<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c, branch v4.18</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm: Fix 'no5lvl' handling</title>
<updated>2018-06-23T12:20:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-22T22:08:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2458e53ff74cd1063ed3e00459da1d35c559d369'/>
<id>2458e53ff74cd1063ed3e00459da1d35c559d369</id>
<content type='text'>
early_identify_cpu() has to use early version of pgtable_l5_enabled()
that doesn't rely on cpu_feature_enabled().

Defining USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 before all includes does the trick.

I lost the define in one of reworks of the original patch.

Fixes: 372fddf70904 ("x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameter")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180622220841.54135-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
early_identify_cpu() has to use early version of pgtable_l5_enabled()
that doesn't rely on cpu_feature_enabled().

Defining USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 before all includes does the trick.

I lost the define in one of reworks of the original patch.

Fixes: 372fddf70904 ("x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameter")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180622220841.54135-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables</title>
<updated>2018-06-14T03:21:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-14T03:21:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=050e9baa9dc9fbd9ce2b27f0056990fc9e0a08a0'/>
<id>050e9baa9dc9fbd9ce2b27f0056990fc9e0a08a0</id>
<content type='text'>
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.

That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.

HOWEVER.

It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like

  CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
  CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y

and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:

  CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
  CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y

That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.

The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one.  This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).

This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:

  CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
  CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y

where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.

Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.

That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.

HOWEVER.

It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like

  CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
  CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y

and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:

  CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
  CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y

That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.

The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one.  This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).

This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:

  CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
  CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y

where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.

Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage</title>
<updated>2018-06-06T12:13:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-01T14:59:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6ac2f49edb1ef5446089c7c660017732886d62d6'/>
<id>6ac2f49edb1ef5446089c7c660017732886d62d6</id>
<content type='text'>
The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
mentions that if CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[24] is set we should be using
the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48) over the VIRT SPEC_CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f)
for speculative store bypass disable.

This in effect means we should clear the X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD
flag so that we would prefer the SPEC_CTRL MSR.

See the document titled:
   124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf

A copy of this document is available at
   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan &lt;Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com&gt;
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed &lt;karahmed@amazon.de&gt;
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Joerg Roedel &lt;joro@8bytes.org&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-3-konrad.wilk@oracle.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
mentions that if CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[24] is set we should be using
the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48) over the VIRT SPEC_CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f)
for speculative store bypass disable.

This in effect means we should clear the X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD
flag so that we would prefer the SPEC_CTRL MSR.

See the document titled:
   124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf

A copy of this document is available at
   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan &lt;Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com&gt;
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed &lt;karahmed@amazon.de&gt;
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Joerg Roedel &lt;joro@8bytes.org&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-3-konrad.wilk@oracle.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Add AMD's variant of SSB_NO</title>
<updated>2018-06-06T12:13:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-01T14:59:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=24809860012e0130fbafe536709e08a22b3e959e'/>
<id>24809860012e0130fbafe536709e08a22b3e959e</id>
<content type='text'>
The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
mentions that the CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[26] will mean that the
speculative store bypass disable is no longer needed.

A copy of this document is available at:
    https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan &lt;Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com&gt;
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-2-konrad.wilk@oracle.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
mentions that the CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[26] will mean that the
speculative store bypass disable is no longer needed.

A copy of this document is available at:
    https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan &lt;Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com&gt;
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-2-konrad.wilk@oracle.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2018-06-05T01:19:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-05T01:19:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5cef8c2a2289117b7f65de4313b7157578ec1a71'/>
<id>5cef8c2a2289117b7f65de4313b7157578ec1a71</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar:

 - Centaur CPU updates (David Wang)

 - AMD and other CPU topology enumeration improvements and fixes
   (Borislav Petkov, Thomas Gleixner, Suravee Suthikulpanit)

 - Continued 5-level paging work (Kirill A. Shutemov)

* 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mm: Mark __pgtable_l5_enabled __initdata
  x86/mm: Mark p4d_offset() __always_inline
  x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameter
  x86/mm: Stop pretending pgtable_l5_enabled is a variable
  x86/mm: Unify pgtable_l5_enabled usage in early boot code
  x86/boot/compressed/64: Fix trampoline page table address calculation
  x86/CPU: Move x86_cpuinfo::x86_max_cores assignment to detect_num_cpu_cores()
  x86/Centaur: Report correct CPU/cache topology
  x86/CPU: Move cpu_detect_cache_sizes() into init_intel_cacheinfo()
  x86/CPU: Make intel_num_cpu_cores() generic
  x86/CPU: Move cpu local function declarations to local header
  x86/CPU/AMD: Derive CPU topology from CPUID function 0xB when available
  x86/CPU: Modify detect_extended_topology() to return result
  x86/CPU/AMD: Calculate last level cache ID from number of sharing threads
  x86/CPU: Rename intel_cacheinfo.c to cacheinfo.c
  perf/events/amd/uncore: Fix amd_uncore_llc ID to use pre-defined cpu_llc_id
  x86/CPU/AMD: Have smp_num_siblings and cpu_llc_id always be present
  x86/Centaur: Initialize supported CPU features properly
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar:

 - Centaur CPU updates (David Wang)

 - AMD and other CPU topology enumeration improvements and fixes
   (Borislav Petkov, Thomas Gleixner, Suravee Suthikulpanit)

 - Continued 5-level paging work (Kirill A. Shutemov)

* 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mm: Mark __pgtable_l5_enabled __initdata
  x86/mm: Mark p4d_offset() __always_inline
  x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameter
  x86/mm: Stop pretending pgtable_l5_enabled is a variable
  x86/mm: Unify pgtable_l5_enabled usage in early boot code
  x86/boot/compressed/64: Fix trampoline page table address calculation
  x86/CPU: Move x86_cpuinfo::x86_max_cores assignment to detect_num_cpu_cores()
  x86/Centaur: Report correct CPU/cache topology
  x86/CPU: Move cpu_detect_cache_sizes() into init_intel_cacheinfo()
  x86/CPU: Make intel_num_cpu_cores() generic
  x86/CPU: Move cpu local function declarations to local header
  x86/CPU/AMD: Derive CPU topology from CPUID function 0xB when available
  x86/CPU: Modify detect_extended_topology() to return result
  x86/CPU/AMD: Calculate last level cache ID from number of sharing threads
  x86/CPU: Rename intel_cacheinfo.c to cacheinfo.c
  perf/events/amd/uncore: Fix amd_uncore_llc ID to use pre-defined cpu_llc_id
  x86/CPU/AMD: Have smp_num_siblings and cpu_llc_id always be present
  x86/Centaur: Initialize supported CPU features properly
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Simplify the CPU bug detection logic</title>
<updated>2018-05-23T08:55:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dominik Brodowski</name>
<email>linux@dominikbrodowski.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-22T09:05:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8ecc4979b1bd9c94168e6fc92960033b7a951336'/>
<id>8ecc4979b1bd9c94168e6fc92960033b7a951336</id>
<content type='text'>
Only CPUs which speculate can speculate. Therefore, it seems prudent
to test for cpu_no_speculation first and only then determine whether
a specific speculating CPU is susceptible to store bypass speculation.
This is underlined by all CPUs currently listed in cpu_no_speculation
were present in cpu_no_spec_store_bypass as well.

Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: bp@suse.de
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180522090539.GA24668@light.dominikbrodowski.net

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Only CPUs which speculate can speculate. Therefore, it seems prudent
to test for cpu_no_speculation first and only then determine whether
a specific speculating CPU is susceptible to store bypass speculation.
This is underlined by all CPUs currently listed in cpu_no_speculation
were present in cpu_no_spec_store_bypass as well.

Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: bp@suse.de
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180522090539.GA24668@light.dominikbrodowski.net

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameter</title>
<updated>2018-05-19T09:56:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-18T10:35:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=372fddf709041743a93e381556f4c41aad1e28f8'/>
<id>372fddf709041743a93e381556f4c41aad1e28f8</id>
<content type='text'>
This kernel parameter allows to force kernel to use 4-level paging even
if hardware and kernel support 5-level paging.

The option may be useful to work around regressions related to 5-level
paging.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518103528.59260-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This kernel parameter allows to force kernel to use 4-level paging even
if hardware and kernel support 5-level paging.

The option may be useful to work around regressions related to 5-level
paging.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518103528.59260-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branches 'x86/urgent' and 'core/urgent' into x86/boot, to pick up fixes and avoid conflicts</title>
<updated>2018-05-19T06:18:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-19T06:18:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=177bfd725bd1b67c7254248cf19f0465d493e631'/>
<id>177bfd725bd1b67c7254248cf19f0465d493e631</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO</title>
<updated>2018-05-18T09:17:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-17T03:18:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=240da953fcc6a9008c92fae5b1f727ee5ed167ab'/>
<id>240da953fcc6a9008c92fae5b1f727ee5ed167ab</id>
<content type='text'>
The "336996 Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations" from
May defines this as SSB_NO, hence lets sync-up.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The "336996 Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations" from
May defines this as SSB_NO, hence lets sync-up.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD</title>
<updated>2018-05-17T15:09:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-10T20:06:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bc226f07dcd3c9ef0b7f6236fe356ea4a9cb4769'/>
<id>bc226f07dcd3c9ef0b7f6236fe356ea4a9cb4769</id>
<content type='text'>
Expose the new virtualized architectural mechanism, VIRT_SSBD, for using
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD) under SVM.  This will allow guests
to use SSBD on hardware that uses non-architectural mechanisms for enabling
SSBD.

[ tglx: Folded the migration fixup from Paolo Bonzini ]

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Expose the new virtualized architectural mechanism, VIRT_SSBD, for using
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD) under SVM.  This will allow guests
to use SSBD on hardware that uses non-architectural mechanisms for enabling
SSBD.

[ tglx: Folded the migration fixup from Paolo Bonzini ]

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
