linux.git/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile, branch v5.14

trace: Add osnoise tracer

2021-06-25T23:57:01+00:00

In the context of high-performance computing (HPC), the Operating System
Noise (*osnoise*) refers to the interference experienced by an application
due to activities inside the operating system. In the context of Linux,
NMIs, IRQs, SoftIRQs, and any other system thread can cause noise to the
system. Moreover, hardware-related jobs can also cause noise, for example,
via SMIs.

The osnoise tracer leverages the hwlat_detector by running a similar
loop with preemption, SoftIRQs and IRQs enabled, thus allowing all
the sources of *osnoise* during its execution. Using the same approach
of hwlat, osnoise takes note of the entry and exit point of any
source of interferences, increasing a per-cpu interference counter. The
osnoise tracer also saves an interference counter for each source of
interference. The interference counter for NMI, IRQs, SoftIRQs, and
threads is increased anytime the tool observes these interferences' entry
events. When a noise happens without any interference from the operating
system level, the hardware noise counter increases, pointing to a
hardware-related noise. In this way, osnoise can account for any
source of interference. At the end of the period, the osnoise tracer
prints the sum of all noise, the max single noise, the percentage of CPU
available for the thread, and the counters for the noise sources.

Usage

Write the ASCII text "osnoise" into the current_tracer file of the
tracing system (generally mounted at /sys/kernel/tracing).

For example::

        [root@f32 ~]# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
        [root@f32 tracing]# echo osnoise > current_tracer

It is possible to follow the trace by reading the trace trace file::

        [root@f32 tracing]# cat trace
        # tracer: osnoise
        #
        #                                _-----=> irqs-off
        #                               / _----=> need-resched
        #                              | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
        #                              || / _--=> preempt-depth                            MAX
        #                              || /                                             SINGLE     Interference counters:
        #                              ||||               RUNTIME      NOISE   % OF CPU  NOISE    +-----------------------------+
        #           TASK-PID      CPU# ||||   TIMESTAMP    IN US       IN US  AVAILABLE  IN US     HW    NMI    IRQ   SIRQ THREAD
        #              | |         |   ||||      |           |             |    |            |      |      |      |      |      |
                   <...>-859     [000] ....    81.637220: 1000000        190  99.98100       9     18      0   1007     18      1
                   <...>-860     [001] ....    81.638154: 1000000        656  99.93440      74     23      0   1006     16      3
                   <...>-861     [002] ....    81.638193: 1000000       5675  99.43250     202      6      0   1013     25     21
                   <...>-862     [003] ....    81.638242: 1000000        125  99.98750      45      1      0   1011     23      0
                   <...>-863     [004] ....    81.638260: 1000000       1721  99.82790     168      7      0   1002     49     41
                   <...>-864     [005] ....    81.638286: 1000000        263  99.97370      57      6      0   1006     26      2
                   <...>-865     [006] ....    81.638302: 1000000        109  99.98910      21      3      0   1006     18      1
                   <...>-866     [007] ....    81.638326: 1000000       7816  99.21840     107      8      0   1016     39     19

In addition to the regular trace fields (from TASK-PID to TIMESTAMP), the
tracer prints a message at the end of each period for each CPU that is
running an osnoise/CPU thread. The osnoise specific fields report:

 - The RUNTIME IN USE reports the amount of time in microseconds that
   the osnoise thread kept looping reading the time.
 - The NOISE IN US reports the sum of noise in microseconds observed
   by the osnoise tracer during the associated runtime.
 - The % OF CPU AVAILABLE reports the percentage of CPU available for
   the osnoise thread during the runtime window.
 - The MAX SINGLE NOISE IN US reports the maximum single noise observed
   during the runtime window.
 - The Interference counters display how many each of the respective
   interference happened during the runtime window.

Note that the example above shows a high number of HW noise samples.
The reason being is that this sample was taken on a virtual machine,
and the host interference is detected as a hardware interference.

Tracer options

The tracer has a set of options inside the osnoise directory, they are:

 - osnoise/cpus: CPUs at which a osnoise thread will execute.
 - osnoise/period_us: the period of the osnoise thread.
 - osnoise/runtime_us: how long an osnoise thread will look for noise.
 - osnoise/stop_tracing_us: stop the system tracing if a single noise
   higher than the configured value happens. Writing 0 disables this
   option.
 - osnoise/stop_tracing_total_us: stop the system tracing if total noise
   higher than the configured value happens. Writing 0 disables this
   option.
 - tracing_threshold: the minimum delta between two time() reads to be
   considered as noise, in us. When set to 0, the default value will
   be used, which is currently 5 us.

Additional Tracing

In addition to the tracer, a set of tracepoints were added to
facilitate the identification of the osnoise source.

 - osnoise:sample_threshold: printed anytime a noise is higher than
   the configurable tolerance_ns.
 - osnoise:nmi_noise: noise from NMI, including the duration.
 - osnoise:irq_noise: noise from an IRQ, including the duration.
 - osnoise:softirq_noise: noise from a SoftIRQ, including the
   duration.
 - osnoise:thread_noise: noise from a thread, including the duration.

Note that all the values are *net values*. For example, if while osnoise
is running, another thread preempts the osnoise thread, it will start a
thread_noise duration at the start. Then, an IRQ takes place, preempting
the thread_noise, starting a irq_noise. When the IRQ ends its execution,
it will compute its duration, and this duration will be subtracted from
the thread_noise, in such a way as to avoid the double accounting of the
IRQ execution. This logic is valid for all sources of noise.

Here is one example of the usage of these tracepoints::

       osnoise/8-961     [008] d.h.  5789.857532: irq_noise: local_timer:236 start 5789.857529929 duration 1845 ns
       osnoise/8-961     [008] dNh.  5789.858408: irq_noise: local_timer:236 start 5789.858404871 duration 2848 ns
     migration/8-54      [008] d...  5789.858413: thread_noise: migration/8:54 start 5789.858409300 duration 3068 ns
       osnoise/8-961     [008] ....  5789.858413: sample_threshold: start 5789.858404555 duration 8723 ns interferences 2

In this example, a noise sample of 8 microseconds was reported in the last
line, pointing to two interferences. Looking backward in the trace, the
two previous entries were about the migration thread running after a
timer IRQ execution. The first event is not part of the noise because
it took place one millisecond before.

It is worth noticing that the sum of the duration reported in the
tracepoints is smaller than eight us reported in the sample_threshold.
The reason roots in the overhead of the entry and exit code that happens
before and after any interference execution. This justifies the dual
approach: measuring thread and tracing.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e649467042d60e7b62714c9c6751a56299d15119.1624372313.git.bristot@redhat.com

Cc: Phil Auld 
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Cc: Kate Carcia 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Alexandre Chartre 
Cc: Clark Willaims 
Cc: John Kacur 
Cc: Juri Lelli 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira 
[
  Made the following functions static:
   trace_irqentry_callback()
   trace_irqexit_callback()
   trace_intel_irqentry_callback()
   trace_intel_irqexit_callback()

  Added to include/trace.h:
   osnoise_arch_register()
   osnoise_arch_unregister()

  Fixed define logic for LATENCY_FS_NOTIFY

  Reported-by: kernel test robot 
]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)

x86/sev-es: Rename sev-es.{ch} to sev.{ch}

2021-05-10T05:40:27+00:00

SEV-SNP builds upon the SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware
protection. Version 2 of the GHCB specification adds new NAE events that
are SEV-SNP specific. Rename the sev-es.{ch} to sev.{ch} so that all
SEV* functionality can be consolidated in one place.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210427111636.1207-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/paravirt: Have only one paravirt patch function

2021-03-11T19:11:09+00:00

There is no need any longer to have different paravirt patch functions
for native and Xen. Eliminate native_patch() and rename
paravirt_patch_default() to paravirt_patch().

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210311142319.4723-15-jgross@suse.com

x86/apb_timer: Remove driver for deprecated platform

2021-02-09T14:28:37+00:00

Intel Moorestown and Medfield are quite old Intel Atom based
32-bit platforms, which were in limited use in some Android phones,
tablets and consumer electronics more than eight years ago.

There are no bugs or problems ever reported outside from Intel
for breaking any of that platforms for years. It seems no real
users exists who run more or less fresh kernel on it. Commit
05f4434bc130 ("ASoC: Intel: remove mfld_machine") is also in align
with this theory.

Due to above and to reduce a burden of supporting outdated drivers,
remove the support for outdated platforms completely.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko 
Acked-by: Linus Walleij 
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki

ima: generalize x86/EFI arch glue for other EFI architectures

2020-11-06T06:40:42+00:00

Move the x86 IMA arch code into security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c,
so that we will be able to wire it up for arm64 in a future patch.

Co-developed-by: Chester Lin 
Signed-off-by: Chester Lin 
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel

x86/head/64: Disable stack protection for head$(BITS).o

2020-10-19T11:11:00+00:00

On 64-bit, the startup_64_setup_env() function added in

  866b556efa12 ("x86/head/64: Install startup GDT")

has stack protection enabled because of set_bringup_idt_handler().
This happens when CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is enabled. It
also currently needs CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled because then
set_bringup_idt_handler() is not an empty stub but that might change in
the future, when the other vendor adds their similar technology.

At this point, %gs is not yet initialized, and this doesn't cause a
crash only because the #PF handler from the decompressor stub is still
installed and handles the page fault.

Disable stack protection for the whole file, and do it on 32-bit as
well to avoid surprises.

 [ bp: Extend commit message with the exact explanation how it happens. ]

Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201008191623.2881677-6-nivedita@alum.mit.edu

Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2020-10-14T17:21:34+00:00

Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
 "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
  by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
  inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
  switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
  exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.

  With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
  hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
  mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
  Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
  Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
  between the guest and the hypervisor.

  Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
  so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
  code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
  brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
  boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
  building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
  not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
  one.

  The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
  mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
  from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
  SEV-ES-specific files:

    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c

  Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
  behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
  setups.

  Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"

* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
  x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
  x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
  x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
  x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
  x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
  x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
  x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
  x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
  x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
  x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
  x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
  ...

x86/sev-es: Setup GHCB-based boot #VC handler

2020-09-09T09:32:27+00:00

Add the infrastructure to handle #VC exceptions when the kernel runs on
virtual addresses and has mapped a GHCB. This handler will be used until
the runtime #VC handler takes over.

Since the handler runs very early, disable instrumentation for sev-es.c.

 [ bp: Make vc_ghcb_invalidate() __always_inline so that it can be
   inlined in noinstr functions like __sev_es_nmi_complete(). ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908123816.GB3764@8bytes.org

x86/sev-es: Compile early handler code into kernel image

2020-09-09T08:44:46+00:00

Setup sev-es.c and include the code from the pre-decompression stage
to also build it into the image of the running kernel. Temporarily add
__maybe_unused annotations to avoid build warnings until the functions
get used.

 [ bp: Use the non-tracing rd/wrmsr variants because:
   vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __sev_es_nmi_complete()+0x11f: \
	   call to do_trace_write_msr() leaves .noinstr.text section
   as __sev_es_nmi_complete() is noinstr due to being called from the
   NMI handler exc_nmi(). ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-39-joro@8bytes.org

x86/static_call: Add out-of-line static call implementation

2020-09-01T07:58:05+00:00

Add the x86 out-of-line static call implementation.  For each key, a
permanent trampoline is created which is the destination for all static
calls for the given key.  The trampoline has a direct jump which gets
patched by static_call_update() when the destination function changes.

[peterz: fixed trampoline, rewrote patching code]

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200818135804.804315175@infradead.org