<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/eventpoll.c, branch v4.13</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>epoll: fix race between ep_poll_callback(POLLFREE) and ep_free()/ep_remove()</title>
<updated>2017-09-01T20:07:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-01T16:55:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=138e4ad67afd5c6c318b056b4d17c17f2c0ca5c0'/>
<id>138e4ad67afd5c6c318b056b4d17c17f2c0ca5c0</id>
<content type='text'>
The race was introduced by me in commit 971316f0503a ("epoll:
ep_unregister_pollwait() can use the freed pwq-&gt;whead").  I did not
realize that nothing can protect eventpoll after ep_poll_callback() sets
-&gt;whead = NULL, only whead-&gt;lock can save us from the race with
ep_free() or ep_remove().

Move -&gt;whead = NULL to the end of ep_poll_callback() and add the
necessary barriers.

TODO: cleanup the ewake/EPOLLEXCLUSIVE logic, it was confusing even
before this patch.

Hopefully this explains use-after-free reported by syzcaller:

	BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in debug_spin_lock_before
	...
	 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4a/0x60 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
	 ep_poll_callback+0x29f/0xff0 fs/eventpoll.c:1148

this is spin_lock(eventpoll-&gt;lock),

	...
	Freed by task 17774:
	...
	 kfree+0xe8/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:3883
	 ep_free+0x22c/0x2a0 fs/eventpoll.c:865

Fixes: 971316f0503a ("epoll: ep_unregister_pollwait() can use the freed pwq-&gt;whead")
Reported-by: 范龙飞 &lt;long7573@126.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The race was introduced by me in commit 971316f0503a ("epoll:
ep_unregister_pollwait() can use the freed pwq-&gt;whead").  I did not
realize that nothing can protect eventpoll after ep_poll_callback() sets
-&gt;whead = NULL, only whead-&gt;lock can save us from the race with
ep_free() or ep_remove().

Move -&gt;whead = NULL to the end of ep_poll_callback() and add the
necessary barriers.

TODO: cleanup the ewake/EPOLLEXCLUSIVE logic, it was confusing even
before this patch.

Hopefully this explains use-after-free reported by syzcaller:

	BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in debug_spin_lock_before
	...
	 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4a/0x60 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
	 ep_poll_callback+0x29f/0xff0 fs/eventpoll.c:1148

this is spin_lock(eventpoll-&gt;lock),

	...
	Freed by task 17774:
	...
	 kfree+0xe8/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:3883
	 ep_free+0x22c/0x2a0 fs/eventpoll.c:865

Fixes: 971316f0503a ("epoll: ep_unregister_pollwait() can use the freed pwq-&gt;whead")
Reported-by: 范龙飞 &lt;long7573@126.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kcmp: fs/epoll: wrap kcmp code with CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE</title>
<updated>2017-07-12T23:26:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyrill Gorcunov</name>
<email>gorcunov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-12T21:34:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=92ef6da3d06ff551a86de41ae37df9cc4b58d7a0'/>
<id>92ef6da3d06ff551a86de41ae37df9cc4b58d7a0</id>
<content type='text'>
kcmp syscall is build iif CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is selected, so wrap
appropriate helpers in epoll code with the config to build it
conditionally.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170513083456.GG1881@uranus.lan
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Reported-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
kcmp syscall is build iif CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is selected, so wrap
appropriate helpers in epoll code with the config to build it
conditionally.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170513083456.GG1881@uranus.lan
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Reported-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kcmp: add KCMP_EPOLL_TFD mode to compare epoll target files</title>
<updated>2017-07-12T23:26:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyrill Gorcunov</name>
<email>gorcunov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-12T21:34:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0791e3644e5ef21646fe565b9061788d05ec71d4'/>
<id>0791e3644e5ef21646fe565b9061788d05ec71d4</id>
<content type='text'>
With current epoll architecture target files are addressed with
file_struct and file descriptor number, where the last is not unique.
Moreover files can be transferred from another process via unix socket,
added into queue and closed then so we won't find this descriptor in the
task fdinfo list.

Thus to checkpoint and restore such processes CRIU needs to find out
where exactly the target file is present to add it into epoll queue.
For this sake one can use kcmp call where some particular target file
from the queue is compared with arbitrary file passed as an argument.

Because epoll target files can have same file descriptor number but
different file_struct a caller should explicitly specify the offset
within.

To test if some particular file is matching entry inside epoll one have
to

 - fill kcmp_epoll_slot structure with epoll file descriptor,
   target file number and target file offset (in case if only
   one target is present then it should be 0)

 - call kcmp as kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_EPOLL_TFD, fd, &amp;kcmp_epoll_slot)
    - the kernel fetch file pointer matching file descriptor @fd of pid1
    - lookups for file struct in epoll queue of pid2 and returns traditional
      0,1,2 result for sorting purpose

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170424154423.511592110@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
With current epoll architecture target files are addressed with
file_struct and file descriptor number, where the last is not unique.
Moreover files can be transferred from another process via unix socket,
added into queue and closed then so we won't find this descriptor in the
task fdinfo list.

Thus to checkpoint and restore such processes CRIU needs to find out
where exactly the target file is present to add it into epoll queue.
For this sake one can use kcmp call where some particular target file
from the queue is compared with arbitrary file passed as an argument.

Because epoll target files can have same file descriptor number but
different file_struct a caller should explicitly specify the offset
within.

To test if some particular file is matching entry inside epoll one have
to

 - fill kcmp_epoll_slot structure with epoll file descriptor,
   target file number and target file offset (in case if only
   one target is present then it should be 0)

 - call kcmp as kcmp(pid1, pid2, KCMP_EPOLL_TFD, fd, &amp;kcmp_epoll_slot)
    - the kernel fetch file pointer matching file descriptor @fd of pid1
    - lookups for file struct in epoll queue of pid2 and returns traditional
      0,1,2 result for sorting purpose

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170424154423.511592110@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>procfs: fdinfo: extend information about epoll target files</title>
<updated>2017-07-12T23:26:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyrill Gorcunov</name>
<email>gorcunov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-12T21:34:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=77493f04b74cdff3a61fb3fb14b1f5a71d88fd5f'/>
<id>77493f04b74cdff3a61fb3fb14b1f5a71d88fd5f</id>
<content type='text'>
Since it is possbile to have same number in tfd field (say file added,
closed, then nother file dup'ed to same number and added back) it is
imposible to distinguish such target files solely by their numbers.

Strictly speaking regular applications don't need to recognize these
targets at all but for checkpoint/restore sake we need to collect
targets to be able to push them back on restore stage in a proper order.

Thus lets add file position, inode and device number where this target
lays.  This three fields can be used as a primary key for sorting, and
together with kcmp help CRIU can find out an exact file target (from the
whole set of processes being checkpointed).

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170424154423.436491881@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Since it is possbile to have same number in tfd field (say file added,
closed, then nother file dup'ed to same number and added back) it is
imposible to distinguish such target files solely by their numbers.

Strictly speaking regular applications don't need to recognize these
targets at all but for checkpoint/restore sake we need to collect
targets to be able to push them back on restore stage in a proper order.

Thus lets add file position, inode and device number where this target
lays.  This three fields can be used as a primary key for sorting, and
together with kcmp help CRIU can find out an exact file target (from the
whole set of processes being checkpointed).

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170424154423.436491881@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs, epoll: short circuit fetching events if thread has been killed</title>
<updated>2017-07-10T23:32:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Rientjes</name>
<email>rientjes@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-10T22:52:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c257a340ede0104e902807f0f001799850343ae9'/>
<id>c257a340ede0104e902807f0f001799850343ae9</id>
<content type='text'>
We've encountered zombies that are waiting for a thread to exit that are
looping in ep_poll() almost endlessly although there is a pending
SIGKILL as a result of a group exit.

This happens because we always find ep_events_available() and fetch more
events and never are able to check for signal_pending() that would break
from the loop and return -EINTR.

Special case fatal signals and break immediately to guarantee that we
loop to fetch more events and delay making a timely exit.

It would also be possible to simply move the check for signal_pending()
higher than checking for ep_events_available(), but there have been no
reports of delayed signal handling other than SIGKILL preventing zombies
from exiting that would be fixed by this.

It fixes an issue for us where we have witnessed zombies sticking around
for at least O(minutes), but considering the code has been like this
forever and nobody else has complained that I have found, I would simply
queue it up for 4.12.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1705031722350.76784@chino.kir.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Davide Libenzi &lt;davidel@xmailserver.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We've encountered zombies that are waiting for a thread to exit that are
looping in ep_poll() almost endlessly although there is a pending
SIGKILL as a result of a group exit.

This happens because we always find ep_events_available() and fetch more
events and never are able to check for signal_pending() that would break
from the loop and return -EINTR.

Special case fatal signals and break immediately to guarantee that we
loop to fetch more events and delay making a timely exit.

It would also be possible to simply move the check for signal_pending()
higher than checking for ep_events_available(), but there have been no
reports of delayed signal handling other than SIGKILL preventing zombies
from exiting that would be fixed by this.

It fixes an issue for us where we have witnessed zombies sticking around
for at least O(minutes), but considering the code has been like this
forever and nobody else has complained that I have found, I would simply
queue it up for 4.12.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1705031722350.76784@chino.kir.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Davide Libenzi &lt;davidel@xmailserver.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/wait: Disambiguate wq_entry-&gt;task_list and wq_head-&gt;task_list naming</title>
<updated>2017-06-20T10:19:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-20T10:06:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2055da97389a605c8a00d163d40903afbe413921'/>
<id>2055da97389a605c8a00d163d40903afbe413921</id>
<content type='text'>
So I've noticed a number of instances where it was not obvious from the
code whether -&gt;task_list was for a wait-queue head or a wait-queue entry.

Furthermore, there's a number of wait-queue users where the lists are
not for 'tasks' but other entities (poll tables, etc.), in which case
the 'task_list' name is actively confusing.

To clear this all up, name the wait-queue head and entry list structure
fields unambiguously:

	struct wait_queue_head::task_list	=&gt; ::head
	struct wait_queue_entry::task_list	=&gt; ::entry

For example, this code:

	rqw-&gt;wait.task_list.next != &amp;wait-&gt;task_list

... is was pretty unclear (to me) what it's doing, while now it's written this way:

	rqw-&gt;wait.head.next != &amp;wait-&gt;entry

... which makes it pretty clear that we are iterating a list until we see the head.

Other examples are:

	list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, next, &amp;x-&gt;task_list, task_list) {
	list_for_each_entry(wq, &amp;fence-&gt;wait.task_list, task_list) {

... where it's unclear (to me) what we are iterating, and during review it's
hard to tell whether it's trying to walk a wait-queue entry (which would be
a bug), while now it's written as:

	list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, next, &amp;x-&gt;head, entry) {
	list_for_each_entry(wq, &amp;fence-&gt;wait.head, entry) {

Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
So I've noticed a number of instances where it was not obvious from the
code whether -&gt;task_list was for a wait-queue head or a wait-queue entry.

Furthermore, there's a number of wait-queue users where the lists are
not for 'tasks' but other entities (poll tables, etc.), in which case
the 'task_list' name is actively confusing.

To clear this all up, name the wait-queue head and entry list structure
fields unambiguously:

	struct wait_queue_head::task_list	=&gt; ::head
	struct wait_queue_entry::task_list	=&gt; ::entry

For example, this code:

	rqw-&gt;wait.task_list.next != &amp;wait-&gt;task_list

... is was pretty unclear (to me) what it's doing, while now it's written this way:

	rqw-&gt;wait.head.next != &amp;wait-&gt;entry

... which makes it pretty clear that we are iterating a list until we see the head.

Other examples are:

	list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, next, &amp;x-&gt;task_list, task_list) {
	list_for_each_entry(wq, &amp;fence-&gt;wait.task_list, task_list) {

... where it's unclear (to me) what we are iterating, and during review it's
hard to tell whether it's trying to walk a wait-queue entry (which would be
a bug), while now it's written as:

	list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, next, &amp;x-&gt;head, entry) {
	list_for_each_entry(wq, &amp;fence-&gt;wait.head, entry) {

Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/wait: Rename wait_queue_t =&gt; wait_queue_entry_t</title>
<updated>2017-06-20T10:18:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-20T10:06:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ac6424b981bce1c4bc55675c6ce11bfe1bbfa64f'/>
<id>ac6424b981bce1c4bc55675c6ce11bfe1bbfa64f</id>
<content type='text'>
Rename:

	wait_queue_t		=&gt;	wait_queue_entry_t

'wait_queue_t' was always a slight misnomer: its name implies that it's a "queue",
but in reality it's a queue *entry*. The 'real' queue is the wait queue head,
which had to carry the name.

Start sorting this out by renaming it to 'wait_queue_entry_t'.

This also allows the real structure name 'struct __wait_queue' to
lose its double underscore and become 'struct wait_queue_entry',
which is the more canonical nomenclature for such data types.

Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Rename:

	wait_queue_t		=&gt;	wait_queue_entry_t

'wait_queue_t' was always a slight misnomer: its name implies that it's a "queue",
but in reality it's a queue *entry*. The 'real' queue is the wait queue head,
which had to carry the name.

Start sorting this out by renaming it to 'wait_queue_entry_t'.

This also allows the real structure name 'struct __wait_queue' to
lose its double underscore and become 'struct wait_queue_entry',
which is the more canonical nomenclature for such data types.

Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>epoll: Add busy poll support to epoll with socket fds.</title>
<updated>2017-03-25T03:49:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sridhar Samudrala</name>
<email>sridhar.samudrala@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-24T17:08:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bf3b9f6372c45b0fbf24d86b8794910d20170017'/>
<id>bf3b9f6372c45b0fbf24d86b8794910d20170017</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch adds busy poll support to epoll. The implementation is meant to
be opportunistic in that it will take the NAPI ID from the last socket
that is added to the ready list that contains a valid NAPI ID and it will
use that for busy polling until the ready list goes empty.  Once the ready
list goes empty the NAPI ID is reset and busy polling is disabled until a
new socket is added to the ready list.

In addition when we insert a new socket into the epoll we record the NAPI
ID and assume we are going to receive events on it.  If that doesn't occur
it will be evicted as the active NAPI ID and we will resume normal
behavior.

An application can use SO_INCOMING_CPU or SO_REUSEPORT_ATTACH_C/EBPF socket
options to spread the incoming connections to specific worker threads
based on the incoming queue. This enables epoll for each worker thread
to have only sockets that receive packets from a single queue. So when an
application calls epoll_wait() and there are no events available to report,
busy polling is done on the associated queue to pull the packets.

Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sridhar.samudrala@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexander.h.duyck@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch adds busy poll support to epoll. The implementation is meant to
be opportunistic in that it will take the NAPI ID from the last socket
that is added to the ready list that contains a valid NAPI ID and it will
use that for busy polling until the ready list goes empty.  Once the ready
list goes empty the NAPI ID is reset and busy polling is disabled until a
new socket is added to the ready list.

In addition when we insert a new socket into the epoll we record the NAPI
ID and assume we are going to receive events on it.  If that doesn't occur
it will be evicted as the active NAPI ID and we will resume normal
behavior.

An application can use SO_INCOMING_CPU or SO_REUSEPORT_ATTACH_C/EBPF socket
options to spread the incoming connections to specific worker threads
based on the incoming queue. This enables epoll for each worker thread
to have only sockets that receive packets from a single queue. So when an
application calls epoll_wait() and there are no events available to report,
busy polling is done on the associated queue to pull the packets.

Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sridhar.samudrala@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexander.h.duyck@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare to move signal wakeup &amp; sigpending methods from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; into &lt;linux/sched/signal.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-02T18:15:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=174cd4b1e5fbd0d74c68cf3a74f5bd4923485512'/>
<id>174cd4b1e5fbd0d74c68cf3a74f5bd4923485512</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix up affected files that include this signal functionality via sched.h.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix up affected files that include this signal functionality via sched.h.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs,eventpoll: don't test for bitfield with stack value</title>
<updated>2017-02-28T02:43:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyrill Gorcunov</name>
<email>gorcunov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-27T22:27:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c857ab640c0cddf451cf743f1b70f9ad7f103090'/>
<id>c857ab640c0cddf451cf743f1b70f9ad7f103090</id>
<content type='text'>
In case if epoll_ctl is called with operation EPOLL_CTL_DEL then
@epds.events variable allocated on stack may contain random bits which
we test then for EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.  Since currently the test look like

	if (epds.events &amp; EPOLLEXCLUSIVE) {
		if (op == EPOLL_CTL_MOD)
			goto error_tgt_fput;
		if (op == EPOLL_CTL_ADD &amp;&amp; (is_file_epoll(tf.file) ||
				(epds.events &amp; ~EPOLLEXCLUSIVE_OK_BITS)))
			goto error_tgt_fput;
	}

Nothing serious will happen even if epds.events has this bit set, still
better to be on safe side and make sure that we're to test this bit at
all.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214154935.GG1850@uranus.lan
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In case if epoll_ctl is called with operation EPOLL_CTL_DEL then
@epds.events variable allocated on stack may contain random bits which
we test then for EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.  Since currently the test look like

	if (epds.events &amp; EPOLLEXCLUSIVE) {
		if (op == EPOLL_CTL_MOD)
			goto error_tgt_fput;
		if (op == EPOLL_CTL_ADD &amp;&amp; (is_file_epoll(tf.file) ||
				(epds.events &amp; ~EPOLLEXCLUSIVE_OK_BITS)))
			goto error_tgt_fput;
	}

Nothing serious will happen even if epds.events has this bit set, still
better to be on safe side and make sure that we're to test this bit at
all.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214154935.GG1850@uranus.lan
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
