Pull x86 spectre fixes from Borislav Petkov:

 - Mitigate Spectre v2-type Branch History Buffer attacks on machines
   which support eIBRS, i.e., the hardware-assisted speculation
   restriction after it has been shown that such machines are vulnerable
   even with the hardware mitigation.

 - Do not use the default LFENCE-based Spectre v2 mitigation on AMD as
   it is insufficient to mitigate such attacks. Instead, switch to
   retpolines on all AMD by default.

 - Update the docs and add some warnings for the obviously vulnerable
   cmdline configurations.

* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT
  x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation
  x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
  x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD
  x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting
  Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc
  x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options
  x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE

Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "x86 host:

   - Expose KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP since it is supported

   - Disable KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING in TSC catchup mode

   - Ensure async page fault token is nonzero

   - Fix lockdep false negative

   - Fix FPU migration regression from the AMX changes

  x86 guest:

   - Don't use PV TLB/IPI/yield on uniprocessor guests

  PPC:

   - reserve capability id (topic branch for ppc/kvm)"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  KVM: x86: nSVM: disallow userspace setting of MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO to non default value when tsc scaling disabled
  KVM: x86/mmu: make apf token non-zero to fix bug
  KVM: PPC: reserve capability 210 for KVM_CAP_PPC_AIL_MODE_3
  x86/kvm: Don't use pv tlb/ipi/sched_yield if on 1 vCPU
  x86/kvm: Fix compilation warning in non-x86_64 builds
  x86/kvm/fpu: Remove kvm_vcpu_arch.guest_supported_xcr0
  x86/kvm/fpu: Limit guest user_xfeatures to supported bits of XCR0
  kvm: x86: Disable KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING if tsc is in always catchup mode
  KVM: Fix lockdep false negative during host resume
  KVM: x86: Add KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP to x86

Thanks to the chaps at VUsec it is now clear that eIBRS is not
sufficient, therefore allow enabling of retpolines along with eIBRS.

Add spectre_v2=eibrs, spectre_v2=eibrs,lfence and
spectre_v2=eibrs,retpoline options to explicitly pick your preferred
means of mitigation.

Since there's new mitigations there's also user visible changes in
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 to reflect these
new mitigations.

  [ bp: Massage commit message, trim error messages,
    do more precise eIBRS mode checking. ]

Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Colp <patrick.colp@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

The RETPOLINE_AMD name is unfortunate since it isn't necessarily
AMD only, in fact Hygon also uses it. Furthermore it will likely be
sufficient for some Intel processors. Therefore rename the thing to
RETPOLINE_LFENCE to better describe what it is.

Add the spectre_v2=retpoline,lfence option as an alias to
spectre_v2=retpoline,amd to preserve existing setups. However, the output
of /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 will be changed.

  [ bp: Fix typos, massage. ]

Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

kvm_vcpu_arch currently contains the guest supported features in both
guest_supported_xcr0 and guest_fpu.fpstate->user_xfeatures field.

Currently both fields are set to the same value in
kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid() and are not changed anywhere else after that.

Since it's not good to keep duplicated data, remove guest_supported_xcr0.

To keep the code more readable, introduce kvm_guest_supported_xcr()
and kvm_guest_supported_xfd() to replace the previous usages of
guest_supported_xcr0.

Signed-off-by: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220217053028.96432-3-leobras@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM:

   - Read HW interrupt pending state from the HW

  x86:

   - Don't truncate the performance event mask on AMD

   - Fix Xen runstate updates to be atomic when preempting vCPU

   - Fix for AMD AVIC interrupt injection race

   - Several other AMD fixes"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  KVM: x86/pmu: Use AMD64_RAW_EVENT_MASK for PERF_TYPE_RAW
  KVM: x86/pmu: Don't truncate the PerfEvtSeln MSR when creating a perf event
  KVM: SVM: fix race between interrupt delivery and AVIC inhibition
  KVM: SVM: set IRR in svm_deliver_interrupt
  KVM: SVM: extract avic_ring_doorbell
  selftests: kvm: Remove absent target file
  KVM: arm64: vgic: Read HW interrupt pending state from the HW
  KVM: x86/xen: Fix runstate updates to be atomic when preempting vCPU
  KVM: x86: SVM: move avic definitions from AMD's spec to svm.h
  KVM: x86: lapic: don't touch irr_pending in kvm_apic_update_apicv when inhibiting it
  KVM: x86: nSVM: deal with L1 hypervisor that intercepts interrupts but lets L2 control them
  KVM: x86: nSVM: expose clean bit support to the guest
  KVM: x86: nSVM/nVMX: set nested_run_pending on VM entry which is a result of RSM
  KVM: x86: nSVM: mark vmcb01 as dirty when restoring SMM saved state
  KVM: x86: nSVM: fix potential NULL derefernce on nested migration
  KVM: x86: SVM: don't passthrough SMAP/SMEP/PKE bits in !NPT && !gCR0.PG case
  Revert "svm: Add warning message for AVIC IPI invalid target"

Pull objtool fix from Borislav Petkov:
 "Fix a case where objtool would mistakenly warn about instructions
  being unreachable"

* tag 'objtool_urgent_for_v5.17_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/bug: Merge annotate_reachable() into _BUG_FLAGS() asm

Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross:

 - Two small cleanups

 - Another fix for addressing the EFI framebuffer above 4GB when running
   as Xen dom0

 - A patch to let Xen guests use reserved bits in MSI- and IO-APIC-
   registers for extended APIC-IDs the same way KVM guests are doing it
   already

* tag 'for-linus-5.17a-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen/pci: Make use of the helper macro LIST_HEAD()
  xen/x2apic: Fix inconsistent indenting
  xen/x86: detect support for extended destination ID
  xen/x86: obtain full video frame buffer address for Dom0 also under EFI

Xen allows the usage of some previously reserved bits in the IO-APIC
RTE and the MSI address fields in order to store high bits for the
target APIC ID. Such feature is already implemented by QEMU/KVM and
HyperV, so in order to enable it just add the handler that checks for
it's presence.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220120152527.7524-3-roger.pau@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

asm/svm.h is the correct place for all values that are defined in
the SVM spec, and that includes AVIC.

Also add some values from the spec that were not defined before
and will be soon useful.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220207155447.840194-10-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>