<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/lib, branch v6.14</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'crc-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux</title>
<updated>2025-01-23T03:55:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-23T03:55:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=37b33c68b00089a574ebd0a856a5d554eb3001b7'/>
<id>37b33c68b00089a574ebd0a856a5d554eb3001b7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull CRC updates from Eric Biggers:

 - Reorganize the architecture-optimized CRC32 and CRC-T10DIF code to be
   directly accessible via the library API, instead of requiring the
   crypto API. This is much simpler and more efficient.

 - Convert some users such as ext4 to use the CRC32 library API instead
   of the crypto API. More conversions like this will come later.

 - Add a KUnit test that tests and benchmarks multiple CRC variants.
   Remove older, less-comprehensive tests that are made redundant by
   this.

 - Add an entry to MAINTAINERS for the kernel's CRC library code. I'm
   volunteering to maintain it. I have additional cleanups and
   optimizations planned for future cycles.

* tag 'crc-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux: (31 commits)
  MAINTAINERS: add entry for CRC library
  powerpc/crc: delete obsolete crc-vpmsum_test.c
  lib/crc32test: delete obsolete crc32test.c
  lib/crc16_kunit: delete obsolete crc16_kunit.c
  lib/crc_kunit.c: add KUnit test suite for CRC library functions
  powerpc/crc-t10dif: expose CRC-T10DIF function through lib
  arm64/crc-t10dif: expose CRC-T10DIF function through lib
  arm/crc-t10dif: expose CRC-T10DIF function through lib
  x86/crc-t10dif: expose CRC-T10DIF function through lib
  crypto: crct10dif - expose arch-optimized lib function
  lib/crc-t10dif: add support for arch overrides
  lib/crc-t10dif: stop wrapping the crypto API
  scsi: target: iscsi: switch to using the crc32c library
  f2fs: switch to using the crc32 library
  jbd2: switch to using the crc32c library
  ext4: switch to using the crc32c library
  lib/crc32: make crc32c() go directly to lib
  bcachefs: Explicitly select CRYPTO from BCACHEFS_FS
  x86/crc32: expose CRC32 functions through lib
  x86/crc32: update prototype for crc32_pclmul_le_16()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull CRC updates from Eric Biggers:

 - Reorganize the architecture-optimized CRC32 and CRC-T10DIF code to be
   directly accessible via the library API, instead of requiring the
   crypto API. This is much simpler and more efficient.

 - Convert some users such as ext4 to use the CRC32 library API instead
   of the crypto API. More conversions like this will come later.

 - Add a KUnit test that tests and benchmarks multiple CRC variants.
   Remove older, less-comprehensive tests that are made redundant by
   this.

 - Add an entry to MAINTAINERS for the kernel's CRC library code. I'm
   volunteering to maintain it. I have additional cleanups and
   optimizations planned for future cycles.

* tag 'crc-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux: (31 commits)
  MAINTAINERS: add entry for CRC library
  powerpc/crc: delete obsolete crc-vpmsum_test.c
  lib/crc32test: delete obsolete crc32test.c
  lib/crc16_kunit: delete obsolete crc16_kunit.c
  lib/crc_kunit.c: add KUnit test suite for CRC library functions
  powerpc/crc-t10dif: expose CRC-T10DIF function through lib
  arm64/crc-t10dif: expose CRC-T10DIF function through lib
  arm/crc-t10dif: expose CRC-T10DIF function through lib
  x86/crc-t10dif: expose CRC-T10DIF function through lib
  crypto: crct10dif - expose arch-optimized lib function
  lib/crc-t10dif: add support for arch overrides
  lib/crc-t10dif: stop wrapping the crypto API
  scsi: target: iscsi: switch to using the crc32c library
  f2fs: switch to using the crc32 library
  jbd2: switch to using the crc32c library
  ext4: switch to using the crc32c library
  lib/crc32: make crc32c() go directly to lib
  bcachefs: Explicitly select CRYPTO from BCACHEFS_FS
  x86/crc32: expose CRC32 functions through lib
  x86/crc32: update prototype for crc32_pclmul_le_16()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: use cmov for user address masking</title>
<updated>2025-01-20T16:51:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-10T18:25:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=91309a70829d94c735c8bb1cc383e78c96127a16'/>
<id>91309a70829d94c735c8bb1cc383e78c96127a16</id>
<content type='text'>
This was a suggestion by David Laight, and while I was slightly worried
that some micro-architecture would predict cmov like a conditional
branch, there is little reason to actually believe any core would be
that broken.

Intel documents that their existing cores treat CMOVcc as a data
dependency that will constrain speculation in their "Speculative
Execution Side Channel Mitigations" whitepaper:

  "Other instructions such as CMOVcc, AND, ADC, SBB and SETcc can also
   be used to prevent bounds check bypass by constraining speculative
   execution on current family 6 processors (Intel® Core™, Intel® Atom™,
   Intel® Xeon® and Intel® Xeon Phi™ processors)"

and while that leaves the future uarch issues open, that's certainly
true of our traditional SBB usage too.

Any core that predicts CMOV will be unusable for various crypto
algorithms that need data-independent timing stability, so let's just
treat CMOV as the safe choice that simplifies the address masking by
avoiding an extra instruction and doesn't need a temporary register.

Suggested-by: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Link: https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/336996-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.pdf
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This was a suggestion by David Laight, and while I was slightly worried
that some micro-architecture would predict cmov like a conditional
branch, there is little reason to actually believe any core would be
that broken.

Intel documents that their existing cores treat CMOVcc as a data
dependency that will constrain speculation in their "Speculative
Execution Side Channel Mitigations" whitepaper:

  "Other instructions such as CMOVcc, AND, ADC, SBB and SETcc can also
   be used to prevent bounds check bypass by constraining speculative
   execution on current family 6 processors (Intel® Core™, Intel® Atom™,
   Intel® Xeon® and Intel® Xeon Phi™ processors)"

and while that leaves the future uarch issues open, that's certainly
true of our traditional SBB usage too.

Any core that predicts CMOV will be unusable for various crypto
algorithms that need data-independent timing stability, so let's just
treat CMOV as the safe choice that simplifies the address masking by
avoiding an extra instruction and doesn't need a temporary register.

Suggested-by: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Link: https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/336996-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.pdf
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/crc-t10dif: expose CRC-T10DIF function through lib</title>
<updated>2024-12-02T01:23:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-02T01:20:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ed4bc981d52b49c5d35bfc4cacdac98ff135add3'/>
<id>ed4bc981d52b49c5d35bfc4cacdac98ff135add3</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the x86 CRC-T10DIF assembly code into the lib directory and wire it
up to the library interface.  This allows it to be used without going
through the crypto API.  It remains usable via the crypto API too via
the shash algorithms that use the library interface.  Thus all the
arch-specific "shash" code becomes unnecessary and is removed.

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241202012056.209768-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move the x86 CRC-T10DIF assembly code into the lib directory and wire it
up to the library interface.  This allows it to be used without going
through the crypto API.  It remains usable via the crypto API too via
the shash algorithms that use the library interface.  Thus all the
arch-specific "shash" code becomes unnecessary and is removed.

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241202012056.209768-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/crc32: expose CRC32 functions through lib</title>
<updated>2024-12-02T01:23:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-02T01:08:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=55d1ecceb8d6a5c9ceff7c6528075bd0ce4e8366'/>
<id>55d1ecceb8d6a5c9ceff7c6528075bd0ce4e8366</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the x86 CRC32 assembly code into the lib directory and wire it up
to the library interface.  This allows it to be used without going
through the crypto API.  It remains usable via the crypto API too via
the shash algorithms that use the library interface.  Thus all the
arch-specific "shash" code becomes unnecessary and is removed.

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241202010844.144356-14-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move the x86 CRC32 assembly code into the lib directory and wire it up
to the library interface.  This allows it to be used without going
through the crypto API.  It remains usable via the crypto API too via
the shash algorithms that use the library interface.  Thus all the
arch-specific "shash" code becomes unnecessary and is removed.

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241202010844.144356-14-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue</title>
<updated>2024-10-25T16:53:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-24T01:17:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=86e6b1547b3d013bc392adf775b89318441403c2'/>
<id>86e6b1547b3d013bc392adf775b89318441403c2</id>
<content type='text'>
It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space.  And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the
result:

  CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“

Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.

But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1].
That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the
speculation window is now open.

Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the
regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm
version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.

It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no
speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations.

Reported-by: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/80d94591-1297-4afb-b510-c665efd37f10@citrix.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241023094448.GAZxjFkEOOF_DM83TQ@fat_crate.local/ [1]
Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1010.html
Link: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.10771
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Tested-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman &lt;maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com&gt; # LAM case
Fixes: 2865baf54077 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional")
Fixes: 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM")
Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space.  And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the
result:

  CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“

Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.

But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1].
That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the
speculation window is now open.

Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the
regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm
version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.

It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no
speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations.

Reported-by: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/80d94591-1297-4afb-b510-c665efd37f10@citrix.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241023094448.GAZxjFkEOOF_DM83TQ@fat_crate.local/ [1]
Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1010.html
Link: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.10771
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Tested-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman &lt;maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com&gt; # LAM case
Fixes: 2865baf54077 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional")
Fixes: 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM")
Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>move asm/unaligned.h to linux/unaligned.h</title>
<updated>2024-10-02T21:23:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-01T19:35:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5f60d5f6bbc12e782fac78110b0ee62698f3b576'/>
<id>5f60d5f6bbc12e782fac78110b0ee62698f3b576</id>
<content type='text'>
asm/unaligned.h is always an include of asm-generic/unaligned.h;
might as well move that thing to linux/unaligned.h and include
that - there's nothing arch-specific in that header.

auto-generated by the following:

for i in `git grep -l -w asm/unaligned.h`; do
	sed -i -e "s/asm\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
for i in `git grep -l -w asm-generic/unaligned.h`; do
	sed -i -e "s/asm-generic\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
git mv include/asm-generic/unaligned.h include/linux/unaligned.h
git mv tools/include/asm-generic/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
sed -i -e "/unaligned.h/d" include/asm-generic/Kbuild
sed -i -e "s/__ASM_GENERIC/__LINUX/" include/linux/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
asm/unaligned.h is always an include of asm-generic/unaligned.h;
might as well move that thing to linux/unaligned.h and include
that - there's nothing arch-specific in that header.

auto-generated by the following:

for i in `git grep -l -w asm/unaligned.h`; do
	sed -i -e "s/asm\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
for i in `git grep -l -w asm-generic/unaligned.h`; do
	sed -i -e "s/asm-generic\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
git mv include/asm-generic/unaligned.h include/linux/unaligned.h
git mv tools/include/asm-generic/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
sed -i -e "/unaligned.h/d" include/asm-generic/Kbuild
sed -i -e "s/__ASM_GENERIC/__LINUX/" include/linux/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'locking/core' into locking/urgent, to pick up pending commits</title>
<updated>2024-09-29T06:57:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-29T06:57:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ae39e0bd150bd2739582f72ad70b5a0b15e74576'/>
<id>ae39e0bd150bd2739582f72ad70b5a0b15e74576</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge all pending locking commits into a single branch.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Merge all pending locking commits into a single branch.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/uaccess: Zero the 8-byte get_range case on failure on 32-bit</title>
<updated>2024-08-01T19:19:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gow</name>
<email>davidgow@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-31T07:30:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=dd35a0933269c636635b6af89dc6fa1782791e56'/>
<id>dd35a0933269c636635b6af89dc6fa1782791e56</id>
<content type='text'>
While zeroing the upper 32 bits of an 8-byte getuser on 32-bit x86 was
fixed by commit 8c860ed825cb ("x86/uaccess: Fix missed zeroing of ia32 u64
get_user() range checking") it was broken again in commit 8a2462df1547
("x86/uaccess: Improve the 8-byte getuser() case").

This is because the register which holds the upper 32 bits (%ecx) is being
cleared _after_ the check_range, so if the range check fails, %ecx is never
cleared.

This can be reproduced with:
./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --arch i386 usercopy

Instead, clear %ecx _before_ check_range in the 8-byte case. This
reintroduces a bit of the ugliness we were trying to avoid by adding
another #ifndef CONFIG_X86_64, but at least keeps check_range from needing
a separate bad_get_user_8 jump.

Fixes: 8a2462df1547 ("x86/uaccess: Improve the 8-byte getuser() case")
Signed-off-by: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240731073031.4045579-1-davidgow@google.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
While zeroing the upper 32 bits of an 8-byte getuser on 32-bit x86 was
fixed by commit 8c860ed825cb ("x86/uaccess: Fix missed zeroing of ia32 u64
get_user() range checking") it was broken again in commit 8a2462df1547
("x86/uaccess: Improve the 8-byte getuser() case").

This is because the register which holds the upper 32 bits (%ecx) is being
cleared _after_ the check_range, so if the range check fails, %ecx is never
cleared.

This can be reproduced with:
./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --arch i386 usercopy

Instead, clear %ecx _before_ check_range in the 8-byte case. This
reintroduces a bit of the ugliness we were trying to avoid by adding
another #ifndef CONFIG_X86_64, but at least keeps check_range from needing
a separate bad_get_user_8 jump.

Fixes: 8a2462df1547 ("x86/uaccess: Improve the 8-byte getuser() case")
Signed-off-by: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240731073031.4045579-1-davidgow@google.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/setup: Parse the builtin command line before merging</title>
<updated>2024-07-31T19:46:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-30T14:15:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bf514327c324bc8af64f359b341cc9b189c096fd'/>
<id>bf514327c324bc8af64f359b341cc9b189c096fd</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit in Fixes was added as a catch-all for cases where the cmdline is
parsed before being merged with the builtin one.

And promptly one issue appeared, see Link below. The microcode loader
really needs to parse it that early, but the merging happens later.

Reshuffling the early boot nightmare^W code to handle that properly would
be a painful exercise for another day so do the chicken thing and parse the
builtin cmdline too before it has been merged.

Fixes: 0c40b1c7a897 ("x86/setup: Warn when option parsing is done too early")
Reported-by: Mike Lothian &lt;mike@fireburn.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240730152108.GAZqkE5Dfi9AuKllRw@fat_crate.local
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722152330.GCZp55ck8E_FT4kPnC@fat_crate.local
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit in Fixes was added as a catch-all for cases where the cmdline is
parsed before being merged with the builtin one.

And promptly one issue appeared, see Link below. The microcode loader
really needs to parse it that early, but the merging happens later.

Reshuffling the early boot nightmare^W code to handle that properly would
be a painful exercise for another day so do the chicken thing and parse the
builtin cmdline too before it has been merged.

Fixes: 0c40b1c7a897 ("x86/setup: Warn when option parsing is done too early")
Reported-by: Mike Lothian &lt;mike@fireburn.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240730152108.GAZqkE5Dfi9AuKllRw@fat_crate.local
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722152330.GCZp55ck8E_FT4kPnC@fat_crate.local
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>locking/atomic/x86: Introduce the read64_nonatomic macro to x86_32 with cx8</title>
<updated>2024-07-17T14:28:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Uros Bizjak</name>
<email>ubizjak@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-05T18:13:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6e30a7c98a9fda2f894e970e9cd637657f39c59d'/>
<id>6e30a7c98a9fda2f894e970e9cd637657f39c59d</id>
<content type='text'>
As described in commit:

  e73c4e34a0e9 ("locking/atomic/x86: Introduce arch_atomic64_read_nonatomic() to x86_32")

the value preload before the CMPXCHG loop does not need to be atomic.

Introduce the read64_nonatomic assembly macro to load the value from a
atomic_t location in a faster non-atomic way and use it in
atomic64_cx8_32.S.

Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak &lt;ubizjak@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240605181424.3228-1-ubizjak@gmail.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As described in commit:

  e73c4e34a0e9 ("locking/atomic/x86: Introduce arch_atomic64_read_nonatomic() to x86_32")

the value preload before the CMPXCHG loop does not need to be atomic.

Introduce the read64_nonatomic assembly macro to load the value from a
atomic_t location in a faster non-atomic way and use it in
atomic64_cx8_32.S.

Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak &lt;ubizjak@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240605181424.3228-1-ubizjak@gmail.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
