<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/fscache, branch v4.14</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T10:10:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-01T14:07:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd'/>
<id>b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>FS-Cache: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload</title>
<updated>2017-10-12T16:16:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-09T19:40:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d124b2c53c7bee6569d2a2d0b18b4a1afde00134'/>
<id>d124b2c53c7bee6569d2a2d0b18b4a1afde00134</id>
<content type='text'>
When the file /proc/fs/fscache/objects (available with
CONFIG_FSCACHE_OBJECT_LIST=y) is opened, we request a user key with
description "fscache:objlist", then access its payload.  However, a
revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for this.
request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a window
where the key can be revoked before we access its payload.

Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.

Fixes: 4fbf4291aa15 ("FS-Cache: Allow the current state of all objects to be dumped")
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;    [v2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When the file /proc/fs/fscache/objects (available with
CONFIG_FSCACHE_OBJECT_LIST=y) is opened, we request a user key with
description "fscache:objlist", then access its payload.  However, a
revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for this.
request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a window
where the key can be revoked before we access its payload.

Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.

Fixes: 4fbf4291aa15 ("FS-Cache: Allow the current state of all objects to be dumped")
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;    [v2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscache: fix fscache_objlist_show format processing</title>
<updated>2017-09-14T01:53:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-13T23:28:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ebfddb3d447f5267c76680ea4d242e6f9bcafa87'/>
<id>ebfddb3d447f5267c76680ea4d242e6f9bcafa87</id>
<content type='text'>
gcc points out a minor bug in the handling of unknown cookie types,
which could result in a string overflow when the integer is copied into
a 3-byte string:

  fs/fscache/object-list.c: In function 'fscache_objlist_show':
  fs/fscache/object-list.c:265:19: error: 'sprintf' may write a terminating nul past the end of the destination [-Werror=format-overflow=]
   sprintf(_type, "%02u", cookie-&gt;def-&gt;type);
                  ^~~~~~
  fs/fscache/object-list.c:265:4: note: 'sprintf' output between 3 and 4 bytes into a destination of size 3

This is currently harmless as no code sets a type other than 0 or 1, but
it makes sense to use snprintf() here to avoid overflowing the array if
that changes.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170714120720.906842-22-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
gcc points out a minor bug in the handling of unknown cookie types,
which could result in a string overflow when the integer is copied into
a 3-byte string:

  fs/fscache/object-list.c: In function 'fscache_objlist_show':
  fs/fscache/object-list.c:265:19: error: 'sprintf' may write a terminating nul past the end of the destination [-Werror=format-overflow=]
   sprintf(_type, "%02u", cookie-&gt;def-&gt;type);
                  ^~~~~~
  fs/fscache/object-list.c:265:4: note: 'sprintf' output between 3 and 4 bytes into a destination of size 3

This is currently harmless as no code sets a type other than 0 or 1, but
it makes sense to use snprintf() here to avoid overflowing the array if
that changes.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170714120720.906842-22-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: remove nr_pages argument from pagevec_lookup{,_range}()</title>
<updated>2017-09-07T00:27:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-06T23:21:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=397162ffa2ed1cadffe05c324c6ddc53647f9c62'/>
<id>397162ffa2ed1cadffe05c324c6ddc53647f9c62</id>
<content type='text'>
All users of pagevec_lookup() and pagevec_lookup_range() now pass
PAGEVEC_SIZE as a desired number of pages.

Just drop the argument.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170726114704.7626-11-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
All users of pagevec_lookup() and pagevec_lookup_range() now pass
PAGEVEC_SIZE as a desired number of pages.

Just drop the argument.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170726114704.7626-11-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: make pagevec_lookup() update index</title>
<updated>2017-09-07T00:27:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-06T23:21:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d72dc8a25afc71ce90ee92bdd77550e9beb85d4d'/>
<id>d72dc8a25afc71ce90ee92bdd77550e9beb85d4d</id>
<content type='text'>
Make pagevec_lookup() (and underlying find_get_pages()) update index to
the next page where iteration should continue.  Most callers want this
and also pagevec_lookup_tag() already does this.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170726114704.7626-3-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make pagevec_lookup() (and underlying find_get_pages()) update index to
the next page where iteration should continue.  Most callers want this
and also pagevec_lookup_tag() already does this.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170726114704.7626-3-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload()</title>
<updated>2017-03-01T23:09:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-01T15:11:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0837e49ab3fa8d903a499984575d71efee8097ce'/>
<id>0837e49ab3fa8d903a499984575d71efee8097ce</id>
<content type='text'>
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:

 (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
     to protect the key.

 (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
     used to protect the key and the may be being modified.

Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:

 (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:

	dereference_key_locked()
	user_key_payload_locked()

 (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:

	dereference_key_rcu()
	user_key_payload_rcu()

This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper

  ===============================
  [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
  4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G        W
  -------------------------------
  ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
  other info that might help us debug this:
  rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
  1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
    #0:  (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [&lt;d000000002527abc&gt;] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G        W       4.10.0 #1
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
    lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
    nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
    nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
    decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
    decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
    rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
    call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
    __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
    rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
    nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
    _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
    mount_fs+0x74/0x210
    vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
    nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
    nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
    mount_fs+0x74/0x210
    vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
    do_mount+0x254/0xf70
    SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
    system_call+0x38/0xe0

Reported-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:

 (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
     to protect the key.

 (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
     used to protect the key and the may be being modified.

Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:

 (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:

	dereference_key_locked()
	user_key_payload_locked()

 (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:

	dereference_key_rcu()
	user_key_payload_rcu()

This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper

  ===============================
  [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
  4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G        W
  -------------------------------
  ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
  other info that might help us debug this:
  rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
  1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
    #0:  (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [&lt;d000000002527abc&gt;] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G        W       4.10.0 #1
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
    lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
    nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
    nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
    decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
    decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
    rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
    call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
    __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
    rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
    nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
    _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
    mount_fs+0x74/0x210
    vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
    nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
    nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
    mount_fs+0x74/0x210
    vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
    do_mount+0x254/0xf70
    SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
    system_call+0x38/0xe0

Reported-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscache: Fix dead object requeue</title>
<updated>2017-01-31T18:23:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-31T09:45:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=e26bfebdfc0d212d366de9990a096665d5c0209a'/>
<id>e26bfebdfc0d212d366de9990a096665d5c0209a</id>
<content type='text'>
Under some circumstances, an fscache object can become queued such that it
fscache_object_work_func() can be called once the object is in the
OBJECT_DEAD state.  This results in the kernel oopsing when it tries to
invoke the handler for the state (which is hard coded to 0x2).

The way this comes about is something like the following:

 (1) The object dispatcher is processing a work state for an object.  This
     is done in workqueue context.

 (2) An out-of-band event comes in that isn't masked, causing the object to
     be queued, say EV_KILL.

 (3) The object dispatcher finishes processing the current work state on
     that object and then sees there's another event to process, so,
     without returning to the workqueue core, it processes that event too.
     It then follows the chain of events that initiates until we reach
     OBJECT_DEAD without going through a wait state (such as
     WAIT_FOR_CLEARANCE).

     At this point, object-&gt;events may be 0, object-&gt;event_mask will be 0
     and oob_event_mask will be 0.

 (4) The object dispatcher returns to the workqueue processor, and in due
     course, this sees that the object's work item is still queued and
     invokes it again.

 (5) The current state is a work state (OBJECT_DEAD), so the dispatcher
     jumps to it - resulting in an OOPS.

When I'm seeing this, the work state in (1) appears to have been either
LOOK_UP_OBJECT or CREATE_OBJECT (object-&gt;oob_table is
fscache_osm_lookup_oob).

The window for (2) is very small:

 (A) object-&gt;event_mask is cleared whilst the event dispatch process is
     underway - though there's no memory barrier to force this to the top
     of the function.

     The window, therefore is from the time the object was selected by the
     workqueue processor and made requeueable to the time the mask was
     cleared.

 (B) fscache_raise_event() will only queue the object if it manages to set
     the event bit and the corresponding event_mask bit was set.

     The enqueuement is then deferred slightly whilst we get a ref on the
     object and get the per-CPU variable for workqueue congestion.  This
     slight deferral slightly increases the probability by allowing extra
     time for the workqueue to make the item requeueable.

Handle this by giving the dead state a processor function and checking the
for the dead state address rather than seeing if the processor function is
address 0x2.  The dead state processor function can then set a flag to
indicate that it's occurred and give a warning if it occurs more than once
per object.

If this race occurs, an oops similar to the following is seen (note the RIP
value):

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000002
IP: [&lt;0000000000000002&gt;] 0x1
PGD 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 17 PID: 16077 Comm: kworker/u48:9 Not tainted 3.10.0-327.18.2.el7.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
Workqueue: fscache_object fscache_object_work_func [fscache]
task: ffff880302b63980 ti: ffff880717544000 task.ti: ffff880717544000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;0000000000000002&gt;]  [&lt;0000000000000002&gt;] 0x1
RSP: 0018:ffff880717547df8  EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffffffffa0368640 RBX: ffff880edf7a4480 RCX: dead000000200200
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff880edf7a4480
RBP: ffff880717547e18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: dfc40a25cb3a4510
R10: dfc40a25cb3a4510 R11: 0000000000000400 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff880edf7a4510 R14: ffff8817f6153400 R15: 0000000000000600
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88181f420000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 000000000194a000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Stack:
 ffffffffa0363695 ffff880edf7a4510 ffff88093f16f900 ffff8817faa4ec00
 ffff880717547e60 ffffffff8109d5db 00000000faa4ec18 0000000000000000
 ffff8817faa4ec18 ffff88093f16f930 ffff880302b63980 ffff88093f16f900
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffffa0363695&gt;] ? fscache_object_work_func+0xa5/0x200 [fscache]
 [&lt;ffffffff8109d5db&gt;] process_one_work+0x17b/0x470
 [&lt;ffffffff8109e4ac&gt;] worker_thread+0x21c/0x400
 [&lt;ffffffff8109e290&gt;] ? rescuer_thread+0x400/0x400
 [&lt;ffffffff810a5acf&gt;] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
 [&lt;ffffffff810a5a00&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140
 [&lt;ffffffff816460d8&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
 [&lt;ffffffff810a5a00&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeremy McNicoll &lt;jeremymc@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Frank Sorenson &lt;sorenson@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Under some circumstances, an fscache object can become queued such that it
fscache_object_work_func() can be called once the object is in the
OBJECT_DEAD state.  This results in the kernel oopsing when it tries to
invoke the handler for the state (which is hard coded to 0x2).

The way this comes about is something like the following:

 (1) The object dispatcher is processing a work state for an object.  This
     is done in workqueue context.

 (2) An out-of-band event comes in that isn't masked, causing the object to
     be queued, say EV_KILL.

 (3) The object dispatcher finishes processing the current work state on
     that object and then sees there's another event to process, so,
     without returning to the workqueue core, it processes that event too.
     It then follows the chain of events that initiates until we reach
     OBJECT_DEAD without going through a wait state (such as
     WAIT_FOR_CLEARANCE).

     At this point, object-&gt;events may be 0, object-&gt;event_mask will be 0
     and oob_event_mask will be 0.

 (4) The object dispatcher returns to the workqueue processor, and in due
     course, this sees that the object's work item is still queued and
     invokes it again.

 (5) The current state is a work state (OBJECT_DEAD), so the dispatcher
     jumps to it - resulting in an OOPS.

When I'm seeing this, the work state in (1) appears to have been either
LOOK_UP_OBJECT or CREATE_OBJECT (object-&gt;oob_table is
fscache_osm_lookup_oob).

The window for (2) is very small:

 (A) object-&gt;event_mask is cleared whilst the event dispatch process is
     underway - though there's no memory barrier to force this to the top
     of the function.

     The window, therefore is from the time the object was selected by the
     workqueue processor and made requeueable to the time the mask was
     cleared.

 (B) fscache_raise_event() will only queue the object if it manages to set
     the event bit and the corresponding event_mask bit was set.

     The enqueuement is then deferred slightly whilst we get a ref on the
     object and get the per-CPU variable for workqueue congestion.  This
     slight deferral slightly increases the probability by allowing extra
     time for the workqueue to make the item requeueable.

Handle this by giving the dead state a processor function and checking the
for the dead state address rather than seeing if the processor function is
address 0x2.  The dead state processor function can then set a flag to
indicate that it's occurred and give a warning if it occurs more than once
per object.

If this race occurs, an oops similar to the following is seen (note the RIP
value):

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000002
IP: [&lt;0000000000000002&gt;] 0x1
PGD 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 17 PID: 16077 Comm: kworker/u48:9 Not tainted 3.10.0-327.18.2.el7.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
Workqueue: fscache_object fscache_object_work_func [fscache]
task: ffff880302b63980 ti: ffff880717544000 task.ti: ffff880717544000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;0000000000000002&gt;]  [&lt;0000000000000002&gt;] 0x1
RSP: 0018:ffff880717547df8  EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffffffffa0368640 RBX: ffff880edf7a4480 RCX: dead000000200200
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff880edf7a4480
RBP: ffff880717547e18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: dfc40a25cb3a4510
R10: dfc40a25cb3a4510 R11: 0000000000000400 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff880edf7a4510 R14: ffff8817f6153400 R15: 0000000000000600
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88181f420000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 000000000194a000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Stack:
 ffffffffa0363695 ffff880edf7a4510 ffff88093f16f900 ffff8817faa4ec00
 ffff880717547e60 ffffffff8109d5db 00000000faa4ec18 0000000000000000
 ffff8817faa4ec18 ffff88093f16f930 ffff880302b63980 ffff88093f16f900
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffffa0363695&gt;] ? fscache_object_work_func+0xa5/0x200 [fscache]
 [&lt;ffffffff8109d5db&gt;] process_one_work+0x17b/0x470
 [&lt;ffffffff8109e4ac&gt;] worker_thread+0x21c/0x400
 [&lt;ffffffff8109e290&gt;] ? rescuer_thread+0x400/0x400
 [&lt;ffffffff810a5acf&gt;] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
 [&lt;ffffffff810a5a00&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140
 [&lt;ffffffff816460d8&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
 [&lt;ffffffff810a5a00&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x140/0x140

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeremy McNicoll &lt;jeremymc@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Frank Sorenson &lt;sorenson@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington &lt;bcodding@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscache: Clear outstanding writes when disabling a cookie</title>
<updated>2017-01-31T18:23:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-18T14:29:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6bdded59c8933940ac7e5b416448276ac89d1144'/>
<id>6bdded59c8933940ac7e5b416448276ac89d1144</id>
<content type='text'>
fscache_disable_cookie() needs to clear the outstanding writes on the
cookie it's disabling because they cannot be completed after.

Without this, fscache_nfs_open_file() gets stuck because it disables the
cookie when the file is opened for writing but can't uncache the pages till
afterwards - otherwise there's a race between the open routine and anyone
who already has it open R/O and is still reading from it.

Looking in /proc/pid/stack of the offending process shows:

[&lt;ffffffffa0142883&gt;] __fscache_wait_on_page_write+0x82/0x9b [fscache]
[&lt;ffffffffa014336e&gt;] __fscache_uncache_all_inode_pages+0x91/0xe1 [fscache]
[&lt;ffffffffa01740fa&gt;] nfs_fscache_open_file+0x59/0x9e [nfs]
[&lt;ffffffffa01ccf41&gt;] nfs4_file_open+0x17f/0x1b8 [nfsv4]
[&lt;ffffffff8117350e&gt;] do_dentry_open+0x16d/0x2b7
[&lt;ffffffff811743ac&gt;] vfs_open+0x5c/0x65
[&lt;ffffffff81184185&gt;] path_openat+0x785/0x8fb
[&lt;ffffffff81184343&gt;] do_filp_open+0x48/0x9e
[&lt;ffffffff81174710&gt;] do_sys_open+0x13b/0x1cb
[&lt;ffffffff811747b9&gt;] SyS_open+0x19/0x1b
[&lt;ffffffff81001c44&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x17a
[&lt;ffffffff8165c2da&gt;] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a
[&lt;ffffffffffffffff&gt;] 0xffffffffffffffff

Reported-by: Jianhong Yin &lt;jiyin@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steve Dickson &lt;steved@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
fscache_disable_cookie() needs to clear the outstanding writes on the
cookie it's disabling because they cannot be completed after.

Without this, fscache_nfs_open_file() gets stuck because it disables the
cookie when the file is opened for writing but can't uncache the pages till
afterwards - otherwise there's a race between the open routine and anyone
who already has it open R/O and is still reading from it.

Looking in /proc/pid/stack of the offending process shows:

[&lt;ffffffffa0142883&gt;] __fscache_wait_on_page_write+0x82/0x9b [fscache]
[&lt;ffffffffa014336e&gt;] __fscache_uncache_all_inode_pages+0x91/0xe1 [fscache]
[&lt;ffffffffa01740fa&gt;] nfs_fscache_open_file+0x59/0x9e [nfs]
[&lt;ffffffffa01ccf41&gt;] nfs4_file_open+0x17f/0x1b8 [nfsv4]
[&lt;ffffffff8117350e&gt;] do_dentry_open+0x16d/0x2b7
[&lt;ffffffff811743ac&gt;] vfs_open+0x5c/0x65
[&lt;ffffffff81184185&gt;] path_openat+0x785/0x8fb
[&lt;ffffffff81184343&gt;] do_filp_open+0x48/0x9e
[&lt;ffffffff81174710&gt;] do_sys_open+0x13b/0x1cb
[&lt;ffffffff811747b9&gt;] SyS_open+0x19/0x1b
[&lt;ffffffff81001c44&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x17a
[&lt;ffffffff8165c2da&gt;] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a
[&lt;ffffffffffffffff&gt;] 0xffffffffffffffff

Reported-by: Jianhong Yin &lt;jiyin@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steve Dickson &lt;steved@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>FS-Cache: Initialise stores_lock in netfs cookie</title>
<updated>2017-01-31T18:23:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-18T14:29:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=62deb8187d116581c88c69a2dd9b5c16588545d4'/>
<id>62deb8187d116581c88c69a2dd9b5c16588545d4</id>
<content type='text'>
Initialise the stores_lock in fscache netfs cookies.  Technically, it
shouldn't be necessary, since the netfs cookie is an index and stores no
data, but initialising it anyway adds insignificant overhead.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steve Dickson &lt;steved@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Initialise the stores_lock in fscache netfs cookies.  Technically, it
shouldn't be necessary, since the netfs cookie is an index and stores no
data, but initialising it anyway adds insignificant overhead.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steve Dickson &lt;steved@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'd_real' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs into work.misc</title>
<updated>2016-07-01T03:34:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-01T03:34:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b223f4e215b32849b841e750e83a915b670070f5'/>
<id>b223f4e215b32849b841e750e83a915b670070f5</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
