<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/include/uapi, branch v5.10</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/kvm: Reserve KVM_FEATURE_MSI_EXT_DEST_ID</title>
<updated>2020-10-28T17:52:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Woodhouse</name>
<email>dwmw@amazon.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-19T14:55:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5a169bf04cd2bfdbac967d12eb5b70915b29d7ee'/>
<id>5a169bf04cd2bfdbac967d12eb5b70915b29d7ee</id>
<content type='text'>
No functional change; just reserve the feature bit for now so that VMMs
can start to implement it.

This will allow the host to indicate that MSI emulation supports 15-bit
destination IDs, allowing up to 32768 CPUs without interrupt remapping.

cf. https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11816693/ for qemu

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;4cd59bed05f4b7410d3d1ffd1e997ab53683874d.camel@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
No functional change; just reserve the feature bit for now so that VMMs
can start to implement it.

This will allow the host to indicate that MSI emulation supports 15-bit
destination IDs, allowing up to 32768 CPUs without interrupt remapping.

cf. https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11816693/ for qemu

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;4cd59bed05f4b7410d3d1ffd1e997ab53683874d.camel@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2020-10-23T18:17:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-23T18:17:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f9a705ad1c077ec2872c641f0db9c0d5b4a097bb'/>
<id>f9a705ad1c077ec2872c641f0db9c0d5b4a097bb</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "For x86, there is a new alternative and (in the future) more scalable
  implementation of extended page tables that does not need a reverse
  map from guest physical addresses to host physical addresses.

  For now it is disabled by default because it is still lacking a few of
  the existing MMU's bells and whistles. However it is a very solid
  piece of work and it is already available for people to hammer on it.

  Other updates:

  ARM:
   - New page table code for both hypervisor and guest stage-2
   - Introduction of a new EL2-private host context
   - Allow EL2 to have its own private per-CPU variables
   - Support of PMU event filtering
   - Complete rework of the Spectre mitigation

  PPC:
   - Fix for running nested guests with in-kernel IRQ chip
   - Fix race condition causing occasional host hard lockup
   - Minor cleanups and bugfixes

  x86:
   - allow trapping unknown MSRs to userspace
   - allow userspace to force #GP on specific MSRs
   - INVPCID support on AMD
   - nested AMD cleanup, on demand allocation of nested SVM state
   - hide PV MSRs and hypercalls for features not enabled in CPUID
   - new test for MSR_IA32_TSC writes from host and guest
   - cleanups: MMU, CPUID, shared MSRs
   - LAPIC latency optimizations ad bugfixes"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (232 commits)
  kvm: x86/mmu: NX largepage recovery for TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Don't clear write flooding count for direct roots
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support MMIO in the TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support write protection for nesting in tdp MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support disabling dirty logging for the tdp MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support dirty logging for the TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support changed pte notifier in tdp MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Add access tracking for tdp_mmu
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support invalidate range MMU notifier for TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Allocate struct kvm_mmu_pages for all pages in TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Add TDP MMU PF handler
  kvm: x86/mmu: Remove disallowed_hugepage_adjust shadow_walk_iterator arg
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support zapping SPTEs in the TDP MMU
  KVM: Cache as_id in kvm_memory_slot
  kvm: x86/mmu: Add functions to handle changed TDP SPTEs
  kvm: x86/mmu: Allocate and free TDP MMU roots
  kvm: x86/mmu: Init / Uninit the TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Introduce tdp_iter
  KVM: mmu: extract spte.h and spte.c
  KVM: mmu: Separate updating a PTE from kvm_set_pte_rmapp
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "For x86, there is a new alternative and (in the future) more scalable
  implementation of extended page tables that does not need a reverse
  map from guest physical addresses to host physical addresses.

  For now it is disabled by default because it is still lacking a few of
  the existing MMU's bells and whistles. However it is a very solid
  piece of work and it is already available for people to hammer on it.

  Other updates:

  ARM:
   - New page table code for both hypervisor and guest stage-2
   - Introduction of a new EL2-private host context
   - Allow EL2 to have its own private per-CPU variables
   - Support of PMU event filtering
   - Complete rework of the Spectre mitigation

  PPC:
   - Fix for running nested guests with in-kernel IRQ chip
   - Fix race condition causing occasional host hard lockup
   - Minor cleanups and bugfixes

  x86:
   - allow trapping unknown MSRs to userspace
   - allow userspace to force #GP on specific MSRs
   - INVPCID support on AMD
   - nested AMD cleanup, on demand allocation of nested SVM state
   - hide PV MSRs and hypercalls for features not enabled in CPUID
   - new test for MSR_IA32_TSC writes from host and guest
   - cleanups: MMU, CPUID, shared MSRs
   - LAPIC latency optimizations ad bugfixes"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (232 commits)
  kvm: x86/mmu: NX largepage recovery for TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Don't clear write flooding count for direct roots
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support MMIO in the TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support write protection for nesting in tdp MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support disabling dirty logging for the tdp MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support dirty logging for the TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support changed pte notifier in tdp MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Add access tracking for tdp_mmu
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support invalidate range MMU notifier for TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Allocate struct kvm_mmu_pages for all pages in TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Add TDP MMU PF handler
  kvm: x86/mmu: Remove disallowed_hugepage_adjust shadow_walk_iterator arg
  kvm: x86/mmu: Support zapping SPTEs in the TDP MMU
  KVM: Cache as_id in kvm_memory_slot
  kvm: x86/mmu: Add functions to handle changed TDP SPTEs
  kvm: x86/mmu: Allocate and free TDP MMU roots
  kvm: x86/mmu: Init / Uninit the TDP MMU
  kvm: x86/mmu: Introduce tdp_iter
  KVM: mmu: extract spte.h and spte.c
  KVM: mmu: Separate updating a PTE from kvm_set_pte_rmapp
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering</title>
<updated>2020-09-28T11:58:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Graf</name>
<email>graf@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-25T14:34:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1a155254ff937ac92cf9940d273ea597b2c667a2'/>
<id>1a155254ff937ac92cf9940d273ea597b2c667a2</id>
<content type='text'>
It's not desireable to have all MSRs always handled by KVM kernel space. Some
MSRs would be useful to handle in user space to either emulate behavior (like
uCode updates) or differentiate whether they are valid based on the CPU model.

To allow user space to specify which MSRs it wants to see handled by KVM,
this patch introduces a new ioctl to push filter rules with bitmaps into
KVM. Based on these bitmaps, KVM can then decide whether to reject MSR access.
With the addition of KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR it can also deflect the
denied MSR events to user space to operate on.

If no filter is populated, MSR handling stays identical to before.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf &lt;graf@amazon.com&gt;

Message-Id: &lt;20200925143422.21718-8-graf@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It's not desireable to have all MSRs always handled by KVM kernel space. Some
MSRs would be useful to handle in user space to either emulate behavior (like
uCode updates) or differentiate whether they are valid based on the CPU model.

To allow user space to specify which MSRs it wants to see handled by KVM,
this patch introduces a new ioctl to push filter rules with bitmaps into
KVM. Based on these bitmaps, KVM can then decide whether to reject MSR access.
With the addition of KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR it can also deflect the
denied MSR events to user space to operate on.

If no filter is populated, MSR handling stays identical to before.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf &lt;graf@amazon.com&gt;

Message-Id: &lt;20200925143422.21718-8-graf@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filtering</title>
<updated>2020-09-28T11:58:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Graf</name>
<email>graf@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-25T14:34:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=51de8151bd21bae0ce76f604eec6a7176f7093b3'/>
<id>51de8151bd21bae0ce76f604eec6a7176f7093b3</id>
<content type='text'>
In the following commits we will add pieces of MSR filtering.
To ensure that code compiles even with the feature half-merged, let's add
a few stubs and struct definitions before the real patches start.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf &lt;graf@amazon.com&gt;

Message-Id: &lt;20200925143422.21718-4-graf@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In the following commits we will add pieces of MSR filtering.
To ensure that code compiles even with the feature half-merged, let's add
a few stubs and struct definitions before the real patches start.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf &lt;graf@amazon.com&gt;

Message-Id: &lt;20200925143422.21718-4-graf@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: Enable INVPCID feature on AMD</title>
<updated>2020-09-28T11:57:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Babu Moger</name>
<email>babu.moger@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-11T19:29:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4407a797e9412afba2f7815fb19395d4b32dca4e'/>
<id>4407a797e9412afba2f7815fb19395d4b32dca4e</id>
<content type='text'>
The following intercept bit has been added to support VMEXIT
for INVPCID instruction:
Code    Name            Cause
A2h     VMEXIT_INVPCID  INVPCID instruction

The following bit has been added to the VMCB layout control area
to control intercept of INVPCID:
Byte Offset     Bit(s)    Function
14h             2         intercept INVPCID

Enable the interceptions when the the guest is running with shadow
page table enabled and handle the tlbflush based on the invpcid
instruction type.

For the guests with nested page table (NPT) support, the INVPCID
feature works as running it natively. KVM does not need to do any
special handling in this case.

AMD documentation for INVPCID feature is available at "AMD64
Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volume 2: System Programming,
Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.34(or later)"

The documentation can be obtained at the links below:
Link: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537

Signed-off-by: Babu Moger &lt;babu.moger@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;159985255929.11252.17346684135277453258.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The following intercept bit has been added to support VMEXIT
for INVPCID instruction:
Code    Name            Cause
A2h     VMEXIT_INVPCID  INVPCID instruction

The following bit has been added to the VMCB layout control area
to control intercept of INVPCID:
Byte Offset     Bit(s)    Function
14h             2         intercept INVPCID

Enable the interceptions when the the guest is running with shadow
page table enabled and handle the tlbflush based on the invpcid
instruction type.

For the guests with nested page table (NPT) support, the INVPCID
feature works as running it natively. KVM does not need to do any
special handling in this case.

AMD documentation for INVPCID feature is available at "AMD64
Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volume 2: System Programming,
Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.34(or later)"

The documentation can be obtained at the links below:
Link: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537

Signed-off-by: Babu Moger &lt;babu.moger@amd.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;159985255929.11252.17346684135277453258.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T16:02:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joerg Roedel</name>
<email>jroedel@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T13:16:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4ca68e023b11e4d5908bf9ee326fab01111d77d5'/>
<id>4ca68e023b11e4d5908bf9ee326fab01111d77d5</id>
<content type='text'>
When running under SEV-ES, the kernel has to tell the hypervisor when to
open the NMI window again after an NMI was injected. This is done with
an NMI-complete message to the hypervisor.

Add code to the kernel's NMI handler to send this message right at the
beginning of do_nmi(). This always allows nesting NMIs.

 [ bp: Mark __sev_es_nmi_complete() noinstr:
   vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: exc_nmi()+0x17: call to __sev_es_nmi_complete()
	leaves .noinstr.text section
   While at it, use __pa_nodebug() for the same reason due to
   CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y:
   vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __sev_es_nmi_complete()+0xd9: call to __phys_addr()
   	leaves .noinstr.text section ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-71-joro@8bytes.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When running under SEV-ES, the kernel has to tell the hypervisor when to
open the NMI window again after an NMI was injected. This is done with
an NMI-complete message to the hypervisor.

Add code to the kernel's NMI handler to send this message right at the
beginning of do_nmi(). This always allows nesting NMIs.

 [ bp: Mark __sev_es_nmi_complete() noinstr:
   vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: exc_nmi()+0x17: call to __sev_es_nmi_complete()
	leaves .noinstr.text section
   While at it, use __pa_nodebug() for the same reason due to
   CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y:
   vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __sev_es_nmi_complete()+0xd9: call to __phys_addr()
   	leaves .noinstr.text section ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-71-joro@8bytes.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T09:33:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joerg Roedel</name>
<email>jroedel@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T13:16:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=094794f59720d7e877a1eeb372ecedeed6b441ab'/>
<id>094794f59720d7e877a1eeb372ecedeed6b441ab</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a play_dead handler when running under SEV-ES. This is needed
because the hypervisor can't deliver an SIPI request to restart the AP.
Instead, the kernel has to issue a VMGEXIT to halt the VCPU until the
hypervisor wakes it up again.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-70-joro@8bytes.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a play_dead handler when running under SEV-ES. This is needed
because the hypervisor can't deliver an SIPI request to restart the AP.
Instead, the kernel has to issue a VMGEXIT to halt the VCPU until the
hypervisor wakes it up again.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-70-joro@8bytes.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T09:33:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T13:16:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8940ac9ced8bc1c48c4e28b0784e3234c9d14469'/>
<id>8940ac9ced8bc1c48c4e28b0784e3234c9d14469</id>
<content type='text'>
As part of the GHCB specification, the booting of APs under SEV-ES
requires an AP jump table when transitioning from one layer of code to
another (e.g. when going from UEFI to the OS). As a result, each layer
that parks an AP must provide the physical address of an AP jump table
to the next layer via the hypervisor.

Upon booting of the kernel, read the AP jump table address from the
hypervisor. Under SEV-ES, APs are started using the INIT-SIPI-SIPI
sequence. Before issuing the first SIPI request for an AP, the start
CS and IP is programmed into the AP jump table. Upon issuing the SIPI
request, the AP will awaken and jump to that start CS:IP address.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
[ jroedel@suse.de: - Adapted to different code base
                   - Moved AP table setup from SIPI sending path to
		     real-mode setup code
		   - Fix sparse warnings ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-67-joro@8bytes.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As part of the GHCB specification, the booting of APs under SEV-ES
requires an AP jump table when transitioning from one layer of code to
another (e.g. when going from UEFI to the OS). As a result, each layer
that parks an AP must provide the physical address of an AP jump table
to the next layer via the hypervisor.

Upon booting of the kernel, read the AP jump table address from the
hypervisor. Under SEV-ES, APs are started using the INIT-SIPI-SIPI
sequence. Before issuing the first SIPI request for an AP, the start
CS and IP is programmed into the AP jump table. Upon issuing the SIPI
request, the AP will awaken and jump to that start CS:IP address.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
[ jroedel@suse.de: - Adapted to different code base
                   - Moved AP table setup from SIPI sending path to
		     real-mode setup code
		   - Fix sparse warnings ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-67-joro@8bytes.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T09:33:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T13:15:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=51ee7d6e3d2b70a3f232cceffab5084a2abd6719'/>
<id>51ee7d6e3d2b70a3f232cceffab5084a2abd6719</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a handler for #VC exceptions caused by MMIO intercepts. These
intercepts come along as nested page faults on pages with reserved
bits set.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to VC handling framework ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-50-joro@8bytes.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a handler for #VC exceptions caused by MMIO intercepts. These
intercepts come along as nested page faults on pages with reserved
bits set.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
[ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to VC handling framework ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-50-joro@8bytes.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/boot/compressed/64: Setup a GHCB-based VC Exception handler</title>
<updated>2020-09-07T17:45:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joerg Roedel</name>
<email>jroedel@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T13:15:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=597cfe48212a3f110ab0f918bf59791f453e65b7'/>
<id>597cfe48212a3f110ab0f918bf59791f453e65b7</id>
<content type='text'>
Install an exception handler for #VC exception that uses a GHCB. Also
add the infrastructure for handling different exit-codes by decoding
the instruction that caused the exception and error handling.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-24-joro@8bytes.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Install an exception handler for #VC exception that uses a GHCB. Also
add the infrastructure for handling different exit-codes by decoding
the instruction that caused the exception and error handling.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-24-joro@8bytes.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
