<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/open.c, branch v2.6.25</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>asmlinkage_protect replaces prevent_tail_call</title>
<updated>2008-04-11T00:28:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roland McGrath</name>
<email>roland@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-10T22:37:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=54a015104136974262afa4b8ddd943ea70dec8a2'/>
<id>54a015104136974262afa4b8ddd943ea70dec8a2</id>
<content type='text'>
The prevent_tail_call() macro works around the problem of the compiler
clobbering argument words on the stack, which for asmlinkage functions
is the caller's (user's) struct pt_regs.  The tail/sibling-call
optimization is not the only way that the compiler can decide to use
stack argument words as scratch space, which we have to prevent.
Other optimizations can do it too.

Until we have new compiler support to make "asmlinkage" binding on the
compiler's own use of the stack argument frame, we have work around all
the manifestations of this issue that crop up.

More cases seem to be prevented by also keeping the incoming argument
variables live at the end of the function.  This makes their original
stack slots attractive places to leave those variables, so the compiler
tends not clobber them for something else.  It's still no guarantee, but
it handles some observed cases that prevent_tail_call() did not.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The prevent_tail_call() macro works around the problem of the compiler
clobbering argument words on the stack, which for asmlinkage functions
is the caller's (user's) struct pt_regs.  The tail/sibling-call
optimization is not the only way that the compiler can decide to use
stack argument words as scratch space, which we have to prevent.
Other optimizations can do it too.

Until we have new compiler support to make "asmlinkage" binding on the
compiler's own use of the stack argument frame, we have work around all
the manifestations of this issue that crop up.

More cases seem to be prevented by also keeping the incoming argument
variables live at the end of the function.  This makes their original
stack slots attractive places to leave those variables, so the compiler
tends not clobber them for something else.  It's still no guarantee, but
it handles some observed cases that prevent_tail_call() did not.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] check for null vfsmount in dentry_open()</title>
<updated>2008-03-19T10:50:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2008-02-15T22:37:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=322ee5b36eac42e762526b0df7fa432beba6e7a0'/>
<id>322ee5b36eac42e762526b0df7fa432beba6e7a0</id>
<content type='text'>
Make sure no-one calls dentry_open with a NULL vfsmount argument and crap
out with a stacktrace otherwise.  A NULL file-&gt;f_vfsmnt has always been
problematic, but with the per-mount r/o tracking we can't accept anymore
at all.

[AV] the last place that passed NULL had been eliminated by the previous
patch (reiserfs xattr stuff)

Acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;haveblue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make sure no-one calls dentry_open with a NULL vfsmount argument and crap
out with a stacktrace otherwise.  A NULL file-&gt;f_vfsmnt has always been
problematic, but with the per-mount r/o tracking we can't accept anymore
at all.

[AV] the last place that passed NULL had been eliminated by the previous
patch (reiserfs xattr stuff)

Acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;haveblue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Make set_fs_{root,pwd} take a struct path</title>
<updated>2008-02-15T05:13:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Blunck</name>
<email>jblunck@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2008-02-15T03:34:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ac748a09fc873915254ed69fe83f1a95436ee30a'/>
<id>ac748a09fc873915254ed69fe83f1a95436ee30a</id>
<content type='text'>
In nearly all cases the set_fs_{root,pwd}() calls work on a struct
path. Change the function to reflect this and use path_get() here.

Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck &lt;jblunck@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruen@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In nearly all cases the set_fs_{root,pwd}() calls work on a struct
path. Change the function to reflect this and use path_get() here.

Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck &lt;jblunck@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruen@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Introduce path_put()</title>
<updated>2008-02-15T05:13:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Blunck</name>
<email>jblunck@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2008-02-15T03:34:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1d957f9bf87da74f420424d16ece005202bbebd3'/>
<id>1d957f9bf87da74f420424d16ece005202bbebd3</id>
<content type='text'>
* Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and
  vfsmount of a struct path in the right order

* Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&amp;nd-&gt;path)

* Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional()

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck &lt;jblunck@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruen@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Steven French &lt;sfrench@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
* Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and
  vfsmount of a struct path in the right order

* Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&amp;nd-&gt;path)

* Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional()

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck &lt;jblunck@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruen@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Steven French &lt;sfrench@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Embed a struct path into struct nameidata instead of nd-&gt;{dentry,mnt}</title>
<updated>2008-02-15T05:13:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Blunck</name>
<email>jblunck@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2008-02-15T03:34:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4ac9137858e08a19f29feac4e1f4df7c268b0ba5'/>
<id>4ac9137858e08a19f29feac4e1f4df7c268b0ba5</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.

Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
  &lt;dentry,vfsmount&gt; pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
  struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:

without patch series:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
5321639  858418  715768 6895825  6938d1 vmlinux

with patch series:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
5320026  858418  715768 6894212  693284 vmlinux

This patch:

Switch from nd-&gt;{dentry,mnt} to nd-&gt;path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck &lt;jblunck@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruen@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.

Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
  &lt;dentry,vfsmount&gt; pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
  struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:

without patch series:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
5321639  858418  715768 6895825  6938d1 vmlinux

with patch series:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
5320026  858418  715768 6894212  693284 vmlinux

This patch:

Switch from nd-&gt;{dentry,mnt} to nd-&gt;path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck &lt;jblunck@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruen@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>remove the unused exports of sys_open/sys_read</title>
<updated>2008-02-08T17:22:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arjan van de Ven</name>
<email>arjan@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-02-08T12:20:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3287629eff75c7323e875b942be82f7ac6ca18da'/>
<id>3287629eff75c7323e875b942be82f7ac6ca18da</id>
<content type='text'>
These exports (which aren't used and which are in fact dangerous to use
because they pretty much form a security hole to use) have been marked
_UNUSED since 2.6.24 with removal in 2.6.25.  This patch is their final
departure from the Linux kernel tree.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
These exports (which aren't used and which are in fact dangerous to use
because they pretty much form a security hole to use) have been marked
_UNUSED since 2.6.24 with removal in 2.6.25.  This patch is their final
departure from the Linux kernel tree.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: remove fastcall, it is always empty</title>
<updated>2008-02-08T17:22:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harvey Harrison</name>
<email>harvey.harrison@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-02-08T12:19:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=fc9b52cd8f5f459b88adcf67c47668425ae31a78'/>
<id>fc9b52cd8f5f459b88adcf67c47668425ae31a78</id>
<content type='text'>
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison &lt;harvey.harrison@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison &lt;harvey.harrison@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mark sys_open/sys_read exports unused</title>
<updated>2007-11-15T02:45:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arjan van de Ven</name>
<email>arjan@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-11-15T01:00:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=cb51f973bce7aef46452b0c6faea8f791885f5b8'/>
<id>cb51f973bce7aef46452b0c6faea8f791885f5b8</id>
<content type='text'>
sys_open / sys_read were used in the early 1.2 days to load firmware from
disk inside drivers.  Since 2.0 or so this was deprecated behavior, but
several drivers still were using this.  Since a few years we have a
request_firmware() API that implements this in a nice, consistent way.
Only some old ISA sound drivers (pre-ALSA) still straggled along for some
time....  however with commit c2b1239a9f22f19c53543b460b24507d0e21ea0c the
last user is now gone.

This is a good thing, since using sys_open / sys_read etc for firmware is a
very buggy to dangerous thing to do; these operations put an fd in the
process file descriptor table....  which then can be tampered with from
other threads for example.  For those who don't want the firmware loader,
filp_open()/vfs_read are the better APIs to use, without this security
issue.

The patch below marks sys_open and sys_read unused now that they're
really not used anymore, and for deletion in the 2.6.25 timeframe.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
sys_open / sys_read were used in the early 1.2 days to load firmware from
disk inside drivers.  Since 2.0 or so this was deprecated behavior, but
several drivers still were using this.  Since a few years we have a
request_firmware() API that implements this in a nice, consistent way.
Only some old ISA sound drivers (pre-ALSA) still straggled along for some
time....  however with commit c2b1239a9f22f19c53543b460b24507d0e21ea0c the
last user is now gone.

This is a good thing, since using sys_open / sys_read etc for firmware is a
very buggy to dangerous thing to do; these operations put an fd in the
process file descriptor table....  which then can be tampered with from
other threads for example.  For those who don't want the firmware loader,
filp_open()/vfs_read are the better APIs to use, without this security
issue.

The patch below marks sys_open and sys_read unused now that they're
really not used anymore, and for deletion in the 2.6.25 timeframe.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] pass dentry to audit_inode()/audit_inode_child()</title>
<updated>2007-10-21T06:37:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2007-06-07T16:19:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5a190ae69766da9a34bf31200c5cea4c0667cf94'/>
<id>5a190ae69766da9a34bf31200c5cea4c0667cf94</id>
<content type='text'>
makes caller simpler *and* allows to scan ancestors

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
makes caller simpler *and* allows to scan ancestors

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Implement file posix capabilities</title>
<updated>2007-10-17T15:43:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Serge E. Hallyn</name>
<email>serue@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-10-17T06:31:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b53767719b6cd8789392ea3e7e2eb7b8906898f0'/>
<id>b53767719b6cd8789392ea3e7e2eb7b8906898f0</id>
<content type='text'>
Implement file posix capabilities.  This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.

This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php.  For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.

Changelog:
	Nov 27:
	Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
	(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
	security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
	Fix Kconfig dependency.
	Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.

	Nov 13:
	Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
	capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.

	Nov 13:
	Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
	Dobriyan.

	Nov 09:
	Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
	when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
	up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
	function.

	Nov 08:
	For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
	them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.

	Nov 07:
	Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
	check_cap_sanity().

	Nov 07:
	Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
	capabilities are the default.
	Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
	Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
	audit messages.

	Nov 05:
	Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
	task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
	cap support can be stacked.

	Sep 05:
	As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
	for capability code.

	Sep 01:
	Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
	task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
	they called a program with some fscaps.

	One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
	ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
	cpuset?

	It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
	allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check.  But since
	it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
	CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
	fixing it might be tough.

	     task_setscheduler
		 note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task.  Are we ok with
		     CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
	     task_setioprio
	     task_setnice
		 sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
		 process.  Need same checks as setrlimit

	Aug 21:
	Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
	euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
	might still have elevated caps.

	Aug 15:
	Handle endianness of xattrs.
	Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
	Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
	set, else return -EPERM.
	With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
	doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
	d_instantiate.

	Aug 10:
	Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
	caching it at d_instantiate.

[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk &lt;bunk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Implement file posix capabilities.  This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.

This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php.  For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.

Changelog:
	Nov 27:
	Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
	(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
	security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
	Fix Kconfig dependency.
	Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.

	Nov 13:
	Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
	capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.

	Nov 13:
	Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
	Dobriyan.

	Nov 09:
	Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
	when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
	up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
	function.

	Nov 08:
	For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
	them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.

	Nov 07:
	Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
	check_cap_sanity().

	Nov 07:
	Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
	capabilities are the default.
	Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
	Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
	audit messages.

	Nov 05:
	Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
	task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
	cap support can be stacked.

	Sep 05:
	As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
	for capability code.

	Sep 01:
	Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
	task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
	they called a program with some fscaps.

	One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
	ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
	cpuset?

	It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
	allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check.  But since
	it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
	CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
	fixing it might be tough.

	     task_setscheduler
		 note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task.  Are we ok with
		     CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
	     task_setioprio
	     task_setnice
		 sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
		 process.  Need same checks as setrlimit

	Aug 21:
	Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
	euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
	might still have elevated caps.

	Aug 15:
	Handle endianness of xattrs.
	Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
	Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
	set, else return -EPERM.
	With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
	doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
	d_instantiate.

	Aug 10:
	Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
	caching it at d_instantiate.

[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk &lt;bunk@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
