<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/namespace.c, branch v5.14</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'locks-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jlayton/linux</title>
<updated>2021-08-21T17:50:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-21T17:50:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=15517c724c6e89ed854191028958a43274e3c366'/>
<id>15517c724c6e89ed854191028958a43274e3c366</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull mandatory file locking deprecation warning from Jeff Layton:
 "As discussed on the list, this patch just adds a new warning for folks
  who still have mandatory locking enabled and actually mount with '-o
  mand'. I'd like to get this in for v5.14 so we can push this out into
  stable kernels and hopefully reach folks who have mounts with -o mand.

  For now, I'm operating under the assumption that we'll fully remove
  this support in v5.15, but we can move that out if any legitimate
  users of this facility speak up between now and then"

* tag 'locks-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jlayton/linux:
  fs: warn about impending deprecation of mandatory locks
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull mandatory file locking deprecation warning from Jeff Layton:
 "As discussed on the list, this patch just adds a new warning for folks
  who still have mandatory locking enabled and actually mount with '-o
  mand'. I'd like to get this in for v5.14 so we can push this out into
  stable kernels and hopefully reach folks who have mounts with -o mand.

  For now, I'm operating under the assumption that we'll fully remove
  this support in v5.15, but we can move that out if any legitimate
  users of this facility speak up between now and then"

* tag 'locks-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jlayton/linux:
  fs: warn about impending deprecation of mandatory locks
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: warn about impending deprecation of mandatory locks</title>
<updated>2021-08-21T11:32:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-20T13:29:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=fdd92b64d15bc4aec973caa25899afd782402e68'/>
<id>fdd92b64d15bc4aec973caa25899afd782402e68</id>
<content type='text'>
We've had CONFIG_MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING since 2015 and a lot of distros
have disabled it. Warn the stragglers that still use "-o mand" that
we'll be dropping support for that mount option.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We've had CONFIG_MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING since 2015 and a lot of distros
have disabled it. Warn the stragglers that still use "-o mand" that
we'll be dropping support for that mount option.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ovl: prevent private clone if bind mount is not allowed</title>
<updated>2021-08-10T08:21:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-09T08:19:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=427215d85e8d1476da1a86b8d67aceb485eb3631'/>
<id>427215d85e8d1476da1a86b8d67aceb485eb3631</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the following checks from __do_loopback() to clone_private_mount() as
well:

 - verify that the mount is in the current namespace

 - verify that there are no locked children

Reported-by: Alois Wohlschlager &lt;alois1@gmx-topmail.de&gt;
Fixes: c771d683a62e ("vfs: introduce clone_private_mount()")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.18
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add the following checks from __do_loopback() to clone_private_mount() as
well:

 - verify that the mount is in the current namespace

 - verify that there are no locked children

Reported-by: Alois Wohlschlager &lt;alois1@gmx-topmail.de&gt;
Fixes: c771d683a62e ("vfs: introduce clone_private_mount()")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.18
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mount: Support "nosymfollow" in new mount api</title>
<updated>2021-06-01T10:09:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-01T09:33:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=dd8b477f9a3d8edb136207acb3652e1a34a661b7'/>
<id>dd8b477f9a3d8edb136207acb3652e1a34a661b7</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit dab741e0e02b ("Add a "nosymfollow" mount option.") added support
for the "nosymfollow" mount option allowing to block following symlinks
when resolving paths. The mount option so far was only available in the
old mount api. Make it available in the new mount api as well. Bonus is
that it can be applied to a whole subtree not just a single mount.

Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Mattias Nissler &lt;mnissler@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit dab741e0e02b ("Add a "nosymfollow" mount option.") added support
for the "nosymfollow" mount option allowing to block following symlinks
when resolving paths. The mount option so far was only available in the
old mount api. Make it available in the new mount api as well. Bonus is
that it can be applied to a whole subtree not just a single mount.

Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Mattias Nissler &lt;mnissler@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/mount_setattr: tighten permission checks</title>
<updated>2021-05-12T12:13:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-11T14:30:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2ca4dcc4909d787ee153272f7efc2bff3b498720'/>
<id>2ca4dcc4909d787ee153272f7efc2bff3b498720</id>
<content type='text'>
We currently don't have any filesystems that support idmapped mounts
which are mountable inside a user namespace. That was a deliberate
decision for now as a userns root can just mount the filesystem
themselves. So enforce this restriction explicitly until there's a real
use-case for this. This way we can notice it and will have a chance to
adapt and audit our translation helpers and fstests appropriately if we
need to support such filesystems.

Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Seth Forshee &lt;seth.forshee@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We currently don't have any filesystems that support idmapped mounts
which are mountable inside a user namespace. That was a deliberate
decision for now as a userns root can just mount the filesystem
themselves. So enforce this restriction explicitly until there's a real
use-case for this. This way we can notice it and will have a chance to
adapt and audit our translation helpers and fstests appropriately if we
need to support such filesystems.

Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Seth Forshee &lt;seth.forshee@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/namespace: correct/improve kernel-doc notation</title>
<updated>2021-03-31T20:22:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-18T02:52:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1f287bc4e2d073455bc21ed168ee3f67a75178b6'/>
<id>1f287bc4e2d073455bc21ed168ee3f67a75178b6</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix kernel-doc warnings in fs/namespace.c:

./fs/namespace.c:1379: warning: Function parameter or member 'm' not described in 'may_umount_tree'
./fs/namespace.c:1379: warning: Excess function parameter 'mnt' description in 'may_umount_tree'
./fs/namespace.c:1950: warning: Function parameter or member 'path' not described in 'clone_private_mount'

Also convert path_is_mountpoint() comments to kernel-doc.

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Allegedly-acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210318025227.4162-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix kernel-doc warnings in fs/namespace.c:

./fs/namespace.c:1379: warning: Function parameter or member 'm' not described in 'may_umount_tree'
./fs/namespace.c:1379: warning: Excess function parameter 'mnt' description in 'may_umount_tree'
./fs/namespace.c:1950: warning: Function parameter or member 'path' not described in 'clone_private_mount'

Also convert path_is_mountpoint() comments to kernel-doc.

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Allegedly-acked-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210318025227.4162-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2021-02-27T16:07:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-27T16:07:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5ceabb6078b80a8544ba86d6ee523ad755ae6d5e'/>
<id>5ceabb6078b80a8544ba86d6ee523ad755ae6d5e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted stuff pile - no common topic here"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  whack-a-mole: don't open-code iminor/imajor
  9p: fix misuse of sscanf() in v9fs_stat2inode()
  audit_alloc_mark(): don't open-code ERR_CAST()
  fs/inode.c: make inode_init_always() initialize i_ino to 0
  vfs: don't unnecessarily clone write access for writable fds
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted stuff pile - no common topic here"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  whack-a-mole: don't open-code iminor/imajor
  9p: fix misuse of sscanf() in v9fs_stat2inode()
  audit_alloc_mark(): don't open-code ERR_CAST()
  fs/inode.c: make inode_init_always() initialize i_ino to 0
  vfs: don't unnecessarily clone write access for writable fds
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:43:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=9caccd41541a6f7d6279928d9f971f6642c361af'/>
<id>9caccd41541a6f7d6279928d9f971f6642c361af</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce a new mount bind mount property to allow idmapping mounts. The
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag can be set via the new mount_setattr() syscall
together with a file descriptor referring to a user namespace.

The user namespace referenced by the namespace file descriptor will be
attached to the bind mount. All interactions with the filesystem going
through that mount will be mapped according to the mapping specified in
the user namespace attached to it.

Using user namespaces to mark mounts means we can reuse all the existing
infrastructure in the kernel that already exists to handle idmappings
and can also use this for permission checking to allow unprivileged user
to create idmapped mounts in the future.

Idmapping a mount is decoupled from the caller's user and mount
namespace. This means idmapped mounts can be created in the initial
user namespace which is an important use-case for systemd-homed,
portable usb-sticks between systems, sharing data between the initial
user namespace and unprivileged containers, and other use-cases that
have been brought up. For example, assume a home directory where all
files are owned by uid and gid 1000 and the home directory is brought to
a new laptop where the user has id 12345. The system administrator can
simply create a mount of this home directory with a mapping of
1000:12345:1 and other mappings to indicate the ids should be kept.
(With this it is e.g. also possible to create idmapped mounts on the
host with an identity mapping 1:1:100000 where the root user is not
mapped. A user with root access that e.g. has been pivot rooted into
such a mount on the host will be not be able to execute, read, write, or
create files as root.)

Given that mapping a mount is decoupled from the caller's user namespace
a sufficiently privileged process such as a container manager can set up
an idmapped mount for the container and the container can simply pivot
root to it. There's no need for the container to do anything. The mount
will appear correctly mapped independent of the user namespace the
container uses. This means we don't need to mark a mount as idmappable.

In order to create an idmapped mount the caller must currently be
privileged in the user namespace of the superblock the mount belongs to.
Once a mount has been idmapped we don't allow it to change its mapping.
This keeps permission checking and life-cycle management simple. Users
wanting to change the idmapped can always create a new detached mount
with a different idmapping.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-36-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Mauricio Vásquez Bernal &lt;mauricio@kinvolk.io&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Introduce a new mount bind mount property to allow idmapping mounts. The
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag can be set via the new mount_setattr() syscall
together with a file descriptor referring to a user namespace.

The user namespace referenced by the namespace file descriptor will be
attached to the bind mount. All interactions with the filesystem going
through that mount will be mapped according to the mapping specified in
the user namespace attached to it.

Using user namespaces to mark mounts means we can reuse all the existing
infrastructure in the kernel that already exists to handle idmappings
and can also use this for permission checking to allow unprivileged user
to create idmapped mounts in the future.

Idmapping a mount is decoupled from the caller's user and mount
namespace. This means idmapped mounts can be created in the initial
user namespace which is an important use-case for systemd-homed,
portable usb-sticks between systems, sharing data between the initial
user namespace and unprivileged containers, and other use-cases that
have been brought up. For example, assume a home directory where all
files are owned by uid and gid 1000 and the home directory is brought to
a new laptop where the user has id 12345. The system administrator can
simply create a mount of this home directory with a mapping of
1000:12345:1 and other mappings to indicate the ids should be kept.
(With this it is e.g. also possible to create idmapped mounts on the
host with an identity mapping 1:1:100000 where the root user is not
mapped. A user with root access that e.g. has been pivot rooted into
such a mount on the host will be not be able to execute, read, write, or
create files as root.)

Given that mapping a mount is decoupled from the caller's user namespace
a sufficiently privileged process such as a container manager can set up
an idmapped mount for the container and the container can simply pivot
root to it. There's no need for the container to do anything. The mount
will appear correctly mapped independent of the user namespace the
container uses. This means we don't need to mark a mount as idmappable.

In order to create an idmapped mount the caller must currently be
privileged in the user namespace of the superblock the mount belongs to.
Once a mount has been idmapped we don't allow it to change its mapping.
This keeps permission checking and life-cycle management simple. Users
wanting to change the idmapped can always create a new detached mount
with a different idmapping.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-36-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Mauricio Vásquez Bernal &lt;mauricio@kinvolk.io&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: add mount_setattr()</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:42:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2a1867219c7b27f928e2545782b86daaf9ad50bd'/>
<id>2a1867219c7b27f928e2545782b86daaf9ad50bd</id>
<content type='text'>
This implements the missing mount_setattr() syscall. While the new mount
api allows to change the properties of a superblock there is currently
no way to change the properties of a mount or a mount tree using file
descriptors which the new mount api is based on. In addition the old
mount api has the restriction that mount options cannot be applied
recursively. This hasn't changed since changing mount options on a
per-mount basis was implemented in [1] and has been a frequent request
not just for convenience but also for security reasons. The legacy
mount syscall is unable to accommodate this behavior without introducing
a whole new set of flags because MS_REC | MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND |
MS_RDONLY | MS_NOEXEC | [...] only apply the mount option to the topmost
mount. Changing MS_REC to apply to the whole mount tree would mean
introducing a significant uapi change and would likely cause significant
regressions.

The new mount_setattr() syscall allows to recursively clear and set
mount options in one shot. Multiple calls to change mount options
requesting the same changes are idempotent:

int mount_setattr(int dfd, const char *path, unsigned flags,
                  struct mount_attr *uattr, size_t usize);

Flags to modify path resolution behavior are specified in the @flags
argument. Currently, AT_EMPTY_PATH, AT_RECURSIVE, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW,
and AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT are supported. If useful, additional lookup flags to
restrict path resolution as introduced with openat2() might be supported
in the future.

The mount_setattr() syscall can be expected to grow over time and is
designed with extensibility in mind. It follows the extensible syscall
pattern we have used with other syscalls such as openat2(), clone3(),
sched_{set,get}attr(), and others.
The set of mount options is passed in the uapi struct mount_attr which
currently has the following layout:

struct mount_attr {
	__u64 attr_set;
	__u64 attr_clr;
	__u64 propagation;
	__u64 userns_fd;
};

The @attr_set and @attr_clr members are used to clear and set mount
options. This way a user can e.g. request that a set of flags is to be
raised such as turning mounts readonly by raising MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY in
@attr_set while at the same time requesting that another set of flags is
to be lowered such as removing noexec from a mount tree by specifying
MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC in @attr_clr.

Note, since the MOUNT_ATTR_&lt;atime&gt; values are an enum starting from 0,
not a bitmap, users wanting to transition to a different atime setting
cannot simply specify the atime setting in @attr_set, but must also
specify MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME in the @attr_clr field. So we ensure that
MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME can't be partially set in @attr_clr and that @attr_set
can't have any atime bits set if MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME isn't set in
@attr_clr.

The @propagation field lets callers specify the propagation type of a
mount tree. Propagation is a single property that has four different
settings and as such is not really a flag argument but an enum.
Specifically, it would be unclear what setting and clearing propagation
settings in combination would amount to. The legacy mount() syscall thus
forbids the combination of multiple propagation settings too. The goal
is to keep the semantics of mount propagation somewhat simple as they
are overly complex as it is.

The @userns_fd field lets user specify a user namespace whose idmapping
becomes the idmapping of the mount. This is implemented and explained in
detail in the next patch.

[1]: commit 2e4b7fcd9260 ("[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: honor mount writer counts at remount")

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-35-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This implements the missing mount_setattr() syscall. While the new mount
api allows to change the properties of a superblock there is currently
no way to change the properties of a mount or a mount tree using file
descriptors which the new mount api is based on. In addition the old
mount api has the restriction that mount options cannot be applied
recursively. This hasn't changed since changing mount options on a
per-mount basis was implemented in [1] and has been a frequent request
not just for convenience but also for security reasons. The legacy
mount syscall is unable to accommodate this behavior without introducing
a whole new set of flags because MS_REC | MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND |
MS_RDONLY | MS_NOEXEC | [...] only apply the mount option to the topmost
mount. Changing MS_REC to apply to the whole mount tree would mean
introducing a significant uapi change and would likely cause significant
regressions.

The new mount_setattr() syscall allows to recursively clear and set
mount options in one shot. Multiple calls to change mount options
requesting the same changes are idempotent:

int mount_setattr(int dfd, const char *path, unsigned flags,
                  struct mount_attr *uattr, size_t usize);

Flags to modify path resolution behavior are specified in the @flags
argument. Currently, AT_EMPTY_PATH, AT_RECURSIVE, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW,
and AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT are supported. If useful, additional lookup flags to
restrict path resolution as introduced with openat2() might be supported
in the future.

The mount_setattr() syscall can be expected to grow over time and is
designed with extensibility in mind. It follows the extensible syscall
pattern we have used with other syscalls such as openat2(), clone3(),
sched_{set,get}attr(), and others.
The set of mount options is passed in the uapi struct mount_attr which
currently has the following layout:

struct mount_attr {
	__u64 attr_set;
	__u64 attr_clr;
	__u64 propagation;
	__u64 userns_fd;
};

The @attr_set and @attr_clr members are used to clear and set mount
options. This way a user can e.g. request that a set of flags is to be
raised such as turning mounts readonly by raising MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY in
@attr_set while at the same time requesting that another set of flags is
to be lowered such as removing noexec from a mount tree by specifying
MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC in @attr_clr.

Note, since the MOUNT_ATTR_&lt;atime&gt; values are an enum starting from 0,
not a bitmap, users wanting to transition to a different atime setting
cannot simply specify the atime setting in @attr_set, but must also
specify MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME in the @attr_clr field. So we ensure that
MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME can't be partially set in @attr_clr and that @attr_set
can't have any atime bits set if MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME isn't set in
@attr_clr.

The @propagation field lets callers specify the propagation type of a
mount tree. Propagation is a single property that has four different
settings and as such is not really a flag argument but an enum.
Specifically, it would be unclear what setting and clearing propagation
settings in combination would amount to. The legacy mount() syscall thus
forbids the combination of multiple propagation settings too. The goal
is to keep the semantics of mount propagation somewhat simple as they
are overly complex as it is.

The @userns_fd field lets user specify a user namespace whose idmapping
becomes the idmapping of the mount. This is implemented and explained in
detail in the next patch.

[1]: commit 2e4b7fcd9260 ("[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: honor mount writer counts at remount")

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-35-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper</title>
<updated>2021-01-24T13:29:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-21T13:19:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5b490500f91b212d862560e7568aa5cdc141f9d0'/>
<id>5b490500f91b212d862560e7568aa5cdc141f9d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a simple helper to translate uapi MOUNT_ATTR_* flags to MNT_* flags
which we will use in follow-up patches too.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-34-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a simple helper to translate uapi MOUNT_ATTR_* flags to MNT_* flags
which we will use in follow-up patches too.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-34-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
