Pull misc fs updates from Jan Kara:
 "The new quotactl_fd() syscall (remake of quotactl_path() syscall that
  got introduced & disabled in 5.13 cycle), and couple of udf, reiserfs,
  isofs, and writeback fixes and cleanups"

* tag 'fs_for_v5.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
  writeback: fix obtain a reference to a freeing memcg css
  quota: remove unnecessary oom message
  isofs: remove redundant continue statement
  quota: Wire up quotactl_fd syscall
  quota: Change quotactl_path() systcall to an fd-based one
  reiserfs: Remove unneed check in reiserfs_write_full_page()
  udf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in udf_symlink function
  reiserfs: add check for invalid 1st journal block

Replace a bunch of 'p->state == TASK_RUNNING' with a new helper:
task_is_running(p).

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210611082838.222401495@infradead.org

Wire up the quotactl_fd syscall.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

In commit fa8b90070a80 ("quota: wire up quotactl_path") we have wired up
new quotactl_path syscall. However some people in LWN discussion have
objected that the path based syscall is missing dirfd and flags argument
which is mostly standard for contemporary path based syscalls. Indeed
they have a point and after a discussion with Christian Brauner and
Sascha Hauer I've decided to disable the syscall for now and update its
API. Since there is no userspace currently using that syscall and it
hasn't been released in any major release, we should be fine.

CC: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
CC: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210512153621.n5u43jsytbik4yze@wittgenstein
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

As pointed out by commit

  de9b8f5dcbd9 ("sched: Fix crash trying to dequeue/enqueue the idle thread")

init_idle() can and will be invoked more than once on the same idle
task. At boot time, it is invoked for the boot CPU thread by
sched_init(). Then smp_init() creates the threads for all the secondary
CPUs and invokes init_idle() on them.

As the hotplug machinery brings the secondaries to life, it will issue
calls to idle_thread_get(), which itself invokes init_idle() yet again.
In this case it's invoked twice more per secondary: at _cpu_up(), and at
bringup_cpu().

Given smp_init() already initializes the idle tasks for all *possible*
CPUs, no further initialization should be required. Now, removing
init_idle() from idle_thread_get() exposes some interesting expectations
with regards to the idle task's preempt_count: the secondary startup always
issues a preempt_disable(), requiring some reset of the preempt count to 0
between hot-unplug and hotplug, which is currently served by
idle_thread_get() -> idle_init().

Given the idle task is supposed to have preemption disabled once and never
see it re-enabled, it seems that what we actually want is to initialize its
preempt_count to PREEMPT_DISABLED and leave it there. Do that, and remove
init_idle() from idle_thread_get().

Secondary startups were patched via coccinelle:

  @begone@
  @@

  -preempt_disable();
  ...
  cpu_startup_entry(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE);

Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512094636.2958515-1-valentin.schneider@arm.com

Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
 "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.

  Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.

  From Mickaël's cover letter:
    "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
     global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
     is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
     sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
     system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
     help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
     behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
     process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
     themselves.

     Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
     syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
     use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
     kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
     sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
     Pledge/Unveil.

     In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
     This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
     series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
     combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
     init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"

  The cover letter and v34 posting is here:

      https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/

  See also:

      https://landlock.io/

  This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
  years"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]

* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
  landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
  samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
  selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
  landlock: Add syscall implementations
  arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
  fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
  landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
  landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
  landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
  landlock: Add object management

Pull Xtensa updates from Max Filippov:

 - switch to generic syscall generation scripts

 - new GDBIO implementation for xtensa semihosting interface

 - various small code fixes and cleanups

 - a few typo fixes in comments and Kconfig help text

* tag 'xtensa-20210429' of git://github.com/jcmvbkbc/linux-xtensa:
  xtensa: ISS: add GDBIO implementation to semihosting interface
  xtensa: ISS: split simcall implementation from semihosting interface
  xtensa: simcall.h: Change compitible to compatible
  xtensa: Couple of typo fixes
  xtensa: drop extraneous register load from initialize_mmu
  xtensa: fix pgprot_noncached assumptions
  xtensa: simplify coherent_kvaddr logic
  xtensa: syscalls: switch to generic syscallhdr.sh
  xtensa: syscalls: switch to generic syscalltbl.sh
  xtensa: stop filling syscall array with sys_ni_syscall
  xtensa: remove unneeded export in boot-elf/Makefile
  xtensa: move CONFIG_CPU_*_ENDIAN defines to Kconfig
  xtensa: fix warning comparing pointer to 0
  xtensa: fix spelling mistake in Kconfig "wont" -> "won't"

Pull quota, ext2, reiserfs updates from Jan Kara:

 - support for path (instead of device) based quotactl syscall
   (quotactl_path(2))

 - ext2 conversion to kmap_local()

 - other minor cleanups & fixes

* tag 'for_v5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
  fs/reiserfs/journal.c: delete useless variables
  fs/ext2: Replace kmap() with kmap_local_page()
  ext2: Match up ext2_put_page() with ext2_dotdot() and ext2_find_entry()
  fs/ext2/: fix misspellings using codespell tool
  quota: report warning limits for realtime space quotas
  quota: wire up quotactl_path
  quota: Add mountpath based quota support

Wire up the following system calls for all architectures:
* landlock_create_ruleset(2)
* landlock_add_rule(2)
* landlock_restrict_self(2)

Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-10-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>