<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h, branch v6.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>locking: remove spin_lock_prefetch</title>
<updated>2023-08-12T16:18:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mateusz Guzik</name>
<email>mjguzik@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-12T16:15:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c8afaa1b0f8bc93d013ab2ea6b9649958af3f1d3'/>
<id>c8afaa1b0f8bc93d013ab2ea6b9649958af3f1d3</id>
<content type='text'>
The only remaining consumer is new_inode, where it showed up in 2001 as
commit c37fa164f793 ("v2.4.9.9 -&gt; v2.4.9.10") in a historical repo [1]
with a changelog which does not mention it.

Since then the line got only touched up to keep compiling.

While it may have been of benefit back in the day, it is guaranteed to
at best not get in the way in the multicore setting -- as the code
performs *a lot* of work between the prefetch and actual lock acquire,
any contention means the cacheline is already invalid by the time the
routine calls spin_lock().  It adds spurious traffic, for short.

On top of it prefetch is notoriously tricky to use for single-threaded
purposes, making it questionable from the get go.

As such, remove it.

I admit upfront I did not see value in benchmarking this change, but I
can do it if that is deemed appropriate.

Removal from new_inode and of the entire thing are in the same patch as
requested by Linus, so whatever weird looks can be directed at that guy.

Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/fs/inode.c?id=c37fa164f793735b32aa3f53154ff1a7659e6442 [1]
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mjguzik@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The only remaining consumer is new_inode, where it showed up in 2001 as
commit c37fa164f793 ("v2.4.9.9 -&gt; v2.4.9.10") in a historical repo [1]
with a changelog which does not mention it.

Since then the line got only touched up to keep compiling.

While it may have been of benefit back in the day, it is guaranteed to
at best not get in the way in the multicore setting -- as the code
performs *a lot* of work between the prefetch and actual lock acquire,
any contention means the cacheline is already invalid by the time the
routine calls spin_lock().  It adds spurious traffic, for short.

On top of it prefetch is notoriously tricky to use for single-threaded
purposes, making it questionable from the get go.

As such, remove it.

I admit upfront I did not see value in benchmarking this change, but I
can do it if that is deemed appropriate.

Removal from new_inode and of the entire thing are in the same patch as
requested by Linus, so whatever weird looks can be directed at that guy.

Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/fs/inode.c?id=c37fa164f793735b32aa3f53154ff1a7659e6442 [1]
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mjguzik@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: Move gds_ucode_mitigated() declaration to header</title>
<updated>2023-08-10T16:13:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-09T13:05:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=eb3515dc99c7c85f4170b50838136b2a193f8012'/>
<id>eb3515dc99c7c85f4170b50838136b2a193f8012</id>
<content type='text'>
The declaration got placed in the .c file of the caller, but that
causes a warning for the definition:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:682:6: error: no previous prototype for 'gds_ucode_mitigated' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]

Move it to a header where both sides can observe it instead.

Fixes: 81ac7e5d74174 ("KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230809130530.1913368-2-arnd%40kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The declaration got placed in the .c file of the caller, but that
causes a warning for the definition:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:682:6: error: no previous prototype for 'gds_ucode_mitigated' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]

Move it to a header where both sides can observe it instead.

Fixes: 81ac7e5d74174 ("KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Daniel Sneddon &lt;daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230809130530.1913368-2-arnd%40kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/CPU/AMD: Do not leak quotient data after a division by 0</title>
<updated>2023-08-09T14:55:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-04T22:06:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=77245f1c3c6495521f6a3af082696ee2f8ce3921'/>
<id>77245f1c3c6495521f6a3af082696ee2f8ce3921</id>
<content type='text'>
Under certain circumstances, an integer division by 0 which faults, can
leave stale quotient data from a previous division operation on Zen1
microarchitectures.

Do a dummy division 0/1 before returning from the #DE exception handler
in order to avoid any leaks of potentially sensitive data.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Under certain circumstances, an integer division by 0 which faults, can
leave stale quotient data from a previous division operation on Zen1
microarchitectures.

Do a dummy division 0/1 before returning from the #DE exception handler
in order to avoid any leaks of potentially sensitive data.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation</title>
<updated>2023-07-27T09:07:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-28T09:02:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855'/>
<id>fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.

The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence.  To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.

To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference.  In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.

In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.

The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence.  To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.

To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference.  In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.

In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/smpboot: Get rid of cpu_init_secondary()</title>
<updated>2023-05-15T11:44:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-12T21:07:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=e94cd1503b153ea753f0c4ed9d5ed12e7abd1306'/>
<id>e94cd1503b153ea753f0c4ed9d5ed12e7abd1306</id>
<content type='text'>
The synchronization of the AP with the control CPU is a SMP boot problem
and has nothing to do with cpu_init().

Open code cpu_init_secondary() in start_secondary() and move
wait_for_master_cpu() into the SMP boot code.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mikelley@microsoft.com&gt;
Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko &lt;oleksandr@natalenko.name&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt; # Steam Deck
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512205255.981999763@linutronix.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The synchronization of the AP with the control CPU is a SMP boot problem
and has nothing to do with cpu_init().

Open code cpu_init_secondary() in start_secondary() and move
wait_for_master_cpu() into the SMP boot code.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mikelley@microsoft.com&gt;
Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko &lt;oleksandr@natalenko.name&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt; # Steam Deck
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512205255.981999763@linutronix.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/smpboot: Remove initial_stack on 64-bit</title>
<updated>2023-03-21T12:35:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Brian Gerst</name>
<email>brgerst@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-16T22:21:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3adee777ad0d328e76ca9015cb7924134a992e81'/>
<id>3adee777ad0d328e76ca9015cb7924134a992e81</id>
<content type='text'>
In order to facilitate parallel startup, start to eliminate some of the
global variables passing information to CPUs in the startup path.

However, start by introducing one more: smpboot_control. For now this
merely holds the CPU# of the CPU which is coming up. Each CPU can then
find its own per-cpu data, and everything else it needs can be found
from there, allowing the other global variables to be removed.

First to be removed is initial_stack. Each CPU can load %rsp from its
current_task-&gt;thread.sp instead. That is already set up with the correct
idle thread for APs. Set up the .sp field in INIT_THREAD on x86 so that
the BSP also finds a suitable stack pointer in the static per-cpu data
when coming up on first boot.

On resume from S3, the CPU needs a temporary stack because its idle task
is already active. Instead of setting initial_stack, the sleep code can
simply set its own current-&gt;thread.sp to point to the temporary stack.
Nobody else cares about -&gt;thread.sp for a thread which is currently on
a CPU, because the true value is actually in the %rsp register. Which
is restored with the rest of the CPU context in do_suspend_lowlevel().

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Usama Arif &lt;usama.arif@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Usama Arif &lt;usama.arif@bytedance.com&gt;
Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230316222109.1940300-7-usama.arif@bytedance.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In order to facilitate parallel startup, start to eliminate some of the
global variables passing information to CPUs in the startup path.

However, start by introducing one more: smpboot_control. For now this
merely holds the CPU# of the CPU which is coming up. Each CPU can then
find its own per-cpu data, and everything else it needs can be found
from there, allowing the other global variables to be removed.

First to be removed is initial_stack. Each CPU can load %rsp from its
current_task-&gt;thread.sp instead. That is already set up with the correct
idle thread for APs. Set up the .sp field in INIT_THREAD on x86 so that
the BSP also finds a suitable stack pointer in the static per-cpu data
when coming up on first boot.

On resume from S3, the CPU needs a temporary stack because its idle task
is already active. Instead of setting initial_stack, the sleep code can
simply set its own current-&gt;thread.sp to point to the temporary stack.
Nobody else cares about -&gt;thread.sp for a thread which is currently on
a CPU, because the true value is actually in the %rsp register. Which
is restored with the rest of the CPU context in do_suspend_lowlevel().

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Usama Arif &lt;usama.arif@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Usama Arif &lt;usama.arif@bytedance.com&gt;
Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230316222109.1940300-7-usama.arif@bytedance.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_vdso_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2023-02-21T16:54:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-21T16:54:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3f0b0903fde584a7398f82fc00bf4f8138610b87'/>
<id>3f0b0903fde584a7398f82fc00bf4f8138610b87</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 vdso updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add getcpu support for the 32-bit version of the vDSO

 - Some smaller fixes

* tag 'x86_vdso_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/vdso: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings
  x86/vdso: Fake 32bit VDSO build on 64bit compile for vgetcpu
  selftests: Emit a warning if getcpu() is missing on 32bit
  x86/vdso: Provide getcpu for x86-32.
  x86/cpu: Provide the full setup for getcpu() on x86-32
  x86/vdso: Move VDSO image init to vdso2c generated code
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 vdso updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add getcpu support for the 32-bit version of the vDSO

 - Some smaller fixes

* tag 'x86_vdso_for_v6.3_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/vdso: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings
  x86/vdso: Fake 32bit VDSO build on 64bit compile for vgetcpu
  selftests: Emit a warning if getcpu() is missing on 32bit
  x86/vdso: Provide getcpu for x86-32.
  x86/cpu: Provide the full setup for getcpu() on x86-32
  x86/vdso: Move VDSO image init to vdso2c generated code
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/vdso: Move VDSO image init to vdso2c generated code</title>
<updated>2023-01-25T11:33:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Brian Gerst</name>
<email>brgerst@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T18:40:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4c382d723edce1b3c72b55b1b505cf5526a56afc'/>
<id>4c382d723edce1b3c72b55b1b505cf5526a56afc</id>
<content type='text'>
Generate an init function for each VDSO image, replacing init_vdso() and
sysenter_setup().

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124184019.26850-1-brgerst@gmail.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Generate an init function for each VDSO image, replacing init_vdso() and
sysenter_setup().

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124184019.26850-1-brgerst@gmail.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/microcode: Check CPU capabilities after late microcode update correctly</title>
<updated>2023-01-21T13:53:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashok Raj</name>
<email>ashok.raj@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-09T15:35:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c0dd9245aa9e25a697181f6085692272c9ec61bc'/>
<id>c0dd9245aa9e25a697181f6085692272c9ec61bc</id>
<content type='text'>
The kernel caches each CPU's feature bits at boot in an x86_capability[]
structure. However, the capabilities in the BSP's copy can be turned off
as a result of certain command line parameters or configuration
restrictions, for example the SGX bit. This can cause a mismatch when
comparing the values before and after the microcode update.

Another example is X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL which gets added only after
microcode update:

  --- cpuid.before	2023-01-21 14:54:15.652000747 +0100
  +++ cpuid.after	2023-01-21 14:54:26.632001024 +0100
  @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ CPU:
      0x00000004 0x04: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0x00000000 ecx=0x00000000 edx=0x00000000
      0x00000005 0x00: eax=0x00000040 ebx=0x00000040 ecx=0x00000003 edx=0x11142120
      0x00000006 0x00: eax=0x000027f7 ebx=0x00000002 ecx=0x00000001 edx=0x00000000
  -   0x00000007 0x00: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0x029c6fbf ecx=0x40000000 edx=0xbc002400
  +   0x00000007 0x00: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0x029c6fbf ecx=0x40000000 edx=0xbc002e00
  									     ^^^

and which proves for a gazillionth time that late loading is a bad bad
idea.

microcode_check() is called after an update to report any previously
cached CPUID bits which might have changed due to the update.

Therefore, store the cached CPU caps before the update and compare them
with the CPU caps after the microcode update has succeeded.

Thus, the comparison is done between the CPUID *hardware* bits before
and after the upgrade instead of using the cached, possibly runtime
modified values in BSP's boot_cpu_data copy.

As a result, false warnings about CPUID bits changes are avoided.

  [ bp:
  	- Massage.
	- Add SRBDS_CTRL example.
	- Add kernel-doc.
	- Incorporate forgotten review feedback from dhansen.
	]

Fixes: 1008c52c09dc ("x86/CPU: Add a microcode loader callback")
Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj &lt;ashok.raj@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230109153555.4986-3-ashok.raj@intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The kernel caches each CPU's feature bits at boot in an x86_capability[]
structure. However, the capabilities in the BSP's copy can be turned off
as a result of certain command line parameters or configuration
restrictions, for example the SGX bit. This can cause a mismatch when
comparing the values before and after the microcode update.

Another example is X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL which gets added only after
microcode update:

  --- cpuid.before	2023-01-21 14:54:15.652000747 +0100
  +++ cpuid.after	2023-01-21 14:54:26.632001024 +0100
  @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ CPU:
      0x00000004 0x04: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0x00000000 ecx=0x00000000 edx=0x00000000
      0x00000005 0x00: eax=0x00000040 ebx=0x00000040 ecx=0x00000003 edx=0x11142120
      0x00000006 0x00: eax=0x000027f7 ebx=0x00000002 ecx=0x00000001 edx=0x00000000
  -   0x00000007 0x00: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0x029c6fbf ecx=0x40000000 edx=0xbc002400
  +   0x00000007 0x00: eax=0x00000000 ebx=0x029c6fbf ecx=0x40000000 edx=0xbc002e00
  									     ^^^

and which proves for a gazillionth time that late loading is a bad bad
idea.

microcode_check() is called after an update to report any previously
cached CPUID bits which might have changed due to the update.

Therefore, store the cached CPU caps before the update and compare them
with the CPU caps after the microcode update has succeeded.

Thus, the comparison is done between the CPUID *hardware* bits before
and after the upgrade instead of using the cached, possibly runtime
modified values in BSP's boot_cpu_data copy.

As a result, false warnings about CPUID bits changes are avoided.

  [ bp:
  	- Massage.
	- Add SRBDS_CTRL example.
	- Add kernel-doc.
	- Incorporate forgotten review feedback from dhansen.
	]

Fixes: 1008c52c09dc ("x86/CPU: Add a microcode loader callback")
Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj &lt;ashok.raj@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230109153555.4986-3-ashok.raj@intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/microcode: Add a parameter to microcode_check() to store CPU capabilities</title>
<updated>2023-01-20T20:45:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ashok Raj</name>
<email>ashok.raj@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-09T15:35:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ab31c74455c64e69342ddab21fd9426fcbfefde7'/>
<id>ab31c74455c64e69342ddab21fd9426fcbfefde7</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a parameter to store CPU capabilities before performing a microcode
update so that CPU capabilities can be compared before and after update.

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj &lt;ashok.raj@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230109153555.4986-2-ashok.raj@intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a parameter to store CPU capabilities before performing a microcode
update so that CPU capabilities can be compared before and after update.

  [ bp: Massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj &lt;ashok.raj@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230109153555.4986-2-ashok.raj@intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
