<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h, branch v5.12</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86: Move TS_COMPAT back to asm/thread_info.h</title>
<updated>2021-03-16T21:13:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-01T17:46:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=66c1b6d74cd7035e85c426f0af4aede19e805c8a'/>
<id>66c1b6d74cd7035e85c426f0af4aede19e805c8a</id>
<content type='text'>
Move TS_COMPAT back to asm/thread_info.h, close to TS_I386_REGS_POKED.

It was moved to asm/processor.h by b9d989c7218a ("x86/asm: Move the
thread_info::status field to thread_struct"), then later 37a8f7c38339
("x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info") moved the
'status' field back but TS_COMPAT was forgotten.

Preparatory patch to fix the COMPAT case for get_nr_restart_syscall()

Fixes: 609c19a385c8 ("x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code")
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210201174649.GA17880@redhat.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move TS_COMPAT back to asm/thread_info.h, close to TS_I386_REGS_POKED.

It was moved to asm/processor.h by b9d989c7218a ("x86/asm: Move the
thread_info::status field to thread_struct"), then later 37a8f7c38339
("x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info") moved the
'status' field back but TS_COMPAT was forgotten.

Preparatory patch to fix the COMPAT case for get_nr_restart_syscall()

Fixes: 609c19a385c8 ("x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code")
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210201174649.GA17880@redhat.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/irq/64: Adjust the per CPU irq stack pointer by 8</title>
<updated>2021-02-10T22:34:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-09T23:40:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=951c2a51ae75382d519839e2308394ad43ce4b40'/>
<id>951c2a51ae75382d519839e2308394ad43ce4b40</id>
<content type='text'>
The per CPU hardirq_stack_ptr contains the pointer to the irq stack in the
form that it is ready to be assigned to [ER]SP so that the first push ends
up on the top entry of the stack.

But the stack switching on 64 bit has the following rules:

    1) Store the current stack pointer (RSP) in the top most stack entry
       to allow the unwinder to link back to the previous stack

    2) Set RSP to the top most stack entry

    3) Invoke functions on the irq stack

    4) Pop RSP from the top most stack entry (stored in #1) so it's back
       to the original stack.

That requires all stack switching code to decrement the stored pointer by 8
in order to be able to store the current RSP and then set RSP to that
location. That's a pointless exercise.

Do the -8 adjustment right when storing the pointer and make the data type
a void pointer to avoid confusion vs. the struct irq_stack data type which
is on 64bit only used to declare the backing store. Move the definition
next to the inuse flag so they likely end up in the same cache
line. Sticking them into a struct to enforce it is a seperate change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210210002512.354260928@linutronix.de

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The per CPU hardirq_stack_ptr contains the pointer to the irq stack in the
form that it is ready to be assigned to [ER]SP so that the first push ends
up on the top entry of the stack.

But the stack switching on 64 bit has the following rules:

    1) Store the current stack pointer (RSP) in the top most stack entry
       to allow the unwinder to link back to the previous stack

    2) Set RSP to the top most stack entry

    3) Invoke functions on the irq stack

    4) Pop RSP from the top most stack entry (stored in #1) so it's back
       to the original stack.

That requires all stack switching code to decrement the stored pointer by 8
in order to be able to store the current RSP and then set RSP to that
location. That's a pointless exercise.

Do the -8 adjustment right when storing the pointer and make the data type
a void pointer to avoid confusion vs. the struct irq_stack data type which
is on 64bit only used to declare the backing store. Move the definition
next to the inuse flag so they likely end up in the same cache
line. Sticking them into a struct to enforce it is a seperate change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210210002512.354260928@linutronix.de

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/irq: Sanitize irq stack tracking</title>
<updated>2021-02-10T22:34:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-09T23:40:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=e7f89001797148e8dc7060c335df2c56e73a8c7a'/>
<id>e7f89001797148e8dc7060c335df2c56e73a8c7a</id>
<content type='text'>
The recursion protection for hard interrupt stacks is an unsigned int per
CPU variable initialized to -1 named __irq_count. 

The irq stack switching is only done when the variable is -1, which creates
worse code than just checking for 0. When the stack switching happens it
uses this_cpu_add/sub(1), but there is no reason to do so. It simply can
use straight writes. This is a historical leftover from the low level ASM
code which used inc and jz to make a decision.

Rename it to hardirq_stack_inuse, make it a bool and use plain stores.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210210002512.228830141@linutronix.de


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The recursion protection for hard interrupt stacks is an unsigned int per
CPU variable initialized to -1 named __irq_count. 

The irq stack switching is only done when the variable is -1, which creates
worse code than just checking for 0. When the stack switching happens it
uses this_cpu_add/sub(1), but there is no reason to do so. It simply can
use straight writes. This is a historical leftover from the low level ASM
code which used inc and jz to make a decision.

Rename it to hardirq_stack_inuse, make it a bool and use plain stores.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210210002512.228830141@linutronix.de


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/CPU/AMD: Remove amd_get_nb_id()</title>
<updated>2020-11-19T10:43:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yazen Ghannam</name>
<email>yazen.ghannam@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-09T21:06:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=db970bd231c2264a062e0de4dcf4ead5e6669e7a'/>
<id>db970bd231c2264a062e0de4dcf4ead5e6669e7a</id>
<content type='text'>
The Last Level Cache ID is returned by amd_get_nb_id(). In practice,
this value is the same as the AMD NodeId for callers of this function.
The NodeId is saved in struct cpuinfo_x86.cpu_die_id.

Replace calls to amd_get_nb_id() with the logical CPU's cpu_die_id and
remove the function.

Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam &lt;yazen.ghannam@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201109210659.754018-3-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The Last Level Cache ID is returned by amd_get_nb_id(). In practice,
this value is the same as the AMD NodeId for callers of this function.
The NodeId is saved in struct cpuinfo_x86.cpu_die_id.

Replace calls to amd_get_nb_id() with the logical CPU's cpu_die_id and
remove the function.

Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam &lt;yazen.ghannam@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201109210659.754018-3-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2020-10-22T16:59:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-22T16:59:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f56e65dff6ad52395ef45738799b4fb70ff43376'/>
<id>f56e65dff6ad52395ef45738799b4fb70ff43376</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull initial set_fs() removal from Al Viro:
 "Christoph's set_fs base series + fixups"

* 'work.set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  fs: Allow a NULL pos pointer to __kernel_read
  fs: Allow a NULL pos pointer to __kernel_write
  powerpc: remove address space overrides using set_fs()
  powerpc: use non-set_fs based maccess routines
  x86: remove address space overrides using set_fs()
  x86: make TASK_SIZE_MAX usable from assembly code
  x86: move PAGE_OFFSET, TASK_SIZE &amp; friends to page_{32,64}_types.h
  lkdtm: remove set_fs-based tests
  test_bitmap: remove user bitmap tests
  uaccess: add infrastructure for kernel builds with set_fs()
  fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops
  fs: don't allow kernel reads and writes without iter ops
  sysctl: Convert to iter interfaces
  proc: add a read_iter method to proc proc_ops
  proc: cleanup the compat vs no compat file ops
  proc: remove a level of indentation in proc_get_inode
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull initial set_fs() removal from Al Viro:
 "Christoph's set_fs base series + fixups"

* 'work.set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  fs: Allow a NULL pos pointer to __kernel_read
  fs: Allow a NULL pos pointer to __kernel_write
  powerpc: remove address space overrides using set_fs()
  powerpc: use non-set_fs based maccess routines
  x86: remove address space overrides using set_fs()
  x86: make TASK_SIZE_MAX usable from assembly code
  x86: move PAGE_OFFSET, TASK_SIZE &amp; friends to page_{32,64}_types.h
  lkdtm: remove set_fs-based tests
  test_bitmap: remove user bitmap tests
  uaccess: add infrastructure for kernel builds with set_fs()
  fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops
  fs: don't allow kernel reads and writes without iter ops
  sysctl: Convert to iter interfaces
  proc: add a read_iter method to proc proc_ops
  proc: cleanup the compat vs no compat file ops
  proc: remove a level of indentation in proc_get_inode
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2020-10-14T17:21:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-14T17:21:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=da9803dfd3955bd2f9909d55e23f188ad76dbe58'/>
<id>da9803dfd3955bd2f9909d55e23f188ad76dbe58</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
 "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
  by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
  inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
  switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
  exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.

  With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
  hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
  mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
  Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
  Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
  between the guest and the hypervisor.

  Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
  so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
  code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
  brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
  boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
  building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
  not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
  one.

  The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
  mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
  from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
  SEV-ES-specific files:

    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c

  Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
  behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
  setups.

  Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"

* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
  x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
  x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
  x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
  x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
  x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
  x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
  x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
  x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
  x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
  x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
  x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
 "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
  by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
  inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
  switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
  exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.

  With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
  hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
  mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
  Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
  Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
  between the guest and the hypervisor.

  Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
  so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
  code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
  brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
  boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
  building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
  not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
  one.

  The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
  mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
  from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
  SEV-ES-specific files:

    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c

  Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
  behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
  setups.

  Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"

* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
  x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
  x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
  x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
  x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
  x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
  x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
  x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
  x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
  x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
  x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
  x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T09:33:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joerg Roedel</name>
<email>jroedel@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-07T13:16:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=520d030852b4c9babfce9a79d8b5320b6b5545e6'/>
<id>520d030852b4c9babfce9a79d8b5320b6b5545e6</id>
<content type='text'>
The IDT on 64-bit contains vectors which use paranoid_entry() and/or IST
stacks. To make these vectors work, the TSS and the getcpu GDT entry need
to be set up before the IDT is loaded.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-68-joro@8bytes.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The IDT on 64-bit contains vectors which use paranoid_entry() and/or IST
stacks. To make these vectors work, the TSS and the getcpu GDT entry need
to be set up before the IDT is loaded.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-68-joro@8bytes.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: remove address space overrides using set_fs()</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T02:21:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-03T14:22:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=47058bb54b57962b3958a936ddbc59355e4c5504'/>
<id>47058bb54b57962b3958a936ddbc59355e4c5504</id>
<content type='text'>
Stop providing the possibility to override the address space using
set_fs() now that there is no need for that any more.  To properly
handle the TASK_SIZE_MAX checking for 4 vs 5-level page tables on
x86 a new alternative is introduced, which just like the one in
entry_64.S has to use the hardcoded virtual address bits to escape
the fact that TASK_SIZE_MAX isn't actually a constant when 5-level
page tables are enabled.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Stop providing the possibility to override the address space using
set_fs() now that there is no need for that any more.  To properly
handle the TASK_SIZE_MAX checking for 4 vs 5-level page tables on
x86 a new alternative is introduced, which just like the one in
entry_64.S has to use the hardcoded virtual address bits to escape
the fact that TASK_SIZE_MAX isn't actually a constant when 5-level
page tables are enabled.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: move PAGE_OFFSET, TASK_SIZE &amp; friends to page_{32,64}_types.h</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T02:21:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-03T14:22:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=999c83e8ffd90caa00ee6caf054e037cf8a27d0e'/>
<id>999c83e8ffd90caa00ee6caf054e037cf8a27d0e</id>
<content type='text'>
At least for 64-bit this moves them closer to some of the defines
they are based on, and it prepares for using the TASK_SIZE_MAX
definition from assembly.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
At least for 64-bit this moves them closer to some of the defines
they are based on, and it prepares for using the TASK_SIZE_MAX
definition from assembly.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/debug: Change thread.debugreg6 to thread.virtual_dr6</title>
<updated>2020-09-04T13:12:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-02T13:26:02+00:00</published>
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Current usage of thread.debugreg6 is convoluted at best. It starts life as
a copy of the hardware DR6 value, but then various bits are cleared and
set.

Replace this with a new variable thread.virtual_dr6 that is initialized to
0 when DR6 is read and only gains bits, at the same time the actual (on
stack) dr6 value which is read from the hardware only gets bits cleared.

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Daniel Thompson &lt;daniel.thompson@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902133201.415372940@infradead.org

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<pre>
Current usage of thread.debugreg6 is convoluted at best. It starts life as
a copy of the hardware DR6 value, but then various bits are cleared and
set.

Replace this with a new variable thread.virtual_dr6 that is initialized to
0 when DR6 is read and only gains bits, at the same time the actual (on
stack) dr6 value which is read from the hardware only gets bits cleared.

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Daniel Thompson &lt;daniel.thompson@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902133201.415372940@infradead.org

</pre>
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