There are several functions involved for performing the functionality
of evtchn_do_upcall():

- __xen_evtchn_do_upcall() doing the real work
- xen_hvm_evtchn_do_upcall() just being a wrapper for
  __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(), exposed for external callers
- xen_evtchn_do_upcall() calling __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(), too, but
  without any user

Simplify this maze by:

- removing the unused xen_evtchn_do_upcall()
- removing xen_hvm_evtchn_do_upcall() as the only left caller of
  __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(), while renaming __xen_evtchn_do_upcall() to
  xen_evtchn_do_upcall()

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen:
 "This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's
  Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

  CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and
  indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack
  part of this feature, and just for userspace.

  The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against
  return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a
  secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has
  protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction,
  the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and
  to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops
  the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy.

  For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier
  versions of this patch set"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/

* tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits)
  x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type
  x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm
  x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR
  x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference
  x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm
  x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
  x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
  x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
  selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
  x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
  x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status
  x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
  x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
  x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem
  x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn
  x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
  x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
  ...

Pull fchmodat2 system call from Christian Brauner:
 "This adds the fchmodat2() system call. It is a revised version of the
  fchmodat() system call, adding a missing flag argument. Support for
  both AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW and AT_EMPTY_PATH are included.

  Adding this system call revision has been a longstanding request but
  so far has always fallen through the cracks. While the kernel
  implementation of fchmodat() does not have a flag argument the libc
  provided POSIX-compliant fchmodat(3) version does. Both glibc and musl
  have to implement a workaround in order to support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
  (see [1] and [2]).

  The workaround is brittle because it relies not just on O_PATH and
  O_NOFOLLOW semantics and procfs magic links but also on our rather
  inconsistent symlink semantics.

  This gives userspace a proper fchmodat2() system call that libcs can
  use to properly implement fchmodat(3) and allows them to get rid of
  their hacks. In this case it will immediately benefit them as the
  current workaround is already defunct because of aformentioned
  inconsistencies.

  In addition to AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, give userspace the ability to use
  AT_EMPTY_PATH with fchmodat2(). This is already possible with
  fchownat() so there's no reason to not also support it for
  fchmodat2().

  The implementation is simple and comes with selftests. Implementation
  of the system call and wiring up the system call are done as separate
  patches even though they could arguably be one patch. But in case
  there are merge conflicts from other system call additions it can be
  beneficial to have separate patches"

Link: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/fchmodat.c;h=17eca54051ee28ba1ec3f9aed170a62630959143;hb=a492b1e5ef7ab50c6fdd4e4e9879ea5569ab0a6c#l35 [1]
Link: https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/stat/fchmodat.c?id=718f363bc2067b6487900eddc9180c84e7739f80#n28 [2]

* tag 'v6.6-vfs.fchmodat2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  selftests: fchmodat2: remove duplicate unneeded defines
  fchmodat2: add support for AT_EMPTY_PATH
  selftests: Add fchmodat2 selftest
  arch: Register fchmodat2, usually as syscall 452
  fs: Add fchmodat2()
  Non-functional cleanup of a "__user * filename"

Yingcong has noticed that on the 5-level paging machine, VDSO and VVAR
VMAs are placed above the 47-bit border:

8000001a9000-8000001ad000 r--p 00000000 00:00 0                          [vvar]
8000001ad000-8000001af000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]

This might confuse users who are not aware of 5-level paging and expect
all userspace addresses to be under the 47-bit border.

So far problem has only been triggered with ASLR disabled, although it
may also occur with ASLR enabled if the layout is randomized in a just
right way.

The problem happens due to custom placement for the VMAs in the VDSO
code: vdso_addr() tries to place them above the stack and checks the
result against TASK_SIZE_MAX, which is wrong. TASK_SIZE_MAX is set to
the 56-bit border on 5-level paging machines. Use DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW
instead.

Fixes: b569bab78d8d ("x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace")
Reported-by: Yingcong Wu <yingcong.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230803151609.22141-1-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com

When operating with shadow stacks enabled, the kernel will automatically
allocate shadow stacks for new threads, however in some cases userspace
will need additional shadow stacks. The main example of this is the
ucontext family of functions, which require userspace allocating and
pivoting to userspace managed stacks.

Unlike most other user memory permissions, shadow stacks need to be
provisioned with special data in order to be useful. They need to be setup
with a restore token so that userspace can pivot to them via the RSTORSSP
instruction. But, the security design of shadow stacks is that they
should not be written to except in limited circumstances. This presents a
problem for userspace, as to how userspace can provision this special
data, without allowing for the shadow stack to be generally writable.

Previously, a new PROT_SHADOW_STACK was attempted, which could be
mprotect()ed from RW permissions after the data was provisioned. This was
found to not be secure enough, as other threads could write to the
shadow stack during the writable window.

The kernel can use a special instruction, WRUSS, to write directly to
userspace shadow stacks. So the solution can be that memory can be mapped
as shadow stack permissions from the beginning (never generally writable
in userspace), and the kernel itself can write the restore token.

First, a new madvise() flag was explored, which could operate on the
PROT_SHADOW_STACK memory. This had a couple of downsides:
1. Extra checks were needed in mprotect() to prevent writable memory from
   ever becoming PROT_SHADOW_STACK.
2. Extra checks/vma state were needed in the new madvise() to prevent
   restore tokens being written into the middle of pre-used shadow stacks.
   It is ideal to prevent restore tokens being added at arbitrary
   locations, so the check was to make sure the shadow stack had never been
   written to.
3. It stood out from the rest of the madvise flags, as more of direct
   action than a hint at future desired behavior.

So rather than repurpose two existing syscalls (mmap, madvise) that don't
quite fit, just implement a new map_shadow_stack syscall to allow
userspace to map and setup new shadow stacks in one step. While ucontext
is the primary motivator, userspace may have other unforeseen reasons to
setup its own shadow stacks using the WRSS instruction. Towards this
provide a flag so that stacks can be optionally setup securely for the
common case of ucontext without enabling WRSS. Or potentially have the
kernel set up the shadow stack in some new way.

The following example demonstrates how to create a new shadow stack with
map_shadow_stack:
void *shstk = map_shadow_stack(addr, stack_size, SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN);

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-35-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com

This registers the new fchmodat2 syscall in most places as nuber 452,
with alpha being the exception where it's 562.  I found all these sites
by grepping for fspick, which I assume has found me everything.

Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Message-Id: <a677d521f048e4ca439e7080a5328f21eb8e960e.1689092120.git.legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

The rewrite of ret_from_form() misplaced an unwind hint which caused
all kthread stack unwinds to be marked unreliable, breaking
livepatching.

Restore the annotation and add a comment to explain the how and why of
things.

Fixes: 3aec4ecb3d1f ("x86: Rewrite ret_from_fork() in C")
Reported-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230719201538.GA3553016@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net

When kCFI is enabled, special handling is needed for the indirect call
to the kernel thread function.  Rewrite the ret_from_fork() function in
C so that the compiler can properly handle the indirect call.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230623225529.34590-3-brgerst@gmail.com

The unwinder expects a return address at the very top of the kernel
stack just below pt_regs and before any stack frame is created.  Instead
of calling a wrapper, set up a return address as if ret_from_fork()
was called from the syscall entry code.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230623225529.34590-2-brgerst@gmail.com

Pull mm updates from Andrew Morton:

 - Yosry Ahmed brought back some cgroup v1 stats in OOM logs

 - Yosry has also eliminated cgroup's atomic rstat flushing

 - Nhat Pham adds the new cachestat() syscall. It provides userspace
   with the ability to query pagecache status - a similar concept to
   mincore() but more powerful and with improved usability

 - Mel Gorman provides more optimizations for compaction, reducing the
   prevalence of page rescanning

 - Lorenzo Stoakes has done some maintanance work on the
   get_user_pages() interface

 - Liam Howlett continues with cleanups and maintenance work to the
   maple tree code. Peng Zhang also does some work on maple tree

 - Johannes Weiner has done some cleanup work on the compaction code

 - David Hildenbrand has contributed additional selftests for
   get_user_pages()

 - Thomas Gleixner has contributed some maintenance and optimization
   work for the vmalloc code

 - Baolin Wang has provided some compaction cleanups,

 - SeongJae Park continues maintenance work on the DAMON code

 - Huang Ying has done some maintenance on the swap code's usage of
   device refcounting

 - Christoph Hellwig has some cleanups for the filemap/directio code

 - Ryan Roberts provides two patch series which yield some
   rationalization of the kernel's access to pte entries - use the
   provided APIs rather than open-coding accesses

 - Lorenzo Stoakes has some fixes to the interaction between pagecache
   and directio access to file mappings

 - John Hubbard has a series of fixes to the MM selftesting code

 - ZhangPeng continues the folio conversion campaign

 - Hugh Dickins has been working on the pagetable handling code, mainly
   with a view to reducing the load on the mmap_lock

 - Catalin Marinas has reduced the arm64 kmalloc() minimum alignment
   from 128 to 8

 - Domenico Cerasuolo has improved the zswap reclaim mechanism by
   reorganizing the LRU management

 - Matthew Wilcox provides some fixups to make gfs2 work better with the
   buffer_head code

 - Vishal Moola also has done some folio conversion work

 - Matthew Wilcox has removed the remnants of the pagevec code - their
   functionality is migrated over to struct folio_batch

* tag 'mm-stable-2023-06-24-19-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (380 commits)
  mm/hugetlb: remove hugetlb_set_page_subpool()
  mm: nommu: correct the range of mmap_sem_read_lock in task_mem()
  hugetlb: revert use of page_cache_next_miss()
  Revert "page cache: fix page_cache_next/prev_miss off by one"
  mm/vmscan: fix root proactive reclaim unthrottling unbalanced node
  mm: memcg: rename and document global_reclaim()
  mm: kill [add|del]_page_to_lru_list()
  mm: compaction: convert to use a folio in isolate_migratepages_block()
  mm: zswap: fix double invalidate with exclusive loads
  mm: remove unnecessary pagevec includes
  mm: remove references to pagevec
  mm: rename invalidate_mapping_pagevec to mapping_try_invalidate
  mm: remove struct pagevec
  net: convert sunrpc from pagevec to folio_batch
  i915: convert i915_gpu_error to use a folio_batch
  pagevec: rename fbatch_count()
  mm: remove check_move_unevictable_pages()
  drm: convert drm_gem_put_pages() to use a folio_batch
  i915: convert shmem_sg_free_table() to use a folio_batch
  scatterlist: add sg_set_folio()
  ...