<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/crypto/authenc.c, branch v6.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - stop using alignmask of ahash</title>
<updated>2023-10-27T10:04:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-22T08:10:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=58e4bb5f16e7b643f7ee5d30cd355cefb44b2da9'/>
<id>58e4bb5f16e7b643f7ee5d30cd355cefb44b2da9</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0,
simplify the code in authenc accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0,
simplify the code in authenc accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Only access common skcipher fields on spawn</title>
<updated>2023-10-13T10:27:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-03T03:43:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=cae3304330b52091e132544b307d59cc873649ad'/>
<id>cae3304330b52091e132544b307d59cc873649ad</id>
<content type='text'>
As skcipher spawns may be of the type lskcipher, only the common
fields may be accessed.  This was already the case but use the
correct helpers to make this more obvious.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As skcipher spawns may be of the type lskcipher, only the common
fields may be accessed.  This was already the case but use the
correct helpers to make this more obvious.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Use data directly in completion function</title>
<updated>2023-02-13T10:35:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-08T05:58:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=255e48eb17684157336bd6dd98d22c1b2d9e3f43'/>
<id>255e48eb17684157336bd6dd98d22c1b2d9e3f43</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch does the final flag day conversion of all completion
functions which are now all contained in the Crypto API.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch does the final flag day conversion of all completion
functions which are now all contained in the Crypto API.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Fix sleep in atomic context in decrypt_tail</title>
<updated>2022-01-31T00:21:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-19T06:58:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=66eae850333d639fc278d6f915c6fc01499ea893'/>
<id>66eae850333d639fc278d6f915c6fc01499ea893</id>
<content type='text'>
The function crypto_authenc_decrypt_tail discards its flags
argument and always relies on the flags from the original request
when starting its sub-request.

This is clearly wrong as it may cause the SLEEPABLE flag to be
set when it shouldn't.

Fixes: 92d95ba91772 ("crypto: authenc - Convert to new AEAD interface")
Reported-by: Corentin Labbe &lt;clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Tested-by: Corentin Labbe &lt;clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The function crypto_authenc_decrypt_tail discards its flags
argument and always relies on the flags from the original request
when starting its sub-request.

This is clearly wrong as it may cause the SLEEPABLE flag to be
set when it shouldn't.

Fixes: 92d95ba91772 ("crypto: authenc - Convert to new AEAD interface")
Reported-by: Corentin Labbe &lt;clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Tested-by: Corentin Labbe &lt;clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: algapi - use common mechanism for inheriting flags</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T11:49:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-10T06:20:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7bcb2c99f8ed032cfb3f5596b4dccac6b1f501df'/>
<id>7bcb2c99f8ed032cfb3f5596b4dccac6b1f501df</id>
<content type='text'>
The flag CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC is "inherited" in the sense that when a
template is instantiated, the template will have CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC set if
any of the algorithms it uses has CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC set.

We'd like to add a second flag (CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY) that gets
"inherited" in the same way.  This is difficult because the handling of
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC is hardcoded everywhere.  Address this by:

  - Add CRYPTO_ALG_INHERITED_FLAGS, which contains the set of flags that
    have these inheritance semantics.

  - Add crypto_algt_inherited_mask(), for use by template -&gt;create()
    methods.  It returns any of these flags that the user asked to be
    unset and thus must be passed in the 'mask' to crypto_grab_*().

  - Also modify crypto_check_attr_type() to handle computing the 'mask'
    so that most templates can just use this.

  - Make crypto_grab_*() propagate these flags to the template instance
    being created so that templates don't have to do this themselves.

Make crypto/simd.c propagate these flags too, since it "wraps" another
algorithm, similar to a template.

Based on a patch by Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.2006301414580.30526@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com).

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The flag CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC is "inherited" in the sense that when a
template is instantiated, the template will have CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC set if
any of the algorithms it uses has CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC set.

We'd like to add a second flag (CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY) that gets
"inherited" in the same way.  This is difficult because the handling of
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC is hardcoded everywhere.  Address this by:

  - Add CRYPTO_ALG_INHERITED_FLAGS, which contains the set of flags that
    have these inheritance semantics.

  - Add crypto_algt_inherited_mask(), for use by template -&gt;create()
    methods.  It returns any of these flags that the user asked to be
    unset and thus must be passed in the 'mask' to crypto_grab_*().

  - Also modify crypto_check_attr_type() to handle computing the 'mask'
    so that most templates can just use this.

  - Make crypto_grab_*() propagate these flags to the template instance
    being created so that templates don't have to do this themselves.

Make crypto/simd.c propagate these flags too, since it "wraps" another
algorithm, similar to a template.

Based on a patch by Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.2006301414580.30526@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com).

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - use crypto_grab_ahash() and simplify error paths</title>
<updated>2020-01-09T03:30:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-03T03:58:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=37a861adc95ab7165a33794abda776ea1dad8475'/>
<id>37a861adc95ab7165a33794abda776ea1dad8475</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the authenc template use the new function crypto_grab_ahash() to
initialize its ahash spawn.

This is needed to make all spawns be initialized in a consistent way.

Also simplify the error handling by taking advantage of crypto_drop_*()
now accepting (as a no-op) spawns that haven't been initialized yet, and
by taking advantage of crypto_grab_*() now handling ERR_PTR() names.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make the authenc template use the new function crypto_grab_ahash() to
initialize its ahash spawn.

This is needed to make all spawns be initialized in a consistent way.

Also simplify the error handling by taking advantage of crypto_drop_*()
now accepting (as a no-op) spawns that haven't been initialized yet, and
by taking advantage of crypto_grab_*() now handling ERR_PTR() names.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: skcipher - pass instance to crypto_grab_skcipher()</title>
<updated>2020-01-09T03:30:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-03T03:58:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b9f76dddb1f9f70e008b982381bbc9a67c9b8c66'/>
<id>b9f76dddb1f9f70e008b982381bbc9a67c9b8c66</id>
<content type='text'>
Initializing a crypto_skcipher_spawn currently requires:

1. Set spawn-&gt;base.inst to point to the instance.
2. Call crypto_grab_skcipher().

But there's no reason for these steps to be separate, and in fact this
unneeded complication has caused at least one bug, the one fixed by
commit 6db43410179b ("crypto: adiantum - initialize crypto_spawn::inst")

So just make crypto_grab_skcipher() take the instance as an argument.

To keep the function calls from getting too unwieldy due to this extra
argument, also introduce a 'mask' variable into the affected places
which weren't already using one.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Initializing a crypto_skcipher_spawn currently requires:

1. Set spawn-&gt;base.inst to point to the instance.
2. Call crypto_grab_skcipher().

But there's no reason for these steps to be separate, and in fact this
unneeded complication has caused at least one bug, the one fixed by
commit 6db43410179b ("crypto: adiantum - initialize crypto_spawn::inst")

So just make crypto_grab_skcipher() take the instance as an argument.

To keep the function calls from getting too unwieldy due to this extra
argument, also introduce a 'mask' variable into the affected places
which weren't already using one.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: remove propagation of CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flags</title>
<updated>2020-01-09T03:30:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-31T03:19:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=af5034e8e4a5838fc77e476c1a91822e449d5869'/>
<id>af5034e8e4a5838fc77e476c1a91822e449d5869</id>
<content type='text'>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flags were apparently meant as a way to make the
-&gt;setkey() functions provide more information about errors.  But these
flags weren't actually being used or tested, and in many cases they
weren't being set correctly anyway.  So they've now been removed.

Also, if someone ever actually needs to start better distinguishing
-&gt;setkey() errors (which is somewhat unlikely, as this has been unneeded
for a long time), we'd be much better off just defining different return
values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK and all the unneeded logic that
propagates these flags around.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flags were apparently meant as a way to make the
-&gt;setkey() functions provide more information about errors.  But these
flags weren't actually being used or tested, and in many cases they
weren't being set correctly anyway.  So they've now been removed.

Also, if someone ever actually needs to start better distinguishing
-&gt;setkey() errors (which is somewhat unlikely, as this has been unneeded
for a long time), we'd be much better off just defining different return
values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK and all the unneeded logic that
propagates these flags around.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN</title>
<updated>2020-01-09T03:30:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-31T03:19:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=674f368a952c48ede71784935a799a5205b92b6c'/>
<id>674f368a952c48ede71784935a799a5205b92b6c</id>
<content type='text'>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the -&gt;setkey() functions provide more information about errors.

However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.

Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc.  But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.

Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length.  For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.

So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly.  But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove this flag.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the -&gt;setkey() functions provide more information about errors.

However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.

Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc.  But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.

Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length.  For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.

So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly.  But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove this flag.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152</title>
<updated>2019-05-30T18:26:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-27T06:55:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2874c5fd284268364ece81a7bd936f3c8168e567'/>
<id>2874c5fd284268364ece81a7bd936f3c8168e567</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
