Pull x86/gds fixes from Dave Hansen:
 "Mitigate Gather Data Sampling issue:

   - Add Base GDS mitigation

   - Support GDS_NO under KVM

   - Fix a documentation typo"

* tag 'gds-for-linus-2023-08-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  Documentation/x86: Fix backwards on/off logic about YMM support
  KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM
  x86/speculation: Add Kconfig option for GDS
  x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation
  x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation

Pull x86/srso fixes from Borislav Petkov:
 "Add a mitigation for the speculative RAS (Return Address Stack)
  overflow vulnerability on AMD processors.

  In short, this is yet another issue where userspace poisons a
  microarchitectural structure which can then be used to leak privileged
  information through a side channel"

* tag 'x86_bugs_srso' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/srso: Tie SBPB bit setting to microcode patch detection
  x86/srso: Add a forgotten NOENDBR annotation
  x86/srso: Fix return thunks in generated code
  x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT
  x86/srso: Add IBPB
  x86/srso: Add SRSO_NO support
  x86/srso: Add IBPB_BRTYPE support
  x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation
  x86/bugs: Increase the x86 bugs vector size to two u32s

Add support for the CPUID flag which denotes that the CPU is not
affected by SRSO.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>

Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.

The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence.  To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.

To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference.  In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.

In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.

Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.

This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.

Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.

The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:

    /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

Add a fix for the Zen2 VZEROUPPER data corruption bug where under
certain circumstances executing VZEROUPPER can cause register
corruption or leak data.

The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper
microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix using
a chicken bit.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>

Pull x86 cpu updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Compute the purposeful misalignment of zen_untrain_ret automatically
   and assert __x86_return_thunk's alignment so that future changes to
   the symbol macros do not accidentally break them.

 - Remove CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES Kconfig option as its existence is
   pointless

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/retbleed: Add __x86_return_thunk alignment checks
  x86/cpu: Remove X86_FEATURE_NAMES
  x86/Kconfig: Make X86_FEATURE_NAMES non-configurable in prompt

Pull SMP updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A large update for SMP management:

   - Parallel CPU bringup

     The reason why people are interested in parallel bringup is to
     shorten the (kexec) reboot time of cloud servers to reduce the
     downtime of the VM tenants.

     The current fully serialized bringup does the following per AP:

       1) Prepare callbacks (allocate, intialize, create threads)
       2) Kick the AP alive (e.g. INIT/SIPI on x86)
       3) Wait for the AP to report alive state
       4) Let the AP continue through the atomic bringup
       5) Let the AP run the threaded bringup to full online state

     There are two significant delays:

       #3 The time for an AP to report alive state in start_secondary()
          on x86 has been measured in the range between 350us and 3.5ms
          depending on vendor and CPU type, BIOS microcode size etc.

       #4 The atomic bringup does the microcode update. This has been
          measured to take up to ~8ms on the primary threads depending
          on the microcode patch size to apply.

     On a two socket SKL server with 56 cores (112 threads) the boot CPU
     spends on current mainline about 800ms busy waiting for the APs to
     come up and apply microcode. That's more than 80% of the actual
     onlining procedure.

     This can be reduced significantly by splitting the bringup
     mechanism into two parts:

       1) Run the prepare callbacks and kick the AP alive for each AP
          which needs to be brought up.

          The APs wake up, do their firmware initialization and run the
          low level kernel startup code including microcode loading in
          parallel up to the first synchronization point. (#1 and #2
          above)

       2) Run the rest of the bringup code strictly serialized per CPU
          (#3 - #5 above) as it's done today.

          Parallelizing that stage of the CPU bringup might be possible
          in theory, but it's questionable whether required surgery
          would be justified for a pretty small gain.

     If the system is large enough the first AP is already waiting at
     the first synchronization point when the boot CPU finished the
     wake-up of the last AP. That reduces the AP bringup time on that
     SKL from ~800ms to ~80ms, i.e. by a factor ~10x.

     The actual gain varies wildly depending on the system, CPU,
     microcode patch size and other factors. There are some
     opportunities to reduce the overhead further, but that needs some
     deep surgery in the x86 CPU bringup code.

     For now this is only enabled on x86, but the core functionality
     obviously works for all SMP capable architectures.

   - Enhancements for SMP function call tracing so it is possible to
     locate the scheduling and the actual execution points. That allows
     to measure IPI delivery time precisely"

* tag 'smp-core-2023-06-26' of ssh://gitolite.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (45 commits)
  trace,smp: Add tracepoints for scheduling remotelly called functions
  trace,smp: Add tracepoints around remotelly called functions
  MAINTAINERS: Add CPU HOTPLUG entry
  x86/smpboot: Fix the parallel bringup decision
  x86/realmode: Make stack lock work in trampoline_compat()
  x86/smp: Initialize cpu_primary_thread_mask late
  cpu/hotplug: Fix off by one in cpuhp_bringup_mask()
  x86/apic: Fix use of X{,2}APIC_ENABLE in asm with older binutils
  x86/smpboot/64: Implement arch_cpuhp_init_parallel_bringup() and enable it
  x86/smpboot: Support parallel startup of secondary CPUs
  x86/smpboot: Implement a bit spinlock to protect the realmode stack
  x86/apic: Save the APIC virtual base address
  cpu/hotplug: Allow "parallel" bringup up to CPUHP_BP_KICK_AP_STATE
  x86/apic: Provide cpu_primary_thread mask
  x86/smpboot: Enable split CPU startup
  cpu/hotplug: Provide a split up CPUHP_BRINGUP mechanism
  cpu/hotplug: Reset task stack state in _cpu_up()
  cpu/hotplug: Remove unused state functions
  riscv: Switch to hotplug core state synchronization
  parisc: Switch to hotplug core state synchronization
  ...

Initializing the FPU during the early boot process is a pointless
exercise. Early boot is convoluted and fragile enough.

Nothing requires that the FPU is set up early. It has to be initialized
before fork_init() because the task_struct size depends on the FPU register
buffer size.

Move the initialization to arch_cpu_finalize_init() which is the perfect
place to do so.

No functional change.

This allows to remove quite some of the custom early command line parsing,
but that's subject to the next installment.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.902376621@linutronix.de

Nothing in the call chain requires it

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.783704297@linutronix.de