<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/x86/entry, branch v6.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/entry_32: Add VERW just before userspace transition</title>
<updated>2024-02-20T00:31:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-14T02:22:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a0e2dab44d22b913b4c228c8b52b2a104434b0b3'/>
<id>a0e2dab44d22b913b4c228c8b52b2a104434b0b3</id>
<content type='text'>
As done for entry_64, add support for executing VERW late in exit to
user path for 32-bit mode.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-3-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As done for entry_64, add support for executing VERW late in exit to
user path for 32-bit mode.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-3-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/entry_64: Add VERW just before userspace transition</title>
<updated>2024-02-20T00:31:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-14T02:21:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3c7501722e6b31a6e56edd23cea5e77dbb9ffd1a'/>
<id>3c7501722e6b31a6e56edd23cea5e77dbb9ffd1a</id>
<content type='text'>
Mitigation for MDS is to use VERW instruction to clear any secrets in
CPU Buffers. Any memory accesses after VERW execution can still remain
in CPU buffers. It is safer to execute VERW late in return to user path
to minimize the window in which kernel data can end up in CPU buffers.
There are not many kernel secrets to be had after SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.

Add support for deploying VERW mitigation after user register state is
restored. This helps minimize the chances of kernel data ending up into
CPU buffers after executing VERW.

Note that the mitigation at the new location is not yet enabled.

  Corner case not handled
  =======================
  Interrupts returning to kernel don't clear CPUs buffers since the
  exit-to-user path is expected to do that anyways. But, there could be
  a case when an NMI is generated in kernel after the exit-to-user path
  has cleared the buffers. This case is not handled and NMI returning to
  kernel don't clear CPU buffers because:

  1. It is rare to get an NMI after VERW, but before returning to userspace.
  2. For an unprivileged user, there is no known way to make that NMI
     less rare or target it.
  3. It would take a large number of these precisely-timed NMIs to mount
     an actual attack.  There's presumably not enough bandwidth.
  4. The NMI in question occurs after a VERW, i.e. when user state is
     restored and most interesting data is already scrubbed. Whats left
     is only the data that NMI touches, and that may or may not be of
     any interest.

Suggested-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-2-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Mitigation for MDS is to use VERW instruction to clear any secrets in
CPU Buffers. Any memory accesses after VERW execution can still remain
in CPU buffers. It is safer to execute VERW late in return to user path
to minimize the window in which kernel data can end up in CPU buffers.
There are not many kernel secrets to be had after SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.

Add support for deploying VERW mitigation after user register state is
restored. This helps minimize the chances of kernel data ending up into
CPU buffers after executing VERW.

Note that the mitigation at the new location is not yet enabled.

  Corner case not handled
  =======================
  Interrupts returning to kernel don't clear CPUs buffers since the
  exit-to-user path is expected to do that anyways. But, there could be
  a case when an NMI is generated in kernel after the exit-to-user path
  has cleared the buffers. This case is not handled and NMI returning to
  kernel don't clear CPU buffers because:

  1. It is rare to get an NMI after VERW, but before returning to userspace.
  2. For an unprivileged user, there is no known way to make that NMI
     less rare or target it.
  3. It would take a large number of these precisely-timed NMIs to mount
     an actual attack.  There's presumably not enough bandwidth.
  4. The NMI in question occurs after a VERW, i.e. when user state is
     restored and most interesting data is already scrubbed. Whats left
     is only the data that NMI touches, and that may or may not be of
     any interest.

Suggested-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-2-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Add asm helpers for executing VERW</title>
<updated>2024-02-20T00:31:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-14T02:21:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=baf8361e54550a48a7087b603313ad013cc13386'/>
<id>baf8361e54550a48a7087b603313ad013cc13386</id>
<content type='text'>
MDS mitigation requires clearing the CPU buffers before returning to
user. This needs to be done late in the exit-to-user path. Current
location of VERW leaves a possibility of kernel data ending up in CPU
buffers for memory accesses done after VERW such as:

  1. Kernel data accessed by an NMI between VERW and return-to-user can
     remain in CPU buffers since NMI returning to kernel does not
     execute VERW to clear CPU buffers.
  2. Alyssa reported that after VERW is executed,
     CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y scrubs the stack used by a system
     call. Memory accesses during stack scrubbing can move kernel stack
     contents into CPU buffers.
  3. When caller saved registers are restored after a return from
     function executing VERW, the kernel stack accesses can remain in
     CPU buffers(since they occur after VERW).

To fix this VERW needs to be moved very late in exit-to-user path.

In preparation for moving VERW to entry/exit asm code, create macros
that can be used in asm. Also make VERW patching depend on a new feature
flag X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF.

Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn &lt;alyssa.milburn@intel.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-1-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
MDS mitigation requires clearing the CPU buffers before returning to
user. This needs to be done late in the exit-to-user path. Current
location of VERW leaves a possibility of kernel data ending up in CPU
buffers for memory accesses done after VERW such as:

  1. Kernel data accessed by an NMI between VERW and return-to-user can
     remain in CPU buffers since NMI returning to kernel does not
     execute VERW to clear CPU buffers.
  2. Alyssa reported that after VERW is executed,
     CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y scrubs the stack used by a system
     call. Memory accesses during stack scrubbing can move kernel stack
     contents into CPU buffers.
  3. When caller saved registers are restored after a return from
     function executing VERW, the kernel stack accesses can remain in
     CPU buffers(since they occur after VERW).

To fix this VERW needs to be moved very late in exit-to-user path.

In preparation for moving VERW to entry/exit asm code, create macros
that can be used in asm. Also make VERW patching depend on a new feature
flag X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF.

Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn &lt;alyssa.milburn@intel.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper &lt;andrew.cooper3@citrix.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-1-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'asm-generic-6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic</title>
<updated>2024-01-11T02:13:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-11T02:13:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c29901006179c4c87f9335771e50814ec5707239'/>
<id>c29901006179c4c87f9335771e50814ec5707239</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull asm-generic cleanups from Arnd Bergmann:
 "A series from Baoquan He cleans up the asm-generic/io.h to remove the
  ioremap_uc() definition from everything except x86, which still needs
  it for pre-PAT systems. This series notably contains a patch from
  Jiaxun Yang that converts MIPS to use asm-generic/io.h like every
  other architecture does, enabling future cleanups.

  Some of my own patches fix -Wmissing-prototype warnings in
  architecture specific code across several architectures. This is now
  needed as the warning is enabled by default. There are still some
  remaining warnings in minor platforms, but the series should catch
  most of the widely used ones make them more consistent with one
  another.

  David McKay fixes a bug in __generic_cmpxchg_local() when this is used
  on 64-bit architectures. This could currently only affect parisc64 and
  sparc64.

  Additional cleanups address from Linus Walleij, Uwe Kleine-König,
  Thomas Huth, and Kefeng Wang help reduce unnecessary inconsistencies
  between architectures"

* tag 'asm-generic-6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
  asm-generic: Fix 32 bit __generic_cmpxchg_local
  Hexagon: Make pfn accessors statics inlines
  ARC: mm: Make virt_to_pfn() a static inline
  mips: remove extraneous asm-generic/iomap.h include
  sparc: Use $(kecho) to announce kernel images being ready
  arm64: vdso32: Define BUILD_VDSO32_64 to correct prototypes
  csky: fix arch_jump_label_transform_static override
  arch: add do_page_fault prototypes
  arch: add missing prepare_ftrace_return() prototypes
  arch: vdso: consolidate gettime prototypes
  arch: include linux/cpu.h for trap_init() prototype
  arch: fix asm-offsets.c building with -Wmissing-prototypes
  arch: consolidate arch_irq_work_raise prototypes
  hexagon: Remove CONFIG_HEXAGON_ARCH_VERSION from uapi header
  asm/io: remove unnecessary xlate_dev_mem_ptr() and unxlate_dev_mem_ptr()
  mips: io: remove duplicated codes
  arch/*/io.h: remove ioremap_uc in some architectures
  mips: add &lt;asm-generic/io.h&gt; including
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull asm-generic cleanups from Arnd Bergmann:
 "A series from Baoquan He cleans up the asm-generic/io.h to remove the
  ioremap_uc() definition from everything except x86, which still needs
  it for pre-PAT systems. This series notably contains a patch from
  Jiaxun Yang that converts MIPS to use asm-generic/io.h like every
  other architecture does, enabling future cleanups.

  Some of my own patches fix -Wmissing-prototype warnings in
  architecture specific code across several architectures. This is now
  needed as the warning is enabled by default. There are still some
  remaining warnings in minor platforms, but the series should catch
  most of the widely used ones make them more consistent with one
  another.

  David McKay fixes a bug in __generic_cmpxchg_local() when this is used
  on 64-bit architectures. This could currently only affect parisc64 and
  sparc64.

  Additional cleanups address from Linus Walleij, Uwe Kleine-König,
  Thomas Huth, and Kefeng Wang help reduce unnecessary inconsistencies
  between architectures"

* tag 'asm-generic-6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
  asm-generic: Fix 32 bit __generic_cmpxchg_local
  Hexagon: Make pfn accessors statics inlines
  ARC: mm: Make virt_to_pfn() a static inline
  mips: remove extraneous asm-generic/iomap.h include
  sparc: Use $(kecho) to announce kernel images being ready
  arm64: vdso32: Define BUILD_VDSO32_64 to correct prototypes
  csky: fix arch_jump_label_transform_static override
  arch: add do_page_fault prototypes
  arch: add missing prepare_ftrace_return() prototypes
  arch: vdso: consolidate gettime prototypes
  arch: include linux/cpu.h for trap_init() prototype
  arch: fix asm-offsets.c building with -Wmissing-prototypes
  arch: consolidate arch_irq_work_raise prototypes
  hexagon: Remove CONFIG_HEXAGON_ARCH_VERSION from uapi header
  asm/io: remove unnecessary xlate_dev_mem_ptr() and unxlate_dev_mem_ptr()
  mips: io: remove duplicated codes
  arch/*/io.h: remove ioremap_uc in some architectures
  mips: add &lt;asm-generic/io.h&gt; including
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm</title>
<updated>2024-01-09T20:57:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-09T20:57:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=063a7ce32ddc2c4f2404b0dfd29e60e3dbcdffac'/>
<id>063a7ce32ddc2c4f2404b0dfd29e60e3dbcdffac</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore:

 - Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and
   lsm_set_self_attr().

   The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and
   third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these
   syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under
   /proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple,
   simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current
   /proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM
   was allowed to be active at a given time.

   We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the
   existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and
   even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel
   API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had
   established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls.

   Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly
   unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he
   is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more
   difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM
   community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to
   continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as
   pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g.
   syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain.

   My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing
   out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to
   support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step
   forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our
   reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic
   for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api
   folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of
   their concerns.

 - Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit
   ioctls on 64-bit systems problem.

   This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which
   provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually
   cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while
   Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this
   patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes.

 - Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled
   at boot.

   While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something
   users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and
   then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via
   NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense.

   Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take
   this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like
   the best fit.

 - Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about
   our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc.

   I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated
   MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been
   working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if
   they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role;
   hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to
   look after it.

 - Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits)
  lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
  lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx
  calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass()
  selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test
  MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM
  MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry
  mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts
  mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses
  lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
  lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()
  lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()
  lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()
  lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()
  lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()
  lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation
  lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA
  LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls
  SELinux: Add selfattr hooks
  AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks
  Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore:

 - Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and
   lsm_set_self_attr().

   The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and
   third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these
   syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under
   /proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple,
   simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current
   /proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM
   was allowed to be active at a given time.

   We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the
   existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and
   even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel
   API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had
   established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls.

   Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly
   unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he
   is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more
   difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM
   community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to
   continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as
   pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g.
   syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain.

   My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing
   out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to
   support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step
   forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our
   reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic
   for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api
   folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of
   their concerns.

 - Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit
   ioctls on 64-bit systems problem.

   This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which
   provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually
   cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while
   Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this
   patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes.

 - Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled
   at boot.

   While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something
   users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and
   then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via
   NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense.

   Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take
   this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like
   the best fit.

 - Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about
   our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc.

   I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated
   MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been
   working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if
   they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role;
   hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to
   look after it.

 - Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits)
  lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
  lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx
  calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass()
  selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test
  MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM
  MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry
  mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts
  mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses
  lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
  lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()
  lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()
  lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()
  lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()
  lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()
  lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation
  lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA
  LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls
  SELinux: Add selfattr hooks
  AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks
  Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86-entry-2024-01-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2024-01-09T01:48:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-09T01:48:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2fdbcf715a1b9dd1468317f7cd4b4cd327a09781'/>
<id>2fdbcf715a1b9dd1468317f7cd4b4cd327a09781</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86 entry updates from Ingo Molnar:

 - Optimize common_interrupt_return()

 - Harden the return-to-user code by making a CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY=y check
   unconditional &amp; moving it closer to the IRET.

* tag 'x86-entry-2024-01-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/entry: Harden return-to-user
  x86/entry: Optimize common_interrupt_return()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86 entry updates from Ingo Molnar:

 - Optimize common_interrupt_return()

 - Harden the return-to-user code by making a CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY=y check
   unconditional &amp; moving it closer to the IRET.

* tag 'x86-entry-2024-01-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/entry: Harden return-to-user
  x86/entry: Optimize common_interrupt_return()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'vfs-6.8.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs</title>
<updated>2024-01-08T18:57:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-08T18:57:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8c9440fea77440772542d6dbcb5c36182495c164'/>
<id>8c9440fea77440772542d6dbcb5c36182495c164</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs mount updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains the work to retrieve detailed information about mounts
  via two new system calls. This is hopefully the beginning of the end
  of the saga that started with fsinfo() years ago.

  The LWN articles in [1] and [2] can serve as a summary so we can avoid
  rehashing everything here.

  At LSFMM in May 2022 we got into a room and agreed on what we want to
  do about fsinfo(). Basically, split it into pieces. This is the first
  part of that agreement. Specifically, it is concerned with retrieving
  information about mounts. So this only concerns the mount information
  retrieval, not the mount table change notification, or the extended
  filesystem specific mount option work. That is separate work.

  Currently mounts have a 32bit id. Mount ids are already in heavy use
  by libmount and other low-level userspace but they can't be relied
  upon because they're recycled very quickly. We agreed that mounts
  should carry a unique 64bit id by which they can be referenced
  directly. This is now implemented as part of this work.

  The new 64bit mount id is exposed in statx() through the new
  STATX_MNT_ID_UNIQUE flag. If the flag isn't raised the old mount id is
  returned. If it is raised and the kernel supports the new 64bit mount
  id the flag is raised in the result mask and the new 64bit mount id is
  returned. New and old mount ids do not overlap so they cannot be
  conflated.

  Two new system calls are introduced that operate on the 64bit mount
  id: statmount() and listmount(). A summary of the api and usage can be
  found on LWN as well (cf. [3]) but of course, I'll provide a summary
  here as well.

  Both system calls rely on struct mnt_id_req. Which is the request
  struct used to pass the 64bit mount id identifying the mount to
  operate on. It is extensible to allow for the addition of new
  parameters and for future use in other apis that make use of mount
  ids.

  statmount() mimicks the semantics of statx() and exposes a set flags
  that userspace may raise in mnt_id_req to request specific information
  to be retrieved. A statmount() call returns a struct statmount filled
  in with information about the requested mount. Supported requests are
  indicated by raising the request flag passed in struct mnt_id_req in
  the @mask argument in struct statmount.

  Currently we do support:

   - STATMOUNT_SB_BASIC:
     Basic filesystem info

   - STATMOUNT_MNT_BASIC
     Mount information (mount id, parent mount id, mount attributes etc)

   - STATMOUNT_PROPAGATE_FROM
     Propagation from what mount in current namespace

   - STATMOUNT_MNT_ROOT
     Path of the root of the mount (e.g., mount --bind /bla /mnt returns /bla)

   - STATMOUNT_MNT_POINT
     Path of the mount point (e.g., mount --bind /bla /mnt returns /mnt)

   - STATMOUNT_FS_TYPE
     Name of the filesystem type as the magic number isn't enough due to submounts

  The string options STATMOUNT_MNT_{ROOT,POINT} and STATMOUNT_FS_TYPE
  are appended to the end of the struct. Userspace can use the offsets
  in @fs_type, @mnt_root, and @mnt_point to reference those strings
  easily.

  The struct statmount reserves quite a bit of space currently for
  future extensibility. This isn't really a problem and if this bothers
  us we can just send a follow-up pull request during this cycle.

  listmount() is given a 64bit mount id via mnt_id_req just as
  statmount(). It takes a buffer and a size to return an array of the
  64bit ids of the child mounts of the requested mount. Userspace can
  thus choose to either retrieve child mounts for a mount in batches or
  iterate through the child mounts. For most use-cases it will be
  sufficient to just leave space for a few child mounts. But for big
  mount tables having an iterator is really helpful. Iterating through a
  mount table works by setting @param in mnt_id_req to the mount id of
  the last child mount retrieved in the previous listmount() call"

Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/934469 [1]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/829212 [2]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/950569 [3]

* tag 'vfs-6.8.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  add selftest for statmount/listmount
  fs: keep struct mnt_id_req extensible
  wire up syscalls for statmount/listmount
  add listmount(2) syscall
  statmount: simplify string option retrieval
  statmount: simplify numeric option retrieval
  add statmount(2) syscall
  namespace: extract show_path() helper
  mounts: keep list of mounts in an rbtree
  add unique mount ID
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull vfs mount updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains the work to retrieve detailed information about mounts
  via two new system calls. This is hopefully the beginning of the end
  of the saga that started with fsinfo() years ago.

  The LWN articles in [1] and [2] can serve as a summary so we can avoid
  rehashing everything here.

  At LSFMM in May 2022 we got into a room and agreed on what we want to
  do about fsinfo(). Basically, split it into pieces. This is the first
  part of that agreement. Specifically, it is concerned with retrieving
  information about mounts. So this only concerns the mount information
  retrieval, not the mount table change notification, or the extended
  filesystem specific mount option work. That is separate work.

  Currently mounts have a 32bit id. Mount ids are already in heavy use
  by libmount and other low-level userspace but they can't be relied
  upon because they're recycled very quickly. We agreed that mounts
  should carry a unique 64bit id by which they can be referenced
  directly. This is now implemented as part of this work.

  The new 64bit mount id is exposed in statx() through the new
  STATX_MNT_ID_UNIQUE flag. If the flag isn't raised the old mount id is
  returned. If it is raised and the kernel supports the new 64bit mount
  id the flag is raised in the result mask and the new 64bit mount id is
  returned. New and old mount ids do not overlap so they cannot be
  conflated.

  Two new system calls are introduced that operate on the 64bit mount
  id: statmount() and listmount(). A summary of the api and usage can be
  found on LWN as well (cf. [3]) but of course, I'll provide a summary
  here as well.

  Both system calls rely on struct mnt_id_req. Which is the request
  struct used to pass the 64bit mount id identifying the mount to
  operate on. It is extensible to allow for the addition of new
  parameters and for future use in other apis that make use of mount
  ids.

  statmount() mimicks the semantics of statx() and exposes a set flags
  that userspace may raise in mnt_id_req to request specific information
  to be retrieved. A statmount() call returns a struct statmount filled
  in with information about the requested mount. Supported requests are
  indicated by raising the request flag passed in struct mnt_id_req in
  the @mask argument in struct statmount.

  Currently we do support:

   - STATMOUNT_SB_BASIC:
     Basic filesystem info

   - STATMOUNT_MNT_BASIC
     Mount information (mount id, parent mount id, mount attributes etc)

   - STATMOUNT_PROPAGATE_FROM
     Propagation from what mount in current namespace

   - STATMOUNT_MNT_ROOT
     Path of the root of the mount (e.g., mount --bind /bla /mnt returns /bla)

   - STATMOUNT_MNT_POINT
     Path of the mount point (e.g., mount --bind /bla /mnt returns /mnt)

   - STATMOUNT_FS_TYPE
     Name of the filesystem type as the magic number isn't enough due to submounts

  The string options STATMOUNT_MNT_{ROOT,POINT} and STATMOUNT_FS_TYPE
  are appended to the end of the struct. Userspace can use the offsets
  in @fs_type, @mnt_root, and @mnt_point to reference those strings
  easily.

  The struct statmount reserves quite a bit of space currently for
  future extensibility. This isn't really a problem and if this bothers
  us we can just send a follow-up pull request during this cycle.

  listmount() is given a 64bit mount id via mnt_id_req just as
  statmount(). It takes a buffer and a size to return an array of the
  64bit ids of the child mounts of the requested mount. Userspace can
  thus choose to either retrieve child mounts for a mount in batches or
  iterate through the child mounts. For most use-cases it will be
  sufficient to just leave space for a few child mounts. But for big
  mount tables having an iterator is really helpful. Iterating through a
  mount table works by setting @param in mnt_id_req to the mount id of
  the last child mount retrieved in the previous listmount() call"

Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/934469 [1]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/829212 [2]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/950569 [3]

* tag 'vfs-6.8.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  add selftest for statmount/listmount
  fs: keep struct mnt_id_req extensible
  wire up syscalls for statmount/listmount
  add listmount(2) syscall
  statmount: simplify string option retrieval
  statmount: simplify numeric option retrieval
  add statmount(2) syscall
  namespace: extract show_path() helper
  mounts: keep list of mounts in an rbtree
  add unique mount ID
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wire up syscalls for statmount/listmount</title>
<updated>2023-12-14T10:49:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-25T14:02:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d8b0f5465012538cc4bb10ddc4affadbab73465b'/>
<id>d8b0f5465012538cc4bb10ddc4affadbab73465b</id>
<content type='text'>
Wire up all archs.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231025140205.3586473-7-mszeredi@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Ian Kent &lt;raven@themaw.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Wire up all archs.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231025140205.3586473-7-mszeredi@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Ian Kent &lt;raven@themaw.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/entry: Do not allow external 0x80 interrupts</title>
<updated>2023-12-07T17:51:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-04T08:31:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=55617fb991df535f953589586468612351575704'/>
<id>55617fb991df535f953589586468612351575704</id>
<content type='text'>
The INT 0x80 instruction is used for 32-bit x86 Linux syscalls. The
kernel expects to receive a software interrupt as a result of the INT
0x80 instruction. However, an external interrupt on the same vector
also triggers the same codepath.

An external interrupt on vector 0x80 will currently be interpreted as a
32-bit system call, and assuming that it was a user context.

Panic on external interrupts on the vector.

To distinguish software interrupts from external ones, the kernel checks
the APIC ISR bit relevant to the 0x80 vector. For software interrupts,
this bit will be 0.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v6.0+
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The INT 0x80 instruction is used for 32-bit x86 Linux syscalls. The
kernel expects to receive a software interrupt as a result of the INT
0x80 instruction. However, an external interrupt on the same vector
also triggers the same codepath.

An external interrupt on vector 0x80 will currently be interpreted as a
32-bit system call, and assuming that it was a user context.

Panic on external interrupts on the vector.

To distinguish software interrupts from external ones, the kernel checks
the APIC ISR bit relevant to the 0x80 vector. For software interrupts,
this bit will be 0.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v6.0+
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/entry: Convert INT 0x80 emulation to IDTENTRY</title>
<updated>2023-12-07T17:51:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-04T08:31:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=be5341eb0d43b1e754799498bd2e8756cc167a41'/>
<id>be5341eb0d43b1e754799498bd2e8756cc167a41</id>
<content type='text'>
There is no real reason to have a separate ASM entry point implementation
for the legacy INT 0x80 syscall emulation on 64-bit.

IDTENTRY provides all the functionality needed with the only difference
that it does not:

  - save the syscall number (AX) into pt_regs::orig_ax
  - set pt_regs::ax to -ENOSYS

Both can be done safely in the C code of an IDTENTRY before invoking any of
the syscall related functions which depend on this convention.

Aside of ASM code reduction this prepares for detecting and handling a
local APIC injected vector 0x80.

[ kirill.shutemov: More verbose comments ]
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v6.0+
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There is no real reason to have a separate ASM entry point implementation
for the legacy INT 0x80 syscall emulation on 64-bit.

IDTENTRY provides all the functionality needed with the only difference
that it does not:

  - save the syscall number (AX) into pt_regs::orig_ax
  - set pt_regs::ax to -ENOSYS

Both can be done safely in the C code of an IDTENTRY before invoking any of
the syscall related functions which depend on this convention.

Aside of ASM code reduction this prepares for detecting and handling a
local APIC injected vector 0x80.

[ kirill.shutemov: More verbose comments ]
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v6.0+
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
