linux.git/arch/x86/lib, branch v5.1

x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for early SME setup

2019-04-30T15:59:08+00:00

Enablement of AMD's Secure Memory Encryption feature is determined very
early after start_kernel() is entered. Part of this procedure involves
scanning the command line for the parameter 'mem_encrypt'.

To determine intended state, the function sme_enable() uses library
functions cmdline_find_option() and strncmp(). Their use occurs early
enough such that it cannot be assumed that any instrumentation subsystem
is initialized.

For example, making calls to a KASAN-instrumented function before KASAN
is set up will result in the use of uninitialized memory and a boot
failure.

When AMD's SME support is enabled, conditionally disable instrumentation
of these dependent functions in lib/string.c and arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c.

 [ bp: Get rid of intermediary nostackp var and cleanup whitespace. ]

Fixes: aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption")
Reported-by: Li RongQing 
Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Boris Brezillon 
Cc: Coly Li 
Cc: "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Kent Overstreet 
Cc: "luto@kernel.org" 
Cc: Masahiro Yamada 
Cc: Matthew Wilcox 
Cc: "mingo@redhat.com" 
Cc: "peterz@infradead.org" 
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: x86-ml 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/155657657552.7116.18363762932464011367.stgit@sosrh3.amd.com

x86/lib: Fix indentation issue, remove extra tab

2019-03-21T11:24:38+00:00

The increment of buff is indented one level too deeply, clean
this up by removing a tab.

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" 
Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190314230838.18256-1-colin.king@canonical.com

Merge branch 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2019-03-08T00:36:57+00:00

Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar:
 "Various cleanups and simplifications, none of them really stands out,
  they are all over the place"

* 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/uaccess: Remove unused __addr_ok() macro
  x86/smpboot: Remove unused phys_id variable
  x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Remove the unused prev_pud variable
  x86/fpu: Move init_xstate_size() to __init section
  x86/cpu_entry_area: Move percpu_setup_debug_store() to __init section
  x86/mtrr: Remove unused variable
  x86/boot/compressed/64: Explain paging_prepare()'s return value
  x86/resctrl: Remove duplicate MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL definition
  x86/asm/suspend: Drop ENTRY from local data
  x86/hw_breakpoints, kprobes: Remove kprobes ifdeffery
  x86/boot: Save several bytes in decompressor
  x86/trap: Remove useless declaration
  x86/mm/tlb: Remove unused cpu variable
  x86/events: Mark expected switch-case fall-throughs
  x86/asm-prototypes: Remove duplicate include 
  x86/kernel: Mark expected switch-case fall-throughs
  x86/insn-eval: Mark expected switch-case fall-through
  x86/platform/UV: Replace kmalloc() and memset() with k[cz]alloc() calls
  x86/e820: Replace kmalloc() + memcpy() with kmemdup()

docs/core-api/mm: fix user memory accessors formatting

2019-03-06T05:07:20+00:00

The descriptions of userspace memory access functions had minor issues
with formatting that made kernel-doc unable to properly detect the
function/macro names and the return value sections:

./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:80: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:139: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:231: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:505: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:530: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c:58: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c:69: warning: No description found for return
value of 'clear_user'
./arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c:78: info: Scanning doc for
./arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c:90: warning: No description found for return
value of '__clear_user'

Fix the formatting.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1549549644-4903-3-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

x86: explicitly align IO accesses in memcpy_{to,from}io

2019-02-01T17:07:48+00:00

In commit 170d13ca3a2f ("x86: re-introduce non-generic memcpy_{to,from}io")
I made our copy from IO space use a separate copy routine rather than
rely on the generic memcpy.  I did that because our generic memory copy
isn't actually well-defined when it comes to internal access ordering or
alignment, and will in fact depend on various CPUID flags.

In particular, the default memcpy() for a modern Intel CPU will
generally be just a "rep movsb", which works reasonably well for
medium-sized memory copies of regular RAM, since the CPU will turn it
into fairly optimized microcode.

However, for non-cached memory and IO, "rep movs" ends up being
horrendously slow and will just do the architectural "one byte at a
time" accesses implied by the movsb.

At the other end of the spectrum, if you _don't_ end up using the "rep
movsb" code, you'd likely fall back to the software copy, which does
overlapping accesses for the tail, and may copy things backwards.
Again, for regular memory that's fine, for IO memory not so much.

The thinking was that clearly nobody really cared (because things
worked), but some people had seen horrible performance due to the byte
accesses, so let's just revert back to our long ago version that dod
"rep movsl" for the bulk of the copy, and then fixed up the potentially
last few bytes of the tail with "movsw/b".

Interestingly (and perhaps not entirely surprisingly), while that was
our original memory copy implementation, and had been used before for
IO, in the meantime many new users of memcpy_*io() had come about.  And
while the access patterns for the memory copy weren't well-defined (so
arguably _any_ access pattern should work), in practice the "rep movsb"
case had been very common for the last several years.

In particular Jarkko Sakkinen reported that the memcpy_*io() change
resuled in weird errors from his Geminilake NUC TPM module.

And it turns out that the TPM TCG accesses according to spec require
that the accesses be

 (a) done strictly sequentially

 (b) be naturally aligned

otherwise the TPM chip will abort the PCI transaction.

And, in fact, the tpm_crb.c driver did this:

	memcpy_fromio(buf, priv->rsp, 6);
	...
	memcpy_fromio(&buf[6], &priv->rsp[6], expected - 6);

which really should never have worked in the first place, but back
before commit 170d13ca3a2f it *happened* to work, because the
memcpy_fromio() would be expanded to a regular memcpy, and

 (a) gcc would expand the first memcpy in-line, and turn it into a
     4-byte and a 2-byte read, and they happened to be in the right
     order, and the alignment was right.

 (b) gcc would call "memcpy()" for the second one, and the machines that
     had this TPM chip also apparently ended up always having ERMS
     ("Enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB instructions"), so we'd use the "rep
     movbs" for that copy.

In other words, basically by pure luck, the code happened to use the
right access sizes in the (two different!) memcpy() implementations to
make it all work.

But after commit 170d13ca3a2f, both of the memcpy_fromio() calls
resulted in a call to the routine with the consistent memory accesses,
and in both cases it started out transferring with 4-byte accesses.
Which worked for the first copy, but resulted in the second copy doing a
32-bit read at an address that was only 2-byte aligned.

Jarkko is actually fixing the fragile code in the TPM driver, but since
this is an excellent example of why we absolutely must not use a generic
memcpy for IO accesses, _and_ an IO-specific one really should strive to
align the IO accesses, let's do exactly that.

Side note: Jarkko also noted that the driver had been used on ARM
platforms, and had worked.  That was because on 32-bit ARM, memcpy_*io()
ends up always doing byte accesses, and on 64-bit ARM it first does byte
accesses to align to 8-byte boundaries, and then does 8-byte accesses
for the bulk.

So ARM actually worked by design, and the x86 case worked by pure luck.

We *might* want to make x86-64 do the 8-byte case too.  That should be a
pretty straightforward extension, but let's do one thing at a time.  And
generally MMIO accesses aren't really all that performance-critical, as
shown by the fact that for a long time we just did them a byte at a
time, and very few people ever noticed.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Tested-by: Jerry Snitselaar 
Cc: David Laight 
Fixes: 170d13ca3a2f ("x86: re-introduce non-generic memcpy_{to,from}io")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

x86/insn-eval: Mark expected switch-case fall-through

2019-01-26T09:46:42+00:00

In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough by default, mark
switch-case statements where fall-through is intentional, explicitly.

Thus fix the following warning:

  arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c: In function ‘resolve_default_seg’:
  arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c:179:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
     if (insn->addr_bytes == 2)
        ^
  arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c:182:2: note: here
    case -EDOM:
    ^~~~

Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3

This is part of the ongoing efforts to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough by
default.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: x86-ml 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190125205520.GA9602@embeddedor

x86/kaslr: Fix incorrect i8254 outb() parameters

2019-01-11T20:35:47+00:00

The outb() function takes parameters value and port, in that order.  Fix
the parameters used in the kalsr i8254 fallback code.

Fixes: 5bfce5ef55cb ("x86, kaslr: Provide randomness functions")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Drake 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: linux@endlessm.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190107034024.15005-1-drake@endlessm.com

kbuild: remove redundant target cleaning on failure

2019-01-06T00:46:51+00:00

Since commit 9c2af1c7377a ("kbuild: add .DELETE_ON_ERROR special
target"), the target file is automatically deleted on failure.

The boilerplate code

  ... || { rm -f $@; false; }

is unneeded.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada

x86: re-introduce non-generic memcpy_{to,from}io

2019-01-05T02:15:33+00:00

This has been broken forever, and nobody ever really noticed because
it's purely a performance issue.

Long long ago, in commit 6175ddf06b61 ("x86: Clean up mem*io functions")
Brian Gerst simplified the memory copies to and from iomem, since on
x86, the instructions to access iomem are exactly the same as the
regular instructions.

That is technically true, and things worked, and nobody said anything.
Besides, back then the regular memcpy was pretty simple and worked fine.

Nobody noticed except for David Laight, that is.  David has a testing a
TLP monitor he was writing for an FPGA, and has been occasionally
complaining about how memcpy_toio() writes things one byte at a time.

Which is completely unacceptable from a performance standpoint, even if
it happens to technically work.

The reason it's writing one byte at a time is because while it's
technically true that accesses to iomem are the same as accesses to
regular memory on x86, the _granularity_ (and ordering) of accesses
matter to iomem in ways that they don't matter to regular cached memory.

In particular, when ERMS is set, we default to using "rep movsb" for
larger memory copies.  That is indeed perfectly fine for real memory,
since the whole point is that the CPU is going to do cacheline
optimizations and executes the memory copy efficiently for cached
memory.

With iomem? Not so much.  With iomem, "rep movsb" will indeed work, but
it will copy things one byte at a time. Slowly and ponderously.

Now, originally, back in 2010 when commit 6175ddf06b61 was done, we
didn't use ERMS, and this was much less noticeable.

Our normal memcpy() was simpler in other ways too.

Because in fact, it's not just about using the string instructions.  Our
memcpy() these days does things like "read and write overlapping values"
to handle the last bytes of the copy.  Again, for normal memory,
overlapping accesses isn't an issue.  For iomem? It can be.

So this re-introduces the specialized memcpy_toio(), memcpy_fromio() and
memset_io() functions.  It doesn't particularly optimize them, but it
tries to at least not be horrid, or do overlapping accesses.  In fact,
this uses the existing __inline_memcpy() function that we still had
lying around that uses our very traditional "rep movsl" loop followed by
movsw/movsb for the final bytes.

Somebody may decide to try to improve on it, but if we've gone almost a
decade with only one person really ever noticing and complaining, maybe
it's not worth worrying about further, once it's not _completely_ broken?

Reported-by: David Laight 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function

2019-01-04T02:57:57+00:00

Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.

It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access.  But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.

A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model.  And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.

This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.

There were a couple of notable cases:

 - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.

 - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
   values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
   really used it)

 - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout

but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.

I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something.  Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds