<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h, branch v6.0</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86: Always inline on_thread_stack() and current_top_of_stack()</title>
<updated>2022-05-27T10:34:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-07T11:37:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1894a4030582472336c2873cb07911ce67e0d14e'/>
<id>1894a4030582472336c2873cb07911ce67e0d14e</id>
<content type='text'>
Becaues GCC clearly lost it's marbles again...

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x53: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare+0x4e: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: irqentry_enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x53: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare+0x4e: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: irqentry_enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220526105958.071435483@infradead.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Becaues GCC clearly lost it's marbles again...

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x53: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare+0x4e: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: irqentry_enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to on_thread_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x53: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare+0x4e: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: irqentry_enter_from_user_mode+0x4e: call to current_top_of_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220526105958.071435483@infradead.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86/cpu' into x86/core, to resolve conflicts</title>
<updated>2022-03-15T11:52:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-15T11:52:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=9cea0d46f52f31c077a83a9b9e4e3887adfbecbe'/>
<id>9cea0d46f52f31c077a83a9b9e4e3887adfbecbe</id>
<content type='text'>
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn</title>
<updated>2022-03-15T09:32:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-08T15:30:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f9cdf7ca57cada055f61ef6d0eb4db21c3f200db'/>
<id>f9cdf7ca57cada055f61ef6d0eb4db21c3f200db</id>
<content type='text'>
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: smp_stop_nmi_callback()+0x2b: unreachable instruction

0000 0000000000047cf0 &lt;smp_stop_nmi_callback&gt;:
...
0026    47d16:  e8 00 00 00 00          call   47d1b &lt;smp_stop_nmi_callback+0x2b&gt;       47d17: R_X86_64_PLT32   stop_this_cpu-0x4
002b    47d1b:  b8 01 00 00 00          mov    $0x1,%eax

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154319.290905453@infradead.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: smp_stop_nmi_callback()+0x2b: unreachable instruction

0000 0000000000047cf0 &lt;smp_stop_nmi_callback&gt;:
...
0026    47d16:  e8 00 00 00 00          call   47d1b &lt;smp_stop_nmi_callback+0x2b&gt;       47d17: R_X86_64_PLT32   stop_this_cpu-0x4
002b    47d1b:  b8 01 00 00 00          mov    $0x1,%eax

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154319.290905453@infradead.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Read/save PPIN MSR during initialization</title>
<updated>2022-02-01T15:29:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tony Luck</name>
<email>tony.luck@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-31T23:01:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=822ccfade55b6be7977b364356fcf2d78d8a373a'/>
<id>822ccfade55b6be7977b364356fcf2d78d8a373a</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, the PPIN (Protected Processor Inventory Number) MSR is read
by every CPU that processes a machine check, CMCI, or just polls machine
check banks from a periodic timer. This is not a "fast" MSR, so this
adds to overhead of processing errors.

Add a new "ppin" field to the cpuinfo_x86 structure. Read and save the
PPIN during initialization. Use this copy in mce_setup() instead of
reading the MSR.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131230111.2004669-4-tony.luck@intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently, the PPIN (Protected Processor Inventory Number) MSR is read
by every CPU that processes a machine check, CMCI, or just polls machine
check banks from a periodic timer. This is not a "fast" MSR, so this
adds to overhead of processing errors.

Add a new "ppin" field to the cpuinfo_x86 structure. Read and save the
PPIN during initialization. Use this copy in mce_setup() instead of
reading the MSR.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131230111.2004669-4-tony.luck@intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sgx: Hook arch_memory_failure() into mainline code</title>
<updated>2021-11-15T19:13:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tony Luck</name>
<email>tony.luck@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-26T22:00:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=03b122da74b22fbe7cd98184fa5657a9ce13970c'/>
<id>03b122da74b22fbe7cd98184fa5657a9ce13970c</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a call inside memory_failure() to call the arch specific code
to check if the address is an SGX EPC page and handle it.

Note the SGX EPC pages do not have a "struct page" entry, so the hook
goes in at the same point as the device mapping hook.

Pull the call to acquire the mutex earlier so the SGX errors are also
protected.

Make set_mce_nospec() skip SGX pages when trying to adjust
the 1:1 map.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi &lt;naoya.horiguchi@nec.com&gt;
Tested-by: Reinette Chatre &lt;reinette.chatre@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211026220050.697075-6-tony.luck@intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a call inside memory_failure() to call the arch specific code
to check if the address is an SGX EPC page and handle it.

Note the SGX EPC pages do not have a "struct page" entry, so the hook
goes in at the same point as the device mapping hook.

Pull the call to acquire the mutex earlier so the SGX errors are also
protected.

Make set_mce_nospec() skip SGX pages when trying to adjust
the 1:1 map.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi &lt;naoya.horiguchi@nec.com&gt;
Tested-by: Reinette Chatre &lt;reinette.chatre@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211026220050.697075-6-tony.luck@intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'kvm-5.16-fixes' into kvm-master</title>
<updated>2021-11-11T16:03:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-11T16:03:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f5396f2d826823b16de5d2cef6f46ffc66712482'/>
<id>f5396f2d826823b16de5d2cef6f46ffc66712482</id>
<content type='text'>
* Fix misuse of gfn-to-pfn cache when recording guest steal time / preempted status

* Fix selftests on APICv machines

* Fix sparse warnings

* Fix detection of KVM features in CPUID

* Cleanups for bogus writes to MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN

* Fixes and cleanups for MSR bitmap handling

* Cleanups for INVPCID

* Make x86 KVM_SOFT_MAX_VCPUS consistent with other architectures
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
* Fix misuse of gfn-to-pfn cache when recording guest steal time / preempted status

* Fix selftests on APICv machines

* Fix sparse warnings

* Fix detection of KVM features in CPUID

* Cleanups for bogus writes to MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN

* Fixes and cleanups for MSR bitmap handling

* Cleanups for INVPCID

* Make x86 KVM_SOFT_MAX_VCPUS consistent with other architectures
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Make sure KVM_CPUID_FEATURES really are KVM_CPUID_FEATURES</title>
<updated>2021-11-11T15:56:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Durrant</name>
<email>pdurrant@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-05T09:51:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=760849b1476c94da4cca5d3a5f0a1f64ffc92ba4'/>
<id>760849b1476c94da4cca5d3a5f0a1f64ffc92ba4</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently when kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() runs, it assumes that the
KVM_CPUID_FEATURES leaf is located at 0x40000001. This is not true,
however, if Hyper-V support is enabled. In this case the KVM leaves will
be offset.

This patch introdues as new 'kvm_cpuid_base' field into struct
kvm_vcpu_arch to track the location of the KVM leaves and function
kvm_update_kvm_cpuid_base() (called from kvm_set_cpuid()) to locate the
leaves using the 'KVMKVMKVM\0\0\0' signature (which is now given a
definition in kvm_para.h). Adjustment of KVM_CPUID_FEATURES will hence now
target the correct leaf.

NOTE: A new for_each_possible_hypervisor_cpuid_base() macro is intoduced
      into processor.h to avoid having duplicate code for the iteration
      over possible hypervisor base leaves.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant &lt;pdurrant@amazon.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20211105095101.5384-3-pdurrant@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently when kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() runs, it assumes that the
KVM_CPUID_FEATURES leaf is located at 0x40000001. This is not true,
however, if Hyper-V support is enabled. In this case the KVM leaves will
be offset.

This patch introdues as new 'kvm_cpuid_base' field into struct
kvm_vcpu_arch to track the location of the KVM leaves and function
kvm_update_kvm_cpuid_base() (called from kvm_set_cpuid()) to locate the
leaves using the 'KVMKVMKVM\0\0\0' signature (which is now given a
definition in kvm_para.h). Adjustment of KVM_CPUID_FEATURES will hence now
target the correct leaf.

NOTE: A new for_each_possible_hypervisor_cpuid_base() macro is intoduced
      into processor.h to avoid having duplicate code for the iteration
      over possible hypervisor base leaves.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant &lt;pdurrant@amazon.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20211105095101.5384-3-pdurrant@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2021-11-02T14:56:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-02T14:56:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=cc0356d6a02e064387c16a83cb96fe43ef33181e'/>
<id>cc0356d6a02e064387c16a83cb96fe43ef33181e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Do not #GP on userspace use of CLI/STI but pretend it was a NOP to
   keep old userspace from breaking. Adjust the corresponding iopl
   selftest to that.

 - Improve stack overflow warnings to say which stack got overflowed and
   raise the exception stack sizes to 2 pages since overflowing the
   single page of exception stack is very easy to do nowadays with all
   the tracing machinery enabled. With that, rip out the custom mapping
   of AMD SEV's too.

 - A bunch of changes in preparation for FGKASLR like supporting more
   than 64K section headers in the relocs tool, correct ORC lookup table
   size to cover the whole kernel .text and other adjustments.

* tag 'x86_core_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  selftests/x86/iopl: Adjust to the faked iopl CLI/STI usage
  vmlinux.lds.h: Have ORC lookup cover entire _etext - _stext
  x86/boot/compressed: Avoid duplicate malloc() implementations
  x86/boot: Allow a "silent" kaslr random byte fetch
  x86/tools/relocs: Support &gt;64K section headers
  x86/sev: Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default stacks storage
  x86: Increase exception stack sizes
  x86/mm/64: Improve stack overflow warnings
  x86/iopl: Fake iopl(3) CLI/STI usage
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Do not #GP on userspace use of CLI/STI but pretend it was a NOP to
   keep old userspace from breaking. Adjust the corresponding iopl
   selftest to that.

 - Improve stack overflow warnings to say which stack got overflowed and
   raise the exception stack sizes to 2 pages since overflowing the
   single page of exception stack is very easy to do nowadays with all
   the tracing machinery enabled. With that, rip out the custom mapping
   of AMD SEV's too.

 - A bunch of changes in preparation for FGKASLR like supporting more
   than 64K section headers in the relocs tool, correct ORC lookup table
   size to cover the whole kernel .text and other adjustments.

* tag 'x86_core_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  selftests/x86/iopl: Adjust to the faked iopl CLI/STI usage
  vmlinux.lds.h: Have ORC lookup cover entire _etext - _stext
  x86/boot/compressed: Avoid duplicate malloc() implementations
  x86/boot: Allow a "silent" kaslr random byte fetch
  x86/tools/relocs: Support &gt;64K section headers
  x86/sev: Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default stacks storage
  x86: Increase exception stack sizes
  x86/mm/64: Improve stack overflow warnings
  x86/iopl: Fake iopl(3) CLI/STI usage
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2021-11-01T22:33:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-01T22:33:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=e0f4c59dc4d39b3e9fa61ceb4cf2384787bcd09d'/>
<id>e0f4c59dc4d39b3e9fa61ceb4cf2384787bcd09d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 cpu updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Start checking a CPUID bit on AMD Zen3 which states that the CPU
   clears the segment base when a null selector is written. Do the
   explicit detection on older CPUs, zen2 and hygon specifically, which
   have the functionality but do not advertize the CPUID bit. Factor in
   the presence of a hypervisor underneath the kernel and avoid doing
   the explicit check there which the HV might've decided to not
   advertize for migration safety reasons, or similar.

 - Add support for a new X86 CPU vendor: VORTEX. Needed for whitelisting
   those CPUs in the hardware vulnerabilities detection

 - Force the compiler to use rIP-relative addressing in the fallback
   path of static_cpu_has(), in order to avoid unnecessary register
   pressure

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/cpu: Fix migration safety with X86_BUG_NULL_SEL
  x86/CPU: Add support for Vortex CPUs
  x86/umip: Downgrade warning messages to debug loglevel
  x86/asm: Avoid adding register pressure for the init case in static_cpu_has()
  x86/asm: Add _ASM_RIP() macro for x86-64 (%rip) suffix
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 cpu updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Start checking a CPUID bit on AMD Zen3 which states that the CPU
   clears the segment base when a null selector is written. Do the
   explicit detection on older CPUs, zen2 and hygon specifically, which
   have the functionality but do not advertize the CPUID bit. Factor in
   the presence of a hypervisor underneath the kernel and avoid doing
   the explicit check there which the HV might've decided to not
   advertize for migration safety reasons, or similar.

 - Add support for a new X86 CPU vendor: VORTEX. Needed for whitelisting
   those CPUs in the hardware vulnerabilities detection

 - Force the compiler to use rIP-relative addressing in the fallback
   path of static_cpu_has(), in order to avoid unnecessary register
   pressure

* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/cpu: Fix migration safety with X86_BUG_NULL_SEL
  x86/CPU: Add support for Vortex CPUs
  x86/umip: Downgrade warning messages to debug loglevel
  x86/asm: Avoid adding register pressure for the init case in static_cpu_has()
  x86/asm: Add _ASM_RIP() macro for x86-64 (%rip) suffix
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86-fpu-2021-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2021-11-01T21:03:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-01T21:03:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8cb1ae19bfae92def42c985417cd6e894ddaa047'/>
<id>8cb1ae19bfae92def42c985417cd6e894ddaa047</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 fpu updates from Thomas Gleixner:

 - Cleanup of extable fixup handling to be more robust, which in turn
   allows to make the FPU exception fixups more robust as well.

 - Change the return code for signal frame related failures from
   explicit error codes to a boolean fail/success as that's all what the
   calling code evaluates.

 - A large refactoring of the FPU code to prepare for adding AMX
   support:

      - Distangle the public header maze and remove especially the
        misnomed kitchen sink internal.h which is despite it's name
        included all over the place.

      - Add a proper abstraction for the register buffer storage (struct
        fpstate) which allows to dynamically size the buffer at runtime
        by flipping the pointer to the buffer container from the default
        container which is embedded in task_struct::tread::fpu to a
        dynamically allocated container with a larger register buffer.

      - Convert the code over to the new fpstate mechanism.

      - Consolidate the KVM FPU handling by moving the FPU related code
        into the FPU core which removes the number of exports and avoids
        adding even more export when AMX has to be supported in KVM.
        This also removes duplicated code which was of course
        unnecessary different and incomplete in the KVM copy.

      - Simplify the KVM FPU buffer handling by utilizing the new
        fpstate container and just switching the buffer pointer from the
        user space buffer to the KVM guest buffer when entering
        vcpu_run() and flipping it back when leaving the function. This
        cuts the memory requirements of a vCPU for FPU buffers in half
        and avoids pointless memory copy operations.

        This also solves the so far unresolved problem of adding AMX
        support because the current FPU buffer handling of KVM inflicted
        a circular dependency between adding AMX support to the core and
        to KVM. With the new scheme of switching fpstate AMX support can
        be added to the core code without affecting KVM.

      - Replace various variables with proper data structures so the
        extra information required for adding dynamically enabled FPU
        features (AMX) can be added in one place

 - Add AMX (Advanced Matrix eXtensions) support (finally):

   AMX is a large XSTATE component which is going to be available with
   Saphire Rapids XEON CPUs. The feature comes with an extra MSR
   (MSR_XFD) which allows to trap the (first) use of an AMX related
   instruction, which has two benefits:

    1) It allows the kernel to control access to the feature

    2) It allows the kernel to dynamically allocate the large register
       state buffer instead of burdening every task with the the extra
       8K or larger state storage.

   It would have been great to gain this kind of control already with
   AVX512.

   The support comes with the following infrastructure components:

    1) arch_prctl() to
        - read the supported features (equivalent to XGETBV(0))
        - read the permitted features for a task
        - request permission for a dynamically enabled feature

       Permission is granted per process, inherited on fork() and
       cleared on exec(). The permission policy of the kernel is
       restricted to sigaltstack size validation, but the syscall
       obviously allows further restrictions via seccomp etc.

    2) A stronger sigaltstack size validation for sys_sigaltstack(2)
       which takes granted permissions and the potentially resulting
       larger signal frame into account. This mechanism can also be used
       to enforce factual sigaltstack validation independent of dynamic
       features to help with finding potential victims of the 2K
       sigaltstack size constant which is broken since AVX512 support
       was added.

    3) Exception handling for #NM traps to catch first use of a extended
       feature via a new cause MSR. If the exception was caused by the
       use of such a feature, the handler checks permission for that
       feature. If permission has not been granted, the handler sends a
       SIGILL like the #UD handler would do if the feature would have
       been disabled in XCR0. If permission has been granted, then a new
       fpstate which fits the larger buffer requirement is allocated.

       In the unlikely case that this allocation fails, the handler
       sends SIGSEGV to the task. That's not elegant, but unavoidable as
       the other discussed options of preallocation or full per task
       permissions come with their own set of horrors for kernel and/or
       userspace. So this is the lesser of the evils and SIGSEGV caused
       by unexpected memory allocation failures is not a fundamentally
       new concept either.

       When allocation succeeds, the fpstate properties are filled in to
       reflect the extended feature set and the resulting sizes, the
       fpu::fpstate pointer is updated accordingly and the trap is
       disarmed for this task permanently.

    4) Enumeration and size calculations

    5) Trap switching via MSR_XFD

       The XFD (eXtended Feature Disable) MSR is context switched with
       the same life time rules as the FPU register state itself. The
       mechanism is keyed off with a static key which is default
       disabled so !AMX equipped CPUs have zero overhead. On AMX enabled
       CPUs the overhead is limited by comparing the tasks XFD value
       with a per CPU shadow variable to avoid redundant MSR writes. In
       case of switching from a AMX using task to a non AMX using task
       or vice versa, the extra MSR write is obviously inevitable.

       All other places which need to be aware of the variable feature
       sets and resulting variable sizes are not affected at all because
       they retrieve the information (feature set, sizes) unconditonally
       from the fpstate properties.

    6) Enable the new AMX states

   Note, this is relatively new code despite the fact that AMX support
   is in the works for more than a year now.

   The big refactoring of the FPU code, which allowed to do a proper
   integration has been started exactly 3 weeks ago. Refactoring of the
   existing FPU code and of the original AMX patches took a week and has
   been subject to extensive review and testing. The only fallout which
   has not been caught in review and testing right away was restricted
   to AMX enabled systems, which is completely irrelevant for anyone
   outside Intel and their early access program. There might be dragons
   lurking as usual, but so far the fine grained refactoring has held up
   and eventual yet undetected fallout is bisectable and should be
   easily addressable before the 5.16 release. Famous last words...

   Many thanks to Chang Bae and Dave Hansen for working hard on this and
   also to the various test teams at Intel who reserved extra capacity
   to follow the rapid development of this closely which provides the
   confidence level required to offer this rather large update for
   inclusion into 5.16-rc1

* tag 'x86-fpu-2021-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (110 commits)
  Documentation/x86: Add documentation for using dynamic XSTATE features
  x86/fpu: Include vmalloc.h for vzalloc()
  selftests/x86/amx: Add context switch test
  selftests/x86/amx: Add test cases for AMX state management
  x86/fpu/amx: Enable the AMX feature in 64-bit mode
  x86/fpu: Add XFD handling for dynamic states
  x86/fpu: Calculate the default sizes independently
  x86/fpu/amx: Define AMX state components and have it used for boot-time checks
  x86/fpu/xstate: Prepare XSAVE feature table for gaps in state component numbers
  x86/fpu/xstate: Add fpstate_realloc()/free()
  x86/fpu/xstate: Add XFD #NM handler
  x86/fpu: Update XFD state where required
  x86/fpu: Add sanity checks for XFD
  x86/fpu: Add XFD state to fpstate
  x86/msr-index: Add MSRs for XFD
  x86/cpufeatures: Add eXtended Feature Disabling (XFD) feature bit
  x86/fpu: Reset permission and fpstate on exec()
  x86/fpu: Prepare fpu_clone() for dynamically enabled features
  x86/fpu/signal: Prepare for variable sigframe length
  x86/signal: Use fpu::__state_user_size for sigalt stack validation
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 fpu updates from Thomas Gleixner:

 - Cleanup of extable fixup handling to be more robust, which in turn
   allows to make the FPU exception fixups more robust as well.

 - Change the return code for signal frame related failures from
   explicit error codes to a boolean fail/success as that's all what the
   calling code evaluates.

 - A large refactoring of the FPU code to prepare for adding AMX
   support:

      - Distangle the public header maze and remove especially the
        misnomed kitchen sink internal.h which is despite it's name
        included all over the place.

      - Add a proper abstraction for the register buffer storage (struct
        fpstate) which allows to dynamically size the buffer at runtime
        by flipping the pointer to the buffer container from the default
        container which is embedded in task_struct::tread::fpu to a
        dynamically allocated container with a larger register buffer.

      - Convert the code over to the new fpstate mechanism.

      - Consolidate the KVM FPU handling by moving the FPU related code
        into the FPU core which removes the number of exports and avoids
        adding even more export when AMX has to be supported in KVM.
        This also removes duplicated code which was of course
        unnecessary different and incomplete in the KVM copy.

      - Simplify the KVM FPU buffer handling by utilizing the new
        fpstate container and just switching the buffer pointer from the
        user space buffer to the KVM guest buffer when entering
        vcpu_run() and flipping it back when leaving the function. This
        cuts the memory requirements of a vCPU for FPU buffers in half
        and avoids pointless memory copy operations.

        This also solves the so far unresolved problem of adding AMX
        support because the current FPU buffer handling of KVM inflicted
        a circular dependency between adding AMX support to the core and
        to KVM. With the new scheme of switching fpstate AMX support can
        be added to the core code without affecting KVM.

      - Replace various variables with proper data structures so the
        extra information required for adding dynamically enabled FPU
        features (AMX) can be added in one place

 - Add AMX (Advanced Matrix eXtensions) support (finally):

   AMX is a large XSTATE component which is going to be available with
   Saphire Rapids XEON CPUs. The feature comes with an extra MSR
   (MSR_XFD) which allows to trap the (first) use of an AMX related
   instruction, which has two benefits:

    1) It allows the kernel to control access to the feature

    2) It allows the kernel to dynamically allocate the large register
       state buffer instead of burdening every task with the the extra
       8K or larger state storage.

   It would have been great to gain this kind of control already with
   AVX512.

   The support comes with the following infrastructure components:

    1) arch_prctl() to
        - read the supported features (equivalent to XGETBV(0))
        - read the permitted features for a task
        - request permission for a dynamically enabled feature

       Permission is granted per process, inherited on fork() and
       cleared on exec(). The permission policy of the kernel is
       restricted to sigaltstack size validation, but the syscall
       obviously allows further restrictions via seccomp etc.

    2) A stronger sigaltstack size validation for sys_sigaltstack(2)
       which takes granted permissions and the potentially resulting
       larger signal frame into account. This mechanism can also be used
       to enforce factual sigaltstack validation independent of dynamic
       features to help with finding potential victims of the 2K
       sigaltstack size constant which is broken since AVX512 support
       was added.

    3) Exception handling for #NM traps to catch first use of a extended
       feature via a new cause MSR. If the exception was caused by the
       use of such a feature, the handler checks permission for that
       feature. If permission has not been granted, the handler sends a
       SIGILL like the #UD handler would do if the feature would have
       been disabled in XCR0. If permission has been granted, then a new
       fpstate which fits the larger buffer requirement is allocated.

       In the unlikely case that this allocation fails, the handler
       sends SIGSEGV to the task. That's not elegant, but unavoidable as
       the other discussed options of preallocation or full per task
       permissions come with their own set of horrors for kernel and/or
       userspace. So this is the lesser of the evils and SIGSEGV caused
       by unexpected memory allocation failures is not a fundamentally
       new concept either.

       When allocation succeeds, the fpstate properties are filled in to
       reflect the extended feature set and the resulting sizes, the
       fpu::fpstate pointer is updated accordingly and the trap is
       disarmed for this task permanently.

    4) Enumeration and size calculations

    5) Trap switching via MSR_XFD

       The XFD (eXtended Feature Disable) MSR is context switched with
       the same life time rules as the FPU register state itself. The
       mechanism is keyed off with a static key which is default
       disabled so !AMX equipped CPUs have zero overhead. On AMX enabled
       CPUs the overhead is limited by comparing the tasks XFD value
       with a per CPU shadow variable to avoid redundant MSR writes. In
       case of switching from a AMX using task to a non AMX using task
       or vice versa, the extra MSR write is obviously inevitable.

       All other places which need to be aware of the variable feature
       sets and resulting variable sizes are not affected at all because
       they retrieve the information (feature set, sizes) unconditonally
       from the fpstate properties.

    6) Enable the new AMX states

   Note, this is relatively new code despite the fact that AMX support
   is in the works for more than a year now.

   The big refactoring of the FPU code, which allowed to do a proper
   integration has been started exactly 3 weeks ago. Refactoring of the
   existing FPU code and of the original AMX patches took a week and has
   been subject to extensive review and testing. The only fallout which
   has not been caught in review and testing right away was restricted
   to AMX enabled systems, which is completely irrelevant for anyone
   outside Intel and their early access program. There might be dragons
   lurking as usual, but so far the fine grained refactoring has held up
   and eventual yet undetected fallout is bisectable and should be
   easily addressable before the 5.16 release. Famous last words...

   Many thanks to Chang Bae and Dave Hansen for working hard on this and
   also to the various test teams at Intel who reserved extra capacity
   to follow the rapid development of this closely which provides the
   confidence level required to offer this rather large update for
   inclusion into 5.16-rc1

* tag 'x86-fpu-2021-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (110 commits)
  Documentation/x86: Add documentation for using dynamic XSTATE features
  x86/fpu: Include vmalloc.h for vzalloc()
  selftests/x86/amx: Add context switch test
  selftests/x86/amx: Add test cases for AMX state management
  x86/fpu/amx: Enable the AMX feature in 64-bit mode
  x86/fpu: Add XFD handling for dynamic states
  x86/fpu: Calculate the default sizes independently
  x86/fpu/amx: Define AMX state components and have it used for boot-time checks
  x86/fpu/xstate: Prepare XSAVE feature table for gaps in state component numbers
  x86/fpu/xstate: Add fpstate_realloc()/free()
  x86/fpu/xstate: Add XFD #NM handler
  x86/fpu: Update XFD state where required
  x86/fpu: Add sanity checks for XFD
  x86/fpu: Add XFD state to fpstate
  x86/msr-index: Add MSRs for XFD
  x86/cpufeatures: Add eXtended Feature Disabling (XFD) feature bit
  x86/fpu: Reset permission and fpstate on exec()
  x86/fpu: Prepare fpu_clone() for dynamically enabled features
  x86/fpu/signal: Prepare for variable sigframe length
  x86/signal: Use fpu::__state_user_size for sigalt stack validation
  ...
</pre>
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