linux.git/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c, branch v5.8 Linux kernel source tree crypto: ccp - Fix sparse warnings in sev-dev 2020-06-15T07:38:53+00:00 Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au 2020-06-04T08:09:41+00:00 376bd28d03c97b4d53f5797d5f9b3522c8bd4d3d This patch fixes a bunch of sparse warnings in sev-dev where the __user marking is incorrectly handled. Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Fixes: 7360e4b14350 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT...") Fixes: e799035609e1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl...") Fixes: 76a2b524a4b1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT...") Fixes: d6112ea0cb34 ("crypto: ccp - introduce SEV_GET_ID2 command") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> 
This patch fixes a bunch of sparse warnings in sev-dev where the
__user marking is incorrectly handled.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: 7360e4b14350 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT...")
Fixes: e799035609e1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl...")
Fixes: 76a2b524a4b1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT...")
Fixes: d6112ea0cb34 ("crypto: ccp - introduce SEV_GET_ID2 command")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Merge branch 'uaccess.access_ok' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs 2020-06-01T23:09:43+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2020-06-01T23:09:43+00:00 e0cd9206878a3b95024602b355b254d142f5ce94 Pull uaccess/access_ok updates from Al Viro: "Removals of trivially pointless access_ok() calls. Note: the fiemap stuff was removed from the series, since they are duplicates with part of ext4 series carried in Ted's tree" * 'uaccess.access_ok' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: vmci_host: get rid of pointless access_ok() hfi1: get rid of pointless access_ok() usb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls lpfc_debugfs: get rid of pointless access_ok() efi_test: get rid of pointless access_ok() drm_read(): get rid of pointless access_ok() via-pmu: don't bother with access_ok() drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c: get rid of pointless access_ok() omapfb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls amifb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls drivers/fpga/dfl-afu-dma-region.c: get rid of pointless access_ok() drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-pr.c: get rid of pointless access_ok() cm4000_cs.c cmm_ioctl(): get rid of pointless access_ok() nvram: drop useless access_ok() n_hdlc_tty_read(): remove pointless access_ok() tomoyo_write_control(): get rid of pointless access_ok() btrfs_ioctl_send(): don't bother with access_ok() fat_dir_ioctl(): hadn't needed that access_ok() for more than a decade... dlmfs_file_write(): get rid of pointless access_ok() 
Pull uaccess/access_ok updates from Al Viro:
 "Removals of trivially pointless access_ok() calls.

  Note: the fiemap stuff was removed from the series, since they are
  duplicates with part of ext4 series carried in Ted's tree"

* 'uaccess.access_ok' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  vmci_host: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  hfi1: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  usb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls
  lpfc_debugfs: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  efi_test: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  drm_read(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
  via-pmu: don't bother with access_ok()
  drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  omapfb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls
  amifb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls
  drivers/fpga/dfl-afu-dma-region.c: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-pr.c: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  cm4000_cs.c cmm_ioctl(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
  nvram: drop useless access_ok()
  n_hdlc_tty_read(): remove pointless access_ok()
  tomoyo_write_control(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
  btrfs_ioctl_send(): don't bother with access_ok()
  fat_dir_ioctl(): hadn't needed that access_ok() for more than a decade...
  dlmfs_file_write(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c: get rid of pointless access_ok() 2020-05-29T15:05:54+00:00 Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk 2020-04-23T02:56:59+00:00 835ae3bb530a2e40dd5615c3728d4a78320f6fb8 Contrary to the comments, those do *NOT* verify anything about writability of memory, etc. In all cases addresses are passed only to copy_to_user(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> 
Contrary to the comments, those do *NOT* verify anything about
writability of memory, etc.

In all cases addresses are passed only to copy_to_user().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
crypto: ccp - Add support for SEV-ES to the PSP driver 2020-04-30T05:19:33+00:00 Tom Lendacky thomas.lendacky@amd.com 2020-04-21T17:44:49+00:00 97f9ac3db6612f14ac0c509e1a63ce14fd4cc0eb To provide support for SEV-ES, the hypervisor must provide an area of memory to the PSP. Once this Trusted Memory Region (TMR) is provided to the PSP, the contents of this area of memory are no longer available to the x86. Update the PSP driver to allocate a 1MB region for the TMR that is 1MB aligned and then provide it to the PSP through the SEV INIT command. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> 
To provide support for SEV-ES, the hypervisor must provide an area of
memory to the PSP. Once this Trusted Memory Region (TMR) is provided to
the PSP, the contents of this area of memory are no longer available to
the x86.

Update the PSP driver to allocate a 1MB region for the TMR that is 1MB
aligned and then provide it to the PSP through the SEV INIT command.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto: ccp - use file mode for sev ioctl permissions 2020-03-12T12:00:15+00:00 Connor Kuehl ckuehl@redhat.com 2020-03-06T17:20:10+00:00 b61028135843d5418f0469d11e2769ca77159463 Instead of using CAP_SYS_ADMIN which is restricted to the root user, check the file mode for write permissions before executing commands that can affect the platform. This allows for more fine-grained access control to the SEV ioctl interface. This would allow a SEV-only user or group the ability to administer the platform without requiring them to be root or granting them overly powerful permissions. For example: chown root:root /dev/sev chmod 600 /dev/sev setfacl -m g:sev:r /dev/sev setfacl -m g:sev-admin:rw /dev/sev In this instance, members of the "sev-admin" group have the ability to perform all ioctl calls (including the ones that modify platform state). Members of the "sev" group only have access to the ioctls that do not modify the platform state. This also makes opening "/dev/sev" more consistent with how file descriptors are usually handled. By only checking for CAP_SYS_ADMIN, the file descriptor could be opened read-only but could still execute ioctls that modify the platform state. This patch enforces that the file descriptor is opened with write privileges if it is going to be used to modify the platform state. This flexibility is completely opt-in, and if it is not desirable by the administrator then they do not need to give anyone else access to /dev/sev. Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> 
Instead of using CAP_SYS_ADMIN which is restricted to the root user,
check the file mode for write permissions before executing commands that
can affect the platform. This allows for more fine-grained access
control to the SEV ioctl interface. This would allow a SEV-only user
or group the ability to administer the platform without requiring them
to be root or granting them overly powerful permissions.

For example:

chown root:root /dev/sev
chmod 600 /dev/sev
setfacl -m g:sev:r /dev/sev
setfacl -m g:sev-admin:rw /dev/sev

In this instance, members of the "sev-admin" group have the ability to
perform all ioctl calls (including the ones that modify platform state).
Members of the "sev" group only have access to the ioctls that do not
modify the platform state.

This also makes opening "/dev/sev" more consistent with how file
descriptors are usually handled. By only checking for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
the file descriptor could be opened read-only but could still execute
ioctls that modify the platform state. This patch enforces that the file
descriptor is opened with write privileges if it is going to be used to
modify the platform state.

This flexibility is completely opt-in, and if it is not desirable by
the administrator then they do not need to give anyone else access to
/dev/sev.

Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto: ccp - Cleanup misc_dev on sev_exit() 2020-03-12T12:00:12+00:00 John Allen john.allen@amd.com 2020-03-03T13:57:23+00:00 1f14b57ffc0adcbba0cf35214b0a6129ceae9d09 Explicitly free and clear misc_dev in sev_exit(). Since devm_kzalloc() associates misc_dev with the first device that gets probed, change from devm_kzalloc() to kzalloc() and explicitly free memory in sev_exit() as the first device probed is not guaranteed to be the last device released. To ensure that the variable gets properly set to NULL, remove the local definition of misc_dev. Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support") Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> 
Explicitly free and clear misc_dev in sev_exit(). Since devm_kzalloc()
associates misc_dev with the first device that gets probed, change from
devm_kzalloc() to kzalloc() and explicitly free memory in sev_exit() as
the first device probed is not guaranteed to be the last device released.
To ensure that the variable gets properly set to NULL, remove the local
definition of misc_dev.

Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support")
Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto: ccp - move SEV vdata to a dedicated data structure 2019-12-20T06:58:32+00:00 Rijo Thomas Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com 2019-12-04T06:19:00+00:00 6eb0cc72bcbe9cc5b9ccd41d7226929767e41311 PSP can support both SEV and TEE interface. Therefore, move SEV specific registers to a dedicated data structure. TEE interface specific registers will be added in a later patch. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> 
PSP can support both SEV and TEE interface. Therefore, move
SEV specific registers to a dedicated data structure.
TEE interface specific registers will be added in a later
patch.

Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto: ccp - create a generic psp-dev file 2019-12-20T06:58:32+00:00 Rijo Thomas Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com 2019-12-04T06:18:59+00:00 b93566f1bb54e02a1ff1e3b4782073be1886744e The PSP (Platform Security Processor) provides support for key management commands in Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) mode, along with software-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to enable third-party Trusted Applications. Therefore, introduce psp-dev.c and psp-dev.h files, which can invoke SEV (or TEE) initialization based on platform feature support. TEE interface support will be introduced in a later patch. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> 
The PSP (Platform Security Processor) provides support for key management
commands in Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) mode, along with
software-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to enable third-party
Trusted Applications.

Therefore, introduce psp-dev.c and psp-dev.h files, which can invoke
SEV (or TEE) initialization based on platform feature support.

TEE interface support will be introduced in a later patch.

Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto: ccp - rename psp-dev files to sev-dev 2019-12-20T06:52:59+00:00 Rijo Thomas Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com 2019-12-04T06:18:58+00:00 9b67d08dbc1751ab15d972a63a4d9132e7e7442f This is a preliminary patch for creating a generic PSP device driver file, which will have support for both SEV and TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) interface. This patch does not introduce any new functionality, but simply renames psp-dev.c and psp-dev.h files to sev-dev.c and sev-dev.h files respectively. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> 
This is a preliminary patch for creating a generic PSP device driver
file, which will have support for both SEV and TEE (Trusted Execution
Environment) interface.

This patch does not introduce any new functionality, but simply renames
psp-dev.c and psp-dev.h files to sev-dev.c and sev-dev.h files
respectively.

Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>