<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c, branch v5.10</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack: Do not try to access user space code of other tasks</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T11:56:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-17T20:23:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=860aaabac8235cfde10fe556aa82abbbe3117888'/>
<id>860aaabac8235cfde10fe556aa82abbbe3117888</id>
<content type='text'>
sysrq-t ends up invoking show_opcodes() for each task which tries to access
the user space code of other processes, which is obviously bogus.

It either manages to dump where the foreign task's regs-&gt;ip points to in a
valid mapping of the current task or triggers a pagefault and prints "Code:
Bad RIP value.". Both is just wrong.

Add a safeguard in copy_code() and check whether the @regs pointer matches
currents pt_regs. If not, do not even try to access it.

While at it, add commentary why using copy_from_user_nmi() is safe in
copy_code() even if the function name suggests otherwise.

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117202753.667274723@linutronix.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
sysrq-t ends up invoking show_opcodes() for each task which tries to access
the user space code of other processes, which is obviously bogus.

It either manages to dump where the foreign task's regs-&gt;ip points to in a
valid mapping of the current task or triggers a pagefault and prints "Code:
Bad RIP value.". Both is just wrong.

Add a safeguard in copy_code() and check whether the @regs pointer matches
currents pt_regs. If not, do not even try to access it.

While at it, add commentary why using copy_from_user_nmi() is safe in
copy_code() even if the function name suggests otherwise.

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117202753.667274723@linutronix.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2020-10-14T17:21:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-14T17:21:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=da9803dfd3955bd2f9909d55e23f188ad76dbe58'/>
<id>da9803dfd3955bd2f9909d55e23f188ad76dbe58</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
 "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
  by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
  inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
  switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
  exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.

  With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
  hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
  mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
  Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
  Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
  between the guest and the hypervisor.

  Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
  so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
  code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
  brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
  boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
  building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
  not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
  one.

  The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
  mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
  from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
  SEV-ES-specific files:

    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c

  Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
  behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
  setups.

  Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"

* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
  x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
  x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
  x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
  x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
  x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
  x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
  x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
  x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
  x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
  x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
  x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
 "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
  by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
  inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
  switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
  exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.

  With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
  hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
  mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
  Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
  Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
  between the guest and the hypervisor.

  Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
  so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
  code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
  brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
  boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
  building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
  not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
  one.

  The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
  mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
  from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
  SEV-ES-specific files:

    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c

  Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
  behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
  setups.

  Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"

* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
  x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
  x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
  x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
  x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
  x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
  x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
  x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
  x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
  x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
  x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
  x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack: Fix misleading instruction pointer error message</title>
<updated>2020-10-02T09:33:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Mossberg</name>
<email>mark.mossberg@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-02T04:29:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=238c91115cd05c71447ea071624a4c9fe661f970'/>
<id>238c91115cd05c71447ea071624a4c9fe661f970</id>
<content type='text'>
Printing "Bad RIP value" if copy_code() fails can be misleading for
userspace pointers, since copy_code() can fail if the instruction
pointer is valid but the code is paged out. This is because copy_code()
calls copy_from_user_nmi() for userspace pointers, which disables page
fault handling.

This is reproducible in OOM situations, where it's plausible that the
code may be reclaimed in the time between entry into the kernel and when
this message is printed. This leaves a misleading log in dmesg that
suggests instruction pointer corruption has occurred, which may alarm
users.

Change the message to state the error condition more precisely.

 [ bp: Massage a bit. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Mossberg &lt;mark.mossberg@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201002042915.403558-1-mark.mossberg@gmail.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Printing "Bad RIP value" if copy_code() fails can be misleading for
userspace pointers, since copy_code() can fail if the instruction
pointer is valid but the code is paged out. This is because copy_code()
calls copy_from_user_nmi() for userspace pointers, which disables page
fault handling.

This is reproducible in OOM situations, where it's plausible that the
code may be reclaimed in the time between entry into the kernel and when
this message is printed. This leaves a misleading log in dmesg that
suggests instruction pointer corruption has occurred, which may alarm
users.

Change the message to state the error condition more precisely.

 [ bp: Massage a bit. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Mossberg &lt;mark.mossberg@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201002042915.403558-1-mark.mossberg@gmail.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack/64: Add noinstr version of get_stack_info()</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T09:33:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joerg Roedel</name>
<email>jroedel@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T13:15:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6b27edd74a5e9669120f7bd0ae1f475d124c1042'/>
<id>6b27edd74a5e9669120f7bd0ae1f475d124c1042</id>
<content type='text'>
The get_stack_info() functionality is needed in the entry code for the
#VC exception handler. Provide a version of it in the .text.noinstr
section which can be called safely from there.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-45-joro@8bytes.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The get_stack_info() functionality is needed in the entry code for the
#VC exception handler. Provide a version of it in the .text.noinstr
section which can be called safely from there.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-45-joro@8bytes.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86-core-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2020-08-04T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-04T00:00:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4ee48103151bbce7ae319b477109eba4216b20d2'/>
<id>4ee48103151bbce7ae319b477109eba4216b20d2</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 debug fixlets from Ingo Molnar:
 "Improve x86 debuggability: print registers with the same log level as
  the backtrace"

* tag 'x86-core-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/dumpstack: Show registers dump with trace's log level
  x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to __show_regs()
  x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to show_iret_regs()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 debug fixlets from Ingo Molnar:
 "Improve x86 debuggability: print registers with the same log level as
  the backtrace"

* tag 'x86-core-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/dumpstack: Show registers dump with trace's log level
  x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to __show_regs()
  x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to show_iret_regs()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack: Show registers dump with trace's log level</title>
<updated>2020-07-22T21:56:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Safonov</name>
<email>dima@arista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-29T14:48:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ef2ff0f5d6008d325c9a068e20981c0d0acc4d6b'/>
<id>ef2ff0f5d6008d325c9a068e20981c0d0acc4d6b</id>
<content type='text'>
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind
backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are
not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always
used.

Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only
urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything
else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently
slow (9600 bps).

Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as
morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED
(which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1])
the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping
functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces
with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with
higher log level).

After all preparations are done, provide log_lvl parameter for
show_regs_if_on_stack() and wire up to actual log level used as
an argument for show_trace_log_lvl().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-4-dima@arista.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind
backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are
not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always
used.

Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only
urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything
else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently
slow (9600 bps).

Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as
morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED
(which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1])
the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping
functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces
with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with
higher log level).

After all preparations are done, provide log_lvl parameter for
show_regs_if_on_stack() and wire up to actual log level used as
an argument for show_trace_log_lvl().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-4-dima@arista.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to __show_regs()</title>
<updated>2020-07-22T21:56:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Safonov</name>
<email>dima@arista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-29T14:48:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=44e215352cf17333992d56941b5bf4af60a67609'/>
<id>44e215352cf17333992d56941b5bf4af60a67609</id>
<content type='text'>
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind
backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are
not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always
used.

Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only
urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything
else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently
slow (9600 bps).

Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as
morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED
(which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1])
the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping
functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces
with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with
higher log level).

Add log_lvl parameter to __show_regs().
Keep the used log level intact to separate visible change.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-3-dima@arista.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind
backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are
not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always
used.

Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only
urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything
else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently
slow (9600 bps).

Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as
morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED
(which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1])
the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping
functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces
with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with
higher log level).

Add log_lvl parameter to __show_regs().
Keep the used log level intact to separate visible change.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-3-dima@arista.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack: Add log_lvl to show_iret_regs()</title>
<updated>2020-07-22T21:56:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Safonov</name>
<email>dima@arista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-29T14:48:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=fd07f802a70935fbbfb9cc2d11e1d8ac95f28e44'/>
<id>fd07f802a70935fbbfb9cc2d11e1d8ac95f28e44</id>
<content type='text'>
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind
backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are
not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always
used.

Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only
urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything
else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently
slow (9600 bps).

Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as
morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED
(which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1])
the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping
functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces
with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with
higher log level).

Add log_lvl parameter to show_iret_regs() as a preparation to add it
to __show_regs() and show_regs_if_on_stack().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-2-dima@arista.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
show_trace_log_lvl() provides x86 platform-specific way to unwind
backtrace with a given log level. Unfortunately, registers dump(s) are
not printed with the same log level - instead, KERN_DEFAULT is always
used.

Arista's switches uses quite common setup with rsyslog, where only
urgent messages goes to console (console_log_level=KERN_ERR), everything
else goes into /var/log/ as the console baud-rate often is indecently
slow (9600 bps).

Backtrace dumps without registers printed have proven to be as useful as
morning standups. Furthermore, in order to introduce KERN_UNSUPPRESSED
(which I believe is still the most elegant way to fix raciness of sysrq[1])
the log level should be passed down the stack to register dumping
functions. Besides, there is a potential use-case for printing traces
with KERN_DEBUG level [2] (where registers dump shouldn't appear with
higher log level).

Add log_lvl parameter to show_iret_regs() as a preparation to add it
to __show_regs() and show_regs_if_on_stack().

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20190724170249.9644-1-dima@arista.com/

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629144847.492794-2-dima@arista.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/dumpstack: Dump user space code correctly again</title>
<updated>2020-07-22T21:47:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-22T08:39:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d181d2da0141371bbc360eaea78719203e165e1c'/>
<id>d181d2da0141371bbc360eaea78719203e165e1c</id>
<content type='text'>
H.J. reported that post 5.7 a segfault of a user space task does not longer
dump the Code bytes when /proc/sys/debug/exception-trace is enabled. It
prints 'Code: Bad RIP value.' instead.

This was broken by a recent change which made probe_kernel_read() reject
non-kernel addresses.

Update show_opcodes() so it retrieves user space opcodes via
copy_from_user_nmi().

Fixes: 98a23609b103 ("maccess: always use strict semantics for probe_kernel_read")
Reported-by: H.J. Lu &lt;hjl.tools@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87h7tz306w.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de

</content>
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<pre>
H.J. reported that post 5.7 a segfault of a user space task does not longer
dump the Code bytes when /proc/sys/debug/exception-trace is enabled. It
prints 'Code: Bad RIP value.' instead.

This was broken by a recent change which made probe_kernel_read() reject
non-kernel addresses.

Update show_opcodes() so it retrieves user space opcodes via
copy_from_user_nmi().

Fixes: 98a23609b103 ("maccess: always use strict semantics for probe_kernel_read")
Reported-by: H.J. Lu &lt;hjl.tools@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87h7tz306w.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>maccess: rename probe_kernel_{read,write} to copy_{from,to}_kernel_nofault</title>
<updated>2020-06-17T17:57:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-17T07:37:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=fe557319aa06c23cffc9346000f119547e0f289a'/>
<id>fe557319aa06c23cffc9346000f119547e0f289a</id>
<content type='text'>
Better describe what these functions do.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Better describe what these functions do.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
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