linux.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c, branch v5.19

x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list

2022-07-07T10:33:53+00:00

Cannon lake is also affected by RETBleed, add it to the list.

Fixes: 6ad0ad2bf8a6 ("x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov

x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO

2022-06-27T08:34:01+00:00

BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion.

Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC.

Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate
given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics.

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov

x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness

2022-06-27T08:34:01+00:00

The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get
rid of all that and simply use ANY.

If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had
better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Acked-by: Dave Hansen 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov

x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability

2022-06-27T08:33:59+00:00

Skylake suffers from RSB underflow speculation issues; report this
vulnerability and it's mitigation (spectre_v2=ibrs).

  [jpoimboe: cleanups, eibrs]

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

2022-06-27T08:33:59+00:00

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

  [peterz: add hygon]
  [kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips 
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips 
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov

Merge tag 'x86-bugs-2022-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2022-06-14T14:43:15+00:00

Pull x86 MMIO stale data fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Yet another hw vulnerability with a software mitigation: Processor
  MMIO Stale Data.

  They are a class of MMIO-related weaknesses which can expose stale
  data by propagating it into core fill buffers. Data which can then be
  leaked using the usual speculative execution methods.

  Mitigations include this set along with microcode updates and are
  similar to MDS and TAA vulnerabilities: VERW now clears those buffers
  too"

* tag 'x86-bugs-2022-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warning
  KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests
  x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS
  x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection
  x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data
  x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle
  x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations
  x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data
  x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation update
  x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug
  Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data

x86/microcode: Default-disable late loading

2022-05-31T07:31:19+00:00

It is dangerous and it should not be used anyway - there's a nice early
loading already.

Requested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220525161232.14924-3-bp@alien8.de

Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2022-05-24T01:01:31+00:00

Pull x86 CPU feature updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Remove a bunch of chicken bit options to turn off CPU features which
   are not really needed anymore

 - Misc fixes and cleanups

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/speculation: Add missing prototype for unpriv_ebpf_notify()
  x86/pm: Fix false positive kmemleak report in msr_build_context()
  x86/speculation/srbds: Do not try to turn mitigation off when not supported
  x86/cpu: Remove "noclflush"
  x86/cpu: Remove "noexec"
  x86/cpu: Remove "nosmep"
  x86/cpu: Remove CONFIG_X86_SMAP and "nosmap"
  x86/cpu: Remove "nosep"
  x86/cpu: Allow feature bit names from /proc/cpuinfo in clearcpuid=

Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2022-05-24T00:38:01+00:00

Pull AMD SEV-SNP support from Borislav Petkov:
 "The third AMD confidential computing feature called Secure Nested
  Paging.

  Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection
  against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory
  remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the
  hypervisor.

  At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse
  map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get
  assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets
  accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an
  appropriate action.

  In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a
  SNP guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch.

  And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the
  previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and
  not just bolted on"

* tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits)
  x86/entry: Fixup objtool/ibt validation
  x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap
  x86/sev: Annotate stack change in the #VC handler
  x86/sev: Remove duplicated assignment to variable info
  x86/sev: Fix address space sparse warning
  x86/sev: Get the AP jump table address from secrets page
  x86/sev: Add missing __init annotations to SEV init routines
  virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guest
  virt: sevguest: Change driver name to reflect generic SEV support
  x86/boot: Put globals that are accessed early into the .data section
  x86/boot: Add an efi.h header for the decompressor
  virt: sevguest: Fix bool function returning negative value
  virt: sevguest: Fix return value check in alloc_shared_pages()
  x86/sev-es: Replace open-coded hlt-loop with sev_es_terminate()
  virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
  virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
  virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
  virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
  x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
  x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
  ...

x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS

2022-05-21T10:37:25+00:00

The Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) variant of Processor MMIO Stale
Data vulnerabilities may expose RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY data.
Mitigation for this is added by a microcode update.

As some of the implications of SBDS are similar to SRBDS, SRBDS mitigation
infrastructure can be leveraged by SBDS. Set X86_BUG_SRBDS and use SRBDS
mitigation.

Mitigation is enabled by default; use srbds=off to opt-out. Mitigation
status can be checked from below file:

  /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov