<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c, branch v6.0</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86: remove __range_not_ok()</title>
<updated>2022-02-25T08:36:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-15T08:15:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=36903abedfe8d419e90ce349b2b4ce6dc2883e17'/>
<id>36903abedfe8d419e90ce349b2b4ce6dc2883e17</id>
<content type='text'>
The __range_not_ok() helper is an x86 (and sparc64) specific interface
that does roughly the same thing as __access_ok(), but with different
calling conventions.

Change this to use the normal interface in order for consistency as we
clean up all access_ok() implementations.

This changes the limit from TASK_SIZE to TASK_SIZE_MAX, which Al points
out is the right thing do do here anyway.

The callers have to use __access_ok() instead of the normal access_ok()
though, because on x86 that contains a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() check that cannot
be used inside of NMI context while tracing.

The check in copy_code() is not needed any more, because this one is
already done by copy_from_user_nmi().

Suggested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YgsUKcXGR7r4nINj@zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The __range_not_ok() helper is an x86 (and sparc64) specific interface
that does roughly the same thing as __access_ok(), but with different
calling conventions.

Change this to use the normal interface in order for consistency as we
clean up all access_ok() implementations.

This changes the limit from TASK_SIZE to TASK_SIZE_MAX, which Al points
out is the right thing do do here anyway.

The callers have to use __access_ok() instead of the normal access_ok()
though, because on x86 that contains a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() check that cannot
be used inside of NMI context while tracing.

The check in copy_code() is not needed any more, because this one is
already done by copy_from_user_nmi().

Suggested-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YgsUKcXGR7r4nINj@zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exit: Add and use make_task_dead.</title>
<updated>2021-12-13T18:04:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-28T19:52:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0e25498f8cd43c1b5aa327f373dd094e9a006da7'/>
<id>0e25498f8cd43c1b5aa327f373dd094e9a006da7</id>
<content type='text'>
There are two big uses of do_exit.  The first is it's design use to be
the guts of the exit(2) system call.  The second use is to terminate
a task after something catastrophic has happened like a NULL pointer
in kernel code.

Add a function make_task_dead that is initialy exactly the same as
do_exit to cover the cases where do_exit is called to handle
catastrophic failure.  In time this can probably be reduced to just a
light wrapper around do_task_dead. For now keep it exactly the same so
that there will be no behavioral differences introducing this new
concept.

Replace all of the uses of do_exit that use it for catastraphic
task cleanup with make_task_dead to make it clear what the code
is doing.

As part of this rename rewind_stack_do_exit
rewind_stack_and_make_dead.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are two big uses of do_exit.  The first is it's design use to be
the guts of the exit(2) system call.  The second use is to terminate
a task after something catastrophic has happened like a NULL pointer
in kernel code.

Add a function make_task_dead that is initialy exactly the same as
do_exit to cover the cases where do_exit is called to handle
catastrophic failure.  In time this can probably be reduced to just a
light wrapper around do_task_dead. For now keep it exactly the same so
that there will be no behavioral differences introducing this new
concept.

Replace all of the uses of do_exit that use it for catastraphic
task cleanup with make_task_dead to make it clear what the code
is doing.

As part of this rename rewind_stack_do_exit
rewind_stack_and_make_dead.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack: use %pSb/%pBb for backtrace printing</title>
<updated>2021-07-08T18:48:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Boyd</name>
<email>swboyd@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-08T01:09:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=9ef8af2a8f25b16eec6d2865ca7d9116a24ad46a'/>
<id>9ef8af2a8f25b16eec6d2865ca7d9116a24ad46a</id>
<content type='text'>
Let's use the new printk formats to print the stacktrace entries when
printing a backtrace to the kernel logs.  This will include any module's
build ID[1] in it so that offline/crash debugging can easily locate the
debuginfo for a module via something like debuginfod[2].

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-8-swboyd@chromium.org
Link: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/FeatureBuildId [1]
Link: https://sourceware.org/elfutils/Debuginfod.html [2]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd &lt;swboyd@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Evan Green &lt;evgreen@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang &lt;hsinyi@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Let's use the new printk formats to print the stacktrace entries when
printing a backtrace to the kernel logs.  This will include any module's
build ID[1] in it so that offline/crash debugging can easily locate the
debuginfo for a module via something like debuginfod[2].

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511003845.2429846-8-swboyd@chromium.org
Link: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/FeatureBuildId [1]
Link: https://sourceware.org/elfutils/Debuginfod.html [2]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd &lt;swboyd@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Evan Green &lt;evgreen@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang &lt;hsinyi@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Young &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2020-12-14T21:45:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-14T21:45:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=405f868f13daf7bae85e6fec143121c27d52cdb4'/>
<id>405f868f13daf7bae85e6fec143121c27d52cdb4</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 cleanups from Borislav Petkov:
 "Another branch with a nicely negative diffstat, just the way I
  like 'em:

   - Remove all uses of TIF_IA32 and TIF_X32 and reclaim the two bits in
     the end (Gabriel Krisman Bertazi)

   - All kinds of minor cleanups all over the tree"

* tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (24 commits)
  x86/ia32_signal: Propagate __user annotation properly
  x86/alternative: Update text_poke_bp() kernel-doc comment
  x86/PCI: Make a kernel-doc comment a normal one
  x86/asm: Drop unused RDPID macro
  x86/boot/compressed/64: Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
  x86/head64: Remove duplicate include
  x86/mm: Declare 'start' variable where it is used
  x86/head/64: Remove unused GET_CR2_INTO() macro
  x86/boot: Remove unused finalize_identity_maps()
  x86/uaccess: Document copy_from_user_nmi()
  x86/dumpstack: Make show_trace_log_lvl() static
  x86/mtrr: Fix a kernel-doc markup
  x86/setup: Remove unused MCA variables
  x86, libnvdimm/test: Remove COPY_MC_TEST
  x86: Reclaim TIF_IA32 and TIF_X32
  x86/mm: Convert mmu context ia32_compat into a proper flags field
  x86/elf: Use e_machine to check for x32/ia32 in setup_additional_pages()
  elf: Expose ELF header on arch_setup_additional_pages()
  x86/elf: Use e_machine to select start_thread for x32
  elf: Expose ELF header in compat_start_thread()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 cleanups from Borislav Petkov:
 "Another branch with a nicely negative diffstat, just the way I
  like 'em:

   - Remove all uses of TIF_IA32 and TIF_X32 and reclaim the two bits in
     the end (Gabriel Krisman Bertazi)

   - All kinds of minor cleanups all over the tree"

* tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (24 commits)
  x86/ia32_signal: Propagate __user annotation properly
  x86/alternative: Update text_poke_bp() kernel-doc comment
  x86/PCI: Make a kernel-doc comment a normal one
  x86/asm: Drop unused RDPID macro
  x86/boot/compressed/64: Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
  x86/head64: Remove duplicate include
  x86/mm: Declare 'start' variable where it is used
  x86/head/64: Remove unused GET_CR2_INTO() macro
  x86/boot: Remove unused finalize_identity_maps()
  x86/uaccess: Document copy_from_user_nmi()
  x86/dumpstack: Make show_trace_log_lvl() static
  x86/mtrr: Fix a kernel-doc markup
  x86/setup: Remove unused MCA variables
  x86, libnvdimm/test: Remove COPY_MC_TEST
  x86: Reclaim TIF_IA32 and TIF_X32
  x86/mm: Convert mmu context ia32_compat into a proper flags field
  x86/elf: Use e_machine to check for x32/ia32 in setup_additional_pages()
  elf: Expose ELF header on arch_setup_additional_pages()
  x86/elf: Use e_machine to select start_thread for x32
  elf: Expose ELF header in compat_start_thread()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack: Do not try to access user space code of other tasks</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T11:56:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-17T20:23:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=860aaabac8235cfde10fe556aa82abbbe3117888'/>
<id>860aaabac8235cfde10fe556aa82abbbe3117888</id>
<content type='text'>
sysrq-t ends up invoking show_opcodes() for each task which tries to access
the user space code of other processes, which is obviously bogus.

It either manages to dump where the foreign task's regs-&gt;ip points to in a
valid mapping of the current task or triggers a pagefault and prints "Code:
Bad RIP value.". Both is just wrong.

Add a safeguard in copy_code() and check whether the @regs pointer matches
currents pt_regs. If not, do not even try to access it.

While at it, add commentary why using copy_from_user_nmi() is safe in
copy_code() even if the function name suggests otherwise.

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117202753.667274723@linutronix.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
sysrq-t ends up invoking show_opcodes() for each task which tries to access
the user space code of other processes, which is obviously bogus.

It either manages to dump where the foreign task's regs-&gt;ip points to in a
valid mapping of the current task or triggers a pagefault and prints "Code:
Bad RIP value.". Both is just wrong.

Add a safeguard in copy_code() and check whether the @regs pointer matches
currents pt_regs. If not, do not even try to access it.

While at it, add commentary why using copy_from_user_nmi() is safe in
copy_code() even if the function name suggests otherwise.

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117202753.667274723@linutronix.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack: Make show_trace_log_lvl() static</title>
<updated>2020-11-17T18:05:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hui Su</name>
<email>sh_def@163.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-13T13:39:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=09a217c10504bcaef911cf2af74e424338efe629'/>
<id>09a217c10504bcaef911cf2af74e424338efe629</id>
<content type='text'>
show_trace_log_lvl() is not used by other compilation units so make it
static and remove the declaration from the header file.

Signed-off-by: Hui Su &lt;sh_def@163.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113133943.GA136221@rlk
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
show_trace_log_lvl() is not used by other compilation units so make it
static and remove the declaration from the header file.

Signed-off-by: Hui Su &lt;sh_def@163.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113133943.GA136221@rlk
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2020-10-14T17:21:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-14T17:21:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=da9803dfd3955bd2f9909d55e23f188ad76dbe58'/>
<id>da9803dfd3955bd2f9909d55e23f188ad76dbe58</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
 "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
  by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
  inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
  switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
  exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.

  With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
  hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
  mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
  Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
  Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
  between the guest and the hypervisor.

  Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
  so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
  code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
  brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
  boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
  building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
  not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
  one.

  The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
  mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
  from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
  SEV-ES-specific files:

    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c

  Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
  behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
  setups.

  Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"

* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
  x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
  x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
  x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
  x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
  x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
  x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
  x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
  x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
  x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
  x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
  x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
 "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
  by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
  inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
  switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
  exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.

  With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
  hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
  mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
  Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
  Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
  between the guest and the hypervisor.

  Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
  so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
  code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
  brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
  boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
  building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
  not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
  one.

  The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
  mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
  from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
  SEV-ES-specific files:

    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c

  Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
  behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
  setups.

  Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"

* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
  x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
  x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
  x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
  x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
  x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
  x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
  x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
  x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
  x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
  x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
  x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack: Fix misleading instruction pointer error message</title>
<updated>2020-10-02T09:33:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Mossberg</name>
<email>mark.mossberg@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-02T04:29:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=238c91115cd05c71447ea071624a4c9fe661f970'/>
<id>238c91115cd05c71447ea071624a4c9fe661f970</id>
<content type='text'>
Printing "Bad RIP value" if copy_code() fails can be misleading for
userspace pointers, since copy_code() can fail if the instruction
pointer is valid but the code is paged out. This is because copy_code()
calls copy_from_user_nmi() for userspace pointers, which disables page
fault handling.

This is reproducible in OOM situations, where it's plausible that the
code may be reclaimed in the time between entry into the kernel and when
this message is printed. This leaves a misleading log in dmesg that
suggests instruction pointer corruption has occurred, which may alarm
users.

Change the message to state the error condition more precisely.

 [ bp: Massage a bit. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Mossberg &lt;mark.mossberg@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201002042915.403558-1-mark.mossberg@gmail.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Printing "Bad RIP value" if copy_code() fails can be misleading for
userspace pointers, since copy_code() can fail if the instruction
pointer is valid but the code is paged out. This is because copy_code()
calls copy_from_user_nmi() for userspace pointers, which disables page
fault handling.

This is reproducible in OOM situations, where it's plausible that the
code may be reclaimed in the time between entry into the kernel and when
this message is printed. This leaves a misleading log in dmesg that
suggests instruction pointer corruption has occurred, which may alarm
users.

Change the message to state the error condition more precisely.

 [ bp: Massage a bit. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Mossberg &lt;mark.mossberg@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201002042915.403558-1-mark.mossberg@gmail.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack/64: Add noinstr version of get_stack_info()</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T09:33:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joerg Roedel</name>
<email>jroedel@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T13:15:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6b27edd74a5e9669120f7bd0ae1f475d124c1042'/>
<id>6b27edd74a5e9669120f7bd0ae1f475d124c1042</id>
<content type='text'>
The get_stack_info() functionality is needed in the entry code for the
#VC exception handler. Provide a version of it in the .text.noinstr
section which can be called safely from there.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-45-joro@8bytes.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The get_stack_info() functionality is needed in the entry code for the
#VC exception handler. Provide a version of it in the .text.noinstr
section which can be called safely from there.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-45-joro@8bytes.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86-core-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2020-08-04T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-04T00:00:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4ee48103151bbce7ae319b477109eba4216b20d2'/>
<id>4ee48103151bbce7ae319b477109eba4216b20d2</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 debug fixlets from Ingo Molnar:
 "Improve x86 debuggability: print registers with the same log level as
  the backtrace"

* tag 'x86-core-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/dumpstack: Show registers dump with trace's log level
  x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to __show_regs()
  x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to show_iret_regs()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 debug fixlets from Ingo Molnar:
 "Improve x86 debuggability: print registers with the same log level as
  the backtrace"

* tag 'x86-core-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/dumpstack: Show registers dump with trace's log level
  x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to __show_regs()
  x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to show_iret_regs()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
