<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c, branch v6.11</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option</title>
<updated>2024-06-28T13:35:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-26T06:02:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=42c141fbb651b64db492aab35bc1d96eb4c20261'/>
<id>42c141fbb651b64db492aab35bc1d96eb4c20261</id>
<content type='text'>
In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit
mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable.  Add that as an option.

This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed
with the following commit:

  36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")

with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and
is disabled by default.

Mitigation switch requested by Maksim Davydov &lt;davydov-max@yandex-team.ru&gt;.

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2cbad706a6d5e1da2829e5e123d8d5c80330148c.1719381528.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit
mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable.  Add that as an option.

This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed
with the following commit:

  36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")

with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and
is disabled by default.

Mitigation switch requested by Maksim Davydov &lt;davydov-max@yandex-team.ru&gt;.

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2cbad706a6d5e1da2829e5e123d8d5c80330148c.1719381528.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86-cpu-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2024-05-14T01:44:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-14T01:44:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ecd83bcbed7ad657c80b784eaced84e097e63de7'/>
<id>ecd83bcbed7ad657c80b784eaced84e097e63de7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 cpu updates from Ingo Molnar:

 - Rework the x86 CPU vendor/family/model code: introduce the 'VFM'
   value that is an 8+8+8 bit concatenation of the vendor/family/model
   value, and add macros that work on VFM values. This simplifies the
   addition of new Intel models &amp; families, and simplifies existing
   enumeration &amp; quirk code.

 - Add support for the AMD 0x80000026 leaf, to better parse topology
   information

 - Optimize the NUMA allocation layout of more per-CPU data structures

 - Improve the workaround for AMD erratum 1386

 - Clear TME from /proc/cpuinfo as well, when disabled by the firmware

 - Improve x86 self-tests

 - Extend the mce_record tracepoint with the ::ppin and ::microcode fields

 - Implement recovery for MCE errors in TDX/SEAM non-root mode

 - Misc cleanups and fixes

* tag 'x86-cpu-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (34 commits)
  x86/mm: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/tsc_msr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/tsc: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/resctrl: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/microcode/intel: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/mce: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/cpu/intel_epb: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/aperfmperf: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/apic: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  perf/x86/msr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  perf/x86/intel/uncore: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  perf/x86/intel/pt: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  perf/x86/lbr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  perf/x86/intel/cstate: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/bugs: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/bugs: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/cpu/vfm: Update arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
  x86/cpu/vfm: Add new macros to work with (vendor/family/model) values
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 cpu updates from Ingo Molnar:

 - Rework the x86 CPU vendor/family/model code: introduce the 'VFM'
   value that is an 8+8+8 bit concatenation of the vendor/family/model
   value, and add macros that work on VFM values. This simplifies the
   addition of new Intel models &amp; families, and simplifies existing
   enumeration &amp; quirk code.

 - Add support for the AMD 0x80000026 leaf, to better parse topology
   information

 - Optimize the NUMA allocation layout of more per-CPU data structures

 - Improve the workaround for AMD erratum 1386

 - Clear TME from /proc/cpuinfo as well, when disabled by the firmware

 - Improve x86 self-tests

 - Extend the mce_record tracepoint with the ::ppin and ::microcode fields

 - Implement recovery for MCE errors in TDX/SEAM non-root mode

 - Misc cleanups and fixes

* tag 'x86-cpu-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (34 commits)
  x86/mm: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/tsc_msr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/tsc: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/resctrl: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/microcode/intel: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/mce: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/cpu/intel_epb: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/aperfmperf: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/apic: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  perf/x86/msr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  perf/x86/intel/uncore: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  perf/x86/intel/pt: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  perf/x86/lbr: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  perf/x86/intel/cstate: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/bugs: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/bugs: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines
  x86/cpu/vfm: Update arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
  x86/cpu/vfm: Add new macros to work with (vendor/family/model) values
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines</title>
<updated>2024-04-25T10:27:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tony Luck</name>
<email>tony.luck@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-24T18:15:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8a28b0220266e2b8290e696d4b21c88f32e6aeb1'/>
<id>8a28b0220266e2b8290e696d4b21c88f32e6aeb1</id>
<content type='text'>
New CPU #defines encode vendor and family as well as model.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424181506.41673-1-tony.luck@intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
New CPU #defines encode vendor and family as well as model.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424181506.41673-1-tony.luck@intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Fix BHI retpoline check</title>
<updated>2024-04-14T09:10:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-12T18:10:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=69129794d94c544810e68b2b4eaa7e44063f9bf2'/>
<id>69129794d94c544810e68b2b4eaa7e44063f9bf2</id>
<content type='text'>
Confusingly, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE doesn't mean retpolines are enabled,
as it also includes the original "AMD retpoline" which isn't a retpoline
at all.

Also replace cpu_feature_enabled() with boot_cpu_has() because this is
before alternatives are patched and cpu_feature_enabled()'s fallback
path is slower than plain old boot_cpu_has().

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ad3807424a3953f0323c011a643405619f2a4927.1712944776.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Confusingly, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE doesn't mean retpolines are enabled,
as it also includes the original "AMD retpoline" which isn't a retpoline
at all.

Also replace cpu_feature_enabled() with boot_cpu_has() because this is
before alternatives are patched and cpu_feature_enabled()'s fallback
path is slower than plain old boot_cpu_has().

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ad3807424a3953f0323c011a643405619f2a4927.1712944776.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI</title>
<updated>2024-04-12T10:05:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-11T05:40:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4f511739c54b549061993b53fc0380f48dfca23b'/>
<id>4f511739c54b549061993b53fc0380f48dfca23b</id>
<content type='text'>
For consistency with the other CONFIG_MITIGATION_* options, replace the
CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} options with a single
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI option.

[ mingo: Fix ]

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3833812ea63e7fdbe36bf8b932e63f70d18e2a2a.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For consistency with the other CONFIG_MITIGATION_* options, replace the
CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} options with a single
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI option.

[ mingo: Fix ]

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3833812ea63e7fdbe36bf8b932e63f70d18e2a2a.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto</title>
<updated>2024-04-12T10:05:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-11T05:40:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=36d4fe147c870f6d3f6602befd7ef44393a1c87a'/>
<id>36d4fe147c870f6d3f6602befd7ef44393a1c87a</id>
<content type='text'>
Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only
mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly useful.

Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/412e9dc87971b622bbbaf64740ebc1f140bff343.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only
mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly useful.

Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/412e9dc87971b622bbbaf64740ebc1f140bff343.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation</title>
<updated>2024-04-11T08:30:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-11T05:40:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a'/>
<id>5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a</id>
<content type='text'>
While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still
other low-hanging fruit remaining.  Don't classify it as a mitigation
and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't
have a HW or SW mitigation enabled.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b5951dae3fdee7f1520d5136a27be3bdfe95f88b.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still
other low-hanging fruit remaining.  Don't classify it as a mitigation
and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't
have a HW or SW mitigation enabled.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b5951dae3fdee7f1520d5136a27be3bdfe95f88b.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA</title>
<updated>2024-04-11T08:30:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-11T05:40:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1cea8a280dfd1016148a3820676f2f03e3f5b898'/>
<id>1cea8a280dfd1016148a3820676f2f03e3f5b898</id>
<content type='text'>
The ARCH_CAP_RRSBA check isn't correct: RRSBA may have already been
disabled by the Spectre v2 mitigation (or can otherwise be disabled by
the BHI mitigation itself if needed).  In that case retpolines are fine.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6f56f13da34a0834b69163467449be7f58f253dc.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The ARCH_CAP_RRSBA check isn't correct: RRSBA may have already been
disabled by the Spectre v2 mitigation (or can otherwise be disabled by
the BHI mitigation itself if needed).  In that case retpolines are fine.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6f56f13da34a0834b69163467449be7f58f253dc.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr'</title>
<updated>2024-04-11T08:30:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-11T07:25:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d0485730d2189ffe5d986d4e9e191f1e4d5ffd24'/>
<id>d0485730d2189ffe5d986d4e9e191f1e4d5ffd24</id>
<content type='text'>
So we are using the 'ia32_cap' value in a number of places,
which got its name from MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR register.

But there's very little 'IA32' about it - this isn't 32-bit only
code, nor does it originate from there, it's just a historic
quirk that many Intel MSR names are prefixed with IA32_.

This is already clear from the helper method around the MSR:
x86_read_arch_cap_msr(), which doesn't have the IA32 prefix.

So rename 'ia32_cap' to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' to be consistent with
its role and with the naming of the helper function.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
So we are using the 'ia32_cap' value in a number of places,
which got its name from MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR register.

But there's very little 'IA32' about it - this isn't 32-bit only
code, nor does it originate from there, it's just a historic
quirk that many Intel MSR names are prefixed with IA32_.

This is already clear from the helper method around the MSR:
x86_read_arch_cap_msr(), which doesn't have the IA32 prefix.

So rename 'ia32_cap' to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' to be consistent with
its role and with the naming of the helper function.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES</title>
<updated>2024-04-11T08:30:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-11T05:40:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=cb2db5bb04d7f778fbc1a1ea2507aab436f1bff3'/>
<id>cb2db5bb04d7f778fbc1a1ea2507aab436f1bff3</id>
<content type='text'>
There's no need to keep reading MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES over and
over.  It's even read in the BHI sysfs function which is a big no-no.
Just read it once and cache it.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There's no need to keep reading MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES over and
over.  It's even read in the BHI sysfs function which is a big no-no.
Just read it once and cache it.

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
