Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - Remove legacy compression interface - Improve scatterwalk API - Add request chaining to ahash and acomp - Add virtual address support to ahash and acomp - Add folio support to acomp - Remove NULL dst support from acomp Algorithms: - Library options are fuly hidden (selected by kernel users only) - Add Kerberos5 algorithms - Add VAES-based ctr(aes) on x86 - Ensure LZO respects output buffer length on compression - Remove obsolete SIMD fallback code path from arm/ghash-ce Drivers: - Add support for PCI device 0x1134 in ccp - Add support for rk3588's standalone TRNG in rockchip - Add Inside Secure SafeXcel EIP-93 crypto engine support in eip93 - Fix bugs in tegra uncovered by multi-threaded self-test - Fix corner cases in hisilicon/sec2 Others: - Add SG_MITER_LOCAL to sg miter - Convert ubifs, hibernate and xfrm_ipcomp from legacy API to acomp" * tag 'v6.15-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (187 commits) crypto: testmgr - Add multibuffer acomp testing crypto: acomp - Fix synchronous acomp chaining fallback crypto: testmgr - Add multibuffer hash testing crypto: hash - Fix synchronous ahash chaining fallback crypto: arm/ghash-ce - Remove SIMD fallback code path crypto: essiv - Replace memcpy() + NUL-termination with strscpy() crypto: api - Call crypto_alg_put in crypto_unregister_alg crypto: scompress - Fix incorrect stream freeing crypto: lib/chacha - remove unused arch-specific init support crypto: remove obsolete 'comp' compression API crypto: compress_null - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: cavium/zip - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: zstd - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: lzo - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: lzo-rle - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: lz4hc - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: lz4 - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: deflate - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: 842 - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: nx - Migrate to scomp API ...
Add Kerberos crypto tests to the test manager database. This covers: camellia128-cts-cmac samples from RFC6803 camellia256-cts-cmac samples from RFC6803 aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128 samples from RFC8009 aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 samples from RFC8009 but not: aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 as the test samples in RFC3962 don't seem to be suitable. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Remove the "crct10dif" shash algorithm from the crypto API. It has no known user now that the lib is no longer built on top of it. It has no remaining references in kernel code. The only other potential users would be the usual components that allow specifying arbitrary hash algorithms by name, namely AF_ALG and dm-integrity. However there are no indications that "crct10dif" is being used with these components. Debian Code Search and web searches don't find anything relevant, and explicitly grepping the source code of the usual suspects (cryptsetup, libell, iwd) finds no matches either. "crc32" and "crc32c" are used in a few more places, but that doesn't seem to be the case for "crct10dif". crc_t10dif_update() is also tested by crc_kunit now, so the test coverage provided via the crypto self-tests is no longer needed. Also note that the "crct10dif" shash algorithm was inconsistent with the rest of the shash API in that it wrote the digest in CPU endianness, making the resulting byte array differ on little endian vs. big endian platforms. This means it was effectively just built for use by the lib functions, and it was not actually correct to treat it as "just another hash function" that could be dropped in via the shash API. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250206173857.39794-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Remove crc64-rocksoft from the crypto API. It has no known user now that the lib is no longer built on top of it. It was also added much more recently than the longstanding crc32 and crc32c. Unlike crc32 and crc32c, crc64-rocksoft is also not mentioned in the dm-integrity documentation and there are no references to it in anywhere in the cryptsetup git repo, so it is unlikely to have any user there either. Also, this CRC variant is named incorrectly; it has nothing to do with Rocksoft and should be called crc64-nvme. That is yet another reason to remove it from the crypto API; we would not want anyone to start depending on the current incorrect algorithm name of crc64-rocksoft. Note that this change temporarily makes this CRC variant not be covered by any tests, as previously it was relying on the crypto self-tests. This will be fixed by adding this CRC variant to crc_kunit. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Acked-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130035130.180676-3-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The keywrap (kw) algorithm has no in-tree user. It has never had an in-tree user, and the patch that added it provided no justification for its inclusion. Even use of it via AF_ALG is impossible, as it uses a weird calling convention where part of the ciphertext is returned via the IV buffer, which is not returned to userspace in AF_ALG. It's also unclear whether any new code in the kernel that does key wrapping would actually use this algorithm. It is controversial in the cryptographic community due to having no clearly stated security goal, no security proof, poor performance, and only a 64-bit auth tag. Later work (https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/221) suggested that the goal is deterministic authenticated encryption. But there are now more modern algorithms for this, and this is not the same as key wrapping, for which a regular AEAD such as AES-GCM usually can be (and is) used instead. Therefore, remove this unused code. There were several special cases for this algorithm in the self-tests, due to its weird calling convention. Remove those too. Cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove the vmac64 template, as it has no known users. It also continues
to have longstanding bugs such as alignment violations (see
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241226134847.6690-1-evepolonium@gmail.com/).
This code was added in 2009 by commit f1939f7c5645 ("crypto: vmac - New
hash algorithm for intel_txt support"). Based on the mention of
intel_txt support in the commit title, it seems it was added as a
prerequisite for the contemporaneous patch
"intel_txt: add s3 userspace memory integrity verification"
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/4ABF2B50.6070106@intel.com/). In the design
proposed by that patch, when an Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)
enabled system resumed from suspend, the "tboot" trusted executable
launched the Linux kernel without verifying userspace memory, and then
the Linux kernel used VMAC to verify userspace memory.
However, that patch was never merged, as reviewers had objected to the
design. It was later reworked into commit 4bd96a7a8185 ("x86, tboot:
Add support for S3 memory integrity protection") which made tboot verify
the memory instead. Thus the VMAC support in Linux was never used.
No in-tree user has appeared since then, other than potentially the
usual components that allow specifying arbitrary hash algorithms by
name, namely AF_ALG and dm-integrity. However there are no indications
that VMAC is being used with these components. Debian Code Search and
web searches for "vmac64" (the actual algorithm name) do not return any
results other than the kernel itself, suggesting that it does not appear
in any other code or documentation. Explicitly grepping the source code
of the usual suspects (libell, iwd, cryptsetup) finds no matches either.
Before 2018, the vmac code was also completely broken due to using a
hardcoded nonce and the wrong endianness for the MAC. It was then fixed
by commit ed331adab35b ("crypto: vmac - add nonced version with big
endian digest") and commit 0917b873127c ("crypto: vmac - remove insecure
version with hardcoded nonce"). These were intentionally breaking
changes that changed all the computed MAC values as well as the
algorithm name ("vmac" to "vmac64"). No complaints were ever received
about these breaking changes, strongly suggesting the absence of users.
The reason I had put some effort into fixing this code in 2018 is
because it was used by an out-of-tree driver. But if it is still needed
in that particular out-of-tree driver, the code can be carried in that
driver instead. There is no need to carry it upstream.
Cc: Atharva Tiwari <evepolonium@gmail.com>
Cc: Shane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Commit 1e562deacecc ("crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Migrate to sig_alg backend")
enforced that rsassa-pkcs1 sign/verify operations specify a hash
algorithm. That is necessary because per RFC 8017 sec 8.2, a hash
algorithm identifier must be prepended to the hash before generating or
verifying the signature ("Full Hash Prefix").
However the commit went too far in that it changed user space behavior:
KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY system calls now return -EINVAL unless they specify a
hash algorithm. Intel Wireless Daemon (iwd) is one application issuing
such system calls (for EAP-TLS).
Closer analysis of the Embedded Linux Library (ell) used by iwd reveals
that the problem runs even deeper: When iwd uses TLS 1.1 or earlier, it
not only queries for keys, but performs sign/verify operations without
specifying a hash algorithm. These legacy TLS versions concatenate an
MD5 to a SHA-1 hash and omit the Full Hash Prefix:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/tree/ell/tls-suites.c#n97
TLS 1.1 was deprecated in 2021 by RFC 8996, but removal of support was
inadvertent in this case. It probably should be coordinated with iwd
maintainers first.
So reinstate support for such legacy protocols by defaulting to hash
algorithm "none" which uses an empty Full Hash Prefix.
If it is later on decided to remove TLS 1.1 support but still allow
KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY without a hash algorithm, that can be achieved by
reverting the present commit and replacing it with the following patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZxalYZwH5UiGX5uj@wunner.de/
It's worth noting that Python's cryptography library gained support for
such legacy use cases very recently, so they do seem to still be a thing.
The Python developers identified IKE version 1 as another protocol
omitting the Full Hash Prefix:
https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/issues/10226
https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/issues/5495
The author of those issues, Zoltan Kelemen, spent considerable effort
searching for test vectors but only found one in a 2019 blog post by
Kevin Jones. Add it to testmgr.h to verify correctness of this feature.
Examination of wpa_supplicant as well as various IKE daemons (libreswan,
strongswan, isakmpd, raccoon) has determined that none of them seems to
use the kernel's Key Retention Service, so iwd is the only affected user
space application known so far.
Fixes: 1e562deacecc ("crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Migrate to sig_alg backend")
Reported-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2ed09a22-86c0-4cf0-8bda-ef804ccb3413@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Alternatively to the X9.62 encoding of ecdsa signatures, which uses
ASN.1 and is already supported by the kernel, there's another common
encoding called P1363. It stores r and s as the concatenation of two
big endian, unsigned integers. The name originates from IEEE P1363.
Add a P1363 template in support of the forthcoming SPDM library
(Security Protocol and Data Model) for PCI device authentication.
P1363 is prescribed by SPDM 1.2.1 margin no 44:
"For ECDSA signatures, excluding SM2, in SPDM, the signature shall be
the concatenation of r and s. The size of r shall be the size of
the selected curve. Likewise, the size of s shall be the size of
the selected curve. See BaseAsymAlgo in NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS for
the size of r and s. The byte order for r and s shall be in big
endian order. When placing ECDSA signatures into an SPDM signature
field, r shall come first followed by s."
Link: https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP0274_1.2.1.pdf
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Unlike the rsa driver, which separates signature decoding and signature verification into two steps, the ecdsa driver does both in one. This restricts users to the one signature format currently supported (X9.62) and prevents addition of others such as P1363, which is needed by the forthcoming SPDM library (Security Protocol and Data Model) for PCI device authentication. Per Herbert's suggestion, change ecdsa to use a "raw" signature encoding and then implement X9.62 and P1363 as templates which convert their respective encodings to the raw one. One may then specify "x962(ecdsa-nist-XXX)" or "p1363(ecdsa-nist-XXX)" to pick the encoding. The present commit moves X9.62 decoding to a template. A separate commit is going to introduce another template for P1363 decoding. The ecdsa driver internally represents a signature as two u64 arrays of size ECC_MAX_BYTES. This appears to be the most natural choice for the raw format as it can directly be used for verification without having to further decode signature data or copy it around. Repurpose all the existing test vectors for "x962(ecdsa-nist-XXX)" and create a duplicate of them to test the raw encoding. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZoHXyGwRzVvYkcTP@gondor.apana.org.au/ Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
A sig_alg backend has just been introduced and all asymmetric
sign/verify algorithms have been migrated to it.
The sign/verify operations can thus be dropped from akcipher_alg.
It is now purely for asymmetric encrypt/decrypt.
Move struct crypto_akcipher_sync_data from internal.h to akcipher.c and
unexport crypto_akcipher_sync_{prep,post}(): They're no longer used by
sig.c but only locally in akcipher.c.
In crypto_akcipher_sync_{prep,post}(), drop various NULL pointer checks
for data->dst as they were only necessary for the verify operation.
In the crypto_sig_*() API calls, remove the forks that were necessary
while algorithms were converted from crypto_akcipher to crypto_sig
one by one.
In struct akcipher_testvec, remove the "params", "param_len" and "algo"
elements as they were only needed for the ecrdsa verify operation.
Remove corresponding dead code from test_akcipher_one() as well.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>