linux.git/arch/x86/kernel/apic, branch v4.20

memblock: stop using implicit alignment to SMP_CACHE_BYTES

2018-10-31T15:54:16+00:00

When a memblock allocation APIs are called with align = 0, the alignment
is implicitly set to SMP_CACHE_BYTES.

Implicit alignment is done deep in the memblock allocator and it can
come as a surprise.  Not that such an alignment would be wrong even
when used incorrectly but it is better to be explicit for the sake of
clarity and the prinicple of the least surprise.

Replace all such uses of memblock APIs with the 'align' parameter
explicitly set to SMP_CACHE_BYTES and stop implicit alignment assignment
in the memblock internal allocation functions.

For the case when memblock APIs are used via helper functions, e.g.  like
iommu_arena_new_node() in Alpha, the helper functions were detected with
Coccinelle's help and then manually examined and updated where
appropriate.

The direct memblock APIs users were updated using the semantic patch below:

@@
expression size, min_addr, max_addr, nid;
@@
(
|
- memblock_alloc_try_nid_raw(size, 0, min_addr, max_addr, nid)
+ memblock_alloc_try_nid_raw(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES, min_addr, max_addr,
nid)
|
- memblock_alloc_try_nid_nopanic(size, 0, min_addr, max_addr, nid)
+ memblock_alloc_try_nid_nopanic(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES, min_addr, max_addr,
nid)
|
- memblock_alloc_try_nid(size, 0, min_addr, max_addr, nid)
+ memblock_alloc_try_nid(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES, min_addr, max_addr, nid)
|
- memblock_alloc(size, 0)
+ memblock_alloc(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES)
|
- memblock_alloc_raw(size, 0)
+ memblock_alloc_raw(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES)
|
- memblock_alloc_from(size, 0, min_addr)
+ memblock_alloc_from(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES, min_addr)
|
- memblock_alloc_nopanic(size, 0)
+ memblock_alloc_nopanic(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES)
|
- memblock_alloc_low(size, 0)
+ memblock_alloc_low(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES)
|
- memblock_alloc_low_nopanic(size, 0)
+ memblock_alloc_low_nopanic(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES)
|
- memblock_alloc_from_nopanic(size, 0, min_addr)
+ memblock_alloc_from_nopanic(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES, min_addr)
|
- memblock_alloc_node(size, 0, nid)
+ memblock_alloc_node(size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES, nid)
)

[mhocko@suse.com: changelog update]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix missed uses of implicit alignment]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181016133656.GA10925@rapoport-lnx
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1538687224-17535-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport 
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Paul Burton 	[MIPS]
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman 	[powerpc]
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Chris Zankel 
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Cc: Guan Xuetao 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: Michal Simek 
Cc: Richard Weinberger 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Tony Luck 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: remove include/linux/bootmem.h

2018-10-31T15:54:16+00:00

Move remaining definitions and declarations from include/linux/bootmem.h
into include/linux/memblock.h and remove the redundant header.

The includes were replaced with the semantic patch below and then
semi-automated removal of duplicated '#include 

@@
@@
- #include 
+ #include 

[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: dma-direct: fix up for the removal of linux/bootmem.h]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002185342.133d1680@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: powerpc: fix up for removal of linux/bootmem.h]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181005161406.73ef8727@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: x86/kaslr, ACPI/NUMA: fix for linux/bootmem.h removal]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181008190341.5e396491@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536927045-23536-30-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport 
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Chris Zankel 
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Cc: Greentime Hu 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Guan Xuetao 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" 
Cc: Jonas Bonn 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Ley Foon Tan 
Cc: Mark Salter 
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: Michal Simek 
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt 
Cc: Paul Burton 
Cc: Richard Kuo 
Cc: Richard Weinberger 
Cc: Rich Felker 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Serge Semin 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Tony Luck 
Cc: Vineet Gupta 
Cc: Yoshinori Sato 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

memblock: replace alloc_bootmem with memblock_alloc

2018-10-31T15:54:16+00:00

The alloc_bootmem(size) is a shortcut for allocation of SMP_CACHE_BYTES
aligned memory. When the align parameter of memblock_alloc() is 0, the
alignment is implicitly set to SMP_CACHE_BYTES and thus alloc_bootmem(size)
and memblock_alloc(size, 0) are equivalent.

The conversion is done using the following semantic patch:

@@
expression size;
@@
- alloc_bootmem(size)
+ memblock_alloc(size, 0)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536927045-23536-22-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Chris Zankel 
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Cc: Greentime Hu 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Guan Xuetao 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" 
Cc: Jonas Bonn 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Ley Foon Tan 
Cc: Mark Salter 
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Michal Simek 
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt 
Cc: Paul Burton 
Cc: Richard Kuo 
Cc: Richard Weinberger 
Cc: Rich Felker 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Serge Semin 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Tony Luck 
Cc: Vineet Gupta 
Cc: Yoshinori Sato 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

memblock: replace alloc_bootmem_pages with memblock_alloc

2018-10-31T15:54:15+00:00

The alloc_bootmem_pages() function allocates PAGE_SIZE aligned memory.
memblock_alloc() with alignment set to PAGE_SIZE does exactly the same
thing.

The conversion is done using the following semantic patch:

@@
expression e;
@@
- alloc_bootmem_pages(e)
+ memblock_alloc(e, PAGE_SIZE)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536927045-23536-20-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Chris Zankel 
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Cc: Greentime Hu 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Guan Xuetao 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" 
Cc: Jonas Bonn 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Ley Foon Tan 
Cc: Mark Salter 
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: Michal Simek 
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt 
Cc: Paul Burton 
Cc: Richard Kuo 
Cc: Richard Weinberger 
Cc: Rich Felker 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Serge Semin 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Tony Luck 
Cc: Vineet Gupta 
Cc: Yoshinori Sato 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2018-10-23T15:16:40+00:00

Pull x86 cpu updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle were:

   - Add support for the "Dhyana" x86 CPUs by Hygon: these are licensed
     based on the AMD Zen architecture, and are built and sold in China,
     for domestic datacenter use. The code is pretty close to AMD
     support, mostly with a few quirks and enumeration differences. (Pu
     Wen)

   - Enable CPUID support on Cyrix 6x86/6x86L processors"

* 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  tools/cpupower: Add Hygon Dhyana support
  cpufreq: Add Hygon Dhyana support
  ACPI: Add Hygon Dhyana support
  x86/xen: Add Hygon Dhyana support to Xen
  x86/kvm: Add Hygon Dhyana support to KVM
  x86/mce: Add Hygon Dhyana support to the MCA infrastructure
  x86/bugs: Add Hygon Dhyana to the respective mitigation machinery
  x86/apic: Add Hygon Dhyana support
  x86/pci, x86/amd_nb: Add Hygon Dhyana support to PCI and northbridge
  x86/amd_nb: Check vendor in AMD-only functions
  x86/alternative: Init ideal_nops for Hygon Dhyana
  x86/events: Add Hygon Dhyana support to PMU infrastructure
  x86/smpboot: Do not use BSP INIT delay and MWAIT to idle on Dhyana
  x86/cpu/mtrr: Support TOP_MEM2 and get MTRR number
  x86/cpu: Get cache info and setup cache cpumap for Hygon Dhyana
  x86/cpu: Create Hygon Dhyana architecture support file
  x86/CPU: Change query logic so CPUID is enabled before testing
  x86/CPU: Use correct macros for Cyrix calls

x86/apic: Add Hygon Dhyana support

2018-09-27T16:28:58+00:00

Add Hygon Dhyana support to the APIC subsystem. When running in 32 bit
mode, bigsmp should be enabled if there are more than 8 cores online.

Signed-off-by: Pu Wen 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: mingo@redhat.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7a557265a8c7c9e842fe60f9d8e064458801aef3.1537533369.git.puwen@hygon.cn

irq/matrix: Spread managed interrupts on allocation

2018-09-18T16:27:24+00:00

Linux spreads out the non managed interrupt across the possible target CPUs
to avoid vector space exhaustion.

Managed interrupts are treated differently, as for them the vectors are
reserved (with guarantee) when the interrupt descriptors are initialized.

When the interrupt is requested a real vector is assigned. The assignment
logic uses the first CPU in the affinity mask for assignment. If the
interrupt has more than one CPU in the affinity mask, which happens when a
multi queue device has less queues than CPUs, then doing the same search as
for non managed interrupts makes sense as it puts the interrupt on the
least interrupt plagued CPU. For single CPU affine vectors that's obviously
a NOOP.

Restructre the matrix allocation code so it does the 'best CPU' search, add
the sanity check for an empty affinity mask and adapt the call site in the
x86 vector management code.

[ tglx: Added the empty mask check to the core and improved change log ]

Signed-off-by: Dou Liyang 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180908175838.14450-2-dou_liyang@163.com

x86/apic/vector: Make error return value negative

2018-09-08T10:12:40+00:00

activate_managed() returns EINVAL instead of -EINVAL in case of
error. While this is unlikely to happen, the positive return value would
cause further malfunction at the call site.

Fixes: 2db1f959d9dc ("x86/vector: Handle managed interrupts proper")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

x86/smp: fix non-SMP broken build due to redefinition of apic_id_is_primary_thread

2018-08-14T22:00:00+00:00

The function has an inline "return false;" definition with CONFIG_SMP=n
but the "real" definition is also visible leading to "redefinition of
‘apic_id_is_primary_thread’" compiler error.

Guard it with #ifdef CONFIG_SMP

Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Fixes: 6a4d2657e048 ("x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2018-08-14T16:46:06+00:00

Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware
  engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows
  unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the
  Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual
  address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or
  other reserved bits set.

  If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant
  page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved
  bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads
  the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if
  the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present
  and accessible.

  While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will
  raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of
  loading the data and making it available to other speculative
  instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to
  unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack.

  While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
  allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the
  attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX
  and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation
  bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.

  The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646

  The mitigations provided by this pull request include:

   - Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non
     present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory.

   - Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER.

   - SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT
     by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on
     the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs

   - Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush
     and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line
     and at runtime via sysfs

   - Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of
     mitigations.

  Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways -
  patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes
  heated, but at the end constructive discussions.

  There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which
  might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of
  workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their
  complexity and limitations"

* 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits)
  x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
  tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions
  x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
  x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
  cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
  KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
  Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr()
  x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
  x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16
  x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush()
  x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond'
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
  cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
  ...