<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/include/uapi, branch v5.11</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2020-12-20T18:44:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-20T18:44:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6a447b0e3151893f6d4a889956553c06d2e775c6'/>
<id>6a447b0e3151893f6d4a889956553c06d2e775c6</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "Much x86 work was pushed out to 5.12, but ARM more than made up for it.

  ARM:
   - PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
   - New exception injection code
   - Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
   - Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
   - Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
   - Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
   - PV steal-time cleanups
   - Allow function pointers at EL2
   - Various host EL2 entry cleanups
   - Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation

  s390:
   - memcg accouting for s390 specific parts of kvm and gmap
   - selftest for diag318
   - new kvm_stat for when async_pf falls back to sync

  x86:
   - Tracepoints for the new pagetable code from 5.10
   - Catch VFIO and KVM irqfd events before userspace
   - Reporting dirty pages to userspace with a ring buffer
   - SEV-ES host support
   - Nested VMX support for wait-for-SIPI activity state
   - New feature flag (AVX512 FP16)
   - New system ioctl to report Hyper-V-compatible paravirtualization features

  Generic:
   - Selftest improvements"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (171 commits)
  KVM: SVM: fix 32-bit compilation
  KVM: SVM: Add AP_JUMP_TABLE support in prep for AP booting
  KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Provide an updated VMRUN invocation for SEV-ES guests
  KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU loading
  KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading
  KVM: SVM: Update ASID allocation to support SEV-ES guests
  KVM: SVM: Set the encryption mask for the SVM host save area
  KVM: SVM: Add NMI support for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Guest FPU state save/restore not needed for SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Do not report support for SMM for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: x86: Update __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to support SEV-ES
  KVM: SVM: Add support for CR8 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Add support for CR4 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Add support for CR0 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Add support for EFER write traps for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Support string IO operations for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Support MMIO for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT MSR protocol processing
  KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT processing
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "Much x86 work was pushed out to 5.12, but ARM more than made up for it.

  ARM:
   - PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
   - New exception injection code
   - Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
   - Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
   - Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
   - Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
   - PV steal-time cleanups
   - Allow function pointers at EL2
   - Various host EL2 entry cleanups
   - Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation

  s390:
   - memcg accouting for s390 specific parts of kvm and gmap
   - selftest for diag318
   - new kvm_stat for when async_pf falls back to sync

  x86:
   - Tracepoints for the new pagetable code from 5.10
   - Catch VFIO and KVM irqfd events before userspace
   - Reporting dirty pages to userspace with a ring buffer
   - SEV-ES host support
   - Nested VMX support for wait-for-SIPI activity state
   - New feature flag (AVX512 FP16)
   - New system ioctl to report Hyper-V-compatible paravirtualization features

  Generic:
   - Selftest improvements"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (171 commits)
  KVM: SVM: fix 32-bit compilation
  KVM: SVM: Add AP_JUMP_TABLE support in prep for AP booting
  KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Provide an updated VMRUN invocation for SEV-ES guests
  KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU loading
  KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading
  KVM: SVM: Update ASID allocation to support SEV-ES guests
  KVM: SVM: Set the encryption mask for the SVM host save area
  KVM: SVM: Add NMI support for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Guest FPU state save/restore not needed for SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Do not report support for SMM for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: x86: Update __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to support SEV-ES
  KVM: SVM: Add support for CR8 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Add support for CR4 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Add support for CR0 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Add support for EFER write traps for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Support string IO operations for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Support MMIO for an SEV-ES guest
  KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT MSR protocol processing
  KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT processing
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: Add support for CR8 write traps for an SEV-ES guest</title>
<updated>2020-12-15T10:20:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-10T17:09:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d1949b93c60504b338c89cf8b3873c0d11feb7ed'/>
<id>d1949b93c60504b338c89cf8b3873c0d11feb7ed</id>
<content type='text'>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR8 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;5a01033f4c8b3106ca9374b7cadf8e33da852df1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR8 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;5a01033f4c8b3106ca9374b7cadf8e33da852df1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: Add support for CR4 write traps for an SEV-ES guest</title>
<updated>2020-12-15T10:20:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-10T17:09:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5b51cb13160ae0ba10645bd0a84e7847677fb6a0'/>
<id>5b51cb13160ae0ba10645bd0a84e7847677fb6a0</id>
<content type='text'>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR4 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;c3880bf2db8693aa26f648528fbc6e967ab46e25.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR4 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;c3880bf2db8693aa26f648528fbc6e967ab46e25.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: Add support for CR0 write traps for an SEV-ES guest</title>
<updated>2020-12-15T10:20:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-10T17:09:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f27ad38aac23263c40fe26c0188182c129a8f8dd'/>
<id>f27ad38aac23263c40fe26c0188182c129a8f8dd</id>
<content type='text'>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES support introduces new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR0 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;182c9baf99df7e40ad9617ff90b84542705ef0d7.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES support introduces new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR0 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;182c9baf99df7e40ad9617ff90b84542705ef0d7.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: Add support for EFER write traps for an SEV-ES guest</title>
<updated>2020-12-15T10:20:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-10T17:09:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2985afbcdbb1957a8d31992cebbc4e49d2ad8a77'/>
<id>2985afbcdbb1957a8d31992cebbc4e49d2ad8a77</id>
<content type='text'>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of EFER write access is not
recommended. EFER interception occurs prior to EFER being modified and
the hypervisor is unable to modify EFER itself because the register is
located in the encrypted register state.

SEV-ES support introduces a new EFER write trap. This trap provides
intercept support of an EFER write after it has been modified. The new
EFER value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the
hypervisor to track the setting of the guest EFER.

Add support to track the value of the guest EFER value using the EFER
write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;8993149352a3a87cd0625b3b61bfd31ab28977e1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of EFER write access is not
recommended. EFER interception occurs prior to EFER being modified and
the hypervisor is unable to modify EFER itself because the register is
located in the encrypted register state.

SEV-ES support introduces a new EFER write trap. This trap provides
intercept support of an EFER write after it has been modified. The new
EFER value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the
hypervisor to track the setting of the guest EFER.

Add support to track the value of the guest EFER value using the EFER
write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;8993149352a3a87cd0625b3b61bfd31ab28977e1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT</title>
<updated>2020-12-15T10:20:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-10T17:09:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=291bd20d5d88814a73d43b55b9428feab2f28094'/>
<id>291bd20d5d88814a73d43b55b9428feab2f28094</id>
<content type='text'>
SEV-ES adds a new VMEXIT reason code, VMGEXIT. Initial support for a
VMGEXIT includes mapping the GHCB based on the guest GPA, which is
obtained from a new VMCB field, and then validating the required inputs
for the VMGEXIT exit reason.

Since many of the VMGEXIT exit reasons correspond to existing VMEXIT
reasons, the information from the GHCB is copied into the VMCB control
exit code areas and KVM register areas. The standard exit handlers are
invoked, similar to standard VMEXIT processing. Before restarting the
vCPU, the GHCB is updated with any registers that have been updated by
the hypervisor.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;c6a4ed4294a369bd75c44d03bd7ce0f0c3840e50.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
SEV-ES adds a new VMEXIT reason code, VMGEXIT. Initial support for a
VMGEXIT includes mapping the GHCB based on the guest GPA, which is
obtained from a new VMCB field, and then validating the required inputs
for the VMGEXIT exit reason.

Since many of the VMGEXIT exit reasons correspond to existing VMEXIT
reasons, the information from the GHCB is copied into the VMCB control
exit code areas and KVM register areas. The standard exit handlers are
invoked, similar to standard VMEXIT processing. Before restarting the
vCPU, the GHCB is updated with any registers that have been updated by
the hypervisor.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;c6a4ed4294a369bd75c44d03bd7ce0f0c3840e50.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux</title>
<updated>2020-12-15T00:24:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-15T00:24:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0ca2ce81eb8ee30f3ba8ac7967fef9cfbb44dbdb'/>
<id>0ca2ce81eb8ee30f3ba8ac7967fef9cfbb44dbdb</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:

 - Expose tag address bits in siginfo. The original arm64 ABI did not
   expose any of the bits 63:56 of a tagged address in siginfo. In the
   presence of user ASAN or MTE, this information may be useful. The
   implementation is generic to other architectures supporting tags
   (like SPARC ADI, subject to wiring up the arch code). The user will
   have to opt in via sigaction(SA_EXPOSE_TAGBITS) so that the extra
   bits, if available, become visible in si_addr.

 - Default to 32-bit wide ZONE_DMA. Previously, ZONE_DMA was set to the
   lowest 1GB to cope with the Raspberry Pi 4 limitations, to the
   detriment of other platforms. With these changes, the kernel scans
   the Device Tree dma-ranges and the ACPI IORT information before
   deciding on a smaller ZONE_DMA.

 - Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CONFIG_LTO=y. When building
   with LTO, there is an increased risk of the compiler converting an
   address dependency headed by a READ_ONCE() invocation into a control
   dependency and consequently allowing for harmful reordering by the
   CPU.

 - Add CPPC FFH support using arm64 AMU counters.

 - set_fs() removal on arm64. This renders the User Access Override
   (UAO) ARMv8 feature unnecessary.

 - Perf updates: PMU driver for the ARM DMC-620 memory controller, sysfs
   identifier file for SMMUv3, stop event counters support for i.MX8MP,
   enable the perf events-based hard lockup detector.

 - Reorganise the kernel VA space slightly so that 52-bit VA
   configurations can use more virtual address space.

 - Improve the robustness of the arm64 memory offline event notifier.

 - Pad the Image header to 64K following the EFI header definition
   updated recently to increase the section alignment to 64K.

 - Support CONFIG_CMDLINE_EXTEND on arm64.

 - Do not use tagged PC in the kernel (TCR_EL1.TBID1==1), freeing up 8
   bits for PtrAuth.

 - Switch to vmapped shadow call stacks.

 - Miscellaneous clean-ups.

* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (78 commits)
  perf/imx_ddr: Add system PMU identifier for userspace
  bindings: perf: imx-ddr: add compatible string
  arm64: Fix build failure when HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF is enabled
  arm64: mte: fix prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL) if TCF0=NONE
  arm64: mark __system_matches_cap as __maybe_unused
  arm64: uaccess: remove vestigal UAO support
  arm64: uaccess: remove redundant PAN toggling
  arm64: uaccess: remove addr_limit_user_check()
  arm64: uaccess: remove set_fs()
  arm64: uaccess cleanup macro naming
  arm64: uaccess: split user/kernel routines
  arm64: uaccess: refactor __{get,put}_user
  arm64: uaccess: simplify __copy_user_flushcache()
  arm64: uaccess: rename privileged uaccess routines
  arm64: sdei: explicitly simulate PAN/UAO entry
  arm64: sdei: move uaccess logic to arch/arm64/
  arm64: head.S: always initialize PSTATE
  arm64: head.S: cleanup SCTLR_ELx initialization
  arm64: head.S: rename el2_setup -&gt; init_kernel_el
  arm64: add C wrappers for SET_PSTATE_*()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:

 - Expose tag address bits in siginfo. The original arm64 ABI did not
   expose any of the bits 63:56 of a tagged address in siginfo. In the
   presence of user ASAN or MTE, this information may be useful. The
   implementation is generic to other architectures supporting tags
   (like SPARC ADI, subject to wiring up the arch code). The user will
   have to opt in via sigaction(SA_EXPOSE_TAGBITS) so that the extra
   bits, if available, become visible in si_addr.

 - Default to 32-bit wide ZONE_DMA. Previously, ZONE_DMA was set to the
   lowest 1GB to cope with the Raspberry Pi 4 limitations, to the
   detriment of other platforms. With these changes, the kernel scans
   the Device Tree dma-ranges and the ACPI IORT information before
   deciding on a smaller ZONE_DMA.

 - Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CONFIG_LTO=y. When building
   with LTO, there is an increased risk of the compiler converting an
   address dependency headed by a READ_ONCE() invocation into a control
   dependency and consequently allowing for harmful reordering by the
   CPU.

 - Add CPPC FFH support using arm64 AMU counters.

 - set_fs() removal on arm64. This renders the User Access Override
   (UAO) ARMv8 feature unnecessary.

 - Perf updates: PMU driver for the ARM DMC-620 memory controller, sysfs
   identifier file for SMMUv3, stop event counters support for i.MX8MP,
   enable the perf events-based hard lockup detector.

 - Reorganise the kernel VA space slightly so that 52-bit VA
   configurations can use more virtual address space.

 - Improve the robustness of the arm64 memory offline event notifier.

 - Pad the Image header to 64K following the EFI header definition
   updated recently to increase the section alignment to 64K.

 - Support CONFIG_CMDLINE_EXTEND on arm64.

 - Do not use tagged PC in the kernel (TCR_EL1.TBID1==1), freeing up 8
   bits for PtrAuth.

 - Switch to vmapped shadow call stacks.

 - Miscellaneous clean-ups.

* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (78 commits)
  perf/imx_ddr: Add system PMU identifier for userspace
  bindings: perf: imx-ddr: add compatible string
  arm64: Fix build failure when HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF is enabled
  arm64: mte: fix prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL) if TCF0=NONE
  arm64: mark __system_matches_cap as __maybe_unused
  arm64: uaccess: remove vestigal UAO support
  arm64: uaccess: remove redundant PAN toggling
  arm64: uaccess: remove addr_limit_user_check()
  arm64: uaccess: remove set_fs()
  arm64: uaccess cleanup macro naming
  arm64: uaccess: split user/kernel routines
  arm64: uaccess: refactor __{get,put}_user
  arm64: uaccess: simplify __copy_user_flushcache()
  arm64: uaccess: rename privileged uaccess routines
  arm64: sdei: explicitly simulate PAN/UAO entry
  arm64: sdei: move uaccess logic to arch/arm64/
  arm64: head.S: always initialize PSTATE
  arm64: head.S: cleanup SCTLR_ELx initialization
  arm64: head.S: rename el2_setup -&gt; init_kernel_el
  arm64: add C wrappers for SET_PSTATE_*()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sgx: Fix a typo in kernel-doc markup</title>
<updated>2020-12-02T11:54:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mauro Carvalho Chehab</name>
<email>mchehab+huawei@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-02T08:27:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bab8c183d1d452f5fdc059aef2f0788bd2986231'/>
<id>bab8c183d1d452f5fdc059aef2f0788bd2986231</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix the following kernel-doc warning:

  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h:19: warning: expecting prototype \
    for enum sgx_epage_flags. Prototype was for enum sgx_page_flags instead

 [ bp: Launder the commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab+huawei@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ca11a4540d981cbd5f026b6cbc8931aa55654e00.1606897462.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix the following kernel-doc warning:

  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h:19: warning: expecting prototype \
    for enum sgx_epage_flags. Prototype was for enum sgx_page_flags instead

 [ bp: Launder the commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab+huawei@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ca11a4540d981cbd5f026b6cbc8931aa55654e00.1606897462.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arch: move SA_* definitions to generic headers</title>
<updated>2020-11-23T16:31:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Collingbourne</name>
<email>pcc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-13T02:53:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1d82b7898f2ad9cc414805aef23b99b742218f10'/>
<id>1d82b7898f2ad9cc414805aef23b99b742218f10</id>
<content type='text'>
Most architectures with the exception of alpha, mips, parisc and
sparc use the same values for these flags. Move their definitions into
asm-generic/signal-defs.h and allow the architectures with non-standard
values to override them. Also, document the non-standard flag values
in order to make it easier to add new generic flags in the future.

A consequence of this change is that on powerpc and x86, the constants'
values aside from SA_RESETHAND change signedness from unsigned
to signed. This is not expected to impact realistic use of these
constants. In particular the typical use of the constants where they
are or'ed together and assigned to sa_flags (or another int variable)
would not be affected.

Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne &lt;pcc@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ia3849f18b8009bf41faca374e701cdca36974528
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b6d0d1ec34f9ee93e1105f14f288fba5f89d1f24.1605235762.git.pcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Most architectures with the exception of alpha, mips, parisc and
sparc use the same values for these flags. Move their definitions into
asm-generic/signal-defs.h and allow the architectures with non-standard
values to override them. Also, document the non-standard flag values
in order to make it easier to add new generic flags in the future.

A consequence of this change is that on powerpc and x86, the constants'
values aside from SA_RESETHAND change signedness from unsigned
to signed. This is not expected to impact realistic use of these
constants. In particular the typical use of the constants where they
are or'ed together and assigned to sa_flags (or another int variable)
would not be affected.

Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne &lt;pcc@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ia3849f18b8009bf41faca374e701cdca36974528
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b6d0d1ec34f9ee93e1105f14f288fba5f89d1f24.1605235762.git.pcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:02:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>sean.j.christopherson@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-12T22:01:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=84664369520170f48546c55cbc1f3fbde9b1e140'/>
<id>84664369520170f48546c55cbc1f3fbde9b1e140</id>
<content type='text'>
Enclaves encounter exceptions for lots of reasons: everything from enclave
page faults to NULL pointer dereferences, to system calls that must be
“proxied” to the kernel from outside the enclave.

In addition to the code contained inside an enclave, there is also
supporting code outside the enclave called an “SGX runtime”, which is
virtually always implemented inside a shared library.  The runtime helps
build the enclave and handles things like *re*building the enclave if it
got destroyed by something like a suspend/resume cycle.

The rebuilding has traditionally been handled in SIGSEGV handlers,
registered by the library.  But, being process-wide, shared state, signal
handling and shared libraries do not mix well.

Introduce a vDSO function call that wraps the enclave entry functions
(EENTER/ERESUME functions of the ENCLU instruciton) and returns information
about any exceptions to the caller in the SGX runtime.

Instead of generating a signal, the kernel places exception information in
RDI, RSI and RDX. The kernel-provided userspace portion of the vDSO handler
will place this information in a user-provided buffer or trigger a
user-provided callback at the time of the exception.

The vDSO function calling convention uses the standard RDI RSI, RDX, RCX,
R8 and R9 registers.  This makes it possible to declare the vDSO as a C
prototype, but other than that there is no specific support for SystemV
ABI. Things like storing XSAVE are the responsibility of the enclave and
the runtime.

 [ bp: Change vsgx.o build dependency to CONFIG_X86_SGX. ]

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Cedric Xing &lt;cedric.xing@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cedric Xing &lt;cedric.xing@intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman &lt;jethro@fortanix.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-20-jarkko@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Enclaves encounter exceptions for lots of reasons: everything from enclave
page faults to NULL pointer dereferences, to system calls that must be
“proxied” to the kernel from outside the enclave.

In addition to the code contained inside an enclave, there is also
supporting code outside the enclave called an “SGX runtime”, which is
virtually always implemented inside a shared library.  The runtime helps
build the enclave and handles things like *re*building the enclave if it
got destroyed by something like a suspend/resume cycle.

The rebuilding has traditionally been handled in SIGSEGV handlers,
registered by the library.  But, being process-wide, shared state, signal
handling and shared libraries do not mix well.

Introduce a vDSO function call that wraps the enclave entry functions
(EENTER/ERESUME functions of the ENCLU instruciton) and returns information
about any exceptions to the caller in the SGX runtime.

Instead of generating a signal, the kernel places exception information in
RDI, RSI and RDX. The kernel-provided userspace portion of the vDSO handler
will place this information in a user-provided buffer or trigger a
user-provided callback at the time of the exception.

The vDSO function calling convention uses the standard RDI RSI, RDX, RCX,
R8 and R9 registers.  This makes it possible to declare the vDSO as a C
prototype, but other than that there is no specific support for SystemV
ABI. Things like storing XSAVE are the responsibility of the enclave and
the runtime.

 [ bp: Change vsgx.o build dependency to CONFIG_X86_SGX. ]

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Cedric Xing &lt;cedric.xing@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cedric Xing &lt;cedric.xing@intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman &lt;jethro@fortanix.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-20-jarkko@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
