filesystem
and its user with both read and write being later performed
simultaneously. And there it is semantically not easy to split the
stream into two separate read-only and write-only channels:

    https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/f13aa600/wcfs/wcfs.go#L88-169

Let's fix this regression. The plan is:

1. We can't change nonseekable_open to include &amp;~FMODE_ATOMIC_POS -
   doing so would break many in-kernel nonseekable_open users which
   actually use ppos in read/write handlers.

2. Add stream_open() to kernel to open stream-like non-seekable file
   descriptors. Read and write on such file descriptors would never use
   nor change ppos. And with that property on stream-like files read and
   write will be running without taking f_pos lock - i.e. read and write
   could be running simultaneously.

3. With semantic patch search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel
   nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not
   depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations
   which assume @offset access.

4. Add FOPEN_STREAM to fs/fuse/ and open in-kernel file-descriptors via
   steam_open if that bit is present in filesystem open reply.

   It was tempting to change fs/fuse/ open handler to use stream_open
   instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags, but
   grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE,
   and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and
   write handlers

	https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481

   so if we would do such a change it will break a real user.

5. Add stream_open and FOPEN_STREAM handling to stable kernels starting
   from v3.14+ (the kernel where 9c225f2655 first appeared).

   This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE filesystems that
   provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM | FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE
   in their open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all kernel
   versions. This should work because fs/fuse/ ignores unknown open
   flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a
   kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel
   that is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be &lt; v3.14 where just
   FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE is sufficient to implement streams without read vs
   write deadlock.

This patch adds stream_open, converts /proc/xen/xenbus to it and adds
semantic patch to automatically locate in-kernel places that are either
required to be converted due to read vs write deadlock, or that are just
safe to be converted because read and write do not use ppos and there
are no other funky methods in file_operations.

Regarding semantic patch I've verified each generated change manually -
that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance
left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not
converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations.

The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert,
but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for
unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g.
drivers/input/mousedev.c)

Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yongzhi Pan &lt;panyongzhi@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Julia Lawall &lt;Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr&gt;
Cc: Nikolaus Rath &lt;Nikolaus@rath.org&gt;
Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys &lt;hanwen@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov &lt;kirr@nexedi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 9c225f2655e3 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") added
locking for file.f_pos access and in particular made concurrent read and
write not possible - now both those functions take f_pos lock for the
whole run, and so if e.g. a read is blocked waiting for data, write will
deadlock waiting for that read to complete.

This caused regression for stream-like files where previously read and
write could run simultaneously, but after that patch could not do so
anymore. See e.g. commit 581d21a2d02a ("xenbus: fix deadlock on writes
to /proc/xen/xenbus") which fixes such regression for particular case of
/proc/xen/xenbus.

The patch that added f_pos lock in 2014 did so to guarantee POSIX thread
safety for read/write/lseek and added the locking to file descriptors of
all regular files. In 2014 that thread-safety problem was not new as it
was already discussed earlier in 2006.

However even though 2006'th version of Linus's patch was adding f_pos
locking "only for files that are marked seekable with FMODE_LSEEK (thus
avoiding the stream-like objects like pipes and sockets)", the 2014
version - the one that actually made it into the tree as 9c225f2655e3 -
is doing so irregardless of whether a file is seekable or not.

See

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/53022DB1.4070805@gmail.com/
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180387
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180396

for historic context.

The reason that it did so is, probably, that there are many files that
are marked non-seekable, but e.g. their read implementation actually
depends on knowing current position to correctly handle the read. Some
examples:

	kernel/power/user.c		snapshot_read
	fs/debugfs/file.c		u32_array_read
	fs/fuse/control.c		fuse_conn_waiting_read + ...
	drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c	atk_debugfs_ggrp_read
	arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c		hypfs_read_iter
	...

Despite that, many nonseekable_open users implement read and write with
pure stream semantics - they don't depend on passed ppos at all. And for
those cases where read could wait for something inside, it creates a
situation similar to xenbus - the write could be never made to go until
read is done, and read is waiting for some, potentially external, event,
for potentially unbounded time -&gt; deadlock.

Besides xenbus, there are 14 such places in the kernel that I've found
with semantic patch (see below):

	drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:400:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:985:7-23: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()

In addition to the cases above another regression caused by f_pos
locking is that now FUSE filesystems that implement open with
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, can no longer implement bidirectional
stream-like files - for the same reason as above e.g. read can deadlock
write locking on file.f_pos in the kernel.

FUSE's FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE was added in 2008 in a7c1b990f715 ("fuse:
implement nonseekable open") to support OSSPD. OSSPD implements /dev/dsp
in userspace with FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, with corresponding read and
write routines not depending on current position at all, and with both
read and write being potentially blocking operations:

See

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd
    https://lwn.net/Articles/308445

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1406
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1438-L1477
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1479-L1510

Corresponding libfuse example/test also describes FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE as
"somewhat pipe-like files ..." with read handler not using offset.
However that test implements only read without write and cannot exercise
the deadlock scenario:

    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L124-L131
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L146-L163
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L209-L216

I've actually hit the read vs write deadlock for real while implementing
my FUSE filesystem where there is /head/watch file, for which open
creates separate bidirectional socket-like stream in between filesystem
and its user with both read and write being later performed
simultaneously. And there it is semantically not easy to split the
stream into two separate read-only and write-only channels:

    https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/f13aa600/wcfs/wcfs.go#L88-169

Let's fix this regression. The plan is:

1. We can't change nonseekable_open to include &amp;~FMODE_ATOMIC_POS -
   doing so would break many in-kernel nonseekable_open users which
   actually use ppos in read/write handlers.

2. Add stream_open() to kernel to open stream-like non-seekable file
   descriptors. Read and write on such file descriptors would never use
   nor change ppos. And with that property on stream-like files read and
   write will be running without taking f_pos lock - i.e. read and write
   could be running simultaneously.

3. With semantic patch search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel
   nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not
   depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations
   which assume @offset access.

4. Add FOPEN_STREAM to fs/fuse/ and open in-kernel file-descriptors via
   steam_open if that bit is present in filesystem open reply.

   It was tempting to change fs/fuse/ open handler to use stream_open
   instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags, but
   grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE,
   and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and
   write handlers

	https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481

   so if we would do such a change it will break a real user.

5. Add stream_open and FOPEN_STREAM handling to stable kernels starting
   from v3.14+ (the kernel where 9c225f2655 first appeared).

   This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE filesystems that
   provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM | FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE
   in their open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all kernel
   versions. This should work because fs/fuse/ ignores unknown open
   flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a
   kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel
   that is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be &lt; v3.14 where just
   FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE is sufficient to implement streams without read vs
   write deadlock.

This patch adds stream_open, converts /proc/xen/xenbus to it and adds
semantic patch to automatically locate in-kernel places that are either
required to be converted due to read vs write deadlock, or that are just
safe to be converted because read and write do not use ppos and there
are no other funky methods in file_operations.

Regarding semantic patch I've verified each generated change manually -
that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance
left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not
converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations.

The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert,
but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for
unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g.
drivers/input/mousedev.c)

Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yongzhi Pan &lt;panyongzhi@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Julia Lawall &lt;Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr&gt;
Cc: Nikolaus Rath &lt;Nikolaus@rath.org&gt;
Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys &lt;hanwen@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov &lt;kirr@nexedi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files during execve()</title>
<updated>2019-03-29T17:01:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-29T03:43:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=73601ea5b7b18eb234219ae2adf77530f389da79'/>
<id>73601ea5b7b18eb234219ae2adf77530f389da79</id>
<content type='text'>
syzbot is hitting lockdep warning [1] due to trying to open a fifo
during an execve() operation.  But we don't need to open non regular
files during an execve() operation, for all files which we will need are
the executable file itself and the interpreter programs like /bin/sh and
ld-linux.so.2 .

Since the manpage for execve(2) says that execve() returns EACCES when
the file or a script interpreter is not a regular file, and the manpage
for uselib(2) says that uselib() can return EACCES, and we use
FMODE_EXEC when opening for execve()/uselib(), we can bail out if a non
regular file is requested with FMODE_EXEC set.

Since this deadlock followed by khungtaskd warnings is trivially
reproducible by a local unprivileged user, and syzbot's frequent crash
due to this deadlock defers finding other bugs, let's workaround this
deadlock until we get a chance to find a better solution.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=b5095bfec44ec84213bac54742a82483aad578ce

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1552044017-7890-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+e93a80c1bb7c5c56e522461c149f8bf55eab1b2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 8924feff66f35fe2 ("splice: lift pipe_lock out of splice_to_pipe()")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[4.9+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
syzbot is hitting lockdep warning [1] due to trying to open a fifo
during an execve() operation.  But we don't need to open non regular
files during an execve() operation, for all files which we will need are
the executable file itself and the interpreter programs like /bin/sh and
ld-linux.so.2 .

Since the manpage for execve(2) says that execve() returns EACCES when
the file or a script interpreter is not a regular file, and the manpage
for uselib(2) says that uselib() can return EACCES, and we use
FMODE_EXEC when opening for execve()/uselib(), we can bail out if a non
regular file is requested with FMODE_EXEC set.

Since this deadlock followed by khungtaskd warnings is trivially
reproducible by a local unprivileged user, and syzbot's frequent crash
due to this deadlock defers finding other bugs, let's workaround this
deadlock until we get a chance to find a better solution.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=b5095bfec44ec84213bac54742a82483aad578ce

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1552044017-7890-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+e93a80c1bb7c5c56e522461c149f8bf55eab1b2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 8924feff66f35fe2 ("splice: lift pipe_lock out of splice_to_pipe()")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[4.9+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'ovl-update-4.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs</title>
<updated>2018-08-22T01:19:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-22T01:19:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d9a185f8b49678775ef56ecbdbc7b76970302897'/>
<id>d9a185f8b49678775ef56ecbdbc7b76970302897</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull overlayfs updates from Miklos Szeredi:
 "This contains two new features:

   - Stack file operations: this allows removal of several hacks from
     the VFS, proper interaction of read-only open files with copy-up,
     possibility to implement fs modifying ioctls properly, and others.

   - Metadata only copy-up: when file is on lower layer and only
     metadata is modified (except size) then only copy up the metadata
     and continue to use the data from the lower file"

* tag 'ovl-update-4.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs: (66 commits)
  ovl: Enable metadata only feature
  ovl: Do not do metacopy only for ioctl modifying file attr
  ovl: Do not do metadata only copy-up for truncate operation
  ovl: add helper to force data copy-up
  ovl: Check redirect on index as well
  ovl: Set redirect on upper inode when it is linked
  ovl: Set redirect on metacopy files upon rename
  ovl: Do not set dentry type ORIGIN for broken hardlinks
  ovl: Add an inode flag OVL_CONST_INO
  ovl: Treat metacopy dentries as type OVL_PATH_MERGE
  ovl: Check redirects for metacopy files
  ovl: Move some dir related ovl_lookup_single() code in else block
  ovl: Do not expose metacopy only dentry from d_real()
  ovl: Open file with data except for the case of fsync
  ovl: Add helper ovl_inode_realdata()
  ovl: Store lower data inode in ovl_inode
  ovl: Fix ovl_getattr() to get number of blocks from lower
  ovl: Add helper ovl_dentry_lowerdata() to get lower data dentry
  ovl: Copy up meta inode data from lowest data inode
  ovl: Modify ovl_lookup() and friends to lookup metacopy dentry
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull overlayfs updates from Miklos Szeredi:
 "This contains two new features:

   - Stack file operations: this allows removal of several hacks from
     the VFS, proper interaction of read-only open files with copy-up,
     possibility to implement fs modifying ioctls properly, and others.

   - Metadata only copy-up: when file is on lower layer and only
     metadata is modified (except size) then only copy up the metadata
     and continue to use the data from the lower file"

* tag 'ovl-update-4.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs: (66 commits)
  ovl: Enable metadata only feature
  ovl: Do not do metacopy only for ioctl modifying file attr
  ovl: Do not do metadata only copy-up for truncate operation
  ovl: add helper to force data copy-up
  ovl: Check redirect on index as well
  ovl: Set redirect on upper inode when it is linked
  ovl: Set redirect on metacopy files upon rename
  ovl: Do not set dentry type ORIGIN for broken hardlinks
  ovl: Add an inode flag OVL_CONST_INO
  ovl: Treat metacopy dentries as type OVL_PATH_MERGE
  ovl: Check redirects for metacopy files
  ovl: Move some dir related ovl_lookup_single() code in else block
  ovl: Do not expose metacopy only dentry from d_real()
  ovl: Open file with data except for the case of fsync
  ovl: Add helper ovl_inode_realdata()
  ovl: Store lower data inode in ovl_inode
  ovl: Fix ovl_getattr() to get number of blocks from lower
  ovl: Add helper ovl_dentry_lowerdata() to get lower data dentry
  ovl: Copy up meta inode data from lowest data inode
  ovl: Modify ovl_lookup() and friends to lookup metacopy dentry
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "vfs: do get_write_access() on upper layer of overlayfs"</title>
<updated>2018-07-18T13:44:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-18T13:44:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8cf9ee5061037accf61775f438ad7513576d4413'/>
<id>8cf9ee5061037accf61775f438ad7513576d4413</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 4d0c5ba2ff79ef9f5188998b29fd28fcb05f3667.

We now get write access on both overlay and underlying layers so this patch
is no longer needed for correct operation.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit 4d0c5ba2ff79ef9f5188998b29fd28fcb05f3667.

We now get write access on both overlay and underlying layers so this patch
is no longer needed for correct operation.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "vfs: add flags to d_real()"</title>
<updated>2018-07-18T13:44:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-18T13:44:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4ab30319fd7c691a1b3165325c647a5cd6d282ac'/>
<id>4ab30319fd7c691a1b3165325c647a5cd6d282ac</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 495e642939114478a5237a7d91661ba93b76f15a.

No user of "flags" argument of d_real() remain.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit 495e642939114478a5237a7d91661ba93b76f15a.

No user of "flags" argument of d_real() remain.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "ovl: don't allow writing ioctl on lower layer"</title>
<updated>2018-07-18T13:44:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-18T13:44:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6742cee04353231015ddbe7e8b404ac9c1eb4473'/>
<id>6742cee04353231015ddbe7e8b404ac9c1eb4473</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 7c6893e3c9abf6a9676e060a1e35e5caca673d57.

Overlayfs no longer relies on the vfs for checking writability of files.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit 7c6893e3c9abf6a9676e060a1e35e5caca673d57.

Overlayfs no longer relies on the vfs for checking writability of files.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: don't open real</title>
<updated>2018-07-18T13:44:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-06T21:57:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a6518f73e60e5044656d1ba587e7463479a9381a'/>
<id>a6518f73e60e5044656d1ba587e7463479a9381a</id>
<content type='text'>
Let overlayfs do its thing when opening a file.

This enables stacking and fixes the corner case when a file is opened for
read, modified through a writable open, and data is read from the read-only
file.  After this patch the read-only open will not return stale data even
in this case.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Let overlayfs do its thing when opening a file.

This enables stacking and fixes the corner case when a file is opened for
read, modified through a writable open, and data is read from the read-only
file.  After this patch the read-only open will not return stale data even
in this case.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: make open_with_fake_path() not contribute to nr_files</title>
<updated>2018-07-18T13:44:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-18T13:44:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d3b1084dfd629ef89bc1c4bab95e5cb87e7d08c2'/>
<id>d3b1084dfd629ef89bc1c4bab95e5cb87e7d08c2</id>
<content type='text'>
Stacking file operations in overlay will store an extra open file for each
overlay file opened.

The overhead is just that of "struct file" which is about 256bytes, because
overlay already pins an extra dentry and inode when the file is open, which
add up to a much larger overhead.

For fear of breaking working setups, don't start accounting the extra file.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Stacking file operations in overlay will store an extra open file for each
overlay file opened.

The overhead is just that of "struct file" which is about 256bytes, because
overlay already pins an extra dentry and inode when the file is open, which
add up to a much larger overhead.

For fear of breaking working setups, don't start accounting the extra file.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>new helper: open_with_fake_path()</title>
<updated>2018-07-12T15:18:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-12T15:18:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2abc77af89e17582db9039293c8ac881c8c96d79'/>
<id>2abc77af89e17582db9039293c8ac881c8c96d79</id>
<content type='text'>
open a file by given inode, faking -&gt;f_path.  Use with shitloads
of caution - at the very least you'd damn better make sure that
some dentry alias of that inode is pinned down by the path in
question.  Again, this is no general-purpose interface and I hope
it will eventually go away.  Right now overlayfs wants something
like that, but nothing else should.

Any out-of-tree code with bright idea of using this one *will*
eventually get hurt, with zero notice and great delight on my part.
I refuse to use EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(), especially in situations when
it's really EXPORT_SYMBOL_DONT_USE_IT(), but don't take that export
as "you are welcome to use it".

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
open a file by given inode, faking -&gt;f_path.  Use with shitloads
of caution - at the very least you'd damn better make sure that
some dentry alias of that inode is pinned down by the path in
question.  Again, this is no general-purpose interface and I hope
it will eventually go away.  Right now overlayfs wants something
like that, but nothing else should.

Any out-of-tree code with bright idea of using this one *will*
eventually get hurt, with zero notice and great delight on my part.
I refuse to use EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(), especially in situations when
it's really EXPORT_SYMBOL_DONT_USE_IT(), but don't take that export
as "you are welcome to use it".

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>-&gt;atomic_open(): return 0 in all success cases</title>
<updated>2018-07-12T14:04:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-09T23:17:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=64e1ac4d46f9f5d8284aefb97e1b550dbb26abe8'/>
<id>64e1ac4d46f9f5d8284aefb97e1b550dbb26abe8</id>
<content type='text'>
FMODE_OPENED can be used to distingusish "successful open" from the
"called finish_no_open(), do it yourself" cases.  Since finish_no_open()
has been adjusted, no changes in the instances were actually needed.
The caller has been adjusted.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
FMODE_OPENED can be used to distingusish "successful open" from the
"called finish_no_open(), do it yourself" cases.  Since finish_no_open()
has been adjusted, no changes in the instances were actually needed.
The caller has been adjusted.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
