linux.git/fs/namei.c, branch v3.19

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2014-12-16T23:53:03+00:00

Pull vfs pile #2 from Al Viro:
 "Next pile (and there'll be one or two more).

  The large piece in this one is getting rid of /proc/*/ns/* weirdness;
  among other things, it allows to (finally) make nameidata completely
  opaque outside of fs/namei.c, making for easier further cleanups in
  there"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  coda_venus_readdir(): use file_inode()
  fs/namei.c: fold link_path_walk() call into path_init()
  path_init(): don't bother with LOOKUP_PARENT in argument
  fs/namei.c: new helper (path_cleanup())
  path_init(): store the "base" pointer to file in nameidata itself
  make default ->i_fop have ->open() fail with ENXIO
  make nameidata completely opaque outside of fs/namei.c
  kill proc_ns completely
  take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
  bury struct proc_ns in fs/proc
  copy address of proc_ns_ops into ns_common
  new helpers: ns_alloc_inum/ns_free_inum
  make proc_ns_operations work with struct ns_common * instead of void *
  switch the rest of proc_ns_operations to working with &...->ns
  netns: switch ->get()/->put()/->install()/->inum() to working with &net->ns
  make mntns ->get()/->put()/->install()/->inum() work with &mnt_ns->ns
  common object embedded into various struct ....ns

syscalls: implement execveat() system call

2014-12-13T20:42:51+00:00

This patchset adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd
Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528).

The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an
implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem,
at least for executables (rather than scripts).  The current glibc version
of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed
or otherwise restricted environments.

Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be
an appropriate generalization.

Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without
back-compatibility concerns.  The current implementation just defines the
AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other flags could be
added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474).

Related history:
 - https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone
   realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment.
 - http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered
   documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to
   "prevent other people from wasting their time".
 - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a
   problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve()
   because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since
   been fixed.

This patch (of 4):

Add a new execveat(2) system call.  execveat() is to execve() as openat()
is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a directory, and
resolves the filename relative to that.

In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified,
execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers.  This
replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in other
UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening "/proc/self/fd/" (and
so relies on /proc being mounted).

The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the
script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/"
(for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd//", effectively
reflecting how the executable was found.  This does however mean that
execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also, script
execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file will not be
accessible after exec).

Based on patches by Meredydd Luff.

Signed-off-by: David Drysdale 
Cc: Meredydd Luff 
Cc: Shuah Khan 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: Rich Felker 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Michael Kerrisk 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs/namei.c: fold link_path_walk() call into path_init()

2014-12-11T21:27:57+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

path_init(): don't bother with LOOKUP_PARENT in argument

2014-12-11T21:27:57+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

fs/namei.c: new helper (path_cleanup())

2014-12-11T21:27:57+00:00

All callers of path_init() proceed to do the identical cleanup when
they are done with nameidata.  Don't open-code it...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

path_init(): store the "base" pointer to file in nameidata itself

2014-12-11T21:27:57+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

make nameidata completely opaque outside of fs/namei.c

2014-12-11T02:32:13+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2014-11-02T18:28:43+00:00

Pull VFS fixes from Al Viro:
 "A bunch of assorted fixes, most of them followups to overlayfs merge"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  ovl: initialize ->is_cursor
  Return short read or 0 at end of a raw device, not EIO
  isofs: don't bother with ->d_op for normal case
  isofs_cmp(): we'll never see a dentry for . or ..
  overlayfs: fix lockdep misannotation
  ovl: fix check for cursor
  overlayfs: barriers for opening upper-layer directory
  rcu: Provide counterpart to rcu_dereference() for non-RCU situations
  staging: android: logger: Fix log corruption regression

fs: allow open(dir, O_TMPFILE|..., 0) with mode 0

2014-10-30T22:50:13+00:00

The man page for open(2) indicates that when O_CREAT is specified, the
'mode' argument applies only to future accesses to the file:

	Note that this mode applies only to future accesses of the newly
	created file; the open() call that creates a read-only file
	may well return a read/write file descriptor.

The man page for open(2) implies that 'mode' is treated identically by
O_CREAT and O_TMPFILE.

O_TMPFILE, however, behaves differently:

	int fd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_RDWR, 0);
	assert(fd == -1);
	assert(errno == EACCES);

	int fd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_RDWR, 0600);
	assert(fd > 0);

For O_CREAT, do_last() sets acc_mode to MAY_OPEN only:

	if (*opened & FILE_CREATED) {
		/* Don't check for write permission, don't truncate */
		open_flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
		will_truncate = false;
		acc_mode = MAY_OPEN;
		path_to_nameidata(path, nd);
		goto finish_open_created;
	}

But for O_TMPFILE, do_tmpfile() passes the full op->acc_mode to
may_open().

This patch lines up the behavior of O_TMPFILE with O_CREAT. After the
inode is created, may_open() is called with acc_mode = MAY_OPEN, in
do_tmpfile().

A different, but related glibc bug revealed the discrepancy:
https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523

The glibc lazily loads the 'mode' argument of open() and openat() using
va_arg() only if O_CREAT is present in 'flags' (to support both the 2
argument and the 3 argument forms of open; same idea for openat()).
However, the glibc ignores the 'mode' argument if O_TMPFILE is in
'flags'.

On x86_64, for open(), it magically works anyway, as 'mode' is in
RDX when entering open(), and is still in RDX on SYSCALL, which is where
the kernel looks for the 3rd argument of a syscall.

But openat() is not quite so lucky: 'mode' is in RCX when entering the
glibc wrapper for openat(), while the kernel looks for the 4th argument
of a syscall in R10. Indeed, the syscall calling convention differs from
the regular calling convention in this respect on x86_64. So the kernel
sees mode = 0 when trying to use glibc openat() with O_TMPFILE, and
fails with EACCES.

Signed-off-by: Eric Rannaud 
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

overlayfs: fix lockdep misannotation

2014-10-28T22:32:47+00:00

In an overlay directory that shadows an empty lower directory, say
/mnt/a/empty102, do:

 	touch /mnt/a/empty102/x
 	unlink /mnt/a/empty102/x
 	rmdir /mnt/a/empty102

It's actually harmless, but needs another level of nesting between
I_MUTEX_CHILD and I_MUTEX_NORMAL.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Tested-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro