Pull gcc plugins update from Kees Cook:
 "This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
  extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot
  time as possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in
  CPU operation (due to runtime data differences, hardware differences,
  SMP ordering, thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).

  At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example
  for how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  latent_entropy: Mark functions with __latent_entropy
  gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin

The __latent_entropy gcc attribute can be used only on functions and
variables.  If it is on a function then the plugin will instrument it for
gathering control-flow entropy. If the attribute is on a variable then
the plugin will initialize it with random contents.  The variable must
be an integer, an integer array type or a structure with integer fields.

These specific functions have been selected because they are init
functions (to help gather boot-time entropy), are called at unpredictable
times, or they have variable loops, each of which provide some level of
latent entropy.

Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
[kees: expanded commit message]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted misc bits and pieces.

  There are several single-topic branches left after this (rename2
  series from Miklos, current_time series from Deepa Dinamani, xattr
  series from Andreas, uaccess stuff from from me) and I'd prefer to
  send those separately"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (39 commits)
  proc: switch auxv to use of __mem_open()
  hpfs: support FIEMAP
  cifs: get rid of unused arguments of CIFSSMBWrite()
  posix_acl: uapi header split
  posix_acl: xattr representation cleanups
  fs/aio.c: eliminate redundant loads in put_aio_ring_file
  fs/internal.h: add const to ns_dentry_operations declaration
  compat: remove compat_printk()
  fs/buffer.c: make __getblk_slow() static
  proc: unsigned file descriptors
  fs/file: more unsigned file descriptors
  fs: compat: remove redundant check of nr_segs
  cachefiles: Fix attempt to read i_blocks after deleting file [ver #2]
  cifs: don't use memcpy() to copy struct iov_iter
  get rid of separate multipage fault-in primitives
  fs: Avoid premature clearing of capabilities
  fs: Give dentry to inode_change_ok() instead of inode
  fuse: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok()
  ceph: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok()
  xfs: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok()
  ...

CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.

    mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
    mount --make-rshared /
    for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done

Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.

As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.

Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:

> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.

So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000.  This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts.  Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.

For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.

Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

From: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>

Each namespace has an owning user namespace and now there is not way
to discover these relationships.

Pid and user namepaces are hierarchical. There is no way to discover
parent-child relationships too.

Why we may want to know relationships between namespaces?

One use would be visualization, in order to understand the running
system.  Another would be to answer the question: what capability does
process X have to perform operations on a resource governed by namespace
Y?

One more use-case (which usually called abnormal) is checkpoint/restart.
In CRIU we are going to dump and restore nested namespaces.

There [1] was a discussion about which interface to choose to determing
relationships between namespaces.

Eric suggested to add two ioctl-s [2]:
> Grumble, Grumble.  I think this may actually a case for creating ioctls
> for these two cases.  Now that random nsfs file descriptors are bind
> mountable the original reason for using proc files is not as pressing.
>
> One ioctl for the user namespace that owns a file descriptor.
> One ioctl for the parent namespace of a namespace file descriptor.

Here is an implementaions of these ioctl-s.

$ man man7/namespaces.7
...
Since  Linux  4.X,  the  following  ioctl(2)  calls are supported for
namespace file descriptors.  The correct syntax is:

      fd = ioctl(ns_fd, ioctl_type);

where ioctl_type is one of the following:

NS_GET_USERNS
      Returns a file descriptor that refers to an owning user names‐
      pace.

NS_GET_PARENT
      Returns  a  file descriptor that refers to a parent namespace.
      This ioctl(2) can be used for pid  and  user  namespaces.  For
      user namespaces, NS_GET_PARENT and NS_GET_USERNS have the same
      meaning.

In addition to generic ioctl(2) errors, the following  specific  ones
can occur:

EINVAL NS_GET_PARENT was called for a nonhierarchical namespace.

EPERM  The  requested  namespace  is outside of the current namespace
      scope.

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/6/158
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/9/101

Changes for v2:
* don't return ENOENT for init_user_ns and init_pid_ns. There is nothing
  outside of the init namespace, so we can return EPERM in this case too.
  > The fewer special cases the easier the code is to get
  > correct, and the easier it is to read. // Eric

Changes for v3:
* rename ns->get_owner() to ns->owner(). get_* usually means that it
  grabs a reference.

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "W. Trevor King" <wking@tremily.us>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Return -EPERM if an owning user namespace is outside of a process
current user namespace.

v2: In a first version ns_get_owner returned ENOENT for init_user_ns.
    This special cases was removed from this version. There is nothing
    outside of init_user_ns, so we can return EPERM.
v3: rename ns->get_owner() to ns->owner(). get_* usually means that it
grabs a reference.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

The current error codes returned when a the per user per user
namespace limit are hit (EINVAL, EUSERS, and ENFILE) are wrong.  I
asked for advice on linux-api and it we made clear that those were
the wrong error code, but a correct effor code was not suggested.

The best general error code I have found for hitting a resource limit
is ENOSPC.  It is not perfect but as it is unambiguous it will serve
until someone comes up with a better error code.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

This patch allows flock, posix locks, ofd locks and leases to work
correctly on overlayfs.

Instead of using the underlying inode for storing lock context use the
overlay inode.  This allows locks to be persistent across copy-up.

This is done by introducing locks_inode() helper and using it instead of
file_inode() to get the inode in locking code.  For non-overlayfs the two
are equivalent, except for an extra pointer dereference in locks_inode().

Since lock operations are in "struct file_operations" we must also make
sure not to call underlying filesystem's lock operations.  Introcude a
super block flag MS_NOREMOTELOCK to this effect.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>

v2: Fixed the very obvious lack of setting ucounts
    on struct mnt_ns reported by Andrei Vagin, and the kbuild
    test report.

Reported-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Pull userns vfs updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This tree contains some very long awaited work on generalizing the
  user namespace support for mounting filesystems to include filesystems
  with a backing store.  The real world target is fuse but the goal is
  to update the vfs to allow any filesystem to be supported.  This
  patchset is based on a lot of code review and testing to approach that
  goal.

  While looking at what is needed to support the fuse filesystem it
  became clear that there were things like xattrs for security modules
  that needed special treatment.  That the resolution of those concerns
  would not be fuse specific.  That sorting out these general issues
  made most sense at the generic level, where the right people could be
  drawn into the conversation, and the issues could be solved for
  everyone.

  At a high level what this patchset does a couple of simple things:

   - Add a user namespace owner (s_user_ns) to struct super_block.

   - Teach the vfs to handle filesystem uids and gids not mapping into
     to kuids and kgids and being reported as INVALID_UID and
     INVALID_GID in vfs data structures.

  By assigning a user namespace owner filesystems that are mounted with
  only user namespace privilege can be detected.  This allows security
  modules and the like to know which mounts may not be trusted.  This
  also allows the set of uids and gids that are communicated to the
  filesystem to be capped at the set of kuids and kgids that are in the
  owning user namespace of the filesystem.

  One of the crazier corner casees this handles is the case of inodes
  whose i_uid or i_gid are not mapped into the vfs.  Most of the code
  simply doesn't care but it is easy to confuse the inode writeback path
  so no operation that could cause an inode write-back is permitted for
  such inodes (aka only reads are allowed).

  This set of changes starts out by cleaning up the code paths involved
  in user namespace permirted mounts.  Then when things are clean enough
  adds code that cleanly sets s_user_ns.  Then additional restrictions
  are added that are possible now that the filesystem superblock
  contains owner information.

  These changes should not affect anyone in practice, but there are some
  parts of these restrictions that are changes in behavior.

   - Andy's restriction on suid executables that does not honor the
     suid bit when the path is from another mount namespace (think
     /proc/[pid]/fd/) or when the filesystem was mounted by a less
     privileged user.

   - The replacement of the user namespace implicit setting of MNT_NODEV
     with implicitly setting SB_I_NODEV on the filesystem superblock
     instead.

     Using SB_I_NODEV is a stronger form that happens to make this state
     user invisible.  The user visibility can be managed but it caused
     problems when it was introduced from applications reasonably
     expecting mount flags to be what they were set to.

  There is a little bit of work remaining before it is safe to support
  mounting filesystems with backing store in user namespaces, beyond
  what is in this set of changes.

   - Verifying the mounter has permission to read/write the block device
     during mount.

   - Teaching the integrity modules IMA and EVM to handle filesystems
     mounted with only user namespace root and to reduce trust in their
     security xattrs accordingly.

   - Capturing the mounters credentials and using that for permission
     checks in d_automount and the like.  (Given that overlayfs already
     does this, and we need the work in d_automount it make sense to
     generalize this case).

  Furthermore there are a few changes that are on the wishlist:

   - Get all filesystems supporting posix acls using the generic posix
     acls so that posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user and
     posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user may be removed.  [Maintainability]

   - Reducing the permission checks in places such as remount to allow
     the superblock owner to perform them.

   - Allowing the superblock owner to chown files with unmapped uids and
     gids to something that is mapped so the files may be treated
     normally.

  I am not considering even obvious relaxations of permission checks
  until it is clear there are no more corner cases that need to be
  locked down and handled generically.

  Many thanks to Seth Forshee who kept this code alive, and putting up
  with me rewriting substantial portions of what he did to handle more
  corner cases, and for his diligent testing and reviewing of my
  changes"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (30 commits)
  fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds
  fs: Update i_[ug]id_(read|write) to translate relative to s_user_ns
  evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC
  dquot: For now explicitly don't support filesystems outside of init_user_ns
  quota: Handle quota data stored in s_user_ns in quota_setxquota
  quota: Ensure qids map to the filesystem
  vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
  vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
  cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as()
  fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
  vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns.
  userns: Handle -1 in k[ug]id_has_mapping when !CONFIG_USER_NS
  fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns
  selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
  Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
  Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
  fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
  fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block
  userns: Remove the now unnecessary FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT flag
  userns: Remove implicit MNT_NODEV fragility.
  ...