<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/fs/binfmt_aout.c, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>a.out: Remove the a.out implementation</title>
<updated>2022-09-27T14:11:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-26T22:15:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=987f20a9dcce3989e48d87cff3952c095c994445'/>
<id>987f20a9dcce3989e48d87cff3952c095c994445</id>
<content type='text'>
In commit 19e8b701e258 ("a.out: Stop building a.out/osf1 support on
alpha and m68k") the last users of a.out were disabled.

As nothing has turned up to cause this change to be reverted, let's
remove the code implementing a.out support as well.

There may be userspace users of the uapi bits left so the uapi
headers have been left untouched.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt; # arm defconfigs
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/871qrx3hq3.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In commit 19e8b701e258 ("a.out: Stop building a.out/osf1 support on
alpha and m68k") the last users of a.out were disabled.

As nothing has turned up to cause this change to be reverted, let's
remove the code implementing a.out support as well.

There may be userspace users of the uapi bits left so the uapi
headers have been left untouched.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt; # arm defconfigs
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/871qrx3hq3.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binfmt: a.out: Fix bogus semicolon</title>
<updated>2021-09-05T17:15:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Geert Uytterhoeven</name>
<email>geert@linux-m68k.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-05T09:30:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0319b848b155185815724e1b46103c550627a845'/>
<id>0319b848b155185815724e1b46103c550627a845</id>
<content type='text'>
    fs/binfmt_aout.c: In function ‘load_aout_library’:
    fs/binfmt_aout.c:311:27: error: expected ‘)’ before ‘;’ token
      311 |    MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE;
	  |                           ^
    fs/binfmt_aout.c:309:10: error: too few arguments to function ‘vm_mmap’
      309 |  error = vm_mmap(file, start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data,
	  |          ^~~~~~~
    In file included from fs/binfmt_aout.c:12:
    include/linux/mm.h:2626:35: note: declared here
     2626 | extern unsigned long __must_check vm_mmap(struct file *, unsigned long,
	  |                                   ^~~~~~~

Fix this by reverting the accidental replacement of a comma by a
semicolon.

Fixes: 42be8b42535183f8 ("binfmt: don't use MAP_DENYWRITE when loading shared libraries via uselib()")
Reported-by: noreply@ellerman.id.au
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
    fs/binfmt_aout.c: In function ‘load_aout_library’:
    fs/binfmt_aout.c:311:27: error: expected ‘)’ before ‘;’ token
      311 |    MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE;
	  |                           ^
    fs/binfmt_aout.c:309:10: error: too few arguments to function ‘vm_mmap’
      309 |  error = vm_mmap(file, start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data,
	  |          ^~~~~~~
    In file included from fs/binfmt_aout.c:12:
    include/linux/mm.h:2626:35: note: declared here
     2626 | extern unsigned long __must_check vm_mmap(struct file *, unsigned long,
	  |                                   ^~~~~~~

Fix this by reverting the accidental replacement of a comma by a
semicolon.

Fixes: 42be8b42535183f8 ("binfmt: don't use MAP_DENYWRITE when loading shared libraries via uselib()")
Reported-by: noreply@ellerman.id.au
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE</title>
<updated>2021-09-03T16:42:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Hildenbrand</name>
<email>david@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-23T07:42:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4589ff7ca81516381393649dec8dd4948884b2b2'/>
<id>4589ff7ca81516381393649dec8dd4948884b2b2</id>
<content type='text'>
At exec time when we mmap the new executable via MAP_DENYWRITE we have it
opened via do_open_execat() and already deny_write_access()'ed the file
successfully. Once exec completes, we allow_write_acces(); however,
we set mm-&gt;exe_file in begin_new_exec() via set_mm_exe_file() and
also deny_write_access() as long as mm-&gt;exe_file remains set. We'll
effectively deny write access to our executable via mm-&gt;exe_file
until mm-&gt;exe_file is changed -- when the process is removed, on new
exec, or via sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE).

Let's remove all usage of MAP_DENYWRITE, it's no longer necessary for
mm-&gt;exe_file.

In case of an elf interpreter, we'll now only deny write access to the file
during exec. This is somewhat okay, because the interpreter behaves
(and sometime is) a shared library; all shared libraries, especially the
ones loaded directly in user space like via dlopen() won't ever be mapped
via MAP_DENYWRITE, because we ignore that from user space completely;
these shared libraries can always be modified while mapped and executed.
Let's only special-case the main executable, denying write access while
being executed by a process. This can be considered a minor user space
visible change.

While this is a cleanup, it also fixes part of a problem reported with
VM_DENYWRITE on overlayfs, as VM_DENYWRITE is effectively unused with
this patch and will be removed next:
  "Overlayfs did not honor positive i_writecount on realfile for
   VM_DENYWRITE mappings." [1]

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/YNHXzBgzRrZu1MrD@miu.piliscsaba.redhat.com/

Reported-by: Chengguang Xu &lt;cgxu519@mykernel.net&gt;
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian König &lt;christian.koenig@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
At exec time when we mmap the new executable via MAP_DENYWRITE we have it
opened via do_open_execat() and already deny_write_access()'ed the file
successfully. Once exec completes, we allow_write_acces(); however,
we set mm-&gt;exe_file in begin_new_exec() via set_mm_exe_file() and
also deny_write_access() as long as mm-&gt;exe_file remains set. We'll
effectively deny write access to our executable via mm-&gt;exe_file
until mm-&gt;exe_file is changed -- when the process is removed, on new
exec, or via sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE).

Let's remove all usage of MAP_DENYWRITE, it's no longer necessary for
mm-&gt;exe_file.

In case of an elf interpreter, we'll now only deny write access to the file
during exec. This is somewhat okay, because the interpreter behaves
(and sometime is) a shared library; all shared libraries, especially the
ones loaded directly in user space like via dlopen() won't ever be mapped
via MAP_DENYWRITE, because we ignore that from user space completely;
these shared libraries can always be modified while mapped and executed.
Let's only special-case the main executable, denying write access while
being executed by a process. This can be considered a minor user space
visible change.

While this is a cleanup, it also fixes part of a problem reported with
VM_DENYWRITE on overlayfs, as VM_DENYWRITE is effectively unused with
this patch and will be removed next:
  "Overlayfs did not honor positive i_writecount on realfile for
   VM_DENYWRITE mappings." [1]

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/YNHXzBgzRrZu1MrD@miu.piliscsaba.redhat.com/

Reported-by: Chengguang Xu &lt;cgxu519@mykernel.net&gt;
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian König &lt;christian.koenig@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binfmt: don't use MAP_DENYWRITE when loading shared libraries via uselib()</title>
<updated>2021-09-03T16:42:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Hildenbrand</name>
<email>david@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-22T10:53:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=42be8b42535183f84df99acbaf799e38724348f3'/>
<id>42be8b42535183f84df99acbaf799e38724348f3</id>
<content type='text'>
uselib() is the legacy systemcall for loading shared libraries.
Nowadays, applications use dlopen() to load shared libraries, completely
implemented in user space via mmap().

For example, glibc uses MAP_COPY to mmap shared libraries. While this
maps to MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE on Linux, Linux ignores any
MAP_DENYWRITE specification from user space in mmap.

With this change, all remaining in-tree users of MAP_DENYWRITE use it
to map an executable. We will be able to open shared libraries loaded
via uselib() writable, just as we already can via dlopen() from user
space.

This is one step into the direction of removing MAP_DENYWRITE from the
kernel. This can be considered a minor user space visible change.

Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian König &lt;christian.koenig@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
uselib() is the legacy systemcall for loading shared libraries.
Nowadays, applications use dlopen() to load shared libraries, completely
implemented in user space via mmap().

For example, glibc uses MAP_COPY to mmap shared libraries. While this
maps to MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE on Linux, Linux ignores any
MAP_DENYWRITE specification from user space in mmap.

With this change, all remaining in-tree users of MAP_DENYWRITE use it
to map an executable. We will be able to open shared libraries loaded
via uselib() writable, just as we already can via dlopen() from user
space.

This is one step into the direction of removing MAP_DENYWRITE from the
kernel. This can be considered a minor user space visible change.

Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian König &lt;christian.koenig@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_EXECUTABLE</title>
<updated>2021-06-29T17:53:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Hildenbrand</name>
<email>david@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-29T02:38:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a4eec6a3dfb7a6257ddcacf15e9428fe5834ffd4'/>
<id>a4eec6a3dfb7a6257ddcacf15e9428fe5834ffd4</id>
<content type='text'>
Ever since commit e9714acf8c43 ("mm: kill vma flag VM_EXECUTABLE and
mm-&gt;num_exe_file_vmas"), VM_EXECUTABLE is gone and MAP_EXECUTABLE is
essentially completely ignored.  Let's remove all usage of MAP_EXECUTABLE.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix blooper in fs/binfmt_aout.c. per David]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210421093453.6904-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Feng Tang &lt;feng.tang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kevin Brodsky &lt;Kevin.Brodsky@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Ever since commit e9714acf8c43 ("mm: kill vma flag VM_EXECUTABLE and
mm-&gt;num_exe_file_vmas"), VM_EXECUTABLE is gone and MAP_EXECUTABLE is
essentially completely ignored.  Let's remove all usage of MAP_EXECUTABLE.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix blooper in fs/binfmt_aout.c. per David]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210421093453.6904-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Feng Tang &lt;feng.tang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kevin Brodsky &lt;Kevin.Brodsky@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: Rename flush_old_exec begin_new_exec</title>
<updated>2020-05-07T21:55:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-03T12:54:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2388777a0a5957a10b3d78677216530a9b3bd09f'/>
<id>2388777a0a5957a10b3d78677216530a9b3bd09f</id>
<content type='text'>
There is and has been for a very long time been a lot more going on in
flush_old_exec than just flushing the old state.  After the movement
of code from setup_new_exec there is a whole lot more going on than
just flushing the old executables state.

Rename flush_old_exec to begin_new_exec to more accurately reflect
what this function does.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There is and has been for a very long time been a lot more going on in
flush_old_exec than just flushing the old state.  After the movement
of code from setup_new_exec there is a whole lot more going on than
just flushing the old executables state.

Rename flush_old_exec to begin_new_exec to more accurately reflect
what this function does.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: Merge install_exec_creds into setup_new_exec</title>
<updated>2020-05-07T21:55:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-03T11:48:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=96ecee29b0b560662ec082ee9b6f2049f2a79090'/>
<id>96ecee29b0b560662ec082ee9b6f2049f2a79090</id>
<content type='text'>
The two functions are now always called one right after the
other so merge them together to make future maintenance easier.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The two functions are now always called one right after the
other so merge them together to make future maintenance easier.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binfmt: Move install_exec_creds after setup_new_exec to match binfmt_elf</title>
<updated>2020-05-07T21:54:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-12T15:17:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=e7f7785449a1f459a4a3ca92f82f56fb054dd2b9'/>
<id>e7f7785449a1f459a4a3ca92f82f56fb054dd2b9</id>
<content type='text'>
In 2016 Linus moved install_exec_creds immediately after
setup_new_exec, in binfmt_elf as a cleanup and as part of closing a
potential information leak.

Perform the same cleanup for the other binary formats.

Different binary formats doing the same things the same way makes exec
easier to reason about and easier to maintain.

Greg Ungerer reports:
&gt; I tested the the whole series on non-MMU m68k and non-MMU arm
&gt; (exercising binfmt_flat) and it all tested out with no problems,
&gt; so for the binfmt_flat changes:
Tested-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;

Ref: 9f834ec18def ("binfmt_elf: switch to new creds when switching to new mm")
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In 2016 Linus moved install_exec_creds immediately after
setup_new_exec, in binfmt_elf as a cleanup and as part of closing a
potential information leak.

Perform the same cleanup for the other binary formats.

Different binary formats doing the same things the same way makes exec
easier to reason about and easier to maintain.

Greg Ungerer reports:
&gt; I tested the the whole series on non-MMU m68k and non-MMU arm
&gt; (exercising binfmt_flat) and it all tested out with no problems,
&gt; so for the binfmt_flat changes:
Tested-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;

Ref: 9f834ec18def ("binfmt_elf: switch to new creds when switching to new mm")
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for more missed files</title>
<updated>2019-05-21T08:50:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-19T12:08:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=09c434b8a0047c69e48499de0107de312901e798'/>
<id>09c434b8a0047c69e48499de0107de312901e798</id>
<content type='text'>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

 - Have MODULE_LICENCE("GPL*") inside which was used in the initial
   scan/conversion to ignore the file

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

 - Have MODULE_LICENCE("GPL*") inside which was used in the initial
   scan/conversion to ignore the file

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>a.out: remove core dumping support</title>
<updated>2019-03-05T18:00:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-05T18:00:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=08300f4402abc0eb3bc9c91b27a529836710d32d'/>
<id>08300f4402abc0eb3bc9c91b27a529836710d32d</id>
<content type='text'>
We're (finally) phasing out a.out support for good.  As Borislav Petkov
points out, we've supported ELF binaries for about 25 years by now, and
coredumping in particular has bitrotted over the years.

None of the tool chains even support generating a.out binaries any more,
and the plan is to deprecate a.out support entirely for the kernel.  But
I want to start with just removing the core dumping code, because I can
still imagine that somebody actually might want to support a.out as a
simpler biinary format.

Particularly if you generate some random binaries on the fly, ELF is a
much more complicated format (admittedly ELF also does have a lot of
toolchain support, mitigating that complexity a lot and you really
should have moved over in the last 25 years).

So it's at least somewhat possible that somebody out there has some
workflow that still involves generating and running a.out executables.

In contrast, it's very unlikely that anybody depends on debugging any
legacy a.out core files.  But regardless, I want this phase-out to be
done in two steps, so that we can resurrect a.out support (if needed)
without having to resurrect the core file dumping that is almost
certainly not needed.

Jann Horn pointed to the &lt;asm/a.out-core.h&gt; file that my first trivial
cut at this had missed.

And Alan Cox points out that the a.out binary loader _could_ be done in
user space if somebody wants to, but we might keep just the loader in
the kernel if somebody really wants it, since the loader isn't that big
and has no really odd special cases like the core dumping does.

Acked-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Alan Cox &lt;gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We're (finally) phasing out a.out support for good.  As Borislav Petkov
points out, we've supported ELF binaries for about 25 years by now, and
coredumping in particular has bitrotted over the years.

None of the tool chains even support generating a.out binaries any more,
and the plan is to deprecate a.out support entirely for the kernel.  But
I want to start with just removing the core dumping code, because I can
still imagine that somebody actually might want to support a.out as a
simpler biinary format.

Particularly if you generate some random binaries on the fly, ELF is a
much more complicated format (admittedly ELF also does have a lot of
toolchain support, mitigating that complexity a lot and you really
should have moved over in the last 25 years).

So it's at least somewhat possible that somebody out there has some
workflow that still involves generating and running a.out executables.

In contrast, it's very unlikely that anybody depends on debugging any
legacy a.out core files.  But regardless, I want this phase-out to be
done in two steps, so that we can resurrect a.out support (if needed)
without having to resurrect the core file dumping that is almost
certainly not needed.

Jann Horn pointed to the &lt;asm/a.out-core.h&gt; file that my first trivial
cut at this had missed.

And Alan Cox points out that the a.out binary loader _could_ be done in
user space if somebody wants to, but we might keep just the loader in
the kernel if somebody really wants it, since the loader isn't that big
and has no really odd special cases like the core dumping does.

Acked-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Alan Cox &lt;gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
