<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c, branch v6.13</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - do not request interrupt on cmd completion when irqs disabled</title>
<updated>2024-09-06T06:50:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amit Shah</name>
<email>amit.shah@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-29T10:20:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3401f63e72596dcb7d912a5b67b4291643cc1034'/>
<id>3401f63e72596dcb7d912a5b67b4291643cc1034</id>
<content type='text'>
While sending a command to the PSP, we always requested an interrupt
from the PSP after command completion.  This worked for most cases.  For
the special case of irqs being disabled -- e.g. when running within
crashdump or kexec contexts, we should not set the SEV_CMDRESP_IOC flag,
so the PSP knows to not attempt interrupt delivery.

Fixes: 8ef979584ea8 ("crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump")

Based-on-patch-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah &lt;amit.shah@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
While sending a command to the PSP, we always requested an interrupt
from the PSP after command completion.  This worked for most cases.  For
the special case of irqs being disabled -- e.g. when running within
crashdump or kexec contexts, we should not set the SEV_CMDRESP_IOC flag,
so the PSP knows to not attempt interrupt delivery.

Fixes: 8ef979584ea8 ("crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump")

Based-on-patch-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah &lt;amit.shah@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Properly unregister /dev/sev on sev PLATFORM_STATUS failure</title>
<updated>2024-08-30T10:22:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavan Kumar Paluri</name>
<email>papaluri@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-15T12:25:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ce3d2d6b150ba8528f3218ebf0cee2c2c572662d'/>
<id>ce3d2d6b150ba8528f3218ebf0cee2c2c572662d</id>
<content type='text'>
In case of sev PLATFORM_STATUS failure, sev_get_api_version() fails
resulting in sev_data field of psp_master nulled out. This later becomes
a problem when unloading the ccp module because the device has not been
unregistered (via misc_deregister()) before clearing the sev_data field
of psp_master. As a result, on reloading the ccp module, a duplicate
device issue is encountered as can be seen from the dmesg log below.

on reloading ccp module via modprobe ccp

Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0xd7/0xf0
  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
  sysfs_warn_dup+0x5c/0x70
  sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xbc/0xd
  kobject_add_internal+0xb1/0x2f0
  kobject_add+0x7a/0xe0
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  ? get_device_parent+0xd4/0x1e0
  ? __pfx_klist_children_get+0x10/0x10
  device_add+0x121/0x870
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  device_create_groups_vargs+0xdc/0x100
  device_create_with_groups+0x3f/0x60
  misc_register+0x13b/0x1c0
  sev_dev_init+0x1d4/0x290 [ccp]
  psp_dev_init+0x136/0x300 [ccp]
  sp_init+0x6f/0x80 [ccp]
  sp_pci_probe+0x2a6/0x310 [ccp]
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  local_pci_probe+0x4b/0xb0
  work_for_cpu_fn+0x1a/0x30
  process_one_work+0x203/0x600
  worker_thread+0x19e/0x350
  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
  kthread+0xeb/0x120
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
  kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for sev with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory.
  ccp 0000:22:00.1: sev initialization failed
  ccp 0000:22:00.1: psp initialization failed
  ccp 0000:a2:00.1: no command queues available
  ccp 0000:a2:00.1: psp enabled

Address this issue by unregistering the /dev/sev before clearing out
sev_data in case of PLATFORM_STATUS failure.

Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavan Kumar Paluri &lt;papaluri@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In case of sev PLATFORM_STATUS failure, sev_get_api_version() fails
resulting in sev_data field of psp_master nulled out. This later becomes
a problem when unloading the ccp module because the device has not been
unregistered (via misc_deregister()) before clearing the sev_data field
of psp_master. As a result, on reloading the ccp module, a duplicate
device issue is encountered as can be seen from the dmesg log below.

on reloading ccp module via modprobe ccp

Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0xd7/0xf0
  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
  sysfs_warn_dup+0x5c/0x70
  sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xbc/0xd
  kobject_add_internal+0xb1/0x2f0
  kobject_add+0x7a/0xe0
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  ? get_device_parent+0xd4/0x1e0
  ? __pfx_klist_children_get+0x10/0x10
  device_add+0x121/0x870
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  device_create_groups_vargs+0xdc/0x100
  device_create_with_groups+0x3f/0x60
  misc_register+0x13b/0x1c0
  sev_dev_init+0x1d4/0x290 [ccp]
  psp_dev_init+0x136/0x300 [ccp]
  sp_init+0x6f/0x80 [ccp]
  sp_pci_probe+0x2a6/0x310 [ccp]
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  local_pci_probe+0x4b/0xb0
  work_for_cpu_fn+0x1a/0x30
  process_one_work+0x203/0x600
  worker_thread+0x19e/0x350
  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
  kthread+0xeb/0x120
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
  kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for sev with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory.
  ccp 0000:22:00.1: sev initialization failed
  ccp 0000:22:00.1: psp initialization failed
  ccp 0000:a2:00.1: no command queues available
  ccp 0000:a2:00.1: psp enabled

Address this issue by unregistering the /dev/sev before clearing out
sev_data in case of PLATFORM_STATUS failure.

Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavan Kumar Paluri &lt;papaluri@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Add additional information about an SEV firmware upgrade</title>
<updated>2024-08-24T13:36:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-14T20:42:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=142a794bcf007a22a5b14700e26d740b28d90754'/>
<id>142a794bcf007a22a5b14700e26d740b28d90754</id>
<content type='text'>
Print additional information, in the form of the old and new versions of
the SEV firmware, so that it can be seen what the base firmware was before
the upgrade.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Print additional information, in the form of the old and new versions of
the SEV firmware, so that it can be seen what the base firmware was before
the upgrade.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2024-07-20T19:41:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-20T19:41:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2c9b3512402ed192d1f43f4531fb5da947e72bd0'/>
<id>2c9b3512402ed192d1f43f4531fb5da947e72bd0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM:

   - Initial infrastructure for shadow stage-2 MMUs, as part of nested
     virtualization enablement

   - Support for userspace changes to the guest CTR_EL0 value, enabling
     (in part) migration of VMs between heterogenous hardware

   - Fixes + improvements to pKVM's FF-A proxy, adding support for v1.1
     of the protocol

   - FPSIMD/SVE support for nested, including merged trap configuration
     and exception routing

   - New command-line parameter to control the WFx trap behavior under
     KVM

   - Introduce kCFI hardening in the EL2 hypervisor

   - Fixes + cleanups for handling presence/absence of FEAT_TCRX

   - Miscellaneous fixes + documentation updates

  LoongArch:

   - Add paravirt steal time support

   - Add support for KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET

   - Add perf kvm-stat support for loongarch

  RISC-V:

   - Redirect AMO load/store access fault traps to guest

   - perf kvm stat support

   - Use guest files for IMSIC virtualization, when available

  s390:

   - Assortment of tiny fixes which are not time critical

  x86:

   - Fixes for Xen emulation

   - Add a global struct to consolidate tracking of host values, e.g.
     EFER

   - Add KVM_CAP_X86_APIC_BUS_CYCLES_NS to allow configuring the
     effective APIC bus frequency, because TDX

   - Print the name of the APICv/AVIC inhibits in the relevant
     tracepoint

   - Clean up KVM's handling of vendor specific emulation to
     consistently act on "compatible with Intel/AMD", versus checking
     for a specific vendor

   - Drop MTRR virtualization, and instead always honor guest PAT on
     CPUs that support self-snoop

   - Update to the newfangled Intel CPU FMS infrastructure

   - Don't advertise IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL as an MSR-to-be-saved, as
     it reads '0' and writes from userspace are ignored

   - Misc cleanups

  x86 - MMU:

   - Small cleanups, renames and refactoring extracted from the upcoming
     Intel TDX support

   - Don't allocate kvm_mmu_page.shadowed_translation for shadow pages
     that can't hold leafs SPTEs

   - Unconditionally drop mmu_lock when allocating TDP MMU page tables
     for eager page splitting, to avoid stalling vCPUs when splitting
     huge pages

   - Bug the VM instead of simply warning if KVM tries to split a SPTE
     that is non-present or not-huge. KVM is guaranteed to end up in a
     broken state because the callers fully expect a valid SPTE, it's
     all but dangerous to let more MMU changes happen afterwards

  x86 - AMD:

   - Make per-CPU save_area allocations NUMA-aware

   - Force sev_es_host_save_area() to be inlined to avoid calling into
     an instrumentable function from noinstr code

   - Base support for running SEV-SNP guests. API-wise, this includes a
     new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type, encrypting/measure the initial image into
     guest memory, and finalizing it before launching it. Internally,
     there are some gmem/mmu hooks needed to prepare gmem-allocated
     pages before mapping them into guest private memory ranges

     This includes basic support for attestation guest requests, enough
     to say that KVM supports the GHCB 2.0 specification

     There is no support yet for loading into the firmware those signing
     keys to be used for attestation requests, and therefore no need yet
     for the host to provide certificate data for those keys.

     To support fetching certificate data from userspace, a new KVM exit
     type will be needed to handle fetching the certificate from
     userspace.

     An attempt to define a new KVM_EXIT_COCO / KVM_EXIT_COCO_REQ_CERTS
     exit type to handle this was introduced in v1 of this patchset, but
     is still being discussed by community, so for now this patchset
     only implements a stub version of SNP Extended Guest Requests that
     does not provide certificate data

  x86 - Intel:

   - Remove an unnecessary EPT TLB flush when enabling hardware

   - Fix a series of bugs that cause KVM to fail to detect nested
     pending posted interrupts as valid wake eents for a vCPU executing
     HLT in L2 (with HLT-exiting disable by L1)

   - KVM: x86: Suppress MMIO that is triggered during task switch
     emulation

     Explicitly suppress userspace emulated MMIO exits that are
     triggered when emulating a task switch as KVM doesn't support
     userspace MMIO during complex (multi-step) emulation

     Silently ignoring the exit request can result in the
     WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu-&gt;mmio_needed) firing if KVM exits to userspace
     for some other reason prior to purging mmio_needed

     See commit 0dc902267cb3 ("KVM: x86: Suppress pending MMIO write
     exits if emulator detects exception") for more details on KVM's
     limitations with respect to emulated MMIO during complex emulator
     flows

  Generic:

   - Rename the AS_UNMOVABLE flag that was introduced for KVM to
     AS_INACCESSIBLE, because the special casing needed by these pages
     is not due to just unmovability (and in fact they are only
     unmovable because the CPU cannot access them)

   - New ioctl to populate the KVM page tables in advance, which is
     useful to mitigate KVM page faults during guest boot or after live
     migration. The code will also be used by TDX, but (probably) not
     through the ioctl

   - Enable halt poll shrinking by default, as Intel found it to be a
     clear win

   - Setup empty IRQ routing when creating a VM to avoid having to
     synchronize SRCU when creating a split IRQCHIP on x86

   - Rework the sched_in/out() paths to replace kvm_arch_sched_in() with
     a flag that arch code can use for hooking both sched_in() and
     sched_out()

   - Take the vCPU @id as an "unsigned long" instead of "u32" to avoid
     truncating a bogus value from userspace, e.g. to help userspace
     detect bugs

   - Mark a vCPU as preempted if and only if it's scheduled out while in
     the KVM_RUN loop, e.g. to avoid marking it preempted and thus
     writing guest memory when retrieving guest state during live
     migration blackout

  Selftests:

   - Remove dead code in the memslot modification stress test

   - Treat "branch instructions retired" as supported on all AMD Family
     17h+ CPUs

   - Print the guest pseudo-RNG seed only when it changes, to avoid
     spamming the log for tests that create lots of VMs

   - Make the PMU counters test less flaky when counting LLC cache
     misses by doing CLFLUSH{OPT} in every loop iteration"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (227 commits)
  crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command
  KVM: x86/pmu: Add kvm_pmu_call() to simplify static calls of kvm_pmu_ops
  KVM: x86: Introduce kvm_x86_call() to simplify static calls of kvm_x86_ops
  KVM: x86: Replace static_call_cond() with static_call()
  KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
  x86/sev: Move sev_guest.h into common SEV header
  KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
  KVM: x86: Suppress MMIO that is triggered during task switch emulation
  KVM: x86/mmu: Clean up make_huge_page_split_spte() definition and intro
  KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if KVM tries to split a !hugepage SPTE
  KVM: selftests: x86: Add test for KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
  KVM: x86: Implement kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory()
  KVM: x86/mmu: Make kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() return mapped level
  KVM: x86/mmu: Account pf_{fixed,emulate,spurious} in callers of "do page fault"
  KVM: x86/mmu: Bump pf_taken stat only in the "real" page fault handler
  KVM: Add KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY vcpu ioctl to pre-populate guest memory
  KVM: Document KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY ioctl
  mm, virt: merge AS_UNMOVABLE and AS_INACCESSIBLE
  perf kvm: Add kvm-stat for loongarch64
  LoongArch: KVM: Add PV steal time support in guest side
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM:

   - Initial infrastructure for shadow stage-2 MMUs, as part of nested
     virtualization enablement

   - Support for userspace changes to the guest CTR_EL0 value, enabling
     (in part) migration of VMs between heterogenous hardware

   - Fixes + improvements to pKVM's FF-A proxy, adding support for v1.1
     of the protocol

   - FPSIMD/SVE support for nested, including merged trap configuration
     and exception routing

   - New command-line parameter to control the WFx trap behavior under
     KVM

   - Introduce kCFI hardening in the EL2 hypervisor

   - Fixes + cleanups for handling presence/absence of FEAT_TCRX

   - Miscellaneous fixes + documentation updates

  LoongArch:

   - Add paravirt steal time support

   - Add support for KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET

   - Add perf kvm-stat support for loongarch

  RISC-V:

   - Redirect AMO load/store access fault traps to guest

   - perf kvm stat support

   - Use guest files for IMSIC virtualization, when available

  s390:

   - Assortment of tiny fixes which are not time critical

  x86:

   - Fixes for Xen emulation

   - Add a global struct to consolidate tracking of host values, e.g.
     EFER

   - Add KVM_CAP_X86_APIC_BUS_CYCLES_NS to allow configuring the
     effective APIC bus frequency, because TDX

   - Print the name of the APICv/AVIC inhibits in the relevant
     tracepoint

   - Clean up KVM's handling of vendor specific emulation to
     consistently act on "compatible with Intel/AMD", versus checking
     for a specific vendor

   - Drop MTRR virtualization, and instead always honor guest PAT on
     CPUs that support self-snoop

   - Update to the newfangled Intel CPU FMS infrastructure

   - Don't advertise IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL as an MSR-to-be-saved, as
     it reads '0' and writes from userspace are ignored

   - Misc cleanups

  x86 - MMU:

   - Small cleanups, renames and refactoring extracted from the upcoming
     Intel TDX support

   - Don't allocate kvm_mmu_page.shadowed_translation for shadow pages
     that can't hold leafs SPTEs

   - Unconditionally drop mmu_lock when allocating TDP MMU page tables
     for eager page splitting, to avoid stalling vCPUs when splitting
     huge pages

   - Bug the VM instead of simply warning if KVM tries to split a SPTE
     that is non-present or not-huge. KVM is guaranteed to end up in a
     broken state because the callers fully expect a valid SPTE, it's
     all but dangerous to let more MMU changes happen afterwards

  x86 - AMD:

   - Make per-CPU save_area allocations NUMA-aware

   - Force sev_es_host_save_area() to be inlined to avoid calling into
     an instrumentable function from noinstr code

   - Base support for running SEV-SNP guests. API-wise, this includes a
     new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type, encrypting/measure the initial image into
     guest memory, and finalizing it before launching it. Internally,
     there are some gmem/mmu hooks needed to prepare gmem-allocated
     pages before mapping them into guest private memory ranges

     This includes basic support for attestation guest requests, enough
     to say that KVM supports the GHCB 2.0 specification

     There is no support yet for loading into the firmware those signing
     keys to be used for attestation requests, and therefore no need yet
     for the host to provide certificate data for those keys.

     To support fetching certificate data from userspace, a new KVM exit
     type will be needed to handle fetching the certificate from
     userspace.

     An attempt to define a new KVM_EXIT_COCO / KVM_EXIT_COCO_REQ_CERTS
     exit type to handle this was introduced in v1 of this patchset, but
     is still being discussed by community, so for now this patchset
     only implements a stub version of SNP Extended Guest Requests that
     does not provide certificate data

  x86 - Intel:

   - Remove an unnecessary EPT TLB flush when enabling hardware

   - Fix a series of bugs that cause KVM to fail to detect nested
     pending posted interrupts as valid wake eents for a vCPU executing
     HLT in L2 (with HLT-exiting disable by L1)

   - KVM: x86: Suppress MMIO that is triggered during task switch
     emulation

     Explicitly suppress userspace emulated MMIO exits that are
     triggered when emulating a task switch as KVM doesn't support
     userspace MMIO during complex (multi-step) emulation

     Silently ignoring the exit request can result in the
     WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu-&gt;mmio_needed) firing if KVM exits to userspace
     for some other reason prior to purging mmio_needed

     See commit 0dc902267cb3 ("KVM: x86: Suppress pending MMIO write
     exits if emulator detects exception") for more details on KVM's
     limitations with respect to emulated MMIO during complex emulator
     flows

  Generic:

   - Rename the AS_UNMOVABLE flag that was introduced for KVM to
     AS_INACCESSIBLE, because the special casing needed by these pages
     is not due to just unmovability (and in fact they are only
     unmovable because the CPU cannot access them)

   - New ioctl to populate the KVM page tables in advance, which is
     useful to mitigate KVM page faults during guest boot or after live
     migration. The code will also be used by TDX, but (probably) not
     through the ioctl

   - Enable halt poll shrinking by default, as Intel found it to be a
     clear win

   - Setup empty IRQ routing when creating a VM to avoid having to
     synchronize SRCU when creating a split IRQCHIP on x86

   - Rework the sched_in/out() paths to replace kvm_arch_sched_in() with
     a flag that arch code can use for hooking both sched_in() and
     sched_out()

   - Take the vCPU @id as an "unsigned long" instead of "u32" to avoid
     truncating a bogus value from userspace, e.g. to help userspace
     detect bugs

   - Mark a vCPU as preempted if and only if it's scheduled out while in
     the KVM_RUN loop, e.g. to avoid marking it preempted and thus
     writing guest memory when retrieving guest state during live
     migration blackout

  Selftests:

   - Remove dead code in the memslot modification stress test

   - Treat "branch instructions retired" as supported on all AMD Family
     17h+ CPUs

   - Print the guest pseudo-RNG seed only when it changes, to avoid
     spamming the log for tests that create lots of VMs

   - Make the PMU counters test less flaky when counting LLC cache
     misses by doing CLFLUSH{OPT} in every loop iteration"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (227 commits)
  crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command
  KVM: x86/pmu: Add kvm_pmu_call() to simplify static calls of kvm_pmu_ops
  KVM: x86: Introduce kvm_x86_call() to simplify static calls of kvm_x86_ops
  KVM: x86: Replace static_call_cond() with static_call()
  KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
  x86/sev: Move sev_guest.h into common SEV header
  KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
  KVM: x86: Suppress MMIO that is triggered during task switch emulation
  KVM: x86/mmu: Clean up make_huge_page_split_spte() definition and intro
  KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if KVM tries to split a !hugepage SPTE
  KVM: selftests: x86: Add test for KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
  KVM: x86: Implement kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory()
  KVM: x86/mmu: Make kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() return mapped level
  KVM: x86/mmu: Account pf_{fixed,emulate,spurious} in callers of "do page fault"
  KVM: x86/mmu: Bump pf_taken stat only in the "real" page fault handler
  KVM: Add KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY vcpu ioctl to pre-populate guest memory
  KVM: Document KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY ioctl
  mm, virt: merge AS_UNMOVABLE and AS_INACCESSIBLE
  perf kvm: Add kvm-stat for loongarch64
  LoongArch: KVM: Add PV steal time support in guest side
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command</title>
<updated>2024-07-17T16:46:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Roth</name>
<email>michael.roth@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-01T08:52:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=332d2c1d713e232e163386c35a3ba0c1b90df83f'/>
<id>332d2c1d713e232e163386c35a3ba0c1b90df83f</id>
<content type='text'>
When requesting an attestation report a guest is able to specify whether
it wants SNP firmware to sign the report using either a Versioned Chip
Endorsement Key (VCEK), which is derived from chip-unique secrets, or a
Versioned Loaded Endorsement Key (VLEK) which is obtained from an AMD
Key Derivation Service (KDS) and derived from seeds allocated to
enrolled cloud service providers (CSPs).

For VLEK keys, an SNP_VLEK_LOAD SNP firmware command is used to load
them into the system after obtaining them from the KDS. Add a
corresponding userspace interface so to allow the loading of VLEK keys
into the system.

See SEV-SNP Firmware ABI 1.54, SNP_VLEK_LOAD for more details.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth &lt;michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20240501085210.2213060-21-michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When requesting an attestation report a guest is able to specify whether
it wants SNP firmware to sign the report using either a Versioned Chip
Endorsement Key (VCEK), which is derived from chip-unique secrets, or a
Versioned Loaded Endorsement Key (VLEK) which is obtained from an AMD
Key Derivation Service (KDS) and derived from seeds allocated to
enrolled cloud service providers (CSPs).

For VLEK keys, an SNP_VLEK_LOAD SNP firmware command is used to load
them into the system after obtaining them from the KDS. Add a
corresponding userspace interface so to allow the loading of VLEK keys
into the system.

See SEV-SNP Firmware ABI 1.54, SNP_VLEK_LOAD for more details.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth &lt;michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20240501085210.2213060-21-michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Fix null pointer dereference in __sev_snp_shutdown_locked</title>
<updated>2024-06-16T05:41:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kim Phillips</name>
<email>kim.phillips@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-04T17:47:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=468e3295774d0edce15f4ae475913b5076dd4f40'/>
<id>468e3295774d0edce15f4ae475913b5076dd4f40</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix a null pointer dereference induced by DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE.
Return from __sev_snp_shutdown_locked() if the psp_device or the
sev_device structs are not initialized. Without the fix, the driver will
produce the following splat:

   ccp 0000:55:00.5: enabling device (0000 -&gt; 0002)
   ccp 0000:55:00.5: sev enabled
   ccp 0000:55:00.5: psp enabled
   BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f0
   #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
   #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
   PGD 0 P4D 0
   Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
   CPU: 262 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1+ #29
   RIP: 0010:__sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
   Code: 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 41 89 f7 49 89 fe 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d8 48 8b 05 6a 5a 7f 06 &lt;4c&gt; 8b a0 f0 00 00 00 41 0f b6 9c 24 a2 00 00 00 48 83 fb 02 0f 83
   RSP: 0018:ffffb2ea4014b7b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
   RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e4acd2e0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb2ea4014b808
   RBP: ffffb2ea4014b7e8 R08: 0000000000000106 R09: 000000000003d9c0
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffffa39ff070 R12: ffff9e49d40590c8
   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffb2ea4014b808 R15: 0000000000000000
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9e58b1e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00000000000000f0 CR3: 0000000418a3e001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
   PKRU: 55555554
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    ? __die_body+0x6f/0xb0
    ? __die+0xcc/0xf0
    ? page_fault_oops+0x330/0x3a0
    ? save_trace+0x2a5/0x360
    ? do_user_addr_fault+0x583/0x630
    ? exc_page_fault+0x81/0x120
    ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x2b/0x30
    ? __sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
    __sev_firmware_shutdown+0x349/0x5b0
    ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x66/0xe0
    sev_dev_destroy+0x34/0xb0
    psp_dev_destroy+0x27/0x60
    sp_destroy+0x39/0x90
    sp_pci_remove+0x22/0x60
    pci_device_remove+0x4e/0x110
    really_probe+0x271/0x4e0
    __driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x160
    driver_probe_device+0x24/0x120
    __driver_attach+0xc7/0x280
    ? driver_attach+0x30/0x30
    bus_for_each_dev+0x10d/0x130
    driver_attach+0x22/0x30
    bus_add_driver+0x171/0x2b0
    ? unaccepted_memory_init_kdump+0x20/0x20
    driver_register+0x67/0x100
    __pci_register_driver+0x83/0x90
    sp_pci_init+0x22/0x30
    sp_mod_init+0x13/0x30
    do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x290
    ? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
    ? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
    ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x21e/0x6a0
    ? local_clock+0x1c/0x60
    ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x21e/0x6a0
    ? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
    ? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
    ? __lock_acquire+0xd90/0xe30
    ? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
    ? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
    ? __create_object+0x66/0x100
    ? local_clock+0x1c/0x60
    ? __create_object+0x66/0x100
    ? parameq+0x1b/0x90
    ? parse_one+0x6d/0x1d0
    ? parse_args+0xd7/0x1f0
    ? do_initcall_level+0x180/0x180
    do_initcall_level+0xb0/0x180
    do_initcalls+0x60/0xa0
    ? kernel_init+0x1f/0x1d0
    do_basic_setup+0x41/0x50
    kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x230
    ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
    kernel_init+0x1f/0x1d0
    ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
    ret_from_fork+0x3d/0x50
    ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
    ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
    &lt;/TASK&gt;
   Modules linked in:
   CR2: 00000000000000f0
   ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
   RIP: 0010:__sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
   Code: 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 41 89 f7 49 89 fe 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d8 48 8b 05 6a 5a 7f 06 &lt;4c&gt; 8b a0 f0 00 00 00 41 0f b6 9c 24 a2 00 00 00 48 83 fb 02 0f 83
   RSP: 0018:ffffb2ea4014b7b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
   RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e4acd2e0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb2ea4014b808
   RBP: ffffb2ea4014b7e8 R08: 0000000000000106 R09: 000000000003d9c0
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffffa39ff070 R12: ffff9e49d40590c8
   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffb2ea4014b808 R15: 0000000000000000
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9e58b1e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00000000000000f0 CR3: 0000000418a3e001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
   PKRU: 55555554
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
   Kernel Offset: 0x1fc00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)

Fixes: 1ca5614b84ee ("crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick &lt;liam.merwick@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello &lt;mario.limonciello@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Allen &lt;john.allen@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix a null pointer dereference induced by DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE.
Return from __sev_snp_shutdown_locked() if the psp_device or the
sev_device structs are not initialized. Without the fix, the driver will
produce the following splat:

   ccp 0000:55:00.5: enabling device (0000 -&gt; 0002)
   ccp 0000:55:00.5: sev enabled
   ccp 0000:55:00.5: psp enabled
   BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f0
   #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
   #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
   PGD 0 P4D 0
   Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
   CPU: 262 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1+ #29
   RIP: 0010:__sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
   Code: 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 41 89 f7 49 89 fe 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d8 48 8b 05 6a 5a 7f 06 &lt;4c&gt; 8b a0 f0 00 00 00 41 0f b6 9c 24 a2 00 00 00 48 83 fb 02 0f 83
   RSP: 0018:ffffb2ea4014b7b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
   RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e4acd2e0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb2ea4014b808
   RBP: ffffb2ea4014b7e8 R08: 0000000000000106 R09: 000000000003d9c0
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffffa39ff070 R12: ffff9e49d40590c8
   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffb2ea4014b808 R15: 0000000000000000
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9e58b1e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00000000000000f0 CR3: 0000000418a3e001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
   PKRU: 55555554
   Call Trace:
    &lt;TASK&gt;
    ? __die_body+0x6f/0xb0
    ? __die+0xcc/0xf0
    ? page_fault_oops+0x330/0x3a0
    ? save_trace+0x2a5/0x360
    ? do_user_addr_fault+0x583/0x630
    ? exc_page_fault+0x81/0x120
    ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x2b/0x30
    ? __sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
    __sev_firmware_shutdown+0x349/0x5b0
    ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x66/0xe0
    sev_dev_destroy+0x34/0xb0
    psp_dev_destroy+0x27/0x60
    sp_destroy+0x39/0x90
    sp_pci_remove+0x22/0x60
    pci_device_remove+0x4e/0x110
    really_probe+0x271/0x4e0
    __driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x160
    driver_probe_device+0x24/0x120
    __driver_attach+0xc7/0x280
    ? driver_attach+0x30/0x30
    bus_for_each_dev+0x10d/0x130
    driver_attach+0x22/0x30
    bus_add_driver+0x171/0x2b0
    ? unaccepted_memory_init_kdump+0x20/0x20
    driver_register+0x67/0x100
    __pci_register_driver+0x83/0x90
    sp_pci_init+0x22/0x30
    sp_mod_init+0x13/0x30
    do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x290
    ? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
    ? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
    ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x21e/0x6a0
    ? local_clock+0x1c/0x60
    ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x21e/0x6a0
    ? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
    ? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
    ? __lock_acquire+0xd90/0xe30
    ? sched_clock_noinstr+0xd/0x10
    ? local_clock_noinstr+0x3e/0x100
    ? __create_object+0x66/0x100
    ? local_clock+0x1c/0x60
    ? __create_object+0x66/0x100
    ? parameq+0x1b/0x90
    ? parse_one+0x6d/0x1d0
    ? parse_args+0xd7/0x1f0
    ? do_initcall_level+0x180/0x180
    do_initcall_level+0xb0/0x180
    do_initcalls+0x60/0xa0
    ? kernel_init+0x1f/0x1d0
    do_basic_setup+0x41/0x50
    kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x230
    ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
    kernel_init+0x1f/0x1d0
    ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
    ret_from_fork+0x3d/0x50
    ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
    ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
    &lt;/TASK&gt;
   Modules linked in:
   CR2: 00000000000000f0
   ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
   RIP: 0010:__sev_snp_shutdown_locked+0x2e/0x150
   Code: 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 41 89 f7 49 89 fe 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d8 48 8b 05 6a 5a 7f 06 &lt;4c&gt; 8b a0 f0 00 00 00 41 0f b6 9c 24 a2 00 00 00 48 83 fb 02 0f 83
   RSP: 0018:ffffb2ea4014b7b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
   RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e4acd2e0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb2ea4014b808
   RBP: ffffb2ea4014b7e8 R08: 0000000000000106 R09: 000000000003d9c0
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffffa39ff070 R12: ffff9e49d40590c8
   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffb2ea4014b808 R15: 0000000000000000
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9e58b1e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 00000000000000f0 CR3: 0000000418a3e001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
   PKRU: 55555554
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
   Kernel Offset: 0x1fc00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)

Fixes: 1ca5614b84ee ("crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick &lt;liam.merwick@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello &lt;mario.limonciello@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Allen &lt;john.allen@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/CPU/AMD: Track SNP host status with cc_platform_*()</title>
<updated>2024-04-04T08:40:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-27T15:43:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0ecaefb303de69929dc0036d5021d01cec7ea052'/>
<id>0ecaefb303de69929dc0036d5021d01cec7ea052</id>
<content type='text'>
The host SNP worthiness can determined later, after alternatives have
been patched, in snp_rmptable_init() depending on cmdline options like
iommu=pt which is incompatible with SNP, for example.

Which means that one cannot use X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP and will need to
have a special flag for that control.

Use that newly added CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP in the appropriate places.

Move kdump_sev_callback() to its rightful place, while at it.

Fixes: 216d106c7ff7 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP host initialization support")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Tested-by: Srikanth Aithal &lt;sraithal@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327154317.29909-6-bp@alien8.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The host SNP worthiness can determined later, after alternatives have
been patched, in snp_rmptable_init() depending on cmdline options like
iommu=pt which is incompatible with SNP, for example.

Which means that one cannot use X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP and will need to
have a special flag for that control.

Use that newly added CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP in the appropriate places.

Move kdump_sev_callback() to its rightful place, while at it.

Fixes: 216d106c7ff7 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP host initialization support")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Tested-by: Srikanth Aithal &lt;sraithal@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327154317.29909-6-bp@alien8.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2024-03-12T00:44:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-12T00:44:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=38b334fc767e44816be087b3ec5d84b1438b735f'/>
<id>38b334fc767e44816be087b3ec5d84b1438b735f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add the x86 part of the SEV-SNP host support.

   This will allow the kernel to be used as a KVM hypervisor capable of
   running SNP (Secure Nested Paging) guests. Roughly speaking, SEV-SNP
   is the ultimate goal of the AMD confidential computing side,
   providing the most comprehensive confidential computing environment
   up to date.

   This is the x86 part and there is a KVM part which did not get ready
   in time for the merge window so latter will be forthcoming in the
   next cycle.

 - Rework the early code's position-dependent SEV variable references in
   order to allow building the kernel with clang and -fPIE/-fPIC and
   -mcmodel=kernel

 - The usual set of fixes, cleanups and improvements all over the place

* tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits)
  x86/sev: Disable KMSAN for memory encryption TUs
  x86/sev: Dump SEV_STATUS
  crypto: ccp - Have it depend on AMD_IOMMU
  iommu/amd: Fix failure return from snp_lookup_rmpentry()
  x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code
  crypto: ccp: Make snp_range_list static
  x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
  Documentation: virt: Fix up pre-formatted text block for SEV ioctls
  crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command
  crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command
  crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command
  x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature
  KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe
  crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump
  iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown
  crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands when SNP is enabled
  crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data when SNP is enabled
  crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled
  x86/sev: Introduce an SNP leaked pages list
  crypto: ccp: Provide an API to issue SEV and SNP commands
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add the x86 part of the SEV-SNP host support.

   This will allow the kernel to be used as a KVM hypervisor capable of
   running SNP (Secure Nested Paging) guests. Roughly speaking, SEV-SNP
   is the ultimate goal of the AMD confidential computing side,
   providing the most comprehensive confidential computing environment
   up to date.

   This is the x86 part and there is a KVM part which did not get ready
   in time for the merge window so latter will be forthcoming in the
   next cycle.

 - Rework the early code's position-dependent SEV variable references in
   order to allow building the kernel with clang and -fPIE/-fPIC and
   -mcmodel=kernel

 - The usual set of fixes, cleanups and improvements all over the place

* tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits)
  x86/sev: Disable KMSAN for memory encryption TUs
  x86/sev: Dump SEV_STATUS
  crypto: ccp - Have it depend on AMD_IOMMU
  iommu/amd: Fix failure return from snp_lookup_rmpentry()
  x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code
  crypto: ccp: Make snp_range_list static
  x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
  Documentation: virt: Fix up pre-formatted text block for SEV ioctls
  crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command
  crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command
  crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command
  x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature
  KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe
  crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump
  iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown
  crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands when SNP is enabled
  crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data when SNP is enabled
  crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled
  x86/sev: Introduce an SNP leaked pages list
  crypto: ccp: Provide an API to issue SEV and SNP commands
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp: Make snp_range_list static</title>
<updated>2024-02-03T10:41:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-03T10:40:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f9e6f00d93d34f60f90b42c24e80194b11a72bb2'/>
<id>f9e6f00d93d34f60f90b42c24e80194b11a72bb2</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix:

  drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:93:28: sparse: sparse: symbol 'snp_range_list' was not declared. Should it be static?

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202402031410.GTE3PJ1Y-lkp@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202402031410.GTE3PJ1Y-lkp@intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix:

  drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:93:28: sparse: sparse: symbol 'snp_range_list' was not declared. Should it be static?

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202402031410.GTE3PJ1Y-lkp@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202402031410.GTE3PJ1Y-lkp@intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Fix null pointer dereference in __sev_platform_shutdown_locked</title>
<updated>2024-02-02T10:08:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kim Phillips</name>
<email>kim.phillips@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-25T23:12:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ccb88e9549e7cfd8bcd511c538f437e20026e983'/>
<id>ccb88e9549e7cfd8bcd511c538f437e20026e983</id>
<content type='text'>
The SEV platform device can be shutdown with a null psp_master,
e.g., using DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE.  Found using KASAN:

[  137.148210] ccp 0000:23:00.1: enabling device (0000 -&gt; 0002)
[  137.162647] ccp 0000:23:00.1: no command queues available
[  137.170598] ccp 0000:23:00.1: sev enabled
[  137.174645] ccp 0000:23:00.1: psp enabled
[  137.178890] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000001e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[  137.182693] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000f0-0x00000000000000f7]
[  137.182693] CPU: 93 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #311
[  137.182693] RIP: 0010:__sev_platform_shutdown_locked+0x51/0x180
[  137.182693] Code: 08 80 3c 08 00 0f 85 0e 01 00 00 48 8b 1d 67 b6 01 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d bb f0 00 00 00 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 &lt;80&gt; 3c 01 00 0f 85 fe 00 00 00 48 8b 9b f0 00 00 00 48 85 db 74 2c
[  137.182693] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000cf9b0 EFLAGS: 00010216
[  137.182693] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000001e
[  137.182693] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000000000f0
[  137.182693] RBP: ffffc900000cf9c8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff58f5a66
[  137.182693] R10: ffffc900000cf9c8 R11: ffffffffac7ad32f R12: ffff8881e5052c28
[  137.182693] R13: ffff8881e5052c28 R14: ffff8881758e43e8 R15: ffffffffac64abf8
[  137.182693] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff889de7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  137.182693] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  137.182693] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001cf7c7e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[  137.182693] Call Trace:
[  137.182693]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  137.182693]  ? show_regs+0x6c/0x80
[  137.182693]  ? __die_body+0x24/0x70
[  137.182693]  ? die_addr+0x4b/0x80
[  137.182693]  ? exc_general_protection+0x126/0x230
[  137.182693]  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x2b/0x30
[  137.182693]  ? __sev_platform_shutdown_locked+0x51/0x180
[  137.182693]  sev_firmware_shutdown.isra.0+0x1e/0x80
[  137.182693]  sev_dev_destroy+0x49/0x100
[  137.182693]  psp_dev_destroy+0x47/0xb0
[  137.182693]  sp_destroy+0xbb/0x240
[  137.182693]  sp_pci_remove+0x45/0x60
[  137.182693]  pci_device_remove+0xaa/0x1d0
[  137.182693]  device_remove+0xc7/0x170
[  137.182693]  really_probe+0x374/0xbe0
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  __driver_probe_device+0x199/0x460
[  137.182693]  driver_probe_device+0x4e/0xd0
[  137.182693]  __driver_attach+0x191/0x3d0
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  bus_for_each_dev+0x100/0x190
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x50
[  137.182693]  driver_attach+0x41/0x60
[  137.182693]  bus_add_driver+0x2a8/0x580
[  137.182693]  driver_register+0x141/0x480
[  137.182693]  __pci_register_driver+0x1d6/0x2a0
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  ? esrt_sysfs_init+0x1cd/0x5d0
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_sp_mod_init+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  sp_pci_init+0x22/0x30
[  137.182693]  sp_mod_init+0x14/0x30
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_sp_mod_init+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  do_one_initcall+0xd1/0x470
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  ? parameq+0x80/0xf0
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  ? __kmalloc+0x3b0/0x4e0
[  137.182693]  ? kernel_init_freeable+0x92d/0x1050
[  137.182693]  ? kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte+0x171/0x190
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  kernel_init_freeable+0xa64/0x1050
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  kernel_init+0x24/0x160
[  137.182693]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x3e/0x70
[  137.182693]  ret_from_fork+0x40/0x80
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[  137.182693]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[  137.182693] Modules linked in:
[  137.538483] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: 1b05ece0c931 ("crypto: ccp - During shutdown, check SEV data pointer before using")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello &lt;mario.limonciello@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick &lt;liam.merwick@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Allen &lt;john.allen@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The SEV platform device can be shutdown with a null psp_master,
e.g., using DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE.  Found using KASAN:

[  137.148210] ccp 0000:23:00.1: enabling device (0000 -&gt; 0002)
[  137.162647] ccp 0000:23:00.1: no command queues available
[  137.170598] ccp 0000:23:00.1: sev enabled
[  137.174645] ccp 0000:23:00.1: psp enabled
[  137.178890] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000001e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[  137.182693] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000f0-0x00000000000000f7]
[  137.182693] CPU: 93 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #311
[  137.182693] RIP: 0010:__sev_platform_shutdown_locked+0x51/0x180
[  137.182693] Code: 08 80 3c 08 00 0f 85 0e 01 00 00 48 8b 1d 67 b6 01 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d bb f0 00 00 00 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 &lt;80&gt; 3c 01 00 0f 85 fe 00 00 00 48 8b 9b f0 00 00 00 48 85 db 74 2c
[  137.182693] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000cf9b0 EFLAGS: 00010216
[  137.182693] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000001e
[  137.182693] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000000000f0
[  137.182693] RBP: ffffc900000cf9c8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff58f5a66
[  137.182693] R10: ffffc900000cf9c8 R11: ffffffffac7ad32f R12: ffff8881e5052c28
[  137.182693] R13: ffff8881e5052c28 R14: ffff8881758e43e8 R15: ffffffffac64abf8
[  137.182693] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff889de7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  137.182693] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  137.182693] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001cf7c7e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[  137.182693] Call Trace:
[  137.182693]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  137.182693]  ? show_regs+0x6c/0x80
[  137.182693]  ? __die_body+0x24/0x70
[  137.182693]  ? die_addr+0x4b/0x80
[  137.182693]  ? exc_general_protection+0x126/0x230
[  137.182693]  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x2b/0x30
[  137.182693]  ? __sev_platform_shutdown_locked+0x51/0x180
[  137.182693]  sev_firmware_shutdown.isra.0+0x1e/0x80
[  137.182693]  sev_dev_destroy+0x49/0x100
[  137.182693]  psp_dev_destroy+0x47/0xb0
[  137.182693]  sp_destroy+0xbb/0x240
[  137.182693]  sp_pci_remove+0x45/0x60
[  137.182693]  pci_device_remove+0xaa/0x1d0
[  137.182693]  device_remove+0xc7/0x170
[  137.182693]  really_probe+0x374/0xbe0
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  __driver_probe_device+0x199/0x460
[  137.182693]  driver_probe_device+0x4e/0xd0
[  137.182693]  __driver_attach+0x191/0x3d0
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  bus_for_each_dev+0x100/0x190
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x50
[  137.182693]  driver_attach+0x41/0x60
[  137.182693]  bus_add_driver+0x2a8/0x580
[  137.182693]  driver_register+0x141/0x480
[  137.182693]  __pci_register_driver+0x1d6/0x2a0
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  ? esrt_sysfs_init+0x1cd/0x5d0
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_sp_mod_init+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  sp_pci_init+0x22/0x30
[  137.182693]  sp_mod_init+0x14/0x30
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_sp_mod_init+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  do_one_initcall+0xd1/0x470
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  ? parameq+0x80/0xf0
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  ? __kmalloc+0x3b0/0x4e0
[  137.182693]  ? kernel_init_freeable+0x92d/0x1050
[  137.182693]  ? kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte+0x171/0x190
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  kernel_init_freeable+0xa64/0x1050
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  kernel_init+0x24/0x160
[  137.182693]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x3e/0x70
[  137.182693]  ret_from_fork+0x40/0x80
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[  137.182693]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[  137.182693] Modules linked in:
[  137.538483] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: 1b05ece0c931 ("crypto: ccp - During shutdown, check SEV data pointer before using")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello &lt;mario.limonciello@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick &lt;liam.merwick@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Allen &lt;john.allen@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
