<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/kernel, branch v6.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/e820: Don't reserve SETUP_RNG_SEED in e820</title>
<updated>2024-03-01T18:27:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Bohac</name>
<email>jbohac@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-31T00:04:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7fd817c906503b6813ea3b41f5fdf4192449a707'/>
<id>7fd817c906503b6813ea3b41f5fdf4192449a707</id>
<content type='text'>
SETUP_RNG_SEED in setup_data is supplied by kexec and should
not be reserved in the e820 map.

Doing so reserves 16 bytes of RAM when booting with kexec.
(16 bytes because data-&gt;len is zeroed by parse_setup_data so only
sizeof(setup_data) is reserved.)

When kexec is used repeatedly, each boot adds two entries in the
kexec-provided e820 map as the 16-byte range splits a larger
range of usable memory. Eventually all of the 128 available entries
get used up. The next split will result in losing usable memory
as the new entries cannot be added to the e820 map.

Fixes: 68b8e9713c8e ("x86/setup: Use rng seeds from setup_data")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac &lt;jbohac@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZbmOjKnARGiaYBd5@dwarf.suse.cz
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
SETUP_RNG_SEED in setup_data is supplied by kexec and should
not be reserved in the e820 map.

Doing so reserves 16 bytes of RAM when booting with kexec.
(16 bytes because data-&gt;len is zeroed by parse_setup_data so only
sizeof(setup_data) is reserved.)

When kexec is used repeatedly, each boot adds two entries in the
kexec-provided e820 map as the 16-byte range splits a larger
range of usable memory. Eventually all of the 128 available entries
get used up. The next split will result in losing usable memory
as the new entries cannot be added to the e820 map.

Fixes: 68b8e9713c8e ("x86/setup: Use rng seeds from setup_data")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac &lt;jbohac@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZbmOjKnARGiaYBd5@dwarf.suse.cz
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu/intel: Detect TME keyid bits before setting MTRR mask registers</title>
<updated>2024-02-26T16:16:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-31T23:09:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6890cb1ace350b4386c8aee1343dc3b3ddd214da'/>
<id>6890cb1ace350b4386c8aee1343dc3b3ddd214da</id>
<content type='text'>
MKTME repurposes the high bit of physical address to key id for encryption
key and, even though MAXPHYADDR in CPUID[0x80000008] remains the same,
the valid bits in the MTRR mask register are based on the reduced number
of physical address bits.

detect_tme() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c detects TME and subtracts
it from the total usable physical bits, but it is called too late.
Move the call to early_init_intel() so that it is called in setup_arch(),
before MTRRs are setup.

This fixes boot on TDX-enabled systems, which until now only worked with
"disable_mtrr_cleanup".  Without the patch, the values written to the
MTRRs mask registers were 52-bit wide (e.g. 0x000fffff_80000800) and
the writes failed; with the patch, the values are 46-bit wide, which
matches the reduced MAXPHYADDR that is shown in /proc/cpuinfo.

Reported-by: Zixi Chen &lt;zixchen@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240131230902.1867092-3-pbonzini%40redhat.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
MKTME repurposes the high bit of physical address to key id for encryption
key and, even though MAXPHYADDR in CPUID[0x80000008] remains the same,
the valid bits in the MTRR mask register are based on the reduced number
of physical address bits.

detect_tme() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c detects TME and subtracts
it from the total usable physical bits, but it is called too late.
Move the call to early_init_intel() so that it is called in setup_arch(),
before MTRRs are setup.

This fixes boot on TDX-enabled systems, which until now only worked with
"disable_mtrr_cleanup".  Without the patch, the values written to the
MTRRs mask registers were 52-bit wide (e.g. 0x000fffff_80000800) and
the writes failed; with the patch, the values are 46-bit wide, which
matches the reduced MAXPHYADDR that is shown in /proc/cpuinfo.

Reported-by: Zixi Chen &lt;zixchen@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240131230902.1867092-3-pbonzini%40redhat.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Allow reducing x86_phys_bits during early_identify_cpu()</title>
<updated>2024-02-26T16:16:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-31T23:09:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=9a458198eba98b7207669a166e64d04b04cb651b'/>
<id>9a458198eba98b7207669a166e64d04b04cb651b</id>
<content type='text'>
In commit fbf6449f84bf ("x86/sev-es: Set x86_virt_bits to the correct
value straight away, instead of a two-phase approach"), the initialization
of c-&gt;x86_phys_bits was moved after this_cpu-&gt;c_early_init(c).  This is
incorrect because early_init_amd() expected to be able to reduce the
value according to the contents of CPUID leaf 0x8000001f.

Fortunately, the bug was negated by init_amd()'s call to early_init_amd(),
which does reduce x86_phys_bits in the end.  However, this is very
late in the boot process and, most notably, the wrong value is used for
x86_phys_bits when setting up MTRRs.

To fix this, call get_cpu_address_sizes() as soon as X86_FEATURE_CPUID is
set/cleared, and c-&gt;extended_cpuid_level is retrieved.

Fixes: fbf6449f84bf ("x86/sev-es: Set x86_virt_bits to the correct value straight away, instead of a two-phase approach")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240131230902.1867092-2-pbonzini%40redhat.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In commit fbf6449f84bf ("x86/sev-es: Set x86_virt_bits to the correct
value straight away, instead of a two-phase approach"), the initialization
of c-&gt;x86_phys_bits was moved after this_cpu-&gt;c_early_init(c).  This is
incorrect because early_init_amd() expected to be able to reduce the
value according to the contents of CPUID leaf 0x8000001f.

Fortunately, the bug was negated by init_amd()'s call to early_init_amd(),
which does reduce x86_phys_bits in the end.  However, this is very
late in the boot process and, most notably, the wrong value is used for
x86_phys_bits when setting up MTRRs.

To fix this, call get_cpu_address_sizes() as soon as X86_FEATURE_CPUID is
set/cleared, and c-&gt;extended_cpuid_level is retrieved.

Fixes: fbf6449f84bf ("x86/sev-es: Set x86_virt_bits to the correct value straight away, instead of a two-phase approach")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240131230902.1867092-2-pbonzini%40redhat.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Use ALTERNATIVE() instead of mds_user_clear static key</title>
<updated>2024-02-20T00:31:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-14T02:22:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6613d82e617dd7eb8b0c40b2fe3acea655b1d611'/>
<id>6613d82e617dd7eb8b0c40b2fe3acea655b1d611</id>
<content type='text'>
The VERW mitigation at exit-to-user is enabled via a static branch
mds_user_clear. This static branch is never toggled after boot, and can
be safely replaced with an ALTERNATIVE() which is convenient to use in
asm.

Switch to ALTERNATIVE() to use the VERW mitigation late in exit-to-user
path. Also remove the now redundant VERW in exc_nmi() and
arch_exit_to_user_mode().

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-4-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The VERW mitigation at exit-to-user is enabled via a static branch
mds_user_clear. This static branch is never toggled after boot, and can
be safely replaced with an ALTERNATIVE() which is convenient to use in
asm.

Switch to ALTERNATIVE() to use the VERW mitigation late in exit-to-user
path. Also remove the now redundant VERW in exc_nmi() and
arch_exit_to_user_mode().

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-4-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.8_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2024-02-11T19:41:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-11T19:41:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c021e191cf3da2fea766d784546f4c5acbfcd137'/>
<id>c021e191cf3da2fea766d784546f4c5acbfcd137</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:

 - Correct the minimum CPU family for Transmeta Crusoe in Kconfig so
   that such hw can boot again

 - Do not take into accout XSTATE buffer size info supplied by userspace
   when constructing a sigreturn frame

 - Switch get_/put_user* to EX_TYPE_UACCESS exception handling when an
   MCE is encountered so that it can be properly recovered from instead
   of simply panicking

* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.8_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/Kconfig: Transmeta Crusoe is CPU family 5, not 6
  x86/fpu: Stop relying on userspace for info to fault in xsave buffer
  x86/lib: Revert to _ASM_EXTABLE_UA() for {get,put}_user() fixups
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:

 - Correct the minimum CPU family for Transmeta Crusoe in Kconfig so
   that such hw can boot again

 - Do not take into accout XSTATE buffer size info supplied by userspace
   when constructing a sigreturn frame

 - Switch get_/put_user* to EX_TYPE_UACCESS exception handling when an
   MCE is encountered so that it can be properly recovered from instead
   of simply panicking

* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.8_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/Kconfig: Transmeta Crusoe is CPU family 5, not 6
  x86/fpu: Stop relying on userspace for info to fault in xsave buffer
  x86/lib: Revert to _ASM_EXTABLE_UA() for {get,put}_user() fixups
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2024-02-07T17:52:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-07T17:52:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5c24ba20555acd68537be26f05296649e171a27d'/>
<id>5c24ba20555acd68537be26f05296649e171a27d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "x86 guest:

   - Avoid false positive for check that only matters on AMD processors

  x86:

   - Give a hint when Win2016 might fail to boot due to XSAVES &amp;&amp;
     !XSAVEC configuration

   - Do not allow creating an in-kernel PIT unless an IOAPIC already
     exists

  RISC-V:

   - Allow ISA extensions that were enabled for bare metal in 6.8 (Zbc,
     scalar and vector crypto, Zfh[min], Zihintntl, Zvfh[min], Zfa)

  S390:

   - fix CC for successful PQAP instruction

   - fix a race when creating a shadow page"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  x86/coco: Define cc_vendor without CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
  x86/kvm: Fix SEV check in sev_map_percpu_data()
  KVM: x86: Give a hint when Win2016 might fail to boot due to XSAVES erratum
  KVM: x86: Check irqchip mode before create PIT
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add Zfa extension to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow Zfa extension for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add Zvfh[min] extensions to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow Zvfh[min] extensions for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add Zihintntl extension to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow Zihintntl extension for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add Zfh[min] extensions to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow Zfh[min] extensions for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add vector crypto extensions to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow vector crypto extensions for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add scaler crypto extensions to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow scalar crypto extensions for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add Zbc extension to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow Zbc extension for Guest/VM
  KVM: s390: fix cc for successful PQAP
  KVM: s390: vsie: fix race during shadow creation
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "x86 guest:

   - Avoid false positive for check that only matters on AMD processors

  x86:

   - Give a hint when Win2016 might fail to boot due to XSAVES &amp;&amp;
     !XSAVEC configuration

   - Do not allow creating an in-kernel PIT unless an IOAPIC already
     exists

  RISC-V:

   - Allow ISA extensions that were enabled for bare metal in 6.8 (Zbc,
     scalar and vector crypto, Zfh[min], Zihintntl, Zvfh[min], Zfa)

  S390:

   - fix CC for successful PQAP instruction

   - fix a race when creating a shadow page"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  x86/coco: Define cc_vendor without CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
  x86/kvm: Fix SEV check in sev_map_percpu_data()
  KVM: x86: Give a hint when Win2016 might fail to boot due to XSAVES erratum
  KVM: x86: Check irqchip mode before create PIT
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add Zfa extension to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow Zfa extension for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add Zvfh[min] extensions to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow Zvfh[min] extensions for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add Zihintntl extension to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow Zihintntl extension for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add Zfh[min] extensions to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow Zfh[min] extensions for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add vector crypto extensions to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow vector crypto extensions for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add scaler crypto extensions to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow scalar crypto extensions for Guest/VM
  KVM: riscv: selftests: Add Zbc extension to get-reg-list test
  RISC-V: KVM: Allow Zbc extension for Guest/VM
  KVM: s390: fix cc for successful PQAP
  KVM: s390: vsie: fix race during shadow creation
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/kvm: Fix SEV check in sev_map_percpu_data()</title>
<updated>2024-01-31T21:21:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-24T13:03:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a9ef277488cfc1b7da88235dc11c338a14f34835'/>
<id>a9ef277488cfc1b7da88235dc11c338a14f34835</id>
<content type='text'>
The function sev_map_percpu_data() checks if it is running on an SEV
platform by checking the CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute. However,
this attribute is also defined for TDX.

To avoid false positives, add a cc_vendor check.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Fixes: 4d96f9109109 ("x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with cc_platform_has()")
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20240124130317.495519-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The function sev_map_percpu_data() checks if it is running on an SEV
platform by checking the CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute. However,
this attribute is also defined for TDX.

To avoid false positives, add a cc_vendor check.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Fixes: 4d96f9109109 ("x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with cc_platform_has()")
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20240124130317.495519-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/fpu: Stop relying on userspace for info to fault in xsave buffer</title>
<updated>2024-01-30T15:25:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrei Vagin</name>
<email>avagin@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-30T06:36:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d877550eaf2dc9090d782864c96939397a3c6835'/>
<id>d877550eaf2dc9090d782864c96939397a3c6835</id>
<content type='text'>
Before this change, the expected size of the user space buffer was
taken from fx_sw-&gt;xstate_size. fx_sw-&gt;xstate_size can be changed
from user-space, so it is possible construct a sigreturn frame where:

 * fx_sw-&gt;xstate_size is smaller than the size required by valid bits in
   fx_sw-&gt;xfeatures.
 * user-space unmaps parts of the sigrame fpu buffer so that not all of
   the buffer required by xrstor is accessible.

In this case, xrstor tries to restore and accesses the unmapped area
which results in a fault. But fault_in_readable succeeds because buf +
fx_sw-&gt;xstate_size is within the still mapped area, so it goes back and
tries xrstor again. It will spin in this loop forever.

Instead, fault in the maximum size which can be touched by XRSTOR (taken
from fpstate-&gt;user_size).

[ dhansen: tweak subject / changelog ]

Fixes: fcb3635f5018 ("x86/fpu/signal: Handle #PF in the direct restore path")
Reported-by: Konstantin Bogomolov &lt;bogomolov@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240130063603.3392627-1-avagin%40google.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Before this change, the expected size of the user space buffer was
taken from fx_sw-&gt;xstate_size. fx_sw-&gt;xstate_size can be changed
from user-space, so it is possible construct a sigreturn frame where:

 * fx_sw-&gt;xstate_size is smaller than the size required by valid bits in
   fx_sw-&gt;xfeatures.
 * user-space unmaps parts of the sigrame fpu buffer so that not all of
   the buffer required by xrstor is accessible.

In this case, xrstor tries to restore and accesses the unmapped area
which results in a fault. But fault_in_readable succeeds because buf +
fx_sw-&gt;xstate_size is within the still mapped area, so it goes back and
tries xrstor again. It will spin in this loop forever.

Instead, fault in the maximum size which can be touched by XRSTOR (taken
from fpstate-&gt;user_size).

[ dhansen: tweak subject / changelog ]

Fixes: fcb3635f5018 ("x86/fpu/signal: Handle #PF in the direct restore path")
Reported-by: Konstantin Bogomolov &lt;bogomolov@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240130063603.3392627-1-avagin%40google.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/CPU/AMD: Add more models to X86_FEATURE_ZEN5</title>
<updated>2024-01-25T11:26:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mario Limonciello</name>
<email>mario.limonciello@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-24T22:07:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b9328fd636bd50da89e792e135b234ba8e6fe59f'/>
<id>b9328fd636bd50da89e792e135b234ba8e6fe59f</id>
<content type='text'>
Add model ranges starting at 0x20, 0x40 and 0x70 to the synthetic
feature flag X86_FEATURE_ZEN5.

Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello &lt;mario.limonciello@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124220749.2983-1-mario.limonciello@amd.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add model ranges starting at 0x20, 0x40 and 0x70 to the synthetic
feature flag X86_FEATURE_ZEN5.

Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello &lt;mario.limonciello@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124220749.2983-1-mario.limonciello@amd.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/CPU/AMD: Add X86_FEATURE_ZEN5</title>
<updated>2024-01-23T10:06:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-04T20:11:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3e4147f33f8b647775357bae0248b9a2aeebfcd2'/>
<id>3e4147f33f8b647775357bae0248b9a2aeebfcd2</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a synthetic feature flag for Zen5.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104201138.5072-1-bp@alien8.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a synthetic feature flag for Zen5.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104201138.5072-1-bp@alien8.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
