linux.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c, branch v4.16

x86/speculation: Remove Skylake C2 from Speculation Control microcode blacklist

2018-03-16T11:33:11+00:00

In accordance with Intel's microcode revision guidance from March 6 MCU
rev 0xc2 is cleared on both Skylake H/S and Skylake Xeon E3 processors
that share CPUID 506E3.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Sergeyev 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Jia Zhang 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Kyle Huey 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180313193856.GA8580@localhost.localdomain

x86/spectre_v2: Don't check microcode versions when running under hypervisors

2018-03-08T09:13:02+00:00

As:

 1) It's known that hypervisors lie about the environment anyhow (host
    mismatch)
 
 2) Even if the hypervisor (Xen, KVM, VMWare, etc) provided a valid
    "correct" value, it all gets to be very murky when migration happens
    (do you provide the "new" microcode of the machine?).

And in reality the cloud vendors are the ones that should make sure that
the microcode that is running is correct and we should just sing lalalala
and trust them.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Cc: Wanpeng Li 
Cc: kvm 
Cc: Krčmář 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
CC: "H. Peter Anvin" 
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180226213019.GE9497@char.us.oracle.com

x86/cpu: Rename cpu_data.x86_mask to cpu_data.x86_stepping

2018-02-15T00:15:52+00:00

x86_mask is a confusing name which is hard to associate with the
processor's stepping.

Additionally, correct an indent issue in lib/cpu.c.

Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang 
[ Updated it to more recent kernels. ]
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514771530-70829-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again

2018-02-13T07:58:59+00:00

Arjan points out that the Intel document only clears the 0xc2 microcode
on *some* parts with CPUID 506E3 (INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP stepping 3).
For the Skylake H/S platform it's OK but for Skylake E3 which has the
same CPUID it isn't (yet) cleared.

So removing it from the blacklist was premature. Put it back for now.

Also, Arjan assures me that the 0x84 microcode for Kaby Lake which was
featured in one of the early revisions of the Intel document was never
released to the public, and won't be until/unless it is also validated
as safe. So those can change to 0x80 which is what all *other* versions
of the doc have identified.

Once the retrospective testing of existing public microcodes is done, we
should be back into a mode where new microcodes are only released in
batches and we shouldn't even need to update the blacklist for those
anyway, so this tweaking of the list isn't expected to be a thing which
keeps happening.

Requested-by: Arjan van de Ven 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Arjan van de Ven 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Dan Williams 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518449255-2182-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/speculation: Update Speculation Control microcode blacklist

2018-02-11T10:24:15+00:00

Intel have retroactively blessed the 0xc2 microcode on Skylake mobile
and desktop parts, and the Gemini Lake 0x22 microcode is apparently fine
too. We blacklisted the latter purely because it was present with all
the other problematic ones in the 2018-01-08 release, but now it's
explicitly listed as OK.

We still list 0x84 for the various Kaby Lake / Coffee Lake parts, as
that appeared in one version of the blacklist and then reverted to
0x80 again. We can change it if 0x84 is actually announced to be safe.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Arjan van de Ven 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Dan Williams 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com
Cc: jmattson@google.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com
Cc: sironi@amazon.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518305967-31356-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel

2018-01-30T21:35:05+00:00

Despite the fact that all the other code there seems to be doing it, just
using set_cpu_cap() in early_intel_init() doesn't actually work.

For CPUs with PKU support, setup_pku() calls get_cpu_cap() after
c->c_init() has set those feature bits. That resets those bits back to what
was queried from the hardware.

Turning the bits off for bad microcode is easy to fix. That can just use
setup_clear_cpu_cap() to force them off for all CPUs.

I was less keen on forcing the feature bits *on* that way, just in case
of inconsistencies. I appreciate that the kernel is going to get this
utterly wrong if CPU features are not consistent, because it has already
applied alternatives by the time secondary CPUs are brought up.

But at least if setup_force_cpu_cap() isn't being used, we might have a
chance of *detecting* the lack of the corresponding bit and either
panicking or refusing to bring the offending CPU online.

So ensure that the appropriate feature bits are set within get_cpu_cap()
regardless of how many extra times it's called.

Fixes: 2961298e ("x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517322623-15261-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

Merge tag 'v4.15' into x86/pti, to be able to merge dependent changes

2018-01-30T14:08:27+00:00

Time has come to switch PTI development over to a v4.15 base - we'll still
try to make sure that all PTI fixes backport cleanly to v4.14 and earlier.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags

2018-01-27T18:10:44+00:00

We want to expose the hardware features simply in /proc/cpuinfo as "ibrs",
"ibpb" and "stibp". Since AMD has separate CPUID bits for those, use them
as the user-visible bits.

When the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit is set which indicates both IBRS and IBPB
capability, set those (AMD) bits accordingly. Likewise if the Intel STIBP
bit is set, set the AMD STIBP that's used for the generic hardware
capability.

Hide the rest from /proc/cpuinfo by putting "" in the comments. Including
RETPOLINE and RETPOLINE_AMD which shouldn't be visible there. There are
patches to make the sysfs vulnerabilities information non-readable by
non-root, and the same should apply to all information about which
mitigations are actually in use. Those *shouldn't* appear in /proc/cpuinfo.

The feature bit for whether IBPB is actually used, which is needed for
ALTERNATIVEs, is renamed to X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB.

Originally-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes

2018-01-26T14:53:18+00:00

This doesn't refuse to load the affected microcodes; it just refuses to
use the Spectre v2 mitigation features if they're detected, by clearing
the appropriate feature bits.

The AMD CPUID bits are handled here too, because hypervisors *may* have
been exposing those bits even on Intel chips, for fine-grained control
of what's available.

It is non-trivial to use x86_match_cpu() for this table because that
doesn't handle steppings. And the approach taken in commit bd9240a18
almost made me lose my lunch.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk

kmemcheck: rip it out

2017-11-16T02:21:05+00:00

Fix up makefiles, remove references, and git rm kmemcheck.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-4-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Cc: Steven Rostedt 
Cc: Vegard Nossum 
Cc: Pekka Enberg 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: Alexander Potapenko 
Cc: Tim Hansen 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds