The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) and start a
SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side implementation. If any of
these features are enabled without it, the behavior of the SNP guest will be
undefined.  It may fail booting in a non-obvious way making it difficult to
debug.

Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly later,
detect this early and fail gracefully.

The SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled.  While
booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled features have guest
side implementation. In case a feature is not implemented in the guest, the
guest terminates booting with GHCB protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination
request event, see "SEV-ES Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization"
document (currently at https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf),
section "Termination Request".

Populate SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor can
easily report to the user.

More details in the AMD64 APM Vol 2, Section "SEV_STATUS MSR".

  [ bp:
    - Massage.
    - Move snp_check_features() call to C code.
    Note: the CC:stable@ aspect here is to be able to protect older, stable
    kernels when running on newer hypervisors. Or not "running" but fail
    reliably and in a well-defined manner instead of randomly. ]

Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support")
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118061943.534309-1-nikunj@amd.com

Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add the call depth tracking mitigation for Retbleed which has been
   long in the making. It is a lighterweight software-only fix for
   Skylake-based cores where enabling IBRS is a big hammer and causes a
   significant performance impact.

   What it basically does is, it aligns all kernel functions to 16 bytes
   boundary and adds a 16-byte padding before the function, objtool
   collects all functions' locations and when the mitigation gets
   applied, it patches a call accounting thunk which is used to track
   the call depth of the stack at any time.

   When that call depth reaches a magical, microarchitecture-specific
   value for the Return Stack Buffer, the code stuffs that RSB and
   avoids its underflow which could otherwise lead to the Intel variant
   of Retbleed.

   This software-only solution brings a lot of the lost performance
   back, as benchmarks suggest:

       https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220915111039.092790446@infradead.org/

   That page above also contains a lot more detailed explanation of the
   whole mechanism

 - Implement a new control flow integrity scheme called FineIBT which is
   based on the software kCFI implementation and uses hardware IBT
   support where present to annotate and track indirect branches using a
   hash to validate them

 - Other misc fixes and cleanups

* tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (80 commits)
  x86/paravirt: Use common macro for creating simple asm paravirt functions
  x86/paravirt: Remove clobber bitmask from .parainstructions
  x86/debug: Include percpu.h in debugreg.h to get DECLARE_PER_CPU() et al
  x86/cpufeatures: Move X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH from bit 18 to bit 19 of word 11, to leave space for WIP X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA bit
  x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default
  x86,pm: Force out-of-line memcpy()
  objtool: Fix weak hole vs prefix symbol
  objtool: Optimize elf_dirty_reloc_sym()
  x86/cfi: Add boot time hash randomization
  x86/cfi: Boot time selection of CFI scheme
  x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT
  objtool: Add --cfi to generate the .cfi_sites section
  x86: Add prefix symbols for function padding
  objtool: Add option to generate prefix symbols
  objtool: Avoid O(bloody terrible) behaviour -- an ode to libelf
  objtool: Slice up elf_create_section_symbol()
  kallsyms: Revert "Take callthunks into account"
  x86: Unconfuse CONFIG_ and X86_FEATURE_ namespaces
  x86/retpoline: Fix crash printing warning
  x86/paravirt: Fix a !PARAVIRT build warning
  ...

Pull kernel hardening updates from Kees Cook:

 - Convert flexible array members, fix -Wstringop-overflow warnings, and
   fix KCFI function type mismatches that went ignored by maintainers
   (Gustavo A. R. Silva, Nathan Chancellor, Kees Cook)

 - Remove the remaining side-effect users of ksize() by converting
   dma-buf, btrfs, and coredump to using kmalloc_size_roundup(), add
   more __alloc_size attributes, and introduce full testing of all
   allocator functions. Finally remove the ksize() side-effect so that
   each allocation-aware checker can finally behave without exceptions

 - Introduce oops_limit (default 10,000) and warn_limit (default off) to
   provide greater granularity of control for panic_on_oops and
   panic_on_warn (Jann Horn, Kees Cook)

 - Introduce overflows_type() and castable_to_type() helpers for cleaner
   overflow checking

 - Improve code generation for strscpy() and update str*() kern-doc

 - Convert strscpy and sigphash tests to KUnit, and expand memcpy tests

 - Always use a non-NULL argument for prepare_kernel_cred()

 - Disable structleak plugin in FORTIFY KUnit test (Anders Roxell)

 - Adjust orphan linker section checking to respect CONFIG_WERROR (Xin
   Li)

 - Make sure siginfo is cleared for forced SIGKILL (haifeng.xu)

 - Fix um vs FORTIFY warnings for always-NULL arguments

* tag 'hardening-v6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (31 commits)
  ksmbd: replace one-element arrays with flexible-array members
  hpet: Replace one-element array with flexible-array member
  um: virt-pci: Avoid GCC non-NULL warning
  signal: Initialize the info in ksignal
  lib: fortify_kunit: build without structleak plugin
  panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs
  panic: Introduce warn_limit
  panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks
  exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled
  exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs
  exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops
  panic: Separate sysctl logic from CONFIG_SMP
  mm/pgtable: Fix multiple -Wstringop-overflow warnings
  mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function
  kunit/fortify: Validate __alloc_size attribute results
  drm/sti: Fix return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid()
  drm/fsl-dcu: Fix return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid()
  driver core: Add __alloc_size hint to devm allocators
  overflow: Introduce overflows_type() and castable_to_type()
  coredump: Proactively round up to kmalloc bucket size
  ...

Pull x86 boot updates from Borislav Petkov:
 "A  of early boot cleanups and fixes.

   - Do some spring cleaning to the compressed boot code by moving the
     EFI mixed-mode code to a separate compilation unit, the AMD memory
     encryption early code where it belongs and fixing up build
     dependencies. Make the deprecated EFI handover protocol optional
     with the goal of removing it at some point (Ard Biesheuvel)

   - Skip realmode init code on Xen PV guests as it is not needed there

   - Remove an old 32-bit PIC code compiler workaround"

* tag 'x86_boot_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/boot: Remove x86_32 PIC using %ebx workaround
  x86/boot: Skip realmode init code when running as Xen PV guest
  x86/efi: Make the deprecated EFI handover protocol optional
  x86/boot/compressed: Only build mem_encrypt.S if AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y
  x86/boot/compressed: Adhere to calling convention in get_sev_encryption_bit()
  x86/boot/compressed: Move startup32_check_sev_cbit() out of head_64.S
  x86/boot/compressed: Move startup32_check_sev_cbit() into .text
  x86/boot/compressed: Move startup32_load_idt() out of head_64.S
  x86/boot/compressed: Move startup32_load_idt() into .text section
  x86/boot/compressed: Pull global variable reference into startup32_load_idt()
  x86/boot/compressed: Avoid touching ECX in startup32_set_idt_entry()
  x86/boot/compressed: Simplify IDT/GDT preserve/restore in the EFI thunk
  x86/boot/compressed, efi: Merge multiple definitions of image_offset into one
  x86/boot/compressed: Move efi32_pe_entry() out of head_64.S
  x86/boot/compressed: Move efi32_entry out of head_64.S
  x86/boot/compressed: Move efi32_pe_entry into .text section
  x86/boot/compressed: Move bootargs parsing out of 32-bit startup code
  x86/boot/compressed: Move 32-bit entrypoint code into .text section
  x86/boot/compressed: Rename efi_thunk_64.S to efi-mixed.S

Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
 "Another fairly sizable pull request, by EFI subsystem standards.

  Most of the work was done by me, some of it in collaboration with the
  distro and bootloader folks (GRUB, systemd-boot), where the main focus
  has been on removing pointless per-arch differences in the way EFI
  boots a Linux kernel.

   - Refactor the zboot code so that it incorporates all the EFI stub
     logic, rather than calling the decompressed kernel as a EFI app.

   - Add support for initrd= command line option to x86 mixed mode.

   - Allow initrd= to be used with arbitrary EFI accessible file systems
     instead of just the one the kernel itself was loaded from.

   - Move some x86-only handling and manipulation of the EFI memory map
     into arch/x86, as it is not used anywhere else.

   - More flexible handling of any random seeds provided by the boot
     environment (i.e., systemd-boot) so that it becomes available much
     earlier during the boot.

   - Allow improved arch-agnostic EFI support in loaders, by setting a
     uniform baseline of supported features, and adding a generic magic
     number to the DOS/PE header. This should allow loaders such as GRUB
     or systemd-boot to reduce the amount of arch-specific handling
     substantially.

   - (arm64) Run EFI runtime services from a dedicated stack, and use it
     to recover from synchronous exceptions that might occur in the
     firmware code.

   - (arm64) Ensure that we don't allocate memory outside of the 48-bit
     addressable physical range.

   - Make EFI pstore record size configurable

   - Add support for decoding CXL specific CPER records"

* tag 'efi-next-for-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi: (43 commits)
  arm64: efi: Recover from synchronous exceptions occurring in firmware
  arm64: efi: Execute runtime services from a dedicated stack
  arm64: efi: Limit allocations to 48-bit addressable physical region
  efi: Put Linux specific magic number in the DOS header
  efi: libstub: Always enable initrd command line loader and bump version
  efi: stub: use random seed from EFI variable
  efi: vars: prohibit reading random seed variables
  efi: random: combine bootloader provided RNG seed with RNG protocol output
  efi/cper, cxl: Decode CXL Error Log
  efi/cper, cxl: Decode CXL Protocol Error Section
  efi: libstub: fix efi_load_initrd_dev_path() kernel-doc comment
  efi: x86: Move EFI runtime map sysfs code to arch/x86
  efi: runtime-maps: Clarify purpose and enable by default for kexec
  efi: pstore: Add module parameter for setting the record size
  efi: xen: Set EFI_PARAVIRT for Xen dom0 boot on all architectures
  efi: memmap: Move manipulation routines into x86 arch tree
  efi: memmap: Move EFI fake memmap support into x86 arch tree
  efi: libstub: Undeprecate the command line initrd loader
  efi: libstub: Add mixed mode support to command line initrd loader
  efi: libstub: Permit mixed mode return types other than efi_status_t
  ...

The EFI handover protocol permits a bootloader to invoke the kernel as a
EFI PE/COFF application, while passing a bootparams struct as a third
argument to the entrypoint function call.

This has no basis in the UEFI specification, and there are better ways
to pass additional data to a UEFI application (UEFI configuration
tables, UEFI variables, UEFI protocols) than going around the
StartImage() boot service and jumping to a fixed offset in the loaded
image, just to call a different function that takes a third parameter.

The reason for handling struct bootparams in the bootloader was that the
EFI stub could only load initrd images from the EFI system partition,
and so passing it via struct bootparams was needed for loaders like
GRUB, which pass the initrd in memory, and may load it from anywhere,
including from the network. Another motivation was EFI mixed mode, which
could not use the initrd loader in the EFI stub at all due to 32/64 bit
incompatibilities (which will be fixed shortly [0]), and could not
invoke the ordinary PE/COFF entry point either, for the same reasons.

Given that loaders such as GRUB already carried the bootparams handling
in order to implement non-EFI boot, retaining that code and just passing
bootparams to the EFI stub was a reasonable choice (although defining an
alternate entrypoint could have been avoided.) However, the GRUB side
changes never made it upstream, and are only shipped by some of the
distros in their downstream versions.

In the meantime, EFI support has been added to other Linux architecture
ports, as well as to U-boot and systemd, including arch-agnostic methods
for passing initrd images in memory [1], and for doing mixed mode boot
[2], none of them requiring anything like the EFI handover protocol. So
given that only out-of-tree distro GRUB relies on this, let's permit it
to be omitted from the build, in preparation for retiring it completely
at a later date. (Note that systemd-boot does have an implementation as
well, but only uses it as a fallback for booting images that do not
implement the LoadFile2 based initrd loading method, i.e., v5.8 or older)

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220927085842.2860715-1-ardb@kernel.org/
[1] ec93fc371f01 ("efi/libstub: Add support for loading the initrd from a device path")
[2] 97aa276579b2 ("efi/x86: Add true mixed mode entry point into .compat section")

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221122161017.2426828-18-ardb@kernel.org

Avoid building the mem_encrypt.o object if memory encryption support is
not enabled to begin with.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221122161017.2426828-17-ardb@kernel.org

Make get_sev_encryption_bit() follow the ordinary i386 calling
convention, and only call it if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is actually
enabled. This clarifies the calling code, and makes it more
maintainable.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221122161017.2426828-16-ardb@kernel.org

Now that the startup32_check_sev_cbit() routine can execute from
anywhere and behaves like an ordinary function, it can be moved where it
belongs.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221122161017.2426828-15-ardb@kernel.org

Move startup32_check_sev_cbit() into the .text section and turn it into
an ordinary function using the ordinary 32-bit calling convention,
instead of saving/restoring the registers that are known to be live at
the only call site. This improves maintainability, and makes it possible
to move this function out of head_64.S and into a separate compilation
unit that is specific to memory encryption.

Note that this requires the call site to be moved before the mixed mode
check, as %eax will be live otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221122161017.2426828-14-ardb@kernel.org