Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-7-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull misc fs updates from Jan Kara:
 "The new quotactl_fd() syscall (remake of quotactl_path() syscall that
  got introduced & disabled in 5.13 cycle), and couple of udf, reiserfs,
  isofs, and writeback fixes and cleanups"

* tag 'fs_for_v5.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
  writeback: fix obtain a reference to a freeing memcg css
  quota: remove unnecessary oom message
  isofs: remove redundant continue statement
  quota: Wire up quotactl_fd syscall
  quota: Change quotactl_path() systcall to an fd-based one
  reiserfs: Remove unneed check in reiserfs_write_full_page()
  udf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in udf_symlink function
  reiserfs: add check for invalid 1st journal block

Pull x86 entry code related updates from Thomas Gleixner:

 - Consolidate the macros for .byte ... opcode sequences

 - Deduplicate register offset defines in include files

 - Simplify the ia32,x32 compat handling of the related syscall tables
   to get rid of #ifdeffery.

 - Clear all EFLAGS which are not required for syscall handling

 - Consolidate the syscall tables and switch the generation over to the
   generic shell script and remove the CFLAGS tweaks which are not
   longer required.

 - Use 'int' type for system call numbers to match the generic code.

 - Add more selftests for syscalls

* tag 'x86-entry-2021-06-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/syscalls: Don't adjust CFLAGS for syscall tables
  x86/syscalls: Remove -Wno-override-init for syscall tables
  x86/uml/syscalls: Remove array index from syscall initializers
  x86/syscalls: Clear 'offset' and 'prefix' in case they are set in env
  x86/entry: Use int everywhere for system call numbers
  x86/entry: Treat out of range and gap system calls the same
  x86/entry/64: Sign-extend system calls on entry to int
  selftests/x86/syscall: Add tests under ptrace to syscall_numbering_64
  selftests/x86/syscall: Simplify message reporting in syscall_numbering
  selftests/x86/syscall: Update and extend syscall_numbering_64
  x86/syscalls: Switch to generic syscallhdr.sh
  x86/syscalls: Use __NR_syscalls instead of __NR_syscall_max
  x86/unistd: Define X32_NR_syscalls only for 64-bit kernel
  x86/syscalls: Stop filling syscall arrays with *_sys_ni_syscall
  x86/syscalls: Switch to generic syscalltbl.sh
  x86/entry/x32: Rename __x32_compat_sys_* to __x64_compat_sys_*

Wire up the quotactl_fd syscall.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

If the environment variable 'prefix' is set on the build host, it is
wrongly used as syscall macro prefixes.

  $ export prefix=/usr
  $ make -s defconfig all
  In file included from ./arch/x86/include/asm/unistd.h:20,
                   from <stdin>:2:
  ./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi/asm/unistd_64.h:4:9: warning: missing whitespace after the macro name
      4 | #define __NR_/usrread 0
        |         ^~~~~

arch/x86/entry/syscalls/Makefile should clear 'offset' and 'prefix'.

Fixes: 3cba325b358f ("x86/syscalls: Switch to generic syscallhdr.sh")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525115420.679416-1-masahiroy@kernel.org

Many architectures duplicate similar shell scripts.

Converts x86 to use scripts/syscallhdr.sh.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517073815.97426-7-masahiroy@kernel.org

__NR_syscall_max is only used by x86 and UML. In contrast, __NR_syscalls is
widely used by all the architectures.

Convert __NR_syscall_max to __NR_syscalls and adjust the usage sites.

This prepares x86 to switch to the generic syscallhdr.sh script.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517073815.97426-6-masahiroy@kernel.org

Many architectures duplicate similar shell scripts.

Convert x86 and UML to use scripts/syscalltbl.sh. The generic script
generates seperate headers for x86/64 and x86/x32 syscalls, while the x86
specific script coalesced them into one. Adjust the code accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517073815.97426-3-masahiroy@kernel.org

In commit fa8b90070a80 ("quota: wire up quotactl_path") we have wired up
new quotactl_path syscall. However some people in LWN discussion have
objected that the path based syscall is missing dirfd and flags argument
which is mostly standard for contemporary path based syscalls. Indeed
they have a point and after a discussion with Christian Brauner and
Sascha Hauer I've decided to disable the syscall for now and update its
API. Since there is no userspace currently using that syscall and it
hasn't been released in any major release, we should be fine.

CC: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
CC: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210512153621.n5u43jsytbik4yze@wittgenstein
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
 "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.

  Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.

  From Mickaël's cover letter:
    "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
     global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
     is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
     sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
     system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
     help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
     behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
     process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
     themselves.

     Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
     syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
     use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
     kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
     sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
     Pledge/Unveil.

     In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
     This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
     series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
     combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
     init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"

  The cover letter and v34 posting is here:

      https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/

  See also:

      https://landlock.io/

  This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
  years"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]

* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
  landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
  samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
  selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
  landlock: Add syscall implementations
  arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
  fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
  landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
  landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
  landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
  landlock: Add object management