Pull x86 retpoline fixlet from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Remove the ESP/RSP thunks for retpoline as they cannot ever work.

  Get rid of them before they show up in a release"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk

It doesn't make sense to have an indirect call thunk with esp/rsp as
retpoline code won't work correctly with the stack pointer register.
Removing it will help compiler writers to catch error in case such
a thunk call is emitted incorrectly.

Fixes: 76b043848fd2 ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support")
Suggested-by: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516658974-27852-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com

Pull x86 pti fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A small set of fixes for the meltdown/spectre mitigations:

   - Make kprobes aware of retpolines to prevent probes in the retpoline
     thunks.

   - Make the machine check exception speculation protected. MCE used to
     issue an indirect call directly from the ASM entry code. Convert
     that to a direct call into a C-function and issue the indirect call
     from there so the compiler can add the retpoline protection,

   - Make the vmexit_fill_RSB() assembly less stupid

   - Fix a typo in the PTI documentation"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB
  x86/pti: Document fix wrong index
  kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk
  kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes
  retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk
  x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected

The generated assembler for the C fill RSB inline asm operations has
several issues:

- The C code sets up the loop register, which is then immediately
  overwritten in __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER with the same value again.

- The C code also passes in the iteration count in another register, which
  is not used at all.

Remove these two unnecessary operations. Just rely on the single constant
passed to the macro for the iterations.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180117225328.15414-1-andi@firstfloor.org

Introduce start/end markers of __x86_indirect_thunk_* functions.
To make it easy, consolidate .text.__x86.indirect_thunk.* sections
to one .text.__x86.indirect_thunk section and put it in the
end of kernel text section and adds __indirect_thunk_start/end
so that other subsystem (e.g. kprobes) can identify it.

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151629206178.10241.6828804696410044771.stgit@devbox

The machine check idtentry uses an indirect branch directly from the low
level code. This evades the speculation protection.

Replace it by a direct call into C code and issue the indirect call there
so the compiler can apply the proper speculation protection.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by:Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Niced-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801181626290.1847@nanos

Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Misc fixes:

   - A rather involved set of memory hardware encryption fixes to
     support the early loading of microcode files via the initrd. These
     are larger than what we normally take at such a late -rc stage, but
     there are two mitigating factors: 1) much of the changes are
     limited to the SME code itself 2) being able to early load
     microcode has increased importance in the post-Meltdown/Spectre
     era.

   - An IRQ vector allocator fix

   - An Intel RDT driver use-after-free fix

   - An APIC driver bug fix/revert to make certain older systems boot
     again

   - A pkeys ABI fix

   - TSC calibration fixes

   - A kdump fix"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/apic/vector: Fix off by one in error path
  x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Prevent use after free
  x86/mm: Encrypt the initrd earlier for BSP microcode update
  x86/mm: Prepare sme_encrypt_kernel() for PAGE aligned encryption
  x86/mm: Centralize PMD flags in sme_encrypt_kernel()
  x86/mm: Use a struct to reduce parameters for SME PGD mapping
  x86/mm: Clean up register saving in the __enc_copy() assembly code
  x86/idt: Mark IDT tables __initconst
  Revert "x86/apic: Remove init_bsp_APIC()"
  x86/mm/pkeys: Fix fill_sig_info_pkey
  x86/tsc: Print tsc_khz, when it differs from cpu_khz
  x86/tsc: Fix erroneous TSC rate on Skylake Xeon
  x86/tsc: Future-proof native_calibrate_tsc()
  kdump: Write the correct address of mem_section into vmcoreinfo

Pull x86 pti bits and fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "This last update contains:

   - An objtool fix to prevent a segfault with the gold linker by
     changing the invocation order. That's not just for gold, it's a
     general robustness improvement.

   - An improved error message for objtool which spares tearing hairs.

   - Make KASAN fail loudly if there is not enough memory instead of
     oopsing at some random place later

   - RSB fill on context switch to prevent RSB underflow and speculation
     through other units.

   - Make the retpoline/RSB functionality work reliably for both Intel
     and AMD

   - Add retpoline to the module version magic so mismatch can be
     detected

   - A small (non-fix) update for cpufeatures which prevents cpu feature
     clashing for the upcoming extra mitigation bits to ease
     backporting"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  module: Add retpoline tag to VERMAGIC
  x86/cpufeature: Move processor tracing out of scattered features
  objtool: Improve error message for bad file argument
  objtool: Fix seg fault with gold linker
  x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros
  x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs
  x86/kasan: Panic if there is not enough memory to boot

Processor tracing is already enumerated in word 9 (CPUID[7,0].EBX),
so do not duplicate it in the scattered features word.

Besides being more tidy, this will be useful for KVM when it presents
processor tracing to the guests.  KVM selects host features that are
supported by both the host kernel (depending on command line options,
CPU errata, or whatever) and KVM.  Whenever a full feature word exists,
KVM's code is written in the expectation that the CPUID bit number
matches the X86_FEATURE_* bit number, but this is not the case for
X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516117345-34561-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Currently the BSP microcode update code examines the initrd very early
in the boot process.  If SME is active, the initrd is treated as being
encrypted but it has not been encrypted (in place) yet.  Update the
early boot code that encrypts the kernel to also encrypt the initrd so
that early BSP microcode updates work.

Tested-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110192634.6026.10452.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>