<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/notify/fanotify, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>fanotify: Fix spelling mistake "enforecement" -&gt; "enforcement"</title>
<updated>2026-04-20T07:40:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ethan Carter Edwards</name>
<email>ethan@ethancedwards.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-19T00:42:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ae974ca6f0f3138a835d0ed38bedc87dec85b3b2'/>
<id>ae974ca6f0f3138a835d0ed38bedc87dec85b3b2</id>
<content type='text'>
There is a spelling mistake in a comment. Fix it.

Signed-off-by: Ethan Carter Edwards &lt;ethan@ethancedwards.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260418-fanotify-typo-v1-1-03ea48cb44ba@ethancedwards.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There is a spelling mistake in a comment. Fix it.

Signed-off-by: Ethan Carter Edwards &lt;ethan@ethancedwards.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260418-fanotify-typo-v1-1-03ea48cb44ba@ethancedwards.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fanotify: replace deprecated strcpy in fanotify_info_copy_{name,name2}</title>
<updated>2026-03-23T09:10:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thorsten Blum</name>
<email>thorsten.blum@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-21T21:05:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0fdbe845534f4e0b7243b7a44562c4486ce25fb4'/>
<id>0fdbe845534f4e0b7243b7a44562c4486ce25fb4</id>
<content type='text'>
strcpy() has been deprecated [1] because it performs no bounds checking
on the destination buffer, which can lead to buffer overflows. Replace
it with the safer strscpy().

Link: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strcpy [1]
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum &lt;thorsten.blum@linux.dev&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260321210544.519259-4-thorsten.blum@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
strcpy() has been deprecated [1] because it performs no bounds checking
on the destination buffer, which can lead to buffer overflows. Replace
it with the safer strscpy().

Link: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strcpy [1]
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum &lt;thorsten.blum@linux.dev&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260321210544.519259-4-thorsten.blum@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fanotify: call fanotify_events_supported() before path_permission() and security_path_notify()</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T14:18:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-16T15:06:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=66052a768d4726a31e939b5ac902f2b0b452c8d5'/>
<id>66052a768d4726a31e939b5ac902f2b0b452c8d5</id>
<content type='text'>
The latter trigger LSM (e.g. SELinux) checks, which will log a denial
when permission is denied, so it's better to do them after validity
checks to avoid logging a denial when the operation would fail anyway.

Fixes: 0b3b094ac9a7 ("fanotify: Disallow permission events for proc filesystem")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260216150625.793013-3-omosnace@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The latter trigger LSM (e.g. SELinux) checks, which will log a denial
when permission is denied, so it's better to do them after validity
checks to avoid logging a denial when the operation would fail anyway.

Fixes: 0b3b094ac9a7 ("fanotify: Disallow permission events for proc filesystem")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260216150625.793013-3-omosnace@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fanotify: avoid/silence premature LSM capability checks</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T14:18:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-16T15:06:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0d5ee3373426395478c355f3e93ba4b1118a04e9'/>
<id>0d5ee3373426395478c355f3e93ba4b1118a04e9</id>
<content type='text'>
Make sure calling capable()/ns_capable() actually leads to access denied
when false is returned, because these functions emit an audit record
when a Linux Security Module denies the capability, which makes it
difficult to avoid allowing/silencing unnecessary permissions in
security policies (namely with SELinux).

Where the return value just used to set a flag, use the non-auditing
ns_capable_noaudit() instead.

Fixes: 7cea2a3c505e ("fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260216150625.793013-2-omosnace@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make sure calling capable()/ns_capable() actually leads to access denied
when false is returned, because these functions emit an audit record
when a Linux Security Module denies the capability, which makes it
difficult to avoid allowing/silencing unnecessary permissions in
security policies (namely with SELinux).

Where the return value just used to set a flag, use the non-auditing
ns_capable_noaudit() instead.

Fixes: 7cea2a3c505e ("fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260216150625.793013-2-omosnace@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types</title>
<updated>2026-02-21T09:02:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-21T07:49:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=69050f8d6d075dc01af7a5f2f550a8067510366f'/>
<id>69050f8d6d075dc01af7a5f2f550a8067510366f</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:

Single allocations:	kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)

Array allocations:	kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)

Flex array allocations:	kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)

(where TYPE may also be *VAR)

The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:

Single allocations:	kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)

Array allocations:	kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)

Flex array allocations:	kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)

(where TYPE may also be *VAR)

The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fanotify: convert fanotify_init() to FD_PREPARE()</title>
<updated>2025-11-28T11:42:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-23T16:33:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7129098f4f7b848ead33ce10214b90716e3fd400'/>
<id>7129098f4f7b848ead33ce10214b90716e3fd400</id>
<content type='text'>
Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt; says:

The fix sent in [1] was squashed into this commit.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20251127201618.2115275-1-kuniyu@google.com [1]
Reported-by: syzbot+321168dfa622eda99689@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/6928b121.a70a0220.d98e3.0110.GAE@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251123-work-fd-prepare-v4-8-b6efa1706cfd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt; says:

The fix sent in [1] was squashed into this commit.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20251127201618.2115275-1-kuniyu@google.com [1]
Reported-by: syzbot+321168dfa622eda99689@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/6928b121.a70a0220.d98e3.0110.GAE@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251123-work-fd-prepare-v4-8-b6efa1706cfd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fanotify: add watchdog for permission events</title>
<updated>2025-09-11T14:34:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-09T14:30:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b8cf8fda522d5a37f8948ad8a19a1113cc38710f'/>
<id>b8cf8fda522d5a37f8948ad8a19a1113cc38710f</id>
<content type='text'>
This is to make it easier to debug issues with AV software, which time and
again deadlocks with no indication of where the issue comes from, and the
kernel being blamed for the deadlock.  Then we need to analyze dumps to
prove that the kernel is not in fact at fault.

The deadlock comes from recursion: handling the event triggers another
permission event, in some roundabout way, obviously, otherwise it would
have been found in testing.

With this patch a warning is printed when permission event is received by
userspace but not answered for more than the timeout specified in
/proc/sys/fs/fanotify/watchdog_timeout.  The watchdog can be turned off by
setting the timeout to zero (which is the default).

The timeout is very coarse (T &lt;= t &lt; 2T) but I guess it's good enough for
the purpose.

Overhead should be minimal.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250909143053.112171-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This is to make it easier to debug issues with AV software, which time and
again deadlocks with no indication of where the issue comes from, and the
kernel being blamed for the deadlock.  Then we need to analyze dumps to
prove that the kernel is not in fact at fault.

The deadlock comes from recursion: handling the event triggers another
permission event, in some roundabout way, obviously, otherwise it would
have been found in testing.

With this patch a warning is printed when permission event is received by
userspace but not answered for more than the timeout specified in
/proc/sys/fs/fanotify/watchdog_timeout.  The watchdog can be turned off by
setting the timeout to zero (which is the default).

The timeout is very coarse (T &lt;= t &lt; 2T) but I guess it's good enough for
the purpose.

Overhead should be minimal.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250909143053.112171-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fanotify: Validate the return value of mnt_ns_from_dentry() before dereferencing</title>
<updated>2025-09-05T14:02:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anderson Nascimento</name>
<email>anderson@allelesecurity.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-04T14:09:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=62e59ffe8787b5550ccff70c30b6f6be6a3ac3dd'/>
<id>62e59ffe8787b5550ccff70c30b6f6be6a3ac3dd</id>
<content type='text'>
The function do_fanotify_mark() does not validate if
mnt_ns_from_dentry() returns NULL before dereferencing mntns-&gt;user_ns.
This causes a NULL pointer dereference in do_fanotify_mark() if the
path is not a mount namespace object.

Fix this by checking mnt_ns_from_dentry()'s return value before
dereferencing it.

Before the patch

$ gcc fanotify_nullptr.c -o fanotify_nullptr
$ mkdir A
$ ./fanotify_nullptr
Fanotify fd: 3
fanotify_mark: Operation not permitted
$ unshare -Urm
Fanotify fd: 3
Killed

int main(void){
    int ffd;
    ffd = fanotify_init(FAN_CLASS_NOTIF | FAN_REPORT_MNT, 0);
    if(ffd &lt; 0){
        perror("fanotify_init");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    printf("Fanotify fd: %d\n",ffd);

    if(fanotify_mark(ffd, FAN_MARK_ADD | FAN_MARK_MNTNS,
FAN_MNT_ATTACH, AT_FDCWD, "A") &lt; 0){
        perror("fanotify_mark");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

return 0;
}

After the patch

$ gcc fanotify_nullptr.c -o fanotify_nullptr
$ mkdir A
$ ./fanotify_nullptr
Fanotify fd: 3
fanotify_mark: Operation not permitted
$ unshare -Urm
Fanotify fd: 3
fanotify_mark: Invalid argument

[   25.694973] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
[   25.695006] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   25.695012] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   25.695017] PGD 109a30067 P4D 109a30067 PUD 142b46067 PMD 0
[   25.695025] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   25.695032] CPU: 4 UID: 1000 PID: 1478 Comm: fanotify_nullpt Not
tainted 6.17.0-rc4 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[   25.695040] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual
Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
[   25.695049] RIP: 0010:do_fanotify_mark+0x817/0x950
[   25.695066] Code: 04 00 00 e9 45 fd ff ff 48 8b 7c 24 48 4c 89 54
24 18 4c 89 5c 24 10 4c 89 0c 24 e8 b3 11 fc ff 4c 8b 54 24 18 4c 8b
5c 24 10 &lt;48&gt; 8b 78 38 4c 8b 0c 24 49 89 c4 e9 13 fd ff ff 8b 4c 24 28
85 c9
[   25.695081] RSP: 0018:ffffd31c469e3c08 EFLAGS: 00010203
[   25.695104] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000001000000 RCX: ffff8eb48aebd220
[   25.695110] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8eb4835e8180
[   25.695115] RBP: 0000000000000111 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   25.695142] R10: ffff8eb48a7d56c0 R11: ffff8eb482bede00 R12: 00000000004012a7
[   25.695148] R13: 0000000000000110 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8eb48a7d56c0
[   25.695154] FS:  00007f8733bda740(0000) GS:ffff8eb61ce5f000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   25.695162] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   25.695170] CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 0000000136994006 CR4: 00000000003706f0
[   25.695201] Call Trace:
[   25.695209]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   25.695215]  __x64_sys_fanotify_mark+0x1f/0x30
[   25.695222]  do_syscall_64+0x82/0x2c0
...

Fixes: 58f5fbeb367f ("fanotify: support watching filesystems and mounts inside userns")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/CAPhRvkw4ONypNsJrCnxbKnJbYmLHTDEKFC4C_num_5sVBVa8jg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The function do_fanotify_mark() does not validate if
mnt_ns_from_dentry() returns NULL before dereferencing mntns-&gt;user_ns.
This causes a NULL pointer dereference in do_fanotify_mark() if the
path is not a mount namespace object.

Fix this by checking mnt_ns_from_dentry()'s return value before
dereferencing it.

Before the patch

$ gcc fanotify_nullptr.c -o fanotify_nullptr
$ mkdir A
$ ./fanotify_nullptr
Fanotify fd: 3
fanotify_mark: Operation not permitted
$ unshare -Urm
Fanotify fd: 3
Killed

int main(void){
    int ffd;
    ffd = fanotify_init(FAN_CLASS_NOTIF | FAN_REPORT_MNT, 0);
    if(ffd &lt; 0){
        perror("fanotify_init");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    printf("Fanotify fd: %d\n",ffd);

    if(fanotify_mark(ffd, FAN_MARK_ADD | FAN_MARK_MNTNS,
FAN_MNT_ATTACH, AT_FDCWD, "A") &lt; 0){
        perror("fanotify_mark");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

return 0;
}

After the patch

$ gcc fanotify_nullptr.c -o fanotify_nullptr
$ mkdir A
$ ./fanotify_nullptr
Fanotify fd: 3
fanotify_mark: Operation not permitted
$ unshare -Urm
Fanotify fd: 3
fanotify_mark: Invalid argument

[   25.694973] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
[   25.695006] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   25.695012] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   25.695017] PGD 109a30067 P4D 109a30067 PUD 142b46067 PMD 0
[   25.695025] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   25.695032] CPU: 4 UID: 1000 PID: 1478 Comm: fanotify_nullpt Not
tainted 6.17.0-rc4 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[   25.695040] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual
Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
[   25.695049] RIP: 0010:do_fanotify_mark+0x817/0x950
[   25.695066] Code: 04 00 00 e9 45 fd ff ff 48 8b 7c 24 48 4c 89 54
24 18 4c 89 5c 24 10 4c 89 0c 24 e8 b3 11 fc ff 4c 8b 54 24 18 4c 8b
5c 24 10 &lt;48&gt; 8b 78 38 4c 8b 0c 24 49 89 c4 e9 13 fd ff ff 8b 4c 24 28
85 c9
[   25.695081] RSP: 0018:ffffd31c469e3c08 EFLAGS: 00010203
[   25.695104] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000001000000 RCX: ffff8eb48aebd220
[   25.695110] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8eb4835e8180
[   25.695115] RBP: 0000000000000111 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   25.695142] R10: ffff8eb48a7d56c0 R11: ffff8eb482bede00 R12: 00000000004012a7
[   25.695148] R13: 0000000000000110 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8eb48a7d56c0
[   25.695154] FS:  00007f8733bda740(0000) GS:ffff8eb61ce5f000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   25.695162] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   25.695170] CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 0000000136994006 CR4: 00000000003706f0
[   25.695201] Call Trace:
[   25.695209]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   25.695215]  __x64_sys_fanotify_mark+0x1f/0x30
[   25.695222]  do_syscall_64+0x82/0x2c0
...

Fixes: 58f5fbeb367f ("fanotify: support watching filesystems and mounts inside userns")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/CAPhRvkw4ONypNsJrCnxbKnJbYmLHTDEKFC4C_num_5sVBVa8jg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fanotify: sanitize handle_type values when reporting fid</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T17:17:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-27T10:48:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8631e01c2c5d1fe6705bcc0d733a0b7a17d3daac'/>
<id>8631e01c2c5d1fe6705bcc0d733a0b7a17d3daac</id>
<content type='text'>
Unlike file_handle, type and len of struct fanotify_fh are u8.
Traditionally, filesystem return handle_type &lt; 0xff, but there
is no enforecement for that in vfs.

Add a sanity check in fanotify to avoid truncating handle_type
if its value is &gt; 0xff.

Fixes: 7cdafe6cc4a6 ("exportfs: check for error return value from exportfs_encode_*()")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250627104835.184495-1-amir73il@gmail.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Unlike file_handle, type and len of struct fanotify_fh are u8.
Traditionally, filesystem return handle_type &lt; 0xff, but there
is no enforecement for that in vfs.

Add a sanity check in fanotify to avoid truncating handle_type
if its value is &gt; 0xff.

Fixes: 7cdafe6cc4a6 ("exportfs: check for error return value from exportfs_encode_*()")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250627104835.184495-1-amir73il@gmail.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'fsnotify_for_v6.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs</title>
<updated>2025-05-29T17:34:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-29T17:34:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=db340159f19ae083afb33fce0aaadc77c6b0d547'/>
<id>db340159f19ae083afb33fce0aaadc77c6b0d547</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull fsnotify updates from Jan Kara:
 "Two fanotify cleanups and support for watching namespace-owned
  filesystems by namespace admins (most useful for being able to watch
  for new mounts / unmounts happening within a user namespace)"

* tag 'fsnotify_for_v6.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
  fanotify: support watching filesystems and mounts inside userns
  fanotify: remove redundant permission checks
  fanotify: Drop use of flex array in fanotify_fh
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull fsnotify updates from Jan Kara:
 "Two fanotify cleanups and support for watching namespace-owned
  filesystems by namespace admins (most useful for being able to watch
  for new mounts / unmounts happening within a user namespace)"

* tag 'fsnotify_for_v6.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
  fanotify: support watching filesystems and mounts inside userns
  fanotify: remove redundant permission checks
  fanotify: Drop use of flex array in fanotify_fh
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
