<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/drivers/firmware, branch v3.9-rc2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2013-03-10T00:51:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-10T00:51:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=72932611b4b05bbd89fafa369d564ac8e449809b'/>
<id>72932611b4b05bbd89fafa369d564ac8e449809b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull namespace bugfixes from Eric Biederman:
 "This is three simple fixes against 3.9-rc1.  I have tested each of
  these fixes and verified they work correctly.

  The userns oops in key_change_session_keyring and the BUG_ON triggered
  by proc_ns_follow_link were found by Dave Jones.

  I am including the enhancement for mount to only trigger requests of
  filesystem modules here instead of delaying this for the 3.10 merge
  window because it is both trivial and the kind of change that tends to
  bit-rot if left untouched for two months."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  proc: Use nd_jump_link in proc_ns_follow_link
  fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules (Part 2).
  fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules.
  userns: Stop oopsing in key_change_session_keyring
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull namespace bugfixes from Eric Biederman:
 "This is three simple fixes against 3.9-rc1.  I have tested each of
  these fixes and verified they work correctly.

  The userns oops in key_change_session_keyring and the BUG_ON triggered
  by proc_ns_follow_link were found by Dave Jones.

  I am including the enhancement for mount to only trigger requests of
  filesystem modules here instead of delaying this for the 3.10 merge
  window because it is both trivial and the kind of change that tends to
  bit-rot if left untouched for two months."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  proc: Use nd_jump_link in proc_ns_follow_link
  fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules (Part 2).
  fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules.
  userns: Stop oopsing in key_change_session_keyring
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dmi_scan: fix missing check for _DMI_ signature in smbios_present()</title>
<updated>2013-03-08T23:05:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-08T20:43:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a40e7cf8f06b4e322ba902e4e9f6a6b0c2daa907'/>
<id>a40e7cf8f06b4e322ba902e4e9f6a6b0c2daa907</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 9f9c9cbb6057 ("drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c: fetch dmi version
from SMBIOS if it exists") hoisted the check for "_DMI_" into
dmi_scan_machine(), which means that we don't bother to check for
"_DMI_" at offset 16 in an SMBIOS entry.  smbios_present() may also call
dmi_present() for an address where we found "_SM_", if it failed further
validation.

Check for "_DMI_" in smbios_present() before calling dmi_present().

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Reported-by: Tim McGrath &lt;tmhikaru@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tim Mcgrath &lt;tmhikaru@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Zhenzhong Duan &lt;zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 9f9c9cbb6057 ("drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c: fetch dmi version
from SMBIOS if it exists") hoisted the check for "_DMI_" into
dmi_scan_machine(), which means that we don't bother to check for
"_DMI_" at offset 16 in an SMBIOS entry.  smbios_present() may also call
dmi_present() for an address where we found "_SM_", if it failed further
validation.

Check for "_DMI_" in smbios_present() before calling dmi_present().

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Reported-by: Tim McGrath &lt;tmhikaru@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tim Mcgrath &lt;tmhikaru@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Zhenzhong Duan &lt;zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efivarfs: return accurate error code in efivarfs_fill_super()</title>
<updated>2013-03-06T14:46:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Fleming</name>
<email>matt.fleming@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-05T12:46:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=feff5dc4f98330d8152b521acc2e18c16712e6c8'/>
<id>feff5dc4f98330d8152b521acc2e18c16712e6c8</id>
<content type='text'>
Joseph was hitting a failure case when mounting efivarfs which
resulted in an incorrect error message,

  $ sudo mount -v /sys/firmware/efi/efivars mount: Cannot allocate memory

triggered when efivarfs_valid_name() returned -EINVAL.

Make sure we pass accurate return values up the stack if
efivarfs_fill_super() fails to build inodes for EFI variables.

Reported-by: Joseph Yasi &lt;joe.yasi@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Lingzhu Xiang &lt;lxiang@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jeremy Kerr &lt;jk@ozlabs.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@srcf.ucam.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.8
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt.fleming@intel.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Joseph was hitting a failure case when mounting efivarfs which
resulted in an incorrect error message,

  $ sudo mount -v /sys/firmware/efi/efivars mount: Cannot allocate memory

triggered when efivarfs_valid_name() returned -EINVAL.

Make sure we pass accurate return values up the stack if
efivarfs_fill_super() fails to build inodes for EFI variables.

Reported-by: Joseph Yasi &lt;joe.yasi@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Lingzhu Xiang &lt;lxiang@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jeremy Kerr &lt;jk@ozlabs.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@srcf.ucam.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.8
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt.fleming@intel.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efivars: efivarfs_valid_name() should handle pstore syntax</title>
<updated>2013-03-06T14:46:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Fleming</name>
<email>matt.fleming@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-05T07:40:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=123abd76edf56c02a76b46d3d673897177ef067b'/>
<id>123abd76edf56c02a76b46d3d673897177ef067b</id>
<content type='text'>
Stricter validation was introduced with commit da27a24383b2b
("efivarfs: guid part of filenames are case-insensitive") and commit
47f531e8ba3b ("efivarfs: Validate filenames much more aggressively"),
which is necessary for the guid portion of efivarfs filenames, but we
don't need to be so strict with the first part, the variable name. The
UEFI specification doesn't impose any constraints on variable names
other than they be a NULL-terminated string.

The above commits caused a regression that resulted in users seeing
the following message,

  $ sudo mount -v /sys/firmware/efi/efivars mount: Cannot allocate memory

whenever pstore EFI variables were present in the variable store,
since their variable names failed to pass the following check,

    /* GUID should be right after the first '-' */
    if (s - 1 != strchr(str, '-'))

as a typical pstore filename is of the form, dump-type0-10-1-&lt;guid&gt;.
The fix is trivial since the guid portion of the filename is GUID_LEN
bytes, we can use (len - GUID_LEN) to ensure the '-' character is
where we expect it to be.

(The bogus ENOMEM error value will be fixed in a separate patch.)

Reported-by: Joseph Yasi &lt;joe.yasi@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Joseph Yasi &lt;joe.yasi@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Lingzhu Xiang &lt;lxiang@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jeremy Kerr &lt;jk@ozlabs.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@srcf.ucam.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.8
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt.fleming@intel.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Stricter validation was introduced with commit da27a24383b2b
("efivarfs: guid part of filenames are case-insensitive") and commit
47f531e8ba3b ("efivarfs: Validate filenames much more aggressively"),
which is necessary for the guid portion of efivarfs filenames, but we
don't need to be so strict with the first part, the variable name. The
UEFI specification doesn't impose any constraints on variable names
other than they be a NULL-terminated string.

The above commits caused a regression that resulted in users seeing
the following message,

  $ sudo mount -v /sys/firmware/efi/efivars mount: Cannot allocate memory

whenever pstore EFI variables were present in the variable store,
since their variable names failed to pass the following check,

    /* GUID should be right after the first '-' */
    if (s - 1 != strchr(str, '-'))

as a typical pstore filename is of the form, dump-type0-10-1-&lt;guid&gt;.
The fix is trivial since the guid portion of the filename is GUID_LEN
bytes, we can use (len - GUID_LEN) to ensure the '-' character is
where we expect it to be.

(The bogus ENOMEM error value will be fixed in a separate patch.)

Reported-by: Joseph Yasi &lt;joe.yasi@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Joseph Yasi &lt;joe.yasi@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Lingzhu Xiang &lt;lxiang@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jeremy Kerr &lt;jk@ozlabs.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@srcf.ucam.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.8
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt.fleming@intel.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi: be more paranoid about available space when creating variables</title>
<updated>2013-03-06T14:43:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>matthew.garrett@nebula.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-03T00:40:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=68d929862e29a8b52a7f2f2f86a0600423b093cd'/>
<id>68d929862e29a8b52a7f2f2f86a0600423b093cd</id>
<content type='text'>
UEFI variables are typically stored in flash. For various reasons, avaiable
space is typically not reclaimed immediately upon the deletion of a
variable - instead, the system will garbage collect during initialisation
after a reboot.

Some systems appear to handle this garbage collection extremely poorly,
failing if more than 50% of the system flash is in use. This can result in
the machine refusing to boot. The safest thing to do for the moment is to
forbid writes if they'd end up using more than half of the storage space.
We can make this more finegrained later if we come up with a method for
identifying the broken machines.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;matthew.garrett@nebula.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt.fleming@intel.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
UEFI variables are typically stored in flash. For various reasons, avaiable
space is typically not reclaimed immediately upon the deletion of a
variable - instead, the system will garbage collect during initialisation
after a reboot.

Some systems appear to handle this garbage collection extremely poorly,
failing if more than 50% of the system flash is in use. This can result in
the machine refusing to boot. The safest thing to do for the moment is to
forbid writes if they'd end up using more than half of the storage space.
We can make this more finegrained later if we come up with a method for
identifying the broken machines.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;matthew.garrett@nebula.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt.fleming@intel.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules.</title>
<updated>2013-03-04T03:36:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-03T03:39:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7f78e0351394052e1a6293e175825eb5c7869507'/>
<id>7f78e0351394052e1a6293e175825eb5c7869507</id>
<content type='text'>
Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-"
and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules
to match.

A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code
that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many
users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel.

Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible
modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially
making things safer with no real cost.

Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which
filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf
with blacklist and alias directives.  Allowing simple, safe,
well understood work-arounds to known problematic software.

This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem
name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading
would not work.  While writing this patch I saw a handful of such
cases.  The most significant being autofs that lives in the module
autofs4.

This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request
module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and
people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case
the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module.

After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any
particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond
making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem
module.  The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module()
without regards to the users permissions.  In general all a filesystem
module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep.
Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a
filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted.  In a user
namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
which most filesystems do not set today.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-"
and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules
to match.

A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code
that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many
users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel.

Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible
modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially
making things safer with no real cost.

Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which
filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf
with blacklist and alias directives.  Allowing simple, safe,
well understood work-arounds to known problematic software.

This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem
name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading
would not work.  While writing this patch I saw a handful of such
cases.  The most significant being autofs that lives in the module
autofs4.

This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request
module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and
people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case
the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module.

After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any
particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond
making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem
module.  The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module()
without regards to the users permissions.  In general all a filesystem
module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep.
Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a
filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted.  In a user
namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
which most filesystems do not set today.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86-efi-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2013-02-28T00:17:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-28T00:17:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=e3c4877de8b9d93bd47b6ee88eb594b1c1e10da5'/>
<id>e3c4877de8b9d93bd47b6ee88eb594b1c1e10da5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86/EFI changes from Peter Anvin:

 - Improve the initrd handling in the EFI boot stub by allowing forward
   slashes in the pathname - from Chun-Yi Lee.

 - Cleanup code duplication in the EFI mixed kernel/firmware code - from
   Satoru Takeuchi.

 - efivarfs bug fixes for more strict filename validation, with lots of
   input from Al Viro.

* 'x86-efi-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86, efi: remove duplicate code in setup_arch() by using, efi_is_native()
  efivarfs: guid part of filenames are case-insensitive
  efivarfs: Validate filenames much more aggressively
  efivarfs: Use sizeof() instead of magic number
  x86, efi: Allow slash in file path of initrd
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86/EFI changes from Peter Anvin:

 - Improve the initrd handling in the EFI boot stub by allowing forward
   slashes in the pathname - from Chun-Yi Lee.

 - Cleanup code duplication in the EFI mixed kernel/firmware code - from
   Satoru Takeuchi.

 - efivarfs bug fixes for more strict filename validation, with lots of
   input from Al Viro.

* 'x86-efi-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86, efi: remove duplicate code in setup_arch() by using, efi_is_native()
  efivarfs: guid part of filenames are case-insensitive
  efivarfs: Validate filenames much more aggressively
  efivarfs: Use sizeof() instead of magic number
  x86, efi: Allow slash in file path of initrd
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>memory-hotplug: remove /sys/firmware/memmap/X sysfs</title>
<updated>2013-02-24T01:50:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yasuaki Ishimatsu</name>
<email>isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-23T00:32:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=46c66c4b7ba0f9bb3e2ae3a3cfd40cd3472c8f80'/>
<id>46c66c4b7ba0f9bb3e2ae3a3cfd40cd3472c8f80</id>
<content type='text'>
When (hot)adding memory into system, /sys/firmware/memmap/X/{end, start,
type} sysfs files are created.  But there is no code to remove these
files.  This patch implements the function to remove them.

We cannot free firmware_map_entry which is allocated by bootmem because
there is no way to do so when the system is up.  But we can at least
remember the address of that memory and reuse the storage when the
memory is added next time.

This patch also introduces a new list map_entries_bootmem to link the
map entries allocated by bootmem when they are removed, and a lock to
protect it.  And these entries will be reused when the memory is
hot-added again.

The idea is suggestted by Andrew Morton.

NOTE: It is unsafe to return an entry pointer and release the
      map_entries_lock.  So we should not hold the map_entries_lock
      separately in firmware_map_find_entry() and
      firmware_map_remove_entry().  Hold the map_entries_lock across find
      and remove /sys/firmware/memmap/X operation.

       And also, users of these two functions need to be careful to
      hold the lock when using these two functions.

[tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com: Hold spinlock across find|remove /sys operation]
[tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com: fix the wrong comments of map_entries]
[tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com: reuse the storage of /sys/firmware/memmap/X/ allocated by bootmem]
[tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com: fix section mismatch problem]
[tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com: fix the doc format in drivers/firmware/memmap.c]
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang &lt;wency@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu &lt;isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tang Chen &lt;tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kamezawa Hiroyuki &lt;kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Jiang Liu &lt;jiang.liu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Jianguo Wu &lt;wujianguo@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Lai Jiangshan &lt;laijs@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Tang Chen &lt;tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Julian Calaby &lt;julian.calaby@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When (hot)adding memory into system, /sys/firmware/memmap/X/{end, start,
type} sysfs files are created.  But there is no code to remove these
files.  This patch implements the function to remove them.

We cannot free firmware_map_entry which is allocated by bootmem because
there is no way to do so when the system is up.  But we can at least
remember the address of that memory and reuse the storage when the
memory is added next time.

This patch also introduces a new list map_entries_bootmem to link the
map entries allocated by bootmem when they are removed, and a lock to
protect it.  And these entries will be reused when the memory is
hot-added again.

The idea is suggestted by Andrew Morton.

NOTE: It is unsafe to return an entry pointer and release the
      map_entries_lock.  So we should not hold the map_entries_lock
      separately in firmware_map_find_entry() and
      firmware_map_remove_entry().  Hold the map_entries_lock across find
      and remove /sys/firmware/memmap/X operation.

       And also, users of these two functions need to be careful to
      hold the lock when using these two functions.

[tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com: Hold spinlock across find|remove /sys operation]
[tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com: fix the wrong comments of map_entries]
[tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com: reuse the storage of /sys/firmware/memmap/X/ allocated by bootmem]
[tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com: fix section mismatch problem]
[tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com: fix the doc format in drivers/firmware/memmap.c]
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang &lt;wency@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu &lt;isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tang Chen &lt;tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kamezawa Hiroyuki &lt;kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Jiang Liu &lt;jiang.liu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Jianguo Wu &lt;wujianguo@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Lai Jiangshan &lt;laijs@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Tang Chen &lt;tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Julian Calaby &lt;julian.calaby@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'please-pull-pstore' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/aegl/linux</title>
<updated>2013-02-21T17:38:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-21T17:38:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=024e4ec1856d57bb78c06ec903d29dcf716f5f47'/>
<id>024e4ec1856d57bb78c06ec903d29dcf716f5f47</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull pstore patches from Tony Luck:
 "A few fixes to reduce places where pstore might hang a system in the
  crash path.  Plus a new mountpoint (/sys/fs/pstore ...  makes more
  sense then /dev/pstore)."

Fix up trivial conflict in drivers/firmware/efivars.c

* tag 'please-pull-pstore' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/aegl/linux:
  pstore: Create a convenient mount point for pstore
  efi_pstore: Introducing workqueue updating sysfs
  efivars: Disable external interrupt while holding efivars-&gt;lock
  efi_pstore: Avoid deadlock in non-blocking paths
  pstore: Avoid deadlock in panic and emergency-restart path
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull pstore patches from Tony Luck:
 "A few fixes to reduce places where pstore might hang a system in the
  crash path.  Plus a new mountpoint (/sys/fs/pstore ...  makes more
  sense then /dev/pstore)."

Fix up trivial conflict in drivers/firmware/efivars.c

* tag 'please-pull-pstore' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/aegl/linux:
  pstore: Create a convenient mount point for pstore
  efi_pstore: Introducing workqueue updating sysfs
  efivars: Disable external interrupt while holding efivars-&gt;lock
  efi_pstore: Avoid deadlock in non-blocking paths
  pstore: Avoid deadlock in panic and emergency-restart path
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi_pstore: Introducing workqueue updating sysfs</title>
<updated>2013-02-12T21:04:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Seiji Aguchi</name>
<email>seiji.aguchi@hds.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-12T21:04:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a93bc0c6e07ed9bac44700280e65e2945d864fd4'/>
<id>a93bc0c6e07ed9bac44700280e65e2945d864fd4</id>
<content type='text'>
[Problem]
efi_pstore creates sysfs entries, which enable users to access to NVRAM,
in a write callback. If a kernel panic happens in an interrupt context,
it may fail because it could sleep due to dynamic memory allocations during
creating sysfs entries.

[Patch Description]
This patch removes sysfs operations from a write callback by introducing
a workqueue updating sysfs entries which is scheduled after the write
callback is called.

Also, the workqueue is kicked in a just oops case.
A system will go down in other cases such as panic, clean shutdown and emergency
restart. And we don't need to create sysfs entries because there is no chance for
users to access to them.

efi_pstore will be robust against a kernel panic in an interrupt context with this patch.

Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi &lt;seiji.aguchi@hds.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt.fleming@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[Problem]
efi_pstore creates sysfs entries, which enable users to access to NVRAM,
in a write callback. If a kernel panic happens in an interrupt context,
it may fail because it could sleep due to dynamic memory allocations during
creating sysfs entries.

[Patch Description]
This patch removes sysfs operations from a write callback by introducing
a workqueue updating sysfs entries which is scheduled after the write
callback is called.

Also, the workqueue is kicked in a just oops case.
A system will go down in other cases such as panic, clean shutdown and emergency
restart. And we don't need to create sysfs entries because there is no chance for
users to access to them.

efi_pstore will be robust against a kernel panic in an interrupt context with this patch.

Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi &lt;seiji.aguchi@hds.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt.fleming@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
