<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/btrfs, branch v4.20</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-4.20-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux</title>
<updated>2018-12-05T17:58:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-05T17:58:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d0897090458211f9c6b2d7f5af87f4d3b0403f69'/>
<id>d0897090458211f9c6b2d7f5af87f4d3b0403f69</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba:
 "A patch in 4.19 introduced a sanity check that was too strict and a
  filesystem cannot be mounted.

  This happens for filesystems with more than 10 devices and has been
  reported by a few users so we need the fix to propagate to stable"

* tag 'for-4.20-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: tree-checker: Don't check max block group size as current max chunk size limit is unreliable
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba:
 "A patch in 4.19 introduced a sanity check that was too strict and a
  filesystem cannot be mounted.

  This happens for filesystems with more than 10 devices and has been
  reported by a few users so we need the fix to propagate to stable"

* tag 'for-4.20-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: tree-checker: Don't check max block group size as current max chunk size limit is unreliable
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: tree-checker: Don't check max block group size as current max chunk size limit is unreliable</title>
<updated>2018-12-04T14:05:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
<email>wqu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-23T01:06:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=10950929e994c5ecee149ff0873388d3c98f12b5'/>
<id>10950929e994c5ecee149ff0873388d3c98f12b5</id>
<content type='text'>
[BUG]
A completely valid btrfs will refuse to mount, with error message like:
  BTRFS critical (device sdb2): corrupt leaf: root=2 block=239681536 slot=172 \
    bg_start=12018974720 bg_len=10888413184, invalid block group size, \
    have 10888413184 expect (0, 10737418240]

This has been reported several times as the 4.19 kernel is now being
used. The filesystem refuses to mount, but is otherwise ok and booting
4.18 is a workaround.

Btrfs check returns no error, and all kernels used on this fs is later
than 2011, which should all have the 10G size limit commit.

[CAUSE]
For a 12 devices btrfs, we could allocate a chunk larger than 10G due to
stripe stripe bump up.

__btrfs_alloc_chunk()
|- max_stripe_size = 1G
|- max_chunk_size = 10G
|- data_stripe = 11
|- if (1G * 11 &gt; 10G) {
       stripe_size = 976128930;
       stripe_size = round_up(976128930, SZ_16M) = 989855744

However the final stripe_size (989855744) * 11 = 10888413184, which is
still larger than 10G.

[FIX]
For the comprehensive check, we need to do the full check at chunk read
time, and rely on bg &lt;-&gt; chunk mapping to do the check.

We could just skip the length check for now.

Fixes: fce466eab7ac ("btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Reported-by: Wang Yugui &lt;wangyugui@e16-tech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[BUG]
A completely valid btrfs will refuse to mount, with error message like:
  BTRFS critical (device sdb2): corrupt leaf: root=2 block=239681536 slot=172 \
    bg_start=12018974720 bg_len=10888413184, invalid block group size, \
    have 10888413184 expect (0, 10737418240]

This has been reported several times as the 4.19 kernel is now being
used. The filesystem refuses to mount, but is otherwise ok and booting
4.18 is a workaround.

Btrfs check returns no error, and all kernels used on this fs is later
than 2011, which should all have the 10G size limit commit.

[CAUSE]
For a 12 devices btrfs, we could allocate a chunk larger than 10G due to
stripe stripe bump up.

__btrfs_alloc_chunk()
|- max_stripe_size = 1G
|- max_chunk_size = 10G
|- data_stripe = 11
|- if (1G * 11 &gt; 10G) {
       stripe_size = 976128930;
       stripe_size = round_up(976128930, SZ_16M) = 989855744

However the final stripe_size (989855744) * 11 = 10888413184, which is
still larger than 10G.

[FIX]
For the comprehensive check, we need to do the full check at chunk read
time, and rely on bg &lt;-&gt; chunk mapping to do the check.

We could just skip the length check for now.

Fixes: fce466eab7ac ("btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Reported-by: Wang Yugui &lt;wangyugui@e16-tech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-4.20-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux</title>
<updated>2018-11-28T16:38:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-28T16:38:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=121b018f8c74b4e0ba81b4b8ee73a82db3f24b7b'/>
<id>121b018f8c74b4e0ba81b4b8ee73a82db3f24b7b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
 "Some of these bugs are being hit during testing so we'd like to get
  them merged, otherwise there are usual stability fixes for stable
  trees"

* tag 'for-4.20-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: relocation: set trans to be NULL after ending transaction
  Btrfs: fix race between enabling quotas and subvolume creation
  Btrfs: send, fix infinite loop due to directory rename dependencies
  Btrfs: ensure path name is null terminated at btrfs_control_ioctl
  Btrfs: fix rare chances for data loss when doing a fast fsync
  btrfs: Always try all copies when reading extent buffers
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
 "Some of these bugs are being hit during testing so we'd like to get
  them merged, otherwise there are usual stability fixes for stable
  trees"

* tag 'for-4.20-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: relocation: set trans to be NULL after ending transaction
  Btrfs: fix race between enabling quotas and subvolume creation
  Btrfs: send, fix infinite loop due to directory rename dependencies
  Btrfs: ensure path name is null terminated at btrfs_control_ioctl
  Btrfs: fix rare chances for data loss when doing a fast fsync
  btrfs: Always try all copies when reading extent buffers
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: relocation: set trans to be NULL after ending transaction</title>
<updated>2018-11-23T12:47:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pan Bian</name>
<email>bianpan2016@163.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-23T10:10:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=42a657f57628402c73237547f0134e083e2f6764'/>
<id>42a657f57628402c73237547f0134e083e2f6764</id>
<content type='text'>
The function relocate_block_group calls btrfs_end_transaction to release
trans when update_backref_cache returns 1, and then continues the loop
body. If btrfs_block_rsv_refill fails this time, it will jump out the
loop and the freed trans will be accessed. This may result in a
use-after-free bug. The patch assigns NULL to trans after trans is
released so that it will not be accessed.

Fixes: 0647bf564f1 ("Btrfs: improve forever loop when doing balance relocation")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian &lt;bianpan2016@163.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The function relocate_block_group calls btrfs_end_transaction to release
trans when update_backref_cache returns 1, and then continues the loop
body. If btrfs_block_rsv_refill fails this time, it will jump out the
loop and the freed trans will be accessed. This may result in a
use-after-free bug. The patch assigns NULL to trans after trans is
released so that it will not be accessed.

Fixes: 0647bf564f1 ("Btrfs: improve forever loop when doing balance relocation")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian &lt;bianpan2016@163.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Btrfs: fix race between enabling quotas and subvolume creation</title>
<updated>2018-11-22T17:59:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-19T16:20:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=552f0329c75b3e1d7f9bb8c9e421d37403f192cd'/>
<id>552f0329c75b3e1d7f9bb8c9e421d37403f192cd</id>
<content type='text'>
We have a race between enabling quotas end subvolume creation that cause
subvolume creation to fail with -EINVAL, and the following diagram shows
how it happens:

              CPU 0                                          CPU 1

 btrfs_ioctl()
  btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl()
   btrfs_quota_enable()
    mutex_lock(fs_info-&gt;qgroup_ioctl_lock)

                                                  btrfs_ioctl()
                                                   create_subvol()
                                                    btrfs_qgroup_inherit()
                                                     -&gt; save fs_info-&gt;quota_root
                                                        into quota_root
                                                     -&gt; stores a NULL value
                                                     -&gt; tries to lock the mutex
                                                        qgroup_ioctl_lock
                                                        -&gt; blocks waiting for
                                                           the task at CPU0

   -&gt; sets BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED in fs_info
   -&gt; sets quota_root in fs_info-&gt;quota_root
      (non-NULL value)

   mutex_unlock(fs_info-&gt;qgroup_ioctl_lock)

                                                     -&gt; checks quota enabled
                                                        flag is set
                                                     -&gt; returns -EINVAL because
                                                        fs_info-&gt;quota_root was
                                                        NULL before it acquired
                                                        the mutex
                                                        qgroup_ioctl_lock
                                                   -&gt; ioctl returns -EINVAL

Returning -EINVAL to user space will be confusing if all the arguments
passed to the subvolume creation ioctl were valid.

Fix it by grabbing the value from fs_info-&gt;quota_root after acquiring
the mutex.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We have a race between enabling quotas end subvolume creation that cause
subvolume creation to fail with -EINVAL, and the following diagram shows
how it happens:

              CPU 0                                          CPU 1

 btrfs_ioctl()
  btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl()
   btrfs_quota_enable()
    mutex_lock(fs_info-&gt;qgroup_ioctl_lock)

                                                  btrfs_ioctl()
                                                   create_subvol()
                                                    btrfs_qgroup_inherit()
                                                     -&gt; save fs_info-&gt;quota_root
                                                        into quota_root
                                                     -&gt; stores a NULL value
                                                     -&gt; tries to lock the mutex
                                                        qgroup_ioctl_lock
                                                        -&gt; blocks waiting for
                                                           the task at CPU0

   -&gt; sets BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED in fs_info
   -&gt; sets quota_root in fs_info-&gt;quota_root
      (non-NULL value)

   mutex_unlock(fs_info-&gt;qgroup_ioctl_lock)

                                                     -&gt; checks quota enabled
                                                        flag is set
                                                     -&gt; returns -EINVAL because
                                                        fs_info-&gt;quota_root was
                                                        NULL before it acquired
                                                        the mutex
                                                        qgroup_ioctl_lock
                                                   -&gt; ioctl returns -EINVAL

Returning -EINVAL to user space will be confusing if all the arguments
passed to the subvolume creation ioctl were valid.

Fix it by grabbing the value from fs_info-&gt;quota_root after acquiring
the mutex.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Btrfs: send, fix infinite loop due to directory rename dependencies</title>
<updated>2018-11-21T16:03:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Robbie Ko</name>
<email>robbieko@synology.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-14T18:32:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a4390aee72713d9e73f1132bcdeb17d72fbbf974'/>
<id>a4390aee72713d9e73f1132bcdeb17d72fbbf974</id>
<content type='text'>
When doing an incremental send, due to the need of delaying directory move
(rename) operations we can end up in infinite loop at
apply_children_dir_moves().

An example scenario that triggers this problem is described below, where
directory names correspond to the numbers of their respective inodes.

Parent snapshot:

 .
 |--- 261/
       |--- 271/
             |--- 266/
                   |--- 259/
                   |--- 260/
                   |     |--- 267
                   |
                   |--- 264/
                   |     |--- 258/
                   |           |--- 257/
                   |
                   |--- 265/
                   |--- 268/
                   |--- 269/
                   |     |--- 262/
                   |
                   |--- 270/
                   |--- 272/
                   |     |--- 263/
                   |     |--- 275/
                   |
                   |--- 274/
                         |--- 273/

Send snapshot:

 .
 |-- 275/
      |-- 274/
           |-- 273/
                |-- 262/
                     |-- 269/
                          |-- 258/
                               |-- 271/
                                    |-- 268/
                                         |-- 267/
                                              |-- 270/
                                                   |-- 259/
                                                   |    |-- 265/
                                                   |
                                                   |-- 272/
                                                        |-- 257/
                                                             |-- 260/
                                                             |-- 264/
                                                                  |-- 263/
                                                                       |-- 261/
                                                                            |-- 266/

When processing inode 257 we delay its move (rename) operation because its
new parent in the send snapshot, inode 272, was not yet processed. Then
when processing inode 272, we delay the move operation for that inode
because inode 274 is its ancestor in the send snapshot. Finally we delay
the move operation for inode 274 when processing it because inode 275 is
its new parent in the send snapshot and was not yet moved.

When finishing processing inode 275, we start to do the move operations
that were previously delayed (at apply_children_dir_moves()), resulting in
the following iterations:

1) We issue the move operation for inode 274;

2) Because inode 262 depended on the move operation of inode 274 (it was
   delayed because 274 is its ancestor in the send snapshot), we issue the
   move operation for inode 262;

3) We issue the move operation for inode 272, because it was delayed by
   inode 274 too (ancestor of 272 in the send snapshot);

4) We issue the move operation for inode 269 (it was delayed by 262);

5) We issue the move operation for inode 257 (it was delayed by 272);

6) We issue the move operation for inode 260 (it was delayed by 272);

7) We issue the move operation for inode 258 (it was delayed by 269);

8) We issue the move operation for inode 264 (it was delayed by 257);

9) We issue the move operation for inode 271 (it was delayed by 258);

10) We issue the move operation for inode 263 (it was delayed by 264);

11) We issue the move operation for inode 268 (it was delayed by 271);

12) We verify if we can issue the move operation for inode 270 (it was
    delayed by 271). We detect a path loop in the current state, because
    inode 267 needs to be moved first before we can issue the move
    operation for inode 270. So we delay again the move operation for
    inode 270, this time we will attempt to do it after inode 267 is
    moved;

13) We issue the move operation for inode 261 (it was delayed by 263);

14) We verify if we can issue the move operation for inode 266 (it was
    delayed by 263). We detect a path loop in the current state, because
    inode 270 needs to be moved first before we can issue the move
    operation for inode 266. So we delay again the move operation for
    inode 266, this time we will attempt to do it after inode 270 is
    moved (its move operation was delayed in step 12);

15) We issue the move operation for inode 267 (it was delayed by 268);

16) We verify if we can issue the move operation for inode 266 (it was
    delayed by 270). We detect a path loop in the current state, because
    inode 270 needs to be moved first before we can issue the move
    operation for inode 266. So we delay again the move operation for
    inode 266, this time we will attempt to do it after inode 270 is
    moved (its move operation was delayed in step 12). So here we added
    again the same delayed move operation that we added in step 14;

17) We attempt again to see if we can issue the move operation for inode
    266, and as in step 16, we realize we can not due to a path loop in
    the current state due to a dependency on inode 270. Again we delay
    inode's 266 rename to happen after inode's 270 move operation, adding
    the same dependency to the empty stack that we did in steps 14 and 16.
    The next iteration will pick the same move dependency on the stack
    (the only entry) and realize again there is still a path loop and then
    again the same dependency to the stack, over and over, resulting in
    an infinite loop.

So fix this by preventing adding the same move dependency entries to the
stack by removing each pending move record from the red black tree of
pending moves. This way the next call to get_pending_dir_moves() will
not return anything for the current parent inode.

A test case for fstests, with this reproducer, follows soon.

Signed-off-by: Robbie Ko &lt;robbieko@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
[Wrote changelog with example and more clear explanation]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When doing an incremental send, due to the need of delaying directory move
(rename) operations we can end up in infinite loop at
apply_children_dir_moves().

An example scenario that triggers this problem is described below, where
directory names correspond to the numbers of their respective inodes.

Parent snapshot:

 .
 |--- 261/
       |--- 271/
             |--- 266/
                   |--- 259/
                   |--- 260/
                   |     |--- 267
                   |
                   |--- 264/
                   |     |--- 258/
                   |           |--- 257/
                   |
                   |--- 265/
                   |--- 268/
                   |--- 269/
                   |     |--- 262/
                   |
                   |--- 270/
                   |--- 272/
                   |     |--- 263/
                   |     |--- 275/
                   |
                   |--- 274/
                         |--- 273/

Send snapshot:

 .
 |-- 275/
      |-- 274/
           |-- 273/
                |-- 262/
                     |-- 269/
                          |-- 258/
                               |-- 271/
                                    |-- 268/
                                         |-- 267/
                                              |-- 270/
                                                   |-- 259/
                                                   |    |-- 265/
                                                   |
                                                   |-- 272/
                                                        |-- 257/
                                                             |-- 260/
                                                             |-- 264/
                                                                  |-- 263/
                                                                       |-- 261/
                                                                            |-- 266/

When processing inode 257 we delay its move (rename) operation because its
new parent in the send snapshot, inode 272, was not yet processed. Then
when processing inode 272, we delay the move operation for that inode
because inode 274 is its ancestor in the send snapshot. Finally we delay
the move operation for inode 274 when processing it because inode 275 is
its new parent in the send snapshot and was not yet moved.

When finishing processing inode 275, we start to do the move operations
that were previously delayed (at apply_children_dir_moves()), resulting in
the following iterations:

1) We issue the move operation for inode 274;

2) Because inode 262 depended on the move operation of inode 274 (it was
   delayed because 274 is its ancestor in the send snapshot), we issue the
   move operation for inode 262;

3) We issue the move operation for inode 272, because it was delayed by
   inode 274 too (ancestor of 272 in the send snapshot);

4) We issue the move operation for inode 269 (it was delayed by 262);

5) We issue the move operation for inode 257 (it was delayed by 272);

6) We issue the move operation for inode 260 (it was delayed by 272);

7) We issue the move operation for inode 258 (it was delayed by 269);

8) We issue the move operation for inode 264 (it was delayed by 257);

9) We issue the move operation for inode 271 (it was delayed by 258);

10) We issue the move operation for inode 263 (it was delayed by 264);

11) We issue the move operation for inode 268 (it was delayed by 271);

12) We verify if we can issue the move operation for inode 270 (it was
    delayed by 271). We detect a path loop in the current state, because
    inode 267 needs to be moved first before we can issue the move
    operation for inode 270. So we delay again the move operation for
    inode 270, this time we will attempt to do it after inode 267 is
    moved;

13) We issue the move operation for inode 261 (it was delayed by 263);

14) We verify if we can issue the move operation for inode 266 (it was
    delayed by 263). We detect a path loop in the current state, because
    inode 270 needs to be moved first before we can issue the move
    operation for inode 266. So we delay again the move operation for
    inode 266, this time we will attempt to do it after inode 270 is
    moved (its move operation was delayed in step 12);

15) We issue the move operation for inode 267 (it was delayed by 268);

16) We verify if we can issue the move operation for inode 266 (it was
    delayed by 270). We detect a path loop in the current state, because
    inode 270 needs to be moved first before we can issue the move
    operation for inode 266. So we delay again the move operation for
    inode 266, this time we will attempt to do it after inode 270 is
    moved (its move operation was delayed in step 12). So here we added
    again the same delayed move operation that we added in step 14;

17) We attempt again to see if we can issue the move operation for inode
    266, and as in step 16, we realize we can not due to a path loop in
    the current state due to a dependency on inode 270. Again we delay
    inode's 266 rename to happen after inode's 270 move operation, adding
    the same dependency to the empty stack that we did in steps 14 and 16.
    The next iteration will pick the same move dependency on the stack
    (the only entry) and realize again there is still a path loop and then
    again the same dependency to the stack, over and over, resulting in
    an infinite loop.

So fix this by preventing adding the same move dependency entries to the
stack by removing each pending move record from the red black tree of
pending moves. This way the next call to get_pending_dir_moves() will
not return anything for the current parent inode.

A test case for fstests, with this reproducer, follows soon.

Signed-off-by: Robbie Ko &lt;robbieko@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
[Wrote changelog with example and more clear explanation]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Btrfs: ensure path name is null terminated at btrfs_control_ioctl</title>
<updated>2018-11-14T17:26:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-14T11:35:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f505754fd6599230371cb01b9332754ddc104be1'/>
<id>f505754fd6599230371cb01b9332754ddc104be1</id>
<content type='text'>
We were using the path name received from user space without checking that
it is null terminated. While btrfs-progs is well behaved and does proper
validation and null termination, someone could call the ioctl and pass
a non-null terminated patch, leading to buffer overrun problems in the
kernel.  The ioctl is protected by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

So just set the last byte of the path to a null character, similar to what
we do in other ioctls (add/remove/resize device, snapshot creation, etc).

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We were using the path name received from user space without checking that
it is null terminated. While btrfs-progs is well behaved and does proper
validation and null termination, someone could call the ioctl and pass
a non-null terminated patch, leading to buffer overrun problems in the
kernel.  The ioctl is protected by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

So just set the last byte of the path to a null character, similar to what
we do in other ioctls (add/remove/resize device, snapshot creation, etc).

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain &lt;anand.jain@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Btrfs: fix rare chances for data loss when doing a fast fsync</title>
<updated>2018-11-13T12:49:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Filipe Manana</name>
<email>fdmanana@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-12T10:23:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=aab15e8ec25765cf7968c72cbec7583acf99d8a4'/>
<id>aab15e8ec25765cf7968c72cbec7583acf99d8a4</id>
<content type='text'>
After the simplification of the fast fsync patch done recently by commit
b5e6c3e170b7 ("btrfs: always wait on ordered extents at fsync time") and
commit e7175a692765 ("btrfs: remove the wait ordered logic in the
log_one_extent path"), we got a very short time window where we can get
extents logged without writeback completing first or extents logged
without logging the respective data checksums. Both issues can only happen
when doing a non-full (fast) fsync.

As soon as we enter btrfs_sync_file() we trigger writeback, then lock the
inode and then wait for the writeback to complete before starting to log
the inode. However before we acquire the inode's lock and after we started
writeback, it's possible that more writes happened and dirtied more pages.
If that happened and those pages get writeback triggered while we are
logging the inode (for example, the VM subsystem triggering it due to
memory pressure, or another concurrent fsync), we end up seeing the
respective extent maps in the inode's list of modified extents and will
log matching file extent items without waiting for the respective
ordered extents to complete, meaning that either of the following will
happen:

1) We log an extent after its writeback finishes but before its checksums
   are added to the csum tree, leading to -EIO errors when attempting to
   read the extent after a log replay.

2) We log an extent before its writeback finishes.
   Therefore after the log replay we will have a file extent item pointing
   to an unwritten extent (and without the respective data checksums as
   well).

This could not happen before the fast fsync patch simplification, because
for any extent we found in the list of modified extents, we would wait for
its respective ordered extent to finish writeback or collect its checksums
for logging if it did not complete yet.

Fix this by triggering writeback again after acquiring the inode's lock
and before waiting for ordered extents to complete.

Fixes: e7175a692765 ("btrfs: remove the wait ordered logic in the log_one_extent path")
Fixes: b5e6c3e170b7 ("btrfs: always wait on ordered extents at fsync time")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
After the simplification of the fast fsync patch done recently by commit
b5e6c3e170b7 ("btrfs: always wait on ordered extents at fsync time") and
commit e7175a692765 ("btrfs: remove the wait ordered logic in the
log_one_extent path"), we got a very short time window where we can get
extents logged without writeback completing first or extents logged
without logging the respective data checksums. Both issues can only happen
when doing a non-full (fast) fsync.

As soon as we enter btrfs_sync_file() we trigger writeback, then lock the
inode and then wait for the writeback to complete before starting to log
the inode. However before we acquire the inode's lock and after we started
writeback, it's possible that more writes happened and dirtied more pages.
If that happened and those pages get writeback triggered while we are
logging the inode (for example, the VM subsystem triggering it due to
memory pressure, or another concurrent fsync), we end up seeing the
respective extent maps in the inode's list of modified extents and will
log matching file extent items without waiting for the respective
ordered extents to complete, meaning that either of the following will
happen:

1) We log an extent after its writeback finishes but before its checksums
   are added to the csum tree, leading to -EIO errors when attempting to
   read the extent after a log replay.

2) We log an extent before its writeback finishes.
   Therefore after the log replay we will have a file extent item pointing
   to an unwritten extent (and without the respective data checksums as
   well).

This could not happen before the fast fsync patch simplification, because
for any extent we found in the list of modified extents, we would wait for
its respective ordered extent to finish writeback or collect its checksums
for logging if it did not complete yet.

Fix this by triggering writeback again after acquiring the inode's lock
and before waiting for ordered extents to complete.

Fixes: e7175a692765 ("btrfs: remove the wait ordered logic in the log_one_extent path")
Fixes: b5e6c3e170b7 ("btrfs: always wait on ordered extents at fsync time")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;josef@toxicpanda.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: Always try all copies when reading extent buffers</title>
<updated>2018-11-13T00:55:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikolay Borisov</name>
<email>nborisov@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-06T14:40:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f8397d69daef06d358430d3054662fb597e37c00'/>
<id>f8397d69daef06d358430d3054662fb597e37c00</id>
<content type='text'>
When a metadata read is served the endio routine btree_readpage_end_io_hook
is called which eventually runs the tree-checker. If tree-checker fails
to validate the read eb then it sets EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This
leads to btree_read_extent_buffer_pages wrongly assuming that all
available copies of this extent buffer are wrong and failing prematurely.
Fix this modify btree_read_extent_buffer_pages to read all copies of
the data.

This failure was exhibitted in xfstests btrfs/124 which would
spuriously fail its balance operations. The reason was that when balance
was run following re-introduction of the missing raid1 disk
__btrfs_map_block would map the read request to stripe 0, which
corresponded to devid 2 (the disk which is being removed in the test):

    item 2 key (FIRST_CHUNK_TREE CHUNK_ITEM 3553624064) itemoff 15975 itemsize 112
	length 1073741824 owner 2 stripe_len 65536 type DATA|RAID1
	io_align 65536 io_width 65536 sector_size 4096
	num_stripes 2 sub_stripes 1
		stripe 0 devid 2 offset 2156920832
		dev_uuid 8466c350-ed0c-4c3b-b17d-6379b445d5c8
		stripe 1 devid 1 offset 3553624064
		dev_uuid 1265d8db-5596-477e-af03-df08eb38d2ca

This caused read requests for a checksum item that to be routed to the
stale disk which triggered the aforementioned logic involving
EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This then triggered cascading failures of
the balance operation.

Fixes: a826d6dcb32d ("Btrfs: check items for correctness as we search")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Suggested-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When a metadata read is served the endio routine btree_readpage_end_io_hook
is called which eventually runs the tree-checker. If tree-checker fails
to validate the read eb then it sets EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This
leads to btree_read_extent_buffer_pages wrongly assuming that all
available copies of this extent buffer are wrong and failing prematurely.
Fix this modify btree_read_extent_buffer_pages to read all copies of
the data.

This failure was exhibitted in xfstests btrfs/124 which would
spuriously fail its balance operations. The reason was that when balance
was run following re-introduction of the missing raid1 disk
__btrfs_map_block would map the read request to stripe 0, which
corresponded to devid 2 (the disk which is being removed in the test):

    item 2 key (FIRST_CHUNK_TREE CHUNK_ITEM 3553624064) itemoff 15975 itemsize 112
	length 1073741824 owner 2 stripe_len 65536 type DATA|RAID1
	io_align 65536 io_width 65536 sector_size 4096
	num_stripes 2 sub_stripes 1
		stripe 0 devid 2 offset 2156920832
		dev_uuid 8466c350-ed0c-4c3b-b17d-6379b445d5c8
		stripe 1 devid 1 offset 3553624064
		dev_uuid 1265d8db-5596-477e-af03-df08eb38d2ca

This caused read requests for a checksum item that to be routed to the
stale disk which triggered the aforementioned logic involving
EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This then triggered cascading failures of
the balance operation.

Fixes: a826d6dcb32d ("Btrfs: check items for correctness as we search")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Suggested-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nborisov@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-4.20-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux</title>
<updated>2018-11-11T22:54:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-11T22:54:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=63a42e1a5cb3d01eef2f370c11d8733a32f12f86'/>
<id>63a42e1a5cb3d01eef2f370c11d8733a32f12f86</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
 "Several fixes to recent release (4.19, fixes tagged for stable) and
  other fixes"

* tag 'for-4.20-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  Btrfs: fix missing delayed iputs on unmount
  Btrfs: fix data corruption due to cloning of eof block
  Btrfs: fix infinite loop on inode eviction after deduplication of eof block
  Btrfs: fix deadlock on tree root leaf when finding free extent
  btrfs: avoid link error with CONFIG_NO_AUTO_INLINE
  btrfs: tree-checker: Fix misleading group system information
  Btrfs: fix missing data checksums after a ranged fsync (msync)
  btrfs: fix pinned underflow after transaction aborted
  Btrfs: fix cur_offset in the error case for nocow
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
 "Several fixes to recent release (4.19, fixes tagged for stable) and
  other fixes"

* tag 'for-4.20-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  Btrfs: fix missing delayed iputs on unmount
  Btrfs: fix data corruption due to cloning of eof block
  Btrfs: fix infinite loop on inode eviction after deduplication of eof block
  Btrfs: fix deadlock on tree root leaf when finding free extent
  btrfs: avoid link error with CONFIG_NO_AUTO_INLINE
  btrfs: tree-checker: Fix misleading group system information
  Btrfs: fix missing data checksums after a ranged fsync (msync)
  btrfs: fix pinned underflow after transaction aborted
  Btrfs: fix cur_offset in the error case for nocow
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
