In commit 3b6e2723f32d ("locks: prevent side-effects of
locks_release_private before file_lock is initialized") we removed the
last user of lm_release_private without removing the field itself.

Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull nfsd changes from J. Bruce Fields:
 "This has been an unusually quiet cycle--mostly bugfixes and cleanup.
  The one large piece is Stanislav's work to containerize the server's
  grace period--but that in itself is just one more step in a
  not-yet-complete project to allow fully containerized nfs service.

  There are a number of outstanding delegation, container, v4 state, and
  gss patches that aren't quite ready yet; 3.7 may be wilder."

* 'nfsd-next' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (35 commits)
  NFSd: make boot_time variable per network namespace
  NFSd: make grace end flag per network namespace
  Lockd: move grace period management from lockd() to per-net functions
  LockD: pass actual network namespace to grace period management functions
  LockD: manage grace list per network namespace
  SUNRPC: service request network namespace helper introduced
  NFSd: make nfsd4_manager allocated per network namespace context.
  LockD: make lockd manager allocated per network namespace
  LockD: manage grace period per network namespace
  Lockd: add more debug to host shutdown functions
  Lockd: host complaining function introduced
  LockD: manage used host count per networks namespace
  LockD: manage garbage collection timeout per networks namespace
  LockD: make garbage collector network namespace aware.
  LockD: mark host per network namespace on garbage collect
  nfsd4: fix missing fault_inject.h include
  locks: move lease-specific code out of locks_delete_lock
  locks: prevent side-effects of locks_release_private before file_lock is initialized
  NFSd: set nfsd_serv to NULL after service destruction
  NFSd: introduce nfsd_destroy() helper
  ...

No point putting something only used by one caller into common code.

Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

When calling fcntl(fd, F_SETLEASE, lck) [with lck=F_WRLCK or F_RDLCK],
the custom signal or owner (if any were previously set using F_SETSIG
or F_SETOWN fcntls) would be reset when F_SETLEASE was called for the
second time on the same file descriptor.

This bug is a regression of 2.6.37 and is described here:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=43336

This patch reverts a commit from Oct 2004 (with subject "nfs4 lease:
move the f_delown processing") which originally introduced the
lm_release_private callback.

Signed-off-by: Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

The only checks of the long argument passed to fcntl(fd,F_SETLEASE,.)
are done after converting the long to an int.  Thus some illegal values
may be let through and cause problems in later code.

[ They actually *don't* cause problems in mainline, as of Dave Jones's
  commit 8d657eb3b438 "Remove easily user-triggerable BUG from
  generic_setlease", but we should fix this anyway.  And this patch will
  be necessary to fix real bugs on earlier kernels. ]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This can be trivially triggered from userspace by passing in something unexpected.

    kernel BUG at fs/locks.c:1468!
    invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
    RIP: 0010:generic_setlease+0xc2/0x100
    Call Trace:
      __vfs_setlease+0x35/0x40
      fcntl_setlease+0x76/0x150
      sys_fcntl+0x1c6/0x810
      system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f

Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 3.2+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
  reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
  implementation.

  Highlights:
   - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
     code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.

   - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
     config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
     user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
     checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.

   - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
     user namespace before they are processed.  Removing the need to add
     an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
     uids remains the same.

   - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
     better than it is today.

   - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
     operationally with the user namespace enabled.

   - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
     billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
     enabled.  This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
     164ns per stat operation).

   - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
     Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
     anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
     entertaining failures in userspace.

   - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
     I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
     could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
     handle the case where setuid fails.

   - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
     we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid.  The LFS
     experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
     better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
     can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
     can't map.

   - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
     safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.

  My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
  kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."

Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
  userns:  Silence silly gcc warning.
  cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
  userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
  userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
  userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
  userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
  userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
  userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
  userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
  userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
  userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
  ...

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

We can deadlock if we have a write oplock and two processes
use the same file handle. In this case the first process can't
unlock its lock if the second process blocked on the lock in the
same time.

Fix it by using posix_lock_file rather than posix_lock_file_wait
under cinode->lock_mutex. If we request a blocking lock and
posix_lock_file indicates that there is another lock that prevents
us, wait untill that lock is released and restart our call.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>