<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c, branch v5.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/apic/vector: Warn when vector space exhaustion breaks affinity</title>
<updated>2019-08-28T12:44:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neil Horman</name>
<email>nhorman@tuxdriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-22T14:34:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=743dac494d61d991967ebcfab92e4f80dc7583b3'/>
<id>743dac494d61d991967ebcfab92e4f80dc7583b3</id>
<content type='text'>
On x86, CPUs are limited in the number of interrupts they can have affined
to them as they only support 256 interrupt vectors per CPU. 32 vectors are
reserved for the CPU and the kernel reserves another 22 for internal
purposes. That leaves 202 vectors for assignement to devices.

When an interrupt is set up or the affinity is changed by the kernel or the
administrator, the vector assignment code attempts to honor the requested
affinity mask. If the vector space on the CPUs in that affinity mask is
exhausted the code falls back to a wider set of CPUs and assigns a vector
on a CPU outside of the requested affinity mask silently.

While the effective affinity is reflected in the corresponding
/proc/irq/$N/effective_affinity* files the silent breakage of the requested
affinity can lead to unexpected behaviour for administrators.

Add a pr_warn() when this happens so that adminstrators get at least
informed about it in the syslog.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog and made the pr_warn() more informative ]

Reported-by: djuran@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: djuran@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190822143421.9535-1-nhorman@tuxdriver.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On x86, CPUs are limited in the number of interrupts they can have affined
to them as they only support 256 interrupt vectors per CPU. 32 vectors are
reserved for the CPU and the kernel reserves another 22 for internal
purposes. That leaves 202 vectors for assignement to devices.

When an interrupt is set up or the affinity is changed by the kernel or the
administrator, the vector assignment code attempts to honor the requested
affinity mask. If the vector space on the CPUs in that affinity mask is
exhausted the code falls back to a wider set of CPUs and assigns a vector
on a CPU outside of the requested affinity mask silently.

While the effective affinity is reflected in the corresponding
/proc/irq/$N/effective_affinity* files the silent breakage of the requested
affinity can lead to unexpected behaviour for administrators.

Add a pr_warn() when this happens so that adminstrators get at least
informed about it in the syslog.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog and made the pr_warn() more informative ]

Reported-by: djuran@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: djuran@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190822143421.9535-1-nhorman@tuxdriver.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86-apic-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2019-07-08T18:22:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-08T18:22:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0902d5011cfaabd6a09326299ef77e1c8735fb89'/>
<id>0902d5011cfaabd6a09326299ef77e1c8735fb89</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x96 apic updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Updates for the x86 APIC interrupt handling and APIC timer:

   - Fix a long standing issue with spurious interrupts which was caused
     by the big vector management rework a few years ago. Robert Hodaszi
     provided finally enough debug data and an excellent initial failure
     analysis which allowed to understand the underlying issues.

     This contains a change to the core interrupt management code which
     is required to handle this correctly for the APIC/IO_APIC. The core
     changes are NOOPs for most architectures except ARM64. ARM64 is not
     impacted by the change as confirmed by Marc Zyngier.

   - Newer systems allow to disable the PIT clock for power saving
     causing panic in the timer interrupt delivery check of the IO/APIC
     when the HPET timer is not enabled either. While the clock could be
     turned on this would cause an endless whack a mole game to chase
     the proper register in each affected chipset.

     These systems provide the relevant frequencies for TSC, CPU and the
     local APIC timer via CPUID and/or MSRs, which allows to avoid the
     PIT/HPET based calibration. As the calibration code is the only
     usage of the legacy timers on modern systems and is skipped anyway
     when the frequencies are known already, there is no point in
     setting up the PIT and actually checking for the interrupt delivery
     via IO/APIC.

     To achieve this on a wide variety of platforms, the CPUID/MSR based
     frequency readout has been made more robust, which also allowed to
     remove quite some workarounds which turned out to be not longer
     required. Thanks to Daniel Drake for analysis, patches and
     verification"

* 'x86-apic-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/irq: Seperate unused system vectors from spurious entry again
  x86/irq: Handle spurious interrupt after shutdown gracefully
  x86/ioapic: Implement irq_get_irqchip_state() callback
  genirq: Add optional hardware synchronization for shutdown
  genirq: Fix misleading synchronize_irq() documentation
  genirq: Delay deactivation in free_irq()
  x86/timer: Skip PIT initialization on modern chipsets
  x86/apic: Use non-atomic operations when possible
  x86/apic: Make apic_bsp_setup() static
  x86/tsc: Set LAPIC timer period to crystal clock frequency
  x86/apic: Rename 'lapic_timer_frequency' to 'lapic_timer_period'
  x86/tsc: Use CPUID.0x16 to calculate missing crystal frequency
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x96 apic updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Updates for the x86 APIC interrupt handling and APIC timer:

   - Fix a long standing issue with spurious interrupts which was caused
     by the big vector management rework a few years ago. Robert Hodaszi
     provided finally enough debug data and an excellent initial failure
     analysis which allowed to understand the underlying issues.

     This contains a change to the core interrupt management code which
     is required to handle this correctly for the APIC/IO_APIC. The core
     changes are NOOPs for most architectures except ARM64. ARM64 is not
     impacted by the change as confirmed by Marc Zyngier.

   - Newer systems allow to disable the PIT clock for power saving
     causing panic in the timer interrupt delivery check of the IO/APIC
     when the HPET timer is not enabled either. While the clock could be
     turned on this would cause an endless whack a mole game to chase
     the proper register in each affected chipset.

     These systems provide the relevant frequencies for TSC, CPU and the
     local APIC timer via CPUID and/or MSRs, which allows to avoid the
     PIT/HPET based calibration. As the calibration code is the only
     usage of the legacy timers on modern systems and is skipped anyway
     when the frequencies are known already, there is no point in
     setting up the PIT and actually checking for the interrupt delivery
     via IO/APIC.

     To achieve this on a wide variety of platforms, the CPUID/MSR based
     frequency readout has been made more robust, which also allowed to
     remove quite some workarounds which turned out to be not longer
     required. Thanks to Daniel Drake for analysis, patches and
     verification"

* 'x86-apic-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/irq: Seperate unused system vectors from spurious entry again
  x86/irq: Handle spurious interrupt after shutdown gracefully
  x86/ioapic: Implement irq_get_irqchip_state() callback
  genirq: Add optional hardware synchronization for shutdown
  genirq: Fix misleading synchronize_irq() documentation
  genirq: Delay deactivation in free_irq()
  x86/timer: Skip PIT initialization on modern chipsets
  x86/apic: Use non-atomic operations when possible
  x86/apic: Make apic_bsp_setup() static
  x86/tsc: Set LAPIC timer period to crystal clock frequency
  x86/apic: Rename 'lapic_timer_frequency' to 'lapic_timer_period'
  x86/tsc: Use CPUID.0x16 to calculate missing crystal frequency
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/irq: Handle spurious interrupt after shutdown gracefully</title>
<updated>2019-07-03T08:12:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-28T11:11:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b7107a67f0d125459fe41f86e8079afd1a5e0b15'/>
<id>b7107a67f0d125459fe41f86e8079afd1a5e0b15</id>
<content type='text'>
Since the rework of the vector management, warnings about spurious
interrupts have been reported. Robert provided some more information and
did an initial analysis. The following situation leads to these warnings:

   CPU 0                  CPU 1               IO_APIC

                                              interrupt is raised
                                              sent to CPU1
			  Unable to handle
			  immediately
			  (interrupts off,
			   deep idle delay)
   mask()
   ...
   free()
     shutdown()
     synchronize_irq()
     clear_vector()
                          do_IRQ()
                            -&gt; vector is clear

Before the rework the vector entries of legacy interrupts were statically
assigned and occupied precious vector space while most of them were
unused. Due to that the above situation was handled silently because the
vector was handled and the core handler of the assigned interrupt
descriptor noticed that it is shut down and returned.

While this has been usually observed with legacy interrupts, this situation
is not limited to them. Any other interrupt source, e.g. MSI, can cause the
same issue.

After adding proper synchronization for level triggered interrupts, this
can only happen for edge triggered interrupts where the IO-APIC obviously
cannot provide information about interrupts in flight.

While the spurious warning is actually harmless in this case it worries
users and driver developers.

Handle it gracefully by marking the vector entry as VECTOR_SHUTDOWN instead
of VECTOR_UNUSED when the vector is freed up.

If that above late handling happens the spurious detector will not complain
and switch the entry to VECTOR_UNUSED. Any subsequent spurious interrupt on
that line will trigger the spurious warning as before.

Fixes: 464d12309e1b ("x86/vector: Switch IOAPIC to global reservation mode")
Reported-by: Robert Hodaszi &lt;Robert.Hodaszi@digi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;-
Tested-by: Robert Hodaszi &lt;Robert.Hodaszi@digi.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628111440.459647741@linutronix.de

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Since the rework of the vector management, warnings about spurious
interrupts have been reported. Robert provided some more information and
did an initial analysis. The following situation leads to these warnings:

   CPU 0                  CPU 1               IO_APIC

                                              interrupt is raised
                                              sent to CPU1
			  Unable to handle
			  immediately
			  (interrupts off,
			   deep idle delay)
   mask()
   ...
   free()
     shutdown()
     synchronize_irq()
     clear_vector()
                          do_IRQ()
                            -&gt; vector is clear

Before the rework the vector entries of legacy interrupts were statically
assigned and occupied precious vector space while most of them were
unused. Due to that the above situation was handled silently because the
vector was handled and the core handler of the assigned interrupt
descriptor noticed that it is shut down and returned.

While this has been usually observed with legacy interrupts, this situation
is not limited to them. Any other interrupt source, e.g. MSI, can cause the
same issue.

After adding proper synchronization for level triggered interrupts, this
can only happen for edge triggered interrupts where the IO-APIC obviously
cannot provide information about interrupts in flight.

While the spurious warning is actually harmless in this case it worries
users and driver developers.

Handle it gracefully by marking the vector entry as VECTOR_SHUTDOWN instead
of VECTOR_UNUSED when the vector is freed up.

If that above late handling happens the spurious detector will not complain
and switch the entry to VECTOR_UNUSED. Any subsequent spurious interrupt on
that line will trigger the spurious warning as before.

Fixes: 464d12309e1b ("x86/vector: Switch IOAPIC to global reservation mode")
Reported-by: Robert Hodaszi &lt;Robert.Hodaszi@digi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;-
Tested-by: Robert Hodaszi &lt;Robert.Hodaszi@digi.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628111440.459647741@linutronix.de

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500</title>
<updated>2019-06-19T15:09:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-04T08:11:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d2912cb15bdda8ba4a5dd73396ad62641af2f520'/>
<id>d2912cb15bdda8ba4a5dd73396ad62641af2f520</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation #

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt &lt;info@metux.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation #

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt &lt;info@metux.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/kernel: Fix more -Wmissing-prototypes warnings</title>
<updated>2018-12-08T11:24:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov</name>
<email>bp@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-04T23:34:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ad3bc25a320742f42b3015115384f5aec69c7ce2'/>
<id>ad3bc25a320742f42b3015115384f5aec69c7ce2</id>
<content type='text'>
... with the goal of eventually enabling -Wmissing-prototypes by
default. At least on x86.

Make functions static where possible, otherwise add prototypes or make
them visible through includes.

asm/trace/ changes courtesy of Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt; # ACPI + cpufreq bits
Cc: Andrew Banman &lt;andrew.banman@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: Dimitri Sivanich &lt;dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Travis &lt;mike.travis@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Yi Wang &lt;wang.yi59@zte.com.cn&gt;
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
... with the goal of eventually enabling -Wmissing-prototypes by
default. At least on x86.

Make functions static where possible, otherwise add prototypes or make
them visible through includes.

asm/trace/ changes courtesy of Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt; # ACPI + cpufreq bits
Cc: Andrew Banman &lt;andrew.banman@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: Dimitri Sivanich &lt;dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Travis &lt;mike.travis@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Yi Wang &lt;wang.yi59@zte.com.cn&gt;
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>irq/matrix: Spread managed interrupts on allocation</title>
<updated>2018-09-18T16:27:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dou Liyang</name>
<email>douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-08T17:58:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=76f99ae5b54d48430d1f0c5512a84da0ff9761e0'/>
<id>76f99ae5b54d48430d1f0c5512a84da0ff9761e0</id>
<content type='text'>
Linux spreads out the non managed interrupt across the possible target CPUs
to avoid vector space exhaustion.

Managed interrupts are treated differently, as for them the vectors are
reserved (with guarantee) when the interrupt descriptors are initialized.

When the interrupt is requested a real vector is assigned. The assignment
logic uses the first CPU in the affinity mask for assignment. If the
interrupt has more than one CPU in the affinity mask, which happens when a
multi queue device has less queues than CPUs, then doing the same search as
for non managed interrupts makes sense as it puts the interrupt on the
least interrupt plagued CPU. For single CPU affine vectors that's obviously
a NOOP.

Restructre the matrix allocation code so it does the 'best CPU' search, add
the sanity check for an empty affinity mask and adapt the call site in the
x86 vector management code.

[ tglx: Added the empty mask check to the core and improved change log ]

Signed-off-by: Dou Liyang &lt;douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180908175838.14450-2-dou_liyang@163.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Linux spreads out the non managed interrupt across the possible target CPUs
to avoid vector space exhaustion.

Managed interrupts are treated differently, as for them the vectors are
reserved (with guarantee) when the interrupt descriptors are initialized.

When the interrupt is requested a real vector is assigned. The assignment
logic uses the first CPU in the affinity mask for assignment. If the
interrupt has more than one CPU in the affinity mask, which happens when a
multi queue device has less queues than CPUs, then doing the same search as
for non managed interrupts makes sense as it puts the interrupt on the
least interrupt plagued CPU. For single CPU affine vectors that's obviously
a NOOP.

Restructre the matrix allocation code so it does the 'best CPU' search, add
the sanity check for an empty affinity mask and adapt the call site in the
x86 vector management code.

[ tglx: Added the empty mask check to the core and improved change log ]

Signed-off-by: Dou Liyang &lt;douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180908175838.14450-2-dou_liyang@163.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/apic/vector: Make error return value negative</title>
<updated>2018-09-08T10:12:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-08T10:07:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=47b7360ce563e18c524ce92b55fb4da72b3b3578'/>
<id>47b7360ce563e18c524ce92b55fb4da72b3b3578</id>
<content type='text'>
activate_managed() returns EINVAL instead of -EINVAL in case of
error. While this is unlikely to happen, the positive return value would
cause further malfunction at the call site.

Fixes: 2db1f959d9dc ("x86/vector: Handle managed interrupts proper")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
activate_managed() returns EINVAL instead of -EINVAL in case of
error. While this is unlikely to happen, the positive return value would
cause further malfunction at the call site.

Fixes: 2db1f959d9dc ("x86/vector: Handle managed interrupts proper")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2018-08-14T16:46:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-14T16:46:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=958f338e96f874a0d29442396d6adf9c1e17aa2d'/>
<id>958f338e96f874a0d29442396d6adf9c1e17aa2d</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware
  engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows
  unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the
  Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual
  address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or
  other reserved bits set.

  If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant
  page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved
  bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads
  the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if
  the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present
  and accessible.

  While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will
  raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of
  loading the data and making it available to other speculative
  instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to
  unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack.

  While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
  allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the
  attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX
  and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation
  bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.

  The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646

  The mitigations provided by this pull request include:

   - Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non
     present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory.

   - Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER.

   - SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT
     by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on
     the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs

   - Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush
     and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line
     and at runtime via sysfs

   - Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of
     mitigations.

  Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways -
  patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes
  heated, but at the end constructive discussions.

  There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which
  might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of
  workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their
  complexity and limitations"

* 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits)
  x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
  tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions
  x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
  x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
  cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
  KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
  Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr()
  x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
  x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16
  x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush()
  x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond'
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
  cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware
  engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows
  unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the
  Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual
  address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or
  other reserved bits set.

  If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant
  page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved
  bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads
  the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if
  the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present
  and accessible.

  While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will
  raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of
  loading the data and making it available to other speculative
  instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to
  unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack.

  While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
  allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the
  attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX
  and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation
  bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.

  The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646

  The mitigations provided by this pull request include:

   - Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non
     present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory.

   - Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER.

   - SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT
     by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on
     the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs

   - Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush
     and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line
     and at runtime via sysfs

   - Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of
     mitigations.

  Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways -
  patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes
  heated, but at the end constructive discussions.

  There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which
  might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of
  workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their
  complexity and limitations"

* 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits)
  x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
  tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions
  x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
  x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
  cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
  KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
  Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr()
  x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
  x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16
  x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush()
  x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond'
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
  cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86-apic-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2018-08-13T20:31:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-13T20:31:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=66e22087bdf65c6bdea0a2994fbf7e16995f19f0'/>
<id>66e22087bdf65c6bdea0a2994fbf7e16995f19f0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 apic update from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Trivial cleanups of the APIC related code"

* 'x86-apic-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/apic: Trivial coding style fixes
  x86/vector: Merge allocate_vector() into assign_vector_locked()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 apic update from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Trivial cleanups of the APIC related code"

* 'x86-apic-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/apic: Trivial coding style fixes
  x86/vector: Merge allocate_vector() into assign_vector_locked()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h</title>
<updated>2018-08-05T07:53:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolai Stange</name>
<email>nstange@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-29T10:15:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=447ae316670230d7d29430e2cbf1f5db4f49d14c'/>
<id>447ae316670230d7d29430e2cbf1f5db4f49d14c</id>
<content type='text'>
The next patch in this series will have to make the definition of
irq_cpustat_t available to entering_irq().

Inclusion of asm/hardirq.h into asm/apic.h would cause circular header
dependencies like

  asm/smp.h
    asm/apic.h
      asm/hardirq.h
        linux/irq.h
          linux/topology.h
            linux/smp.h
              asm/smp.h

or

  linux/gfp.h
    linux/mmzone.h
      asm/mmzone.h
        asm/mmzone_64.h
          asm/smp.h
            asm/apic.h
              asm/hardirq.h
                linux/irq.h
                  linux/irqdesc.h
                    linux/kobject.h
                      linux/sysfs.h
                        linux/kernfs.h
                          linux/idr.h
                            linux/gfp.h

and others.

This causes compilation errors because of the header guards becoming
effective in the second inclusion: symbols/macros that had been defined
before wouldn't be available to intermediate headers in the #include chain
anymore.

A possible workaround would be to move the definition of irq_cpustat_t
into its own header and include that from both, asm/hardirq.h and
asm/apic.h.

However, this wouldn't solve the real problem, namely asm/harirq.h
unnecessarily pulling in all the linux/irq.h cruft: nothing in
asm/hardirq.h itself requires it. Also, note that there are some other
archs, like e.g. arm64, which don't have that #include in their
asm/hardirq.h.

Remove the linux/irq.h #include from x86' asm/hardirq.h.

Fix resulting compilation errors by adding appropriate #includes to *.c
files as needed.

Note that some of these *.c files could be cleaned up a bit wrt. to their
set of #includes, but that should better be done from separate patches, if
at all.

Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange &lt;nstange@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The next patch in this series will have to make the definition of
irq_cpustat_t available to entering_irq().

Inclusion of asm/hardirq.h into asm/apic.h would cause circular header
dependencies like

  asm/smp.h
    asm/apic.h
      asm/hardirq.h
        linux/irq.h
          linux/topology.h
            linux/smp.h
              asm/smp.h

or

  linux/gfp.h
    linux/mmzone.h
      asm/mmzone.h
        asm/mmzone_64.h
          asm/smp.h
            asm/apic.h
              asm/hardirq.h
                linux/irq.h
                  linux/irqdesc.h
                    linux/kobject.h
                      linux/sysfs.h
                        linux/kernfs.h
                          linux/idr.h
                            linux/gfp.h

and others.

This causes compilation errors because of the header guards becoming
effective in the second inclusion: symbols/macros that had been defined
before wouldn't be available to intermediate headers in the #include chain
anymore.

A possible workaround would be to move the definition of irq_cpustat_t
into its own header and include that from both, asm/hardirq.h and
asm/apic.h.

However, this wouldn't solve the real problem, namely asm/harirq.h
unnecessarily pulling in all the linux/irq.h cruft: nothing in
asm/hardirq.h itself requires it. Also, note that there are some other
archs, like e.g. arm64, which don't have that #include in their
asm/hardirq.h.

Remove the linux/irq.h #include from x86' asm/hardirq.h.

Fix resulting compilation errors by adding appropriate #includes to *.c
files as needed.

Note that some of these *.c files could be cleaned up a bit wrt. to their
set of #includes, but that should better be done from separate patches, if
at all.

Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange &lt;nstange@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
