<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/ecryptfs, branch v3.3-rc3</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: move misleading function comments</title>
<updated>2012-01-25T23:10:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Wang</name>
<email>liwang@nudt.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-25T07:40:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1589cb1a94c381579a0235ca708d9e2dca6d3a39'/>
<id>1589cb1a94c381579a0235ca708d9e2dca6d3a39</id>
<content type='text'>
 The data encryption was moved from ecryptfs_write_end into
ecryptfs_writepage, this patch moves the corresponding function
comments to be consistent with the modification.

Signed-off-by: Li Wang &lt;liwang@nudt.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
 The data encryption was moved from ecryptfs_write_end into
ecryptfs_writepage, this patch moves the corresponding function
comments to be consistent with the modification.

Signed-off-by: Li Wang &lt;liwang@nudt.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Fix oops when printing debug info in extent crypto functions</title>
<updated>2012-01-25T20:43:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-24T16:02:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=58ded24f0fcb85bddb665baba75892f6ad0f4b8a'/>
<id>58ded24f0fcb85bddb665baba75892f6ad0f4b8a</id>
<content type='text'>
If pages passed to the eCryptfs extent-based crypto functions are not
mapped and the module parameter ecryptfs_verbosity=1 was specified at
loading time, a NULL pointer dereference will occur.

Note that this wouldn't happen on a production system, as you wouldn't
pass ecryptfs_verbosity=1 on a production system. It leaks private
information to the system logs and is for debugging only.

The debugging info printed in these messages is no longer very useful
and rather than doing a kmap() in these debugging paths, it will be
better to simply remove the debugging paths completely.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/913651

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Daniel DeFreez
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If pages passed to the eCryptfs extent-based crypto functions are not
mapped and the module parameter ecryptfs_verbosity=1 was specified at
loading time, a NULL pointer dereference will occur.

Note that this wouldn't happen on a production system, as you wouldn't
pass ecryptfs_verbosity=1 on a production system. It leaks private
information to the system logs and is for debugging only.

The debugging info printed in these messages is no longer very useful
and rather than doing a kmap() in these debugging paths, it will be
better to simply remove the debugging paths completely.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/913651

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Daniel DeFreez
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Remove unused ecryptfs_read()</title>
<updated>2012-01-25T20:43:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-18T21:09:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f2cb933501ebc066bf3c4b1836fd8428f8fe9863'/>
<id>f2cb933501ebc066bf3c4b1836fd8428f8fe9863</id>
<content type='text'>
ecryptfs_read() has been ifdef'ed out for years now and it was
apparently unused before then. It is time to get rid of it for good.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
ecryptfs_read() has been ifdef'ed out for years now and it was
apparently unused before then. It is time to get rid of it for good.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Check inode changes in setattr</title>
<updated>2012-01-25T20:43:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-20T02:33:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a261a03904849c3df50bd0300efb7fb3f865137d'/>
<id>a261a03904849c3df50bd0300efb7fb3f865137d</id>
<content type='text'>
Most filesystems call inode_change_ok() very early in -&gt;setattr(), but
eCryptfs didn't call it at all. It allowed the lower filesystem to make
the call in its -&gt;setattr() function. Then, eCryptfs would copy the
appropriate inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode.

This patch changes that and actually calls inode_change_ok() on the
eCryptfs inode, fairly early in ecryptfs_setattr(). Ideally, the call
would happen earlier in ecryptfs_setattr(), but there are some possible
inode initialization steps that must happen first.

Since the call was already being made on the lower inode, the change in
functionality should be minimal, except for the case of a file extending
truncate call. In that case, inode_newsize_ok() was never being
called on the eCryptfs inode. Rather than inode_newsize_ok() catching
maximum file size errors early on, eCryptfs would encrypt zeroed pages
and write them to the lower filesystem until the lower filesystem's
write path caught the error in generic_write_checks(). This patch
introduces a new function, called ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok(), which
checks if the new lower file size is within the appropriate limits when
the truncate operation will be growing the lower file.

In summary this change prevents eCryptfs truncate operations (and the
resulting page encryptions), which would exceed the lower filesystem
limits or FSIZE rlimits, from ever starting.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Li Wang &lt;liwang@nudt.edu.cn&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Most filesystems call inode_change_ok() very early in -&gt;setattr(), but
eCryptfs didn't call it at all. It allowed the lower filesystem to make
the call in its -&gt;setattr() function. Then, eCryptfs would copy the
appropriate inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode.

This patch changes that and actually calls inode_change_ok() on the
eCryptfs inode, fairly early in ecryptfs_setattr(). Ideally, the call
would happen earlier in ecryptfs_setattr(), but there are some possible
inode initialization steps that must happen first.

Since the call was already being made on the lower inode, the change in
functionality should be minimal, except for the case of a file extending
truncate call. In that case, inode_newsize_ok() was never being
called on the eCryptfs inode. Rather than inode_newsize_ok() catching
maximum file size errors early on, eCryptfs would encrypt zeroed pages
and write them to the lower filesystem until the lower filesystem's
write path caught the error in generic_write_checks(). This patch
introduces a new function, called ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok(), which
checks if the new lower file size is within the appropriate limits when
the truncate operation will be growing the lower file.

In summary this change prevents eCryptfs truncate operations (and the
resulting page encryptions), which would exceed the lower filesystem
limits or FSIZE rlimits, from ever starting.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Li Wang &lt;liwang@nudt.edu.cn&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Make truncate path killable</title>
<updated>2012-01-25T20:43:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-19T00:30:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5e6f0d769017cc49207ef56996e42363ec26c1f0'/>
<id>5e6f0d769017cc49207ef56996e42363ec26c1f0</id>
<content type='text'>
ecryptfs_write() handles the truncation of eCryptfs inodes. It grabs a
page, zeroes out the appropriate portions, and then encrypts the page
before writing it to the lower filesystem. It was unkillable and due to
the lack of sparse file support could result in tying up a large portion
of system resources, while encrypting pages of zeros, with no way for
the truncate operation to be stopped from userspace.

This patch adds the ability for ecryptfs_write() to detect a pending
fatal signal and return as gracefully as possible. The intent is to
leave the lower file in a useable state, while still allowing a user to
break out of the encryption loop. If a pending fatal signal is detected,
the eCryptfs inode size is updated to reflect the modified inode size
and then -EINTR is returned.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
ecryptfs_write() handles the truncation of eCryptfs inodes. It grabs a
page, zeroes out the appropriate portions, and then encrypts the page
before writing it to the lower filesystem. It was unkillable and due to
the lack of sparse file support could result in tying up a large portion
of system resources, while encrypting pages of zeros, with no way for
the truncate operation to be stopped from userspace.

This patch adds the ability for ecryptfs_write() to detect a pending
fatal signal and return as gracefully as possible. The intent is to
leave the lower file in a useable state, while still allowing a user to
break out of the encryption loop. If a pending fatal signal is detected,
the eCryptfs inode size is updated to reflect the modified inode size
and then -EINTR is returned.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Infinite loop due to overflow in ecryptfs_write()</title>
<updated>2012-01-25T20:43:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Wang</name>
<email>liwang@nudt.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-19T01:44:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=684a3ff7e69acc7c678d1a1394fe9e757993fd34'/>
<id>684a3ff7e69acc7c678d1a1394fe9e757993fd34</id>
<content type='text'>
ecryptfs_write() can enter an infinite loop when truncating a file to a
size larger than 4G. This only happens on architectures where size_t is
represented by 32 bits.

This was caused by a size_t overflow due to it incorrectly being used to
store the result of a calculation which uses potentially large values of
type loff_t.

[tyhicks@canonical.com: rewrite subject and commit message]
Signed-off-by: Li Wang &lt;liwang@nudt.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yunchuan Wen &lt;wenyunchuan@kylinos.com.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
ecryptfs_write() can enter an infinite loop when truncating a file to a
size larger than 4G. This only happens on architectures where size_t is
represented by 32 bits.

This was caused by a size_t overflow due to it incorrectly being used to
store the result of a calculation which uses potentially large values of
type loff_t.

[tyhicks@canonical.com: rewrite subject and commit message]
Signed-off-by: Li Wang &lt;liwang@nudt.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yunchuan Wen &lt;wenyunchuan@kylinos.com.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Replace miscdev read/write magic numbers</title>
<updated>2012-01-25T20:43:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-14T15:46:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=48399c0b0e6172888a2e2e36df1595ab1e049ba8'/>
<id>48399c0b0e6172888a2e2e36df1595ab1e049ba8</id>
<content type='text'>
ecryptfs_miscdev_read() and ecryptfs_miscdev_write() contained many
magic numbers for specifying packet header field sizes and offsets. This
patch defines those values and replaces the magic values.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
ecryptfs_miscdev_read() and ecryptfs_miscdev_write() contained many
magic numbers for specifying packet header field sizes and offsets. This
patch defines those values and replaces the magic values.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Report errors in writes to /dev/ecryptfs</title>
<updated>2012-01-25T20:43:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-14T14:51:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7f133504249afa48618becac546ce3c35c9f0185'/>
<id>7f133504249afa48618becac546ce3c35c9f0185</id>
<content type='text'>
Errors in writes to /dev/ecryptfs were being incorrectly reported by
returning 0 or the value of the original write count.

This patch clears up the return code assignment in error paths.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Errors in writes to /dev/ecryptfs were being incorrectly reported by
returning 0 or the value of the original write count.

This patch clears up the return code assignment in error paths.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Sanitize write counts of /dev/ecryptfs</title>
<updated>2012-01-25T20:43:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-12T10:30:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=db10e556518eb9d21ee92ff944530d84349684f4'/>
<id>db10e556518eb9d21ee92ff944530d84349684f4</id>
<content type='text'>
A malicious count value specified when writing to /dev/ecryptfs may
result in a a very large kernel memory allocation.

This patch peeks at the specified packet payload size, adds that to the
size of the packet headers and compares the result with the write count
value. The resulting maximum memory allocation size is approximately 532
bytes.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sasha Levin &lt;levinsasha928@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A malicious count value specified when writing to /dev/ecryptfs may
result in a a very large kernel memory allocation.

This patch peeks at the specified packet payload size, adds that to the
size of the packet headers and compares the result with the write count
value. The resulting maximum memory allocation size is approximately 532
bytes.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sasha Levin &lt;levinsasha928@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: Remove unnecessary variable initialization</title>
<updated>2012-01-25T20:43:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tim Gardner</name>
<email>tim.gardner@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-12T15:31:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bb4503615d95d6826b7907986ad574e3157877e8'/>
<id>bb4503615d95d6826b7907986ad574e3157877e8</id>
<content type='text'>
Removes unneeded variable initialization in ecryptfs_read_metadata(). Also adds
a small comment to help explain metadata reading logic.

[tyhicks@canonical.com: Pulled out of for-stable patch and wrote commit msg]
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner &lt;tim.gardner@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Removes unneeded variable initialization in ecryptfs_read_metadata(). Also adds
a small comment to help explain metadata reading logic.

[tyhicks@canonical.com: Pulled out of for-stable patch and wrote commit msg]
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner &lt;tim.gardner@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
