<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/include, branch v6.14</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2025-03-09T19:04:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-09T19:04:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a382b06d297e78ed7ac67afd0d8e8690406ac4ca'/>
<id>a382b06d297e78ed7ac67afd0d8e8690406ac4ca</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "arm64:

   - Fix a couple of bugs affecting pKVM's PSCI relay implementation
     when running in the hVHE mode, resulting in the host being entered
     with the MMU in an unknown state, and EL2 being in the wrong mode

  x86:

   - Set RFLAGS.IF in C code on SVM to get VMRUN out of the STI shadow

   - Ensure DEBUGCTL is context switched on AMD to avoid running the
     guest with the host's value, which can lead to unexpected bus lock
     #DBs

   - Suppress DEBUGCTL.BTF on AMD (to match Intel), as KVM doesn't
     properly emulate BTF. KVM's lack of context switching has meant BTF
     has always been broken to some extent

   - Always save DR masks for SNP vCPUs if DebugSwap is *supported*, as
     the guest can enable DebugSwap without KVM's knowledge

   - Fix a bug in mmu_stress_tests where a vCPU could finish the "writes
     to RO memory" phase without actually generating a write-protection
     fault

   - Fix a printf() goof in the SEV smoke test that causes build
     failures with -Werror

   - Explicitly zero EAX and EBX in CPUID.0x8000_0022 output when
     PERFMON_V2 isn't supported by KVM"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  KVM: x86: Explicitly zero EAX and EBX when PERFMON_V2 isn't supported by KVM
  KVM: selftests: Fix printf() format goof in SEV smoke test
  KVM: selftests: Ensure all vCPUs hit -EFAULT during initial RO stage
  KVM: SVM: Don't rely on DebugSwap to restore host DR0..DR3
  KVM: SVM: Save host DR masks on CPUs with DebugSwap
  KVM: arm64: Initialize SCTLR_EL1 in __kvm_hyp_init_cpu()
  KVM: arm64: Initialize HCR_EL2.E2H early
  KVM: x86: Snapshot the host's DEBUGCTL after disabling IRQs
  KVM: SVM: Manually context switch DEBUGCTL if LBR virtualization is disabled
  KVM: x86: Snapshot the host's DEBUGCTL in common x86
  KVM: SVM: Suppress DEBUGCTL.BTF on AMD
  KVM: SVM: Drop DEBUGCTL[5:2] from guest's effective value
  KVM: selftests: Assert that STI blocking isn't set after event injection
  KVM: SVM: Set RFLAGS.IF=1 in C code, to get VMRUN out of the STI shadow
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "arm64:

   - Fix a couple of bugs affecting pKVM's PSCI relay implementation
     when running in the hVHE mode, resulting in the host being entered
     with the MMU in an unknown state, and EL2 being in the wrong mode

  x86:

   - Set RFLAGS.IF in C code on SVM to get VMRUN out of the STI shadow

   - Ensure DEBUGCTL is context switched on AMD to avoid running the
     guest with the host's value, which can lead to unexpected bus lock
     #DBs

   - Suppress DEBUGCTL.BTF on AMD (to match Intel), as KVM doesn't
     properly emulate BTF. KVM's lack of context switching has meant BTF
     has always been broken to some extent

   - Always save DR masks for SNP vCPUs if DebugSwap is *supported*, as
     the guest can enable DebugSwap without KVM's knowledge

   - Fix a bug in mmu_stress_tests where a vCPU could finish the "writes
     to RO memory" phase without actually generating a write-protection
     fault

   - Fix a printf() goof in the SEV smoke test that causes build
     failures with -Werror

   - Explicitly zero EAX and EBX in CPUID.0x8000_0022 output when
     PERFMON_V2 isn't supported by KVM"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  KVM: x86: Explicitly zero EAX and EBX when PERFMON_V2 isn't supported by KVM
  KVM: selftests: Fix printf() format goof in SEV smoke test
  KVM: selftests: Ensure all vCPUs hit -EFAULT during initial RO stage
  KVM: SVM: Don't rely on DebugSwap to restore host DR0..DR3
  KVM: SVM: Save host DR masks on CPUs with DebugSwap
  KVM: arm64: Initialize SCTLR_EL1 in __kvm_hyp_init_cpu()
  KVM: arm64: Initialize HCR_EL2.E2H early
  KVM: x86: Snapshot the host's DEBUGCTL after disabling IRQs
  KVM: SVM: Manually context switch DEBUGCTL if LBR virtualization is disabled
  KVM: x86: Snapshot the host's DEBUGCTL in common x86
  KVM: SVM: Suppress DEBUGCTL.BTF on AMD
  KVM: SVM: Drop DEBUGCTL[5:2] from guest's effective value
  KVM: selftests: Assert that STI blocking isn't set after event injection
  KVM: SVM: Set RFLAGS.IF=1 in C code, to get VMRUN out of the STI shadow
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'kvm-x86-fixes-6.14-rcN.2' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD</title>
<updated>2025-03-09T07:44:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-09T07:44:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ea9bd29a9c0d757b3384ae3e633e6bbaddf00725'/>
<id>ea9bd29a9c0d757b3384ae3e633e6bbaddf00725</id>
<content type='text'>
KVM x86 fixes for 6.14-rcN #2

 - Set RFLAGS.IF in C code on SVM to get VMRUN out of the STI shadow.

 - Ensure DEBUGCTL is context switched on AMD to avoid running the guest with
   the host's value, which can lead to unexpected bus lock #DBs.

 - Suppress DEBUGCTL.BTF on AMD (to match Intel), as KVM doesn't properly
   emulate BTF.  KVM's lack of context switching has meant BTF has always been
   broken to some extent.

 - Always save DR masks for SNP vCPUs if DebugSwap is *supported*, as the guest
   can enable DebugSwap without KVM's knowledge.

 - Fix a bug in mmu_stress_tests where a vCPU could finish the "writes to RO
   memory" phase without actually generating a write-protection fault.

 - Fix a printf() goof in the SEV smoke test that causes build failures with
   -Werror.

 - Explicitly zero EAX and EBX in CPUID.0x8000_0022 output when PERFMON_V2
   isn't supported by KVM.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
KVM x86 fixes for 6.14-rcN #2

 - Set RFLAGS.IF in C code on SVM to get VMRUN out of the STI shadow.

 - Ensure DEBUGCTL is context switched on AMD to avoid running the guest with
   the host's value, which can lead to unexpected bus lock #DBs.

 - Suppress DEBUGCTL.BTF on AMD (to match Intel), as KVM doesn't properly
   emulate BTF.  KVM's lack of context switching has meant BTF has always been
   broken to some extent.

 - Always save DR masks for SNP vCPUs if DebugSwap is *supported*, as the guest
   can enable DebugSwap without KVM's knowledge.

 - Fix a bug in mmu_stress_tests where a vCPU could finish the "writes to RO
   memory" phase without actually generating a write-protection fault.

 - Fix a printf() goof in the SEV smoke test that causes build failures with
   -Werror.

 - Explicitly zero EAX and EBX in CPUID.0x8000_0022 output when PERFMON_V2
   isn't supported by KVM.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm: Define PTRS_PER_PMD for assembly code too</title>
<updated>2025-03-07T23:09:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-06T22:00:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6914f7e2e25fac9d1d2b62c208eaa5f2bf810fe9'/>
<id>6914f7e2e25fac9d1d2b62c208eaa5f2bf810fe9</id>
<content type='text'>
Andy reported the following build warning from head_32.S:

  In file included from arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S:29:
  arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h:59:5: error: "PTRS_PER_PMD" is not defined, evaluates to 0 [-Werror=undef]
       59 | #if PTRS_PER_PMD &gt; 1

The reason is that on 2-level i386 paging the folded in PMD's
PTRS_PER_PMD constant is not defined in assembly headers,
only in generic MM C headers.

Instead of trying to fish out the definition from the generic
headers, just define it - it even has a comment for it already...

Reported-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z8oa8AUVyi2HWfo9@gmail.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Andy reported the following build warning from head_32.S:

  In file included from arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S:29:
  arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h:59:5: error: "PTRS_PER_PMD" is not defined, evaluates to 0 [-Werror=undef]
       59 | #if PTRS_PER_PMD &gt; 1

The reason is that on 2-level i386 paging the folded in PMD's
PTRS_PER_PMD constant is not defined in assembly headers,
only in generic MM C headers.

Instead of trying to fish out the definition from the generic
headers, just define it - it even has a comment for it already...

Reported-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z8oa8AUVyi2HWfo9@gmail.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest Request data pages handling under snp_cmd_mutex</title>
<updated>2025-03-07T13:09:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Kardashevskiy</name>
<email>aik@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-07T01:37:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3e385c0d6ce88ac9916dcf84267bd5855d830748'/>
<id>3e385c0d6ce88ac9916dcf84267bd5855d830748</id>
<content type='text'>
Compared to the SNP Guest Request, the "Extended" version adds data pages for
receiving certificates. If not enough pages provided, the HV can report to the
VM how much is needed so the VM can reallocate and repeat.

Commit

  ae596615d93d ("virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex")

moved handling of the allocated/desired pages number out of scope of said
mutex and create a possibility for a race (multiple instances trying to
trigger Extended request in a VM) as there is just one instance of
snp_msg_desc per /dev/sev-guest and no locking other than snp_cmd_mutex.

Fix the issue by moving the data blob/size and the GHCB input struct
(snp_req_data) into snp_guest_req which is allocated on stack now and accessed
by the GHCB caller under that mutex.

Stop allocating SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE in snp_msg_alloc() as only one of four
callers needs it. Free the received blob in get_ext_report() right after it is
copied to the userspace. Possible future users of snp_send_guest_request() are
likely to have different ideas about the buffer size anyways.

Fixes: ae596615d93d ("virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania &lt;nikunj@amd.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307013700.437505-3-aik@amd.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Compared to the SNP Guest Request, the "Extended" version adds data pages for
receiving certificates. If not enough pages provided, the HV can report to the
VM how much is needed so the VM can reallocate and repeat.

Commit

  ae596615d93d ("virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex")

moved handling of the allocated/desired pages number out of scope of said
mutex and create a possibility for a race (multiple instances trying to
trigger Extended request in a VM) as there is just one instance of
snp_msg_desc per /dev/sev-guest and no locking other than snp_cmd_mutex.

Fix the issue by moving the data blob/size and the GHCB input struct
(snp_req_data) into snp_guest_req which is allocated on stack now and accessed
by the GHCB caller under that mutex.

Stop allocating SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE in snp_msg_alloc() as only one of four
callers needs it. Free the received blob in get_ext_report() right after it is
copied to the userspace. Possible future users of snp_send_guest_request() are
likely to have different ideas about the buffer size anyways.

Fixes: ae596615d93d ("virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy &lt;aik@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania &lt;nikunj@amd.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307013700.437505-3-aik@amd.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Add a conditional CS prefix to CALL_NOSPEC</title>
<updated>2025-03-03T11:04:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-01T02:35:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=9af9ad85ac44cb754e526d468c3006b48db5dfd8'/>
<id>9af9ad85ac44cb754e526d468c3006b48db5dfd8</id>
<content type='text'>
Retpoline mitigation for spectre-v2 uses thunks for indirect branches. To
support this mitigation compilers add a CS prefix with
-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix. For an indirect branch in asm, this needs to
be added manually.

CS prefix is already being added to indirect branches in asm files, but not
in inline asm. Add CS prefix to CALL_NOSPEC for inline asm as well. There
is no JMP_NOSPEC for inline asm.

Reported-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228-call-nospec-v3-2-96599fed0f33@linux.intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Retpoline mitigation for spectre-v2 uses thunks for indirect branches. To
support this mitigation compilers add a CS prefix with
-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix. For an indirect branch in asm, this needs to
be added manually.

CS prefix is already being added to indirect branches in asm files, but not
in inline asm. Add CS prefix to CALL_NOSPEC for inline asm as well. There
is no JMP_NOSPEC for inline asm.

Reported-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228-call-nospec-v3-2-96599fed0f33@linux.intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Simplify and make CALL_NOSPEC consistent</title>
<updated>2025-03-03T11:04:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-01T02:35:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=010c4a461c1dbf3fa75ddea8df018a6128b700c6'/>
<id>010c4a461c1dbf3fa75ddea8df018a6128b700c6</id>
<content type='text'>
CALL_NOSPEC macro is used to generate Spectre-v2 mitigation friendly
indirect branches. At compile time the macro defaults to indirect branch,
and at runtime those can be patched to thunk based mitigations.

This approach is opposite of what is done for the rest of the kernel, where
the compile time default is to replace indirect calls with retpoline thunk
calls.

Make CALL_NOSPEC consistent with the rest of the kernel, default to
retpoline thunk at compile time when CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is
enabled.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228-call-nospec-v3-1-96599fed0f33@linux.intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
CALL_NOSPEC macro is used to generate Spectre-v2 mitigation friendly
indirect branches. At compile time the macro defaults to indirect branch,
and at runtime those can be patched to thunk based mitigations.

This approach is opposite of what is done for the rest of the kernel, where
the compile time default is to replace indirect calls with retpoline thunk
calls.

Make CALL_NOSPEC consistent with the rest of the kernel, default to
retpoline thunk at compile time when CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is
enabled.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228-call-nospec-v3-1-96599fed0f33@linux.intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Snapshot the host's DEBUGCTL in common x86</title>
<updated>2025-02-28T17:17:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-27T22:24:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=fb71c795935652fa20eaf9517ca9547f5af99a76'/>
<id>fb71c795935652fa20eaf9517ca9547f5af99a76</id>
<content type='text'>
Move KVM's snapshot of DEBUGCTL to kvm_vcpu_arch and take the snapshot in
common x86, so that SVM can also use the snapshot.

Opportunistically change the field to a u64.  While bits 63:32 are reserved
on AMD, not mentioned at all in Intel's SDM, and managed as an "unsigned
long" by the kernel, DEBUGCTL is an MSR and therefore a 64-bit value.

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li &lt;xiaoyao.li@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227222411.3490595-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move KVM's snapshot of DEBUGCTL to kvm_vcpu_arch and take the snapshot in
common x86, so that SVM can also use the snapshot.

Opportunistically change the field to a u64.  While bits 63:32 are reserved
on AMD, not mentioned at all in Intel's SDM, and managed as an "unsigned
long" by the kernel, DEBUGCTL is an MSR and therefore a 64-bit value.

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li &lt;xiaoyao.li@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227222411.3490595-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'perf_urgent_for_v6.14_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2025-02-16T18:41:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-16T18:41:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ff1848d81ca63e49bce57c29ffb12c6539333ac4'/>
<id>ff1848d81ca63e49bce57c29ffb12c6539333ac4</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:

 - Explicitly clear DEBUGCTL.LBR to prevent LBRs continuing being
   enabled after handoff to the OS

 - Check CPUID(0x23) leaf and subleafs presence properly

 - Remove the PEBS-via-PT feature from being supported on hybrid systems

 - Fix perf record/top default commands on systems without a raw PMU
   registered

* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v6.14_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  perf/x86/intel: Ensure LBRs are disabled when a CPU is starting
  perf/x86/intel: Fix ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF
  perf/x86/intel: Clean up PEBS-via-PT on hybrid
  perf/x86/rapl: Fix the error checking order
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:

 - Explicitly clear DEBUGCTL.LBR to prevent LBRs continuing being
   enabled after handoff to the OS

 - Check CPUID(0x23) leaf and subleafs presence properly

 - Remove the PEBS-via-PT feature from being supported on hybrid systems

 - Fix perf record/top default commands on systems without a raw PMU
   registered

* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v6.14_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  perf/x86/intel: Ensure LBRs are disabled when a CPU is starting
  perf/x86/intel: Fix ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF
  perf/x86/intel: Clean up PEBS-via-PT on hybrid
  perf/x86/rapl: Fix the error checking order
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'kvm-x86-fixes-6.14-rcN' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD</title>
<updated>2025-02-15T00:08:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-15T00:08:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d3d0b8dfe06098d6d584266c35e9a0947f5b7132'/>
<id>d3d0b8dfe06098d6d584266c35e9a0947f5b7132</id>
<content type='text'>
KVM fixes for 6.14 part 1

 - Reject Hyper-V SEND_IPI hypercalls if the local APIC isn't being emulated
   by KVM to fix a NULL pointer dereference.

 - Enter guest mode (L2) from KVM's perspective before initializing the vCPU's
   nested NPT MMU so that the MMU is properly tagged for L2, not L1.

 - Load the guest's DR6 outside of the innermost .vcpu_run() loop, as the
   guest's value may be stale if a VM-Exit is handled in the fastpath.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
KVM fixes for 6.14 part 1

 - Reject Hyper-V SEND_IPI hypercalls if the local APIC isn't being emulated
   by KVM to fix a NULL pointer dereference.

 - Enter guest mode (L2) from KVM's perspective before initializing the vCPU's
   nested NPT MMU so that the MMU is properly tagged for L2, not L1.

 - Load the guest's DR6 outside of the innermost .vcpu_run() loop, as the
   guest's value may be stale if a VM-Exit is handled in the fastpath.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Fix broken SNP support with KVM module built-in</title>
<updated>2025-02-14T23:39:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashish Kalra</name>
<email>ashish.kalra@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-10T22:54:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=409f45387c937145adeeeebc6d6032c2ec232b35'/>
<id>409f45387c937145adeeeebc6d6032c2ec232b35</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix issues with enabling SNP host support and effectively SNP support
which is broken with respect to the KVM module being built-in.

SNP host support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() which is invoked as
device_initcall(). SNP check on IOMMU is done during IOMMU PCI init
(IOMMU_PCI_INIT stage). And for that reason snp_rmptable_init() is
currently invoked via device_initcall() and cannot be invoked via
subsys_initcall() as core IOMMU subsystem gets initialized via
subsys_initcall().

Now, if kvm_amd module is built-in, it gets initialized before SNP host
support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() :

[   10.131811] kvm_amd: TSC scaling supported
[   10.136384] kvm_amd: Nested Virtualization enabled
[   10.141734] kvm_amd: Nested Paging enabled
[   10.146304] kvm_amd: LBR virtualization supported
[   10.151557] kvm_amd: SEV enabled (ASIDs 100 - 509)
[   10.156905] kvm_amd: SEV-ES enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99)
[   10.162256] kvm_amd: SEV-SNP enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99)
[   10.171508] kvm_amd: Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE supported
[   10.177052] kvm_amd: Virtual GIF supported
...
...
[   10.201648] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu

And then svm_x86_ops-&gt;enable_virtualization_cpu()
(svm_enable_virtualization_cpu) programs MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA as following:
wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, sd-&gt;save_area_pa);

So VM_HSAVE_PA is non-zero before SNP support is enabled on all CPUs.

snp_rmptable_init() gets invoked after svm_enable_virtualization_cpu()
as following :
...
[   11.256138] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu
...
[   11.264918] SEV-SNP: in snp_rmptable_init

This triggers a #GP exception in snp_rmptable_init() when snp_enable()
is invoked to set SNP_EN in SYSCFG MSR:

[   11.294289] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010010 (tried to write 0x0000000003fc0000) at rIP: 0xffffffffaf5d5c28 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30)
...
[   11.294404] Call Trace:
[   11.294482]  &lt;IRQ&gt;
[   11.294513]  ? show_stack_regs+0x26/0x30
[   11.294522]  ? ex_handler_msr+0x10f/0x180
[   11.294529]  ? search_extable+0x2b/0x40
[   11.294538]  ? fixup_exception+0x2dd/0x340
[   11.294542]  ? exc_general_protection+0x14f/0x440
[   11.294550]  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x2b/0x30
[   11.294557]  ? __pfx_snp_enable+0x10/0x10
[   11.294567]  ? native_write_msr+0x8/0x30
[   11.294570]  ? __snp_enable+0x5d/0x70
[   11.294575]  snp_enable+0x19/0x20
[   11.294578]  __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x9c/0x3a0
[   11.294586]  generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x17/0x20
[   11.294589]  __sysvec_call_function+0x20/0x90
[   11.294596]  sysvec_call_function+0x80/0xb0
[   11.294601]  &lt;/IRQ&gt;
[   11.294603]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   11.294605]  asm_sysvec_call_function+0x1f/0x30
...
[   11.294631]  arch_cpu_idle+0xd/0x20
[   11.294633]  default_idle_call+0x34/0xd0
[   11.294636]  do_idle+0x1f1/0x230
[   11.294643]  ? complete+0x71/0x80
[   11.294649]  cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x40
[   11.294652]  start_secondary+0x12d/0x160
[   11.294655]  common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[   11.294662]  &lt;/TASK&gt;

This #GP exception is getting triggered due to the following errata for
AMD family 19h Models 10h-1Fh Processors:

Processor may generate spurious #GP(0) Exception on WRMSR instruction:
Description:
The Processor will generate a spurious #GP(0) Exception on a WRMSR
instruction if the following conditions are all met:
- the target of the WRMSR is a SYSCFG register.
- the write changes the value of SYSCFG.SNPEn from 0 to 1.
- One of the threads that share the physical core has a non-zero
value in the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR.

The document being referred to above:
https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/revision-guides/57095-PUB_1_01.pdf

To summarize, with kvm_amd module being built-in, KVM/SVM initialization
happens before host SNP is enabled and this SVM initialization
sets VM_HSAVE_PA to non-zero, which then triggers a #GP when
SYSCFG.SNPEn is being set and this will subsequently cause
SNP_INIT(_EX) to fail with INVALID_CONFIG error as SYSCFG[SnpEn] is not
set on all CPUs.

Essentially SNP host enabling code should be invoked before KVM
initialization, which is currently not the case when KVM is built-in.

Add fix to call snp_rmptable_init() early from iommu_snp_enable()
directly and not invoked via device_initcall() which enables SNP host
support before KVM initialization with kvm_amd module built-in.

Add additional handling for `iommu=off` or `amd_iommu=off` options.

Note that IOMMUs need to be enabled for SNP initialization, therefore,
if host SNP support is enabled but late IOMMU initialization fails
then that will cause PSP driver's SNP_INIT to fail as IOMMU SNP sanity
checks in SNP firmware will fail with invalid configuration error as
below:

[    9.723114] ccp 0000:23:00.1: sev enabled
[    9.727602] ccp 0000:23:00.1: psp enabled
[    9.732527] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: enabling device (0000 -&gt; 0002)
[    9.739098] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: no command queues available
[    9.745167] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: psp enabled
[    9.805337] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV-SNP: failed to INIT rc -5, error 0x3
[    9.866426] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV API:1.53 build:5

Fixes: c3b86e61b756 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature")
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;vasant.hegde@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;vasant.hegde@amd.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;Stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;138b520fb83964782303b43ade4369cd181fdd9c.1739226950.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix issues with enabling SNP host support and effectively SNP support
which is broken with respect to the KVM module being built-in.

SNP host support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() which is invoked as
device_initcall(). SNP check on IOMMU is done during IOMMU PCI init
(IOMMU_PCI_INIT stage). And for that reason snp_rmptable_init() is
currently invoked via device_initcall() and cannot be invoked via
subsys_initcall() as core IOMMU subsystem gets initialized via
subsys_initcall().

Now, if kvm_amd module is built-in, it gets initialized before SNP host
support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() :

[   10.131811] kvm_amd: TSC scaling supported
[   10.136384] kvm_amd: Nested Virtualization enabled
[   10.141734] kvm_amd: Nested Paging enabled
[   10.146304] kvm_amd: LBR virtualization supported
[   10.151557] kvm_amd: SEV enabled (ASIDs 100 - 509)
[   10.156905] kvm_amd: SEV-ES enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99)
[   10.162256] kvm_amd: SEV-SNP enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99)
[   10.171508] kvm_amd: Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE supported
[   10.177052] kvm_amd: Virtual GIF supported
...
...
[   10.201648] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu

And then svm_x86_ops-&gt;enable_virtualization_cpu()
(svm_enable_virtualization_cpu) programs MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA as following:
wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, sd-&gt;save_area_pa);

So VM_HSAVE_PA is non-zero before SNP support is enabled on all CPUs.

snp_rmptable_init() gets invoked after svm_enable_virtualization_cpu()
as following :
...
[   11.256138] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu
...
[   11.264918] SEV-SNP: in snp_rmptable_init

This triggers a #GP exception in snp_rmptable_init() when snp_enable()
is invoked to set SNP_EN in SYSCFG MSR:

[   11.294289] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010010 (tried to write 0x0000000003fc0000) at rIP: 0xffffffffaf5d5c28 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30)
...
[   11.294404] Call Trace:
[   11.294482]  &lt;IRQ&gt;
[   11.294513]  ? show_stack_regs+0x26/0x30
[   11.294522]  ? ex_handler_msr+0x10f/0x180
[   11.294529]  ? search_extable+0x2b/0x40
[   11.294538]  ? fixup_exception+0x2dd/0x340
[   11.294542]  ? exc_general_protection+0x14f/0x440
[   11.294550]  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x2b/0x30
[   11.294557]  ? __pfx_snp_enable+0x10/0x10
[   11.294567]  ? native_write_msr+0x8/0x30
[   11.294570]  ? __snp_enable+0x5d/0x70
[   11.294575]  snp_enable+0x19/0x20
[   11.294578]  __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x9c/0x3a0
[   11.294586]  generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x17/0x20
[   11.294589]  __sysvec_call_function+0x20/0x90
[   11.294596]  sysvec_call_function+0x80/0xb0
[   11.294601]  &lt;/IRQ&gt;
[   11.294603]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   11.294605]  asm_sysvec_call_function+0x1f/0x30
...
[   11.294631]  arch_cpu_idle+0xd/0x20
[   11.294633]  default_idle_call+0x34/0xd0
[   11.294636]  do_idle+0x1f1/0x230
[   11.294643]  ? complete+0x71/0x80
[   11.294649]  cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x40
[   11.294652]  start_secondary+0x12d/0x160
[   11.294655]  common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[   11.294662]  &lt;/TASK&gt;

This #GP exception is getting triggered due to the following errata for
AMD family 19h Models 10h-1Fh Processors:

Processor may generate spurious #GP(0) Exception on WRMSR instruction:
Description:
The Processor will generate a spurious #GP(0) Exception on a WRMSR
instruction if the following conditions are all met:
- the target of the WRMSR is a SYSCFG register.
- the write changes the value of SYSCFG.SNPEn from 0 to 1.
- One of the threads that share the physical core has a non-zero
value in the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR.

The document being referred to above:
https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/revision-guides/57095-PUB_1_01.pdf

To summarize, with kvm_amd module being built-in, KVM/SVM initialization
happens before host SNP is enabled and this SVM initialization
sets VM_HSAVE_PA to non-zero, which then triggers a #GP when
SYSCFG.SNPEn is being set and this will subsequently cause
SNP_INIT(_EX) to fail with INVALID_CONFIG error as SYSCFG[SnpEn] is not
set on all CPUs.

Essentially SNP host enabling code should be invoked before KVM
initialization, which is currently not the case when KVM is built-in.

Add fix to call snp_rmptable_init() early from iommu_snp_enable()
directly and not invoked via device_initcall() which enables SNP host
support before KVM initialization with kvm_amd module built-in.

Add additional handling for `iommu=off` or `amd_iommu=off` options.

Note that IOMMUs need to be enabled for SNP initialization, therefore,
if host SNP support is enabled but late IOMMU initialization fails
then that will cause PSP driver's SNP_INIT to fail as IOMMU SNP sanity
checks in SNP firmware will fail with invalid configuration error as
below:

[    9.723114] ccp 0000:23:00.1: sev enabled
[    9.727602] ccp 0000:23:00.1: psp enabled
[    9.732527] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: enabling device (0000 -&gt; 0002)
[    9.739098] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: no command queues available
[    9.745167] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: psp enabled
[    9.805337] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV-SNP: failed to INIT rc -5, error 0x3
[    9.866426] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV API:1.53 build:5

Fixes: c3b86e61b756 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature")
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;vasant.hegde@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde &lt;vasant.hegde@amd.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;Stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;138b520fb83964782303b43ade4369cd181fdd9c.1739226950.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
